# GURCHARAN PRASAD & ORS v. P. KRISHNANAND GIRi & ANR. ETC

- **Citation:** [1968] 2 S.C.R. 600
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1967-12-13
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 212 to 216 of 1965
- **Bench:** R. S. BAtHAWAT, G. K. Mitter
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/gurcharan-prasad-ors-v-p-krishnanand-giri-anr-etc-4246
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Hindu Law--£ndowment-Mchanti of
math
carrying on ntOMYlending business, acquiring and disposing of properties-Properties how far
personal-Religious head wheat her can own personal property.
The successive Mahants of Uttar Giri Math in Benaras acquired properties and made dispositions of properties to their disciples who succeeded them. The incumbent of the office of Mahant in 1904 entered into a marriage against the custom of the brotherhood.
One of his collatcrab th~
upon filed a suit in wh.ich be claimed to be put in possession of the properties of the Math, also challenging some of the dispositions of properly made by the Mahall!. 1lle defendants contended that all the properties in question did nvt belong to the Math and that the properties lra1':>·
ferred were the personal properties of the Mahan!. Toe trial Coun held
that the transferred propcnies were the personal prope1 lies of the Mahan!
and his predecessors and that only 12 items of property were endowed
properties.
In appeal the High Court held that all the i:ems of property
were personal property.
In further appeal this O:>urt held that the building in which the brotherhood resided was certainly Math property; as to
other properties the case was remanded to the High Court fOr detcrminiog whether they were personal properties or endowment properties. 'The
High Court, noting this Court's view that at least some properties mwt
belong to the Math, observed :
"Jn view of this finding of the Supreme
Cour the fact that the evidence on the record docs not expressly indicate which property belonged to the Math and which did not. should lead
to the conclusion that all the property belongs to the Math.
Proper!y
acquired by a Mahan! personally but blended with the Math property will
it.<elf become Math property."
On this view the High Court dismWed
the appeal. The defendants c..me to this Court.
HELD : The High Court fell into an error in holding that the obsttvations of this Court in the earlier appeal led to the conclusion that all the property belonged to the M:r.h becaUSe the evidence on record did not expressly indicate which P"'perty belonged to the Math and which did not.
If such had beep the intention of the learned Judges bearing the appeal
they would have clearly said so. (607 G-H]
On the facts of the case it was not possible to hold that the Mahants
blended their self-acquired and personal property with Math property •o
as to make the '-'"·hole partake of the charac!cr of the latter class of pro·
peny. The Mahants had systematically pursued a money-lending business, had tran-;fcrred properties to others in recognition of the claims of
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GURCHARAN v. KRISHNANAND (Mitter, J.)
601
the disciples or voluntarily for lawful consideration and were describing
themselves in the Tamliknamas as the absolute owners of the property.
[607 H; 609 GH]
On an examination of the evidence only 15 items of property including
the main building in which the Math was situated were Math property.
About the res: of the property it could not be said that it was not the
pcraonal property of the Mahan!. The transfers of such property by the
latter could not therefore be challenged. [608 OC; 609 HJ
The fact that the successive Mahant.s had renounced the world and
became sanyasis and had almost uniformly nominated the person who was
IO succeed them from out of the disciples or disciples of disciples does
not le.ct to the conclusion that the properties must be treated as Math
properties. [608 CJ
Parama Nand v.
Nihal Chand, 65 I.A. 252 and Raghbir Laia v.
Mohammad Said, A.LR. 1943 P.C. 7, relied on.

## Text

600
GURCHARAN PRASAD & ORS.
v.
P. KRISHNANAND GIRi & ANR. ETC.
December 13, 1967
[R. S. BAtHAWAT AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]
Hindu Law--£ndowment-Mchanti of
math
carrying on ntOMYlending business, acquiring and disposing of properties-Properties how far
personal-Religious head wheat her can own personal property.
