# H. N. Rishbud & lnder Singh v. State oiDelhi, £1955]

- **Citation:** [1964] 3 S.C.R. 88
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/h-n-rishbud-lnder-singh-v-state-oidelhi-1955-3025
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

196!
April 17.
88
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
MUNNA LAL
·v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANOHOO,
and K. C. DAS G.uPTA JJ )
Prwention of Corruption-Investigation by an offic.r not
authorised by the Act-No miscarr·iage of justice-Irregularity,
if vitiates trial· -Sanction obtained to
prosecute four casesJudge split up the four cases into seven-Facts and amounts
involved in the new thi·ee cases same-Sanction if covers "ll the
se1Jen cases-Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947 (fiof 1947),
ss 5, 5A.-Cod• of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898),
... 239.
The appellant was the cashier of the Municipal Board
of Hard war.
He was in charge of the cash and it was his
duty to sec that funds above Rs. 4,000/- were deposited in the
treasury or the Impe1ial Bank. On audit it
was found that
money received by the Board totalling Rs. 52,144/- was not
deposited as required by the rules. On
complaint by the
Chairman of the Board, a Sub.fospector of Police investigated
the case and a case W<tS registered under s. 409 of the Indian
Penal Code.
Rut this case was withdrawn and the accused
discharged on the ground that it was covered by s. 5 (2J
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Thereafter investigation
was conducted by an officer as req dred by s. 5A of the Act.
But this investigation consisted of this that the duly authorised
investigating officer went through the papers of the earlier
investigation and decided to file a
fresh prosecution on the
basis of the ear]ier investigation. Sanccion was obtained for
prosecution under s. 5 (2) of the Act.
Subsequently the four
cases, in which the appellant and his brothN were jointly
charged were split up into 7 cases.
In the three new cases
only the appellant was tried. The
Trial Judge found the
appellant guiltv under s. 5 (2) read with s. 5.(1) of the Act
and sentcncPd him rn undergo imprisonment and to pay fine.
On appeal to the High Court, it upheld the conviction but
reduced the sentence and set aside the sentence of fine.
The
appellant appealed to this Court with special leave.
,
The following points were urg<d
in the appeal before
this Court.
Firstly, it was urged that the investigation W'!S
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME· COURT, REPORTS,.
89
irregular ind not in., accordance with s. 5A of the Act in as
much as the investigation 'was not conducted by a' 'person
authorised by that section. Secondly, it wa• contended that
sanction was ; obtained
only
for
the
first ; four
cases
and no sanction was obtained for the 'three new cases (after
splitting up the four) out oC which the present appeals have
arisen.· It was·· further contended that the sanction was not
with respect to s. 5 (1) (c) of the Act
though it was under s.
5 (2) of the Act and therefore it was
insuffiicient to confer
jurisdiction on the Special Judge to, · try · the appellant under
s. 5 (1) (c) read with s. 5 (2) ·of the Act.
·
·
·
Iltld that s. 5A i.s mandatory · and not directory and
an investigation conducted
in violation
thereof is illegal. -
But this illegality will not vitiate . the results. of the trial
unle-ss it is shown that. it has
bro:.ight about a miscarriage '
of justice; neither does it affect the competence or jurisdictionof the court to try the case.
·
'
·
- . · ·
·. '.In the present appeals 'it is nof shown that there. bas
been miscarriage of justice as a result of the illegal inveSiigatiOn·.
H. N. Rishbud & lnder Singh v. State oiDelhi, £1955]
1 S.C.R. 1150 followed.
·
S•ate of Madhy.z Pradesh v. Mubarak Ali [1959]Supp. 2
S.C.R. 201 distinguished,
·
The mer~ fact that in view_ of the provisio~s of s. 239
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the Special Judge
thought it necessary to separate the trial of the appellant
-with respect to certain items for which there was sanction would
not mean that these cases had no sanction behind it. · The
sanction pf the original four cases wou Id cover thes_e three casCs ·
also.
-
-
·
_
The. aiieg~~fons mJ.de ·in the sanction-_ show ~h~t th~
sanctioning authorit

## Text

196!
April 17.