The successive Mahants of Uttar Giri Math in Benaras acquired properties and made dispositions of properties to their disciples who succeeded them. The incumbent of the office of Mahant in 1904 entered into a marriage against the custom of the brotherhood.
One of his collatcrab th~
upon filed a suit in wh.ich be claimed to be put in possession of the properties of the Math, also challenging some of the dispositions of properly made by the Mahall!. 1lle defendants contended that all the properties in question did nvt belong to the Math and that the properties lra1':>·
ferred were the personal properties of the Mahan!. Toe trial Coun held
that the transferred propcnies were the personal prope1 lies of the Mahan!
and his predecessors and that only 12 items of property were endowed
properties.
In appeal the High Court held that all the i:ems of property
were personal property.
In further appeal this O:>urt held that the building in which the brotherhood resided was certainly Math property; as to
other properties the case was remanded to the High Court fOr detcrminiog whether they were personal properties or endowment properties. 'The
High Court, noting this Court's view that at least some properties mwt
belong to the Math, observed :
"Jn view of this finding of the Supreme
Cour the fact that the evidence on the record docs not expressly indicate which property belonged to the Math and which did not. should lead
to the conclusion that all the property belongs to the Math.
Proper!y
acquired by a Mahan! personally but blended with the Math property will
it.<elf become Math property."
On this view the High Court dismWed
the appeal. The defendants c..me to this Court.
HELD : The High Court fell into an error in holding that the obsttvations of this Court in the earlier appeal led to the conclusion that all the property belonged to the M:r.h becaUSe the evidence on record did not expressly indicate which P"'perty belonged to the Math and which did not.
If such had beep the intention of the learned Judges bearing the appeal
they would have clearly said so. (607 G-H]
On the facts of the case it was not possible to hold that the Mahants
blended their self-acquired and personal property with Math property •o
as to make the '-'"·hole partake of the charac!cr of the latter class of pro·
peny. The Mahants had systematically pursued a money-lending business, had tran-;fcrred properties to others in recognition of the claims of
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GURCHARAN v. KRISHNANAND (Mitter, J.)
601
the disciples or voluntarily for lawful consideration and were describing
themselves in the Tamliknamas as the absolute owners of the property.
[607 H; 609 GH]
On an examination of the evidence only 15 items of property including
the main building in which the Math was situated were Math property.
About the res: of the property it could not be said that it was not the
pcraonal property of the Mahan!. The transfers of such property by the
latter could not therefore be challenged. [608 OC; 609 HJ
The fact that the successive Mahant.s had renounced the world and
became sanyasis and had almost uniformly nominated the person who was
IO succeed them from out of the disciples or disciples of disciples does
not le.ct to the conclusion that the properties must be treated as Math
properties. [608 CJ
Parama Nand v.
Nihal Chand, 65 I.A. 252 and Raghbir Laia v.
Mohammad Said, A.LR. 1943 P.C. 7, relied on.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 212 to
216 of 1965.
Appeals by certificates/special leave from the judgment and
decree dated September 3, 1965 of the Allahabad High Court in
First Appeals Nos. 523 of 1933, and 557 of 1930.
R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, An/I Kumar Gupra, Shiv
Pujmi
Singh and K. M. K. Nair, for the appellants (In C.A. No. >!12
of 1965).
Yogeshwar Prasad, E. C. Agrawa/a and P. C. Agrawala, for
the appellants (In C.As. Nos. 213 and 214 of 1965).
(T. · N. Kunzru, B.P. Singh and R. R Datar, for the appellant
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(In C. A. No. 215 of 1965), for the respondent (In C.As. Nos,
, 212, '213 and 214 of 1965 and for the respondents (In C.A.
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No. 216 of 1965).
C. B. Agarwala, V. K. Sanghi and K. P. Qupta, for the
appe1lant (In C. A. No. 216 of 1965).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Mitter, J.
Bounded by the river Ganges on the east, in the
locality named Tripura Bhairvi of the temple studded city of
Benaras there stands a math popularly known as Uttam Giri's
Math, the origin of which is lost in antiquity. For well over a
century this Math has been a sanctuary of a spiritual brotherhood
of Nihang Dasnami Sanyasis.
Claim is laid that they belong to
one of the ten orders of Sanyasis founded by the chelas of the
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
['.968] 2 S.C.R.
four disciples of the famous philosopher, Sankaracharya. Starting
probably without any nucleus of endowed immovable property,
the heads of the Math appear to have prospered enormously in
matters material and temporal. Successive heads of the Math or
Mahants as they were commonly known, seem to
have
been
mon: keen about the acquisition of wealth and preservation ol
propenies than about the furtherance of the spiritual benefit o(
the brotherhood.
Gifts in the shape of endowments
seldom
came their way but the Mahants who uniformly
pursued a
money lending business also styled as a banking
business
in
some of the documents, went on amassing wealth and property
treating themselves as full owners thereof and directing tbcir successors almost invariably nominated by their wills, to treat the
property in the same way as they themselves were doing but paying scant regard to the cause of the brotherhood or the pursuit
of any charitable purposes.
One Mayanand Giri became the
Mahant in 1904 and it is his acts and conduct which sparked off
this litigation nearly forty years ago.
The immediate cause of
the legal proceedings was his marriage which led the plaintiff,
Purushottarnanand Giri, to file the suit in the court of the Sul>-
ordinate Judge of Bcnaras claiming a dcclara(ipn that by
Ii.is
marriage, the defendant No. I, Mayanand Giri, had
lost his
right to continue as Mahant and that the plaintiff as his nearest
collateral should, according tq the custom of Nihaog
D'15nami
Sanyasis, be put in occupation and possession of the Math and
the properties appertaining thereto. The plain~iff also challenged
a number of alienations impleading no less than forty five persons as defendants and claiming that the transfers made by
defendant No. I were invalid and not binding on the Mahant of
the Math.
The suit was contested not only by Mayanand Giri
but also by a number of the transferees.
The defences raised
were many and various.
The first defendant pleaded inter alia
that the plaintiff was not his nearest collateral, that there did not
exist a Math with the customs and usages alleged in the plaint
and that all the properties scheduled in the plaint were not the
subject matt.er <tf any endowment.
The case of the transferees was that most of the propcrtie5
were acquired by successive Mahants starting from
Chaitan~a
Giri by the practice of a money lending business.
It was S3ld
that a ·banking firm styled as Uttam Giri Shivdutt Giri
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GURCHARAN v. KRISHNANAND (Mitter, /.)
603
started by his sue<:essors and it was this business which was pursued by the Mahants that gave rise to the wealth accumulated in
the Math. The common defence of all the transferee defendants
who contested· the suit was that Mayanand Giri was the absolute
owner of the properties alienated and that they themselves were
bona fide transferees for valuable cilnsideration and as such the
transactions en'.ered into with them by Mayanand Giri
could
not be challenged.
The suit was dismissed as against a large
number of defendants who were found to be dead at the time
of its institution or because they were not properly brought on
the record in place of the original defendants.
The Subordinate Judge after a protracted hearing came to
the conclusion that the ancient documents on the record, coupled
with the other evidence, established the existenct; of an ancient
Math, that the Mahants from the time of Gangot Gir had been
carrying on a money lending business,
that an
ancestor of
Gangot Gir by name Gomtigir had established a Math on a
humble scale, that Prem Giri, a grand ~iple of Gangot Gir,
established another Math of his own, that Uttam Gir who succeeded Prem Gir had certainly created one and that the predecessois of the defendant, Mayanand Giri like himself had two
kinds of properties, namely, Math property and personal property.
According to the Subordinate Judge the nucleus from which the
Math in suit originated was the personal property of Prem Gir.