88
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
MUNNA LAL
·v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANOHOO,
and K. C. DAS G.uPTA JJ )
Prwention of Corruption-Investigation by an offic.r not
authorised by the Act-No miscarr·iage of justice-Irregularity,
if vitiates trial· -Sanction obtained to
prosecute four casesJudge split up the four cases into seven-Facts and amounts
involved in the new thi·ee cases same-Sanction if covers "ll the
se1Jen cases-Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947 (fiof 1947),
ss 5, 5A.-Cod• of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898),
... 239.
The appellant was the cashier of the Municipal Board
of Hard war.
He was in charge of the cash and it was his
duty to sec that funds above Rs. 4,000/- were deposited in the
treasury or the Impe1ial Bank. On audit it
was found that
money received by the Board totalling Rs. 52,144/- was not
deposited as required by the rules. On
complaint by the
Chairman of the Board, a Sub.fospector of Police investigated
the case and a case W<tS registered under s. 409 of the Indian
Penal Code.
Rut this case was withdrawn and the accused
discharged on the ground that it was covered by s. 5 (2J
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Thereafter investigation
was conducted by an officer as req dred by s. 5A of the Act.
But this investigation consisted of this that the duly authorised
investigating officer went through the papers of the earlier
investigation and decided to file a
fresh prosecution on the
basis of the ear]ier investigation. Sanccion was obtained for
prosecution under s. 5 (2) of the Act.
Subsequently the four
cases, in which the appellant and his brothN were jointly
charged were split up into 7 cases.
In the three new cases
only the appellant was tried. The
Trial Judge found the
appellant guiltv under s. 5 (2) read with s. 5.(1) of the Act
and sentcncPd him rn undergo imprisonment and to pay fine.
On appeal to the High Court, it upheld the conviction but
reduced the sentence and set aside the sentence of fine.
The
appellant appealed to this Court with special leave.
,
The following points were urg<d
in the appeal before
this Court.
Firstly, it was urged that the investigation W'!S
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME· COURT, REPORTS,.
89
irregular ind not in., accordance with s. 5A of the Act in as
much as the investigation 'was not conducted by a' 'person
authorised by that section. Secondly, it wa• contended that
sanction was ; obtained
only
for
the
first ; four
cases
and no sanction was obtained for the 'three new cases (after
splitting up the four) out oC which the present appeals have
arisen.· It was·· further contended that the sanction was not
with respect to s. 5 (1) (c) of the Act
though it was under s.
5 (2) of the Act and therefore it was
insuffiicient to confer
jurisdiction on the Special Judge to, · try · the appellant under
s. 5 (1) (c) read with s. 5 (2) ·of the Act.
·
·
·
Iltld that s. 5A i.s mandatory · and not directory and
an investigation conducted
in violation
thereof is illegal. -
But this illegality will not vitiate . the results. of the trial
unle-ss it is shown that. it has
bro:.ight about a miscarriage '
of justice; neither does it affect the competence or jurisdictionof the court to try the case.
·
'
·
- . · ·
·. '.In the present appeals 'it is nof shown that there. bas
been miscarriage of justice as a result of the illegal inveSiigatiOn·.
H. N. Rishbud & lnder Singh v. State oiDelhi, £1955]
1 S.C.R. 1150 followed.
·
S•ate of Madhy.z Pradesh v. Mubarak Ali [1959]Supp. 2
S.C.R. 201 distinguished,
·
The mer~ fact that in view_ of the provisio~s of s. 239
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the Special Judge
thought it necessary to separate the trial of the appellant
-with respect to certain items for which there was sanction would
not mean that these cases had no sanction behind it. · The
sanction pf the original four cases wou Id cover thes_e three casCs ·
also.
-
-
·
_
The. aiieg~~fons mJ.de ·in the sanction-_ show ~h~t th~
sanctioning authority had s.·5 (1) (c) in mind because the san·
ction speaks of misappropfiation and embezzlement of the money
of the BOard and misappropriation and· embezzlement. is only
to be found ins. 5 (I) (c). As the words of the sanction stand.
they would cover_ a case of mi!'iappropriation
or conversion to
. his own case by the ·appellant himself . or by alJowing others
to do so. The sanction is sufficient for
the purpose of giving·
jurisdiction to the Special Juige to
take cognizance of the
cases out of which. the present appeals have aris~n.