On the evidence he held 12 items of property mentioned in the
will of Shivdutt Gir who sue<:eeded Prem Gir and two other
items of property to be endowed properties. The transfers effected by Mayan.and were, ae<:ording to the Subordinate Judge,
beyond challenge because they related only
to his
personal
properties.
Two appeals were filed against the judgment and decree of
the Subordinate Judge, one by the plaintiff and the other by
Mayanand.
The All\iliabad High Court on appeal
dismissed
the suit on the view that there was no Math at all, that there wa.s
only a banking business and that the property was non-religious
personal property acquired by Mayanand and his predecessors
by following a banking business.
A further appeal from
the
Allahabad High Court was disposed of by
this
Court by
a
judgment dated December 20, 1954.
After noting in brief the
604
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 2 S.C.R
conclusions of the Subordin~te Judge and of the Allahabad High
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Coun, it was observed by this Coun that "the ,hort and only
question therefore before us is, whether or not the existence of
the math which is the foundation of the plaintiff's case has been
satisfactorily made out." This Court then proceeded to examine
the principal ancient documents and observed:
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"All the above documents, broadly considered, indicate dcfimtcly-
( I) the existence of a spiritual b~otherhood affiliated to each other by tics of initiation and succcssion,
(2) the existence of a mutt which is the residence
of the brotherhood as well as of the gaddinashin
thereof and which in specific terms has been
successively proYided as being inalienable,
( 3) the existence of certain properties at least from
the date o( death of Sheodat· Gir which were
made specifically inalienable in the hands of his
successors, presumably for the use of the spiritual brotherhood, and
( 4) the existence of a number of items of property
which in terms were dedicated
for
spiritual
uses like Dhannashalas, feeding of ascetcis,
etc. and were designated as waqf:"
This Court then considered the evidence of prior
conduct of
Mayanand Giri himself and certain admissions made by him and
held "that the case of the first defendant denying the existence of
a mutt or of any properties as belonging to it is totally false."
According to this Court :
"it is quite clear that what is n,ow designated as
the mutt No. 42/90-D must have been in existence at
least from the time of Prem, Gir i.e. for over a century and that this item of propeny in the hands of successorc of Prem Gir was subject to the condition of inalienability, expressly provided in Premgir's
Tamliknama, alld impliedly so provided in the will of Sheodat Gir."
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GURCHARAN v. KRISHNANAND (Mitter,/.)
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Further
"notwithstanding that there is· no specific deed of
endowment, the fact that the particular building has
been continuously used as the residence of the brotherhood, and the seat of the head thereof in succession and
the fact that it has been specifically provided as being
inalienable constitute sufficient evidence of dedication
of this building as a mutt."
Examining the evidence further, both oral and documentary,
this Court was not inclined to concur with the view expressed
by the High Court that the evidence did not "disclose the existence at any time of a religious institution or a monastery with
any attempt at religious study or religious teaching but that it
disclosed only banking or money lending business which passed
on from each of its proprietors to his chosen successor." Great
stress was laid on the documents of 1828
and 1839-· to
be
noted in detail hereafter-which did not, according to this Court,
indicate that the ownership given thereby to the successors was
to be for their personal uses and that all the transactions disclosed by these and other documents noticed by the High Court
were inter se between the members of the brotherhood and not
with outsiders.
It was observed that
"The document of 1887 appears to us to clinch
the position by specifically providing that the properties
left by Sheodat Gir were not to be alienable in
the
hands of the successors.
The inalienability impressed
upon by these properties by the then. head of the spiritual
brotherhood can reasonably be presutned to be
only · · ·
for the purpose of spintual brotherhood."
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According to this Court these circumstances should "be nolll1al!y
treated as indicative of the ~eligious character of the property for
the use of the brotherhood.".