'
/''
'
'
"
'
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JirnrsnICTION: Criminal
Aj?peal Nos. 102·104 of 196~,
'
'
1963
·---
Mun .. l.41
••
Stall of Uttar
fra<fejh ·
/
. ,
.-.
'
/
1961
M11mu1 Lal
v.
St1.te of Utta'
Pr,.Jesh
Wane/too J,
90
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment
and order dated December 21, 1960 of the Allahabad
High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 737, 738 and
744of1960.
Frank Anthony and P. C. Agarwal,a, for the
appellant.
G. C. ~Mathur and C. P. Lal, for the respondent.
1963. April 17. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
WANOHOO ].-These are three appeals by
special leave against the judgment of the Allahabad
High Court. It will be convenient to dispose them
of together, though they arise out of three different
trials before the Special Judge, Saharanpur under
s. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, No. 2
of 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), as the
appellant is the same in all the appeals.
1'he brief facts necessary for present purposes
are these.
Munnalal was the cashier of the Municipal Board of Hardwar and had been working as
such since 1932.
He was in-charge of the cash and
it was his duty to see that whenever the funds in his
possession exceeded Rs. 4,000/~ they Were deposited
in the treasury or the Imperial Bank at Roorkee.
In 1949 there was an audit of the accounts of the
Board and on May 24, 1949, the auditor found that
the money received by the Board from April 20, 1949,
to May 23, 1949, totalling Rs. 52,144/- had not been
deposited in the treasury or the Imperial Bank at
Roorkee. The matter was then reported to the Chairman of the Board, who called Munnalal and took
his explanation as to the alleged embezzlement. It
is said that the appellant admitted that he had spent
some of the money in the marriage of his daughter
and some was used in his shop and Rs. 10,000/ to
Rs. 11,000/- had been given to the Executive Officer
iμiq the re!llainder was at his house. The appellant
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
91
was asked to make good the loss immediately but
failed to do so. Thereupon the appellant was suspended and the matter was handed over to the police
for investigation.
The police registered a case under s. 409 of
the Indian Penal Code and after investigation
prosecuted the Executive Officer as well as the
appellant and his brother who was the Assistant
Cashier at the relevant time. The case was transferred
by the High Court to a magistrate in Meerut; but
that case was not proceeded with as an application
was made to withdraw it on the ground that the case
was covered by s. 5 (2) of the Act. So the magistrate
discharged the three accused of that case. Thereafter necessary sanction was given for prosecution
under s. 5 (2) of the Act and four prosecutions were
launched against the appellant and his brother. The
Special Judge, however, took the view that the joint
trial of the appellant and his brothers was not possible
with respect to some of the moneys said to have been
embezzled. He therefore ordered that there should
be three separate trials of the appellant alone with
respect to certain moneys in addition to the four
trials of the appellant and his brother with respect
to the remainder.
That is how seven trials took
place. In the present appeals we are not concerned
with the other accused, namely, the brother of the
appellant, as he was acquitted. We are also notconcerned with four of the trials; we are only concerned with three trials with respect to three sums of
money in these three appeals. Appeal No. 102 is
concerned with a sum of Rs. 1623/4/-, received
between April 14, 1949 and May 23, 1949 and not
accounted for; appeal No. 103 is concerned with a
sum of Rs. 96ll-9-6 received between April 20, 1949
and May 24, 1949 and not accounted for; and appeal .
No. 104 is concerned with a sum of Rs. 43087/-/3
received between April 20, 1949 and May 24, 1949
1111d not accounted for.
1963
Mutmll Lid
v.
St1t11 of Utlor
Pr•desh
Wano\,. J,
1963
Mun11a Lal -
v.
Stat1 of Uttar
Pradesh
fYanchoo J.
92
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]VOL.
Tile case of the prosecution was that these sums
were received by the appellant during the period
mentioned above and had not been deposited either
in the treasury or in the Imperial Bank at Roorkee
as required by the rules. The appellant practically
admitted the receipt of the money except' a few items
which were also found by the Special Judge to have
been received by him.
He also admitted that his
duty was to deposit any sums above Rs. 4,000/- in
the Imperial Bank or the treasury at Roorkee.
He
was however inconsistent in his defence as to what he
did with the moneys which he had undoubtedly
received.