The conclusion of this Court (as appearing at page . 607 of
the paper book) wa~ in these terms:-
"We are, therefore, satisfied that the existence of a
mutt as an institution has been clearly made out on · ·
the evidence in this case and that t}le building No. 42/
90-D belongs to and constitutes the mutt and that the
606
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1968] 2 S.C.R.
contrary view is untenable. The only substantial question
in the case is whether and to what extent the properties
in suit belong to this mutt as an institution. Tne learned trial Judge dealt with this question and held only
a few out of the large number of items mentioned ;ii
the plaint ,schedule as
belonging
to the mutt.
The
learned Judges of the High Court did not feel
called
upon to give any finding as to this in the view that
thev had taken.
These appeals will, therefore, have
to zo back to the High Court for further consideration of this question and of other questions left undecided."
Fir.ally it was observed (at p. 610):
"that our judgment concludes the question as
to
whether house No. 42/90-D is· or is not mutt property.
The only substantial questions that remain are as to
which of the other properties in the
plaint schedule
., belong to the mutt and whether such alienations as
relate to mutt properties arc valid and binding on the
1nutt."
This Court further upheld the finding of the Subordinate Judge
in favour of a custom among the Dasnami
Sanyasis of
the
neighbourhood that by reason of his marriage Mayanand had
become a "Patil" and had forfeited the office of Mahantship and
the same community had elected the plaintiff as the Mahant of
the Ma!h at Tripura Bhairavi.
On remand, the High Court examined the ancient documents
once more and after referring to the observations of this Court
quoted above, stated that it had been definitely found
by this
Court that some of the properties in suit must belong to the Math
and went on to add:
"In view of this finding of the Supreme Court the
fact that the evidence on the record does not expressly
indicate which property belonged to the Math
and
which did not, should lead to the conclusion that all
the property belongs to the Math.
Property acquired
by a Mahant personally but blended with the
Math
pmperty wilt itself become Math property. He is competent to endow his property.
Blending it with Math
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GURCHARAN v. KR!SHNANAND (Mitter, •J.)
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property is an indication that he endowed it to the
Math or intended it to be Math prnperty."
According to the High Court:
"It was, therefore, necessary for the defendants to
establish that such and such property was
acquired
not as a Mahant but as an individual and was
also
kl!pt separate from the Math property which the
Mahant was managing."
The High Court then went on to consider the alienations
made by the Mahants who had preceded Mayanand Girl from
time to time and was of the view:
"during this Jong period the brotherhood did purchase properties but hardly transferred any
property
and that this may be either as the properties were not
considered personal anp alienable or as the mahants
had no occasion to transfer property, their income ..
being in excess of expenditure."
The High Court examined the transactions of Mayanand Giri
challenged by the plaintiff and was not satisfied that any enquiry
had been made by the alienees about the necessi.y or the purpose of the math justifying the alienations.
In the result, the
High Court allowed the appeal with costs throughout against
Mayanand Girl and a number of alienees, some of whom only
have come up in appeal.
[His Lordship then examined the documentary evidence in
order to ascertain the character of the property in dispute and
held:]
In our view, the High Court fell into an error in holding that
the observations of this Court Jed to the conclusion that all the
property belonged to the math because the evidence on
the
record did not expressly indicate which property belonged to the
math and which did not. On the facts of this case it is not
possible to hold that the mahants blended their self:acquired and
personal property with math property so as to make the whole
partake of the character of the latter class of property. A Mahant
is undoubtedly competent to endow the property acquired by
him but merely because in the Tamilknamas he makes no dis-
608
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 2 S.C.R.
tinction between property acquired by him personally and property which undoub:edly formed the subject matter of a prior
endowment,
the
personally
acquired
properti~s
cannot
be said to be math property when 1he evidence on record establishes that all the mahants were holding themselves out as absolute owners of the property and were transferring various item;;
of property from time to time albeit to persons
of the same
brotherhood.
On the evidence on record, we are not in a position to hold
that any of the propt'rties o:her than the 15 items above mentioned were math properties.