He first tried to prove that he had deposited the amounts. In the
alternative his case was
that a practice had been prevailing for many years in
the office of the Board under which the Executive
Officer and other employees of the Board •.1sed to take
advances from the cashier from time to
time by
sending slips and the cashier was utilised as a banker
for all officers and servants of the Board, including
the Executive Officer.
Though these sums were
supposed to be returned to the cashier (appellant) in
the beginning of the next month when pay was drawn
by
those
who
had taken these unauthorised
advances, in actual fact this did not always happen.
The result of these advances which were sometimes
of large amounts was that the money could not be
deposited in the treasury according to the rules as
these advances were being constantly made to the
officers and servants of "the Board. The appellant
therefore contended that he had not converted the
money to his own use and had advanced the same
to the officers and servants of the Board according
to the practice prevalent for a number of years and
that such advances were even made to the highest
officer of the Board, namely, the Executive Officer,
and that the officers all knew of this practice and
also knew that moneys were not being deposited in the
Bank or the treasury at Roorkee as required by
rules.
:l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
93
The Special Judge held on the evidence that
it was proved that the moneys which were the subject
matter of the charge (except for two iccms) had been
received by the appellant. He also held that except
for certain items, the appellant had dishonestly or
fraudulently misappropriated or otherwise converted
to his own use the property entrusted to him or under
his control as a pub] ic servant or allowed any other
person so to do.
He therefore found the appellant
guilty under s. 5 (2) of the Act read withs. 5 (1) (c)
thereof. The Special Judge sentenced the appellant
to five years' rigorous imprisonment in the cases
from which appeals Nos. 102 and 103 arise but ordered the sentences to
run concurrently. He also
sentenced the appellant in the case from which appeal
No. 104 arises to five years' rigorous imprisonment
and a fine of Rs. 42,0UO/-.
The sentence in this case
was apparently not made concurrent.
The appellant filed three appeals before the
High Court which were heard together.
The High
Court agreed with the conclusions of the Special
Judge and upheld the conviction of the appellant
in the three cases. In view however of the practice
to which reference has been made above and which
was proved to the hilt and in view also of the fact
that these cases had taken almost 11 years to be
disposed of, the High Court reduced the sentences
in the thFee cases to two years' rigorous imprisonment
and made them all concurrent. It also set aside. the sentence of fine as it was of the view that though the appellant was guilty he had not converted the money to
his own use but had advanced most of it to the officers
and servants of the Board. The present appeals by
special leave are against these judgments of the High
Court in the three appeals.
Two points have been urged on behalf of the
appellant and it is said that in view of those points
the trial was illegal and should be quashed. In the
first place it is urged that the investigation was
J96J
Munni ltzl
v.
Stat1 of Uttar
Pradesh.
Wanchoo J,
196S
A1u':'na Lal
v.
Stst11 ef Ultar
Pradesh
Wanchoo J.
94
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
irregular and not in accordance with s. 5A of the
Act. Section 5A lays down that no police officer
below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police
shall investigate ·any offence punishable under the
Act outside the presidency towns without the order
of a magistrate of the first class. What happened
in this case was that originally the entire investigation was done by a sub-inspector of police and thereafter the case under ss. 409/406 of the Indian Penal
Code was instituted ag:i.inst the appellant, his brother
and the Executive Officer.
That· case was later
withdrawn and it was thereafter that sanction was
granted for the prosecution of the appellant and his
brother under s. 5 (2) of the Act and investigation
was made as required by s. 5·A. But the evidence
shows that this investigation merely consisted of this
that the duly authorised investigating officer went
through the papers of the earlier investigation and
decided to file four prosecutions as already indicated
on the basis of the earlier investigation, It does
appears from these facts that though the letter of
s. 5A of the Act was complied ·with its spirit was not,
for in reality there was no investigation by the officer
authorised
under that
section
and the real
investigation was by a sub-inspector of police
who was never
authorised.
In H. N. Rishbud
&
Ind.er
Singh v. The State of Delhi ('), this
Court held that "s. 5A is mandatory and not
directory and an investigation conducted in violation
thereof is illegal". This Court further held that "if
cognizanc_e is in afct taken on a police report in
breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation, the results which follow cannot be set aside
unless the illegality in the investigation can be
shown to have brought about a miscarriage . of
justice". It was further held that "an illegality
committed in the course of an investigation does not
affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the
court for trial and where cognizance of the case has
in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to
(I) [1955] I S, C. R. 1150.