The fact that the predecessors-ininterest of Mayanand Girl .had renounced the world and became
sanyasis and had almost uniformly nominated the person who
was to succeed them from out of· the disciples or disciples of
disciples, de.cs not lead to the conclusion that
the
properties
must be treated as math properties.
In Paramo Nand v. Nihal
Chand(') the question before the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council was whether an Udasi could acquire private property with his own money or by his exertions and if he did so,
whether it passed on his death to his spiri\ual heir including his
Chela or could be inherited by his natural relaiivcs.
There one
Narain Das had tiled a suit for obtaining an authoritative pronouncement on the character of certain property held by him,
the case of the defendants being 'that Narain Das was no more
than the trustee of an endowment and could be called upon to
furnish details of the nature and purpose of the trust. The High
Court at Lahore had held in favour of the trust, the principal
ground of their judgment being that the properties had descended from Guru to Chela. This was not accepted by the Judicial
Committee and it was observed that:
"t,11.is circumstance (the descent
from
Guru
to
Chela) does not necessarily lead to the con~Jusion that
a property, when acquired by a Mabant, loses its secular character and partakes of a religious character."
In Raghbir Lala v. Mohammad Said(') the plaintiffs' case was
that the land in suit claimed by the defendanLs directly or in-
(t) 6l I.A. 2l2.
(2) A.LR. 1943 P.C.7.
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GURCHARAN v. KR!SHNANAND (Mitter, J.)
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directly undc:r transfers made. in 1915 and 1916 by one Jainandar Kirat were debutter. It was established that one Manindar had purchased the land in the suit but there was no evidence
that having acquired the land Manindar dedicated it to any
Jain institution or religious purpose.
It transpired that he had
solicited subscriptions for the erection of a temple which was not
built and that except for the actual site of the foundations
of
the temple, he had used the rest of his land for his own purposes.
According to the Judicial Committee :
"He appears to have made money by practising
astrology and medicine and
by
lending
moneyoccupations which he added to that
of a
religious
teacher ... · ....... His life and conduct may not have
been in accord with his religious professions as a Jain
ascetic, but in fact he held and managed the ·property
which he had bought and inckW litigated about it, as
if it were his own without any interference or assistance
by the Jain community."
The Judicial Committ~e held on this evidence that the plaintiffs
could not succeed on the ground of dedication by
Manindar.
The Board further observed:
"No doubt if a question arises whether particular
property· acquired by a given individual was acquired
on his own behalf or oil behalf of some other person or
in.stitution with whom or with which he was connected
the circumstance that the individual so acquiring property was a professed ascetic may have some importance. But it is out of question to suppose chat a man's
religious opinions or professions can make him incapable in law of holding property."
In our view, the observations made on the prior occasion by
this Court were only an indication that the circumstance of succession of properties from one Mahant to another had an important bearing on the final conclusion as to the character of
the properties without being a decisive factor in respect ther.:of.
In this case, we find that the Mahants had systematically pursued
a money-lending business, that there was little nucleus of any
endowed property, that during the course of a century and a half
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SUPllBME COURT REPORTS
(1968] 2 S.C.R.
the proved endowments were hardly of any importance, that the
Mahants were transferring properties to others in recognition of
the claims of the disciples or voluntarily for lawful consideration
and were describing themselves in the
Tamliknamas
as
the
absolute owners of the property, we cannot but hold that the
properties in their charge were their personal properties unless it
be established that any particular item of property was the subject matter of an endqwment of a gift for a particular charitable
purpose.
We have already held that only 15 items of property
including premi1cs No. 42/90-D were
math properties.
On
the evidence, we arc not in a position to declare that the other
properties were not personal properties in the hands of Mayanand Giri.
It follows that the transfers of Mayanand Girl of
this class of properties must be upheld so far as they arc subject
matter of the appeals before u>.
G C.
Appeals al/owed.
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