--
...
--·-J·
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
95
termination the invalidity of the preceding investigation does not vitiate the result unless miscarriage of
justice has been caused thereby". In view of this
decision, even if there was irregularity in the investigation ands. 5A was not complied with in substance,
the trials cannot be held to be illegal unless it is
shown that miscarriage of justice has been caused on
account of the illegal investigation. Learned counsel
for the appellant has been unable to show us how
there was any miscarriage of justice in these cases at
all due to the irregular investigation.
As a matter of
fact on the alternative case put forward by the
appellant, the substance of the prosecution case was
practically admitted by him and he merely pleaded
certain mitigating circumstances. Learned counsel
for the appellant however drew our attention to
the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mubarak Ali. (')
In that case an objection was taken before the trial
began before the :Special Judge that the investigation
had been carried on in breach of s. 5A of the Act.
The matter went before the High Court and it
directed that in order to rectify the defect and cure
the illegality in the investigation, the Special Judge
should have ordered the Duputy Superintendent
of Police to carry on the investigation himself while
the case remained pending in the court of the Special
Judge. That order of the High Court was brought in
appeal to this Court, and the appeal was dismissed .
This case in our opinion is of no assistance to the
appellant, for there the objection was taken at the
earliest stage before the trial began and it was in those
circumstances that the trial was stayed till proper
investigation was completed and a proper report
made thereafter for the prosecution of the accused of
that case. In the present cases no objection was
taken at the trial when it began and it was allowed
to come to an end. In these circumstances the
ratio of Mubarakali's case (1) cannot apply and the
decision in Rishbud' s case (') would apply. The
appellant therefore cannot say that the trial was
(I) (1959) Supp. 2 s. c. R. 201.
(2) (1955) 1 s. c. R, mo.
I~6J
Munn• Ltl
v.
St•t1 oj UUar
P1aiu•
Wa11eAoo J.
·1963
A1tmn1 [,al
..
fJtat1 oj .Uttor
Pradesh
Wanchoo· J.
l!!l
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] vot.
vitiated unless he can show that any prejudice was
caused to him on account of the illegal or irregular
investigation. We have already remarked that no
such thing has been shown in this case ; nor was it
possible to show any such thing in view of the
alternative defence taken by the
appelJant. We
therefore reject. this contention.
The next contention that has been urged is
that there was no proper sanction in these 'cases and
this is based on the fact that only four cases were
filed before the Special Judge with of course proper
sanction ; but these cases were split up into seven
and the argument is that there was no sanction for
the remaining three cases, and two of the present
appeals namely Nos. 102 and 103 are out of these
split-up cases. It is also urged that the sanction
was not with respect to s. 5 (l) (c) of the Act though
it was under s. 5 (2) of the Act and tllerefore it was
insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Special
Judge to try the appellant under s. 5 (I) (c) read
withs. 5 (2). We are of opinion that there is no
force in either of these contentions. It is true that
the Special Judge split up .the four cases before him
into seven ; but it is not disputed that the amounts
involved in the three new cases which the Special
Judge had directed for splitting up due to the
difficulty of joint trial were with respect to amounts
which were included in the four cases filed before
him and with respect to which there was sanction.
The mere fact that in view of the provisions of s. 239
of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Special Judge
thought it necessary to separate the trial of Munnalal with respect to certain items for which there Was
sanction would not mean that these cases which were
directed by the Special Judge to be split up for that
reason had no sanction behind it. The sanction
of the original four case3 would cover these three
cases also which were split out of the original four
cases.
['
-
..
:i S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT RhPORTS
97
As to the argument that there was no sanction
for prosecution under s. 5 (1) (c), it is clear that there
is no force in it. The sanction says that the appellant had received money and mfoappropriated it by
not crediting the same into the treasury and embezzled it and was therefore guilty of criminal misconduct
and liable to prosecution under ss. 409/406 and
s. 5 (2) of the Act. The allegations made clearly
show that the sanctioning authority had s. 5 (I) (c)
in mind because the sanction speaks of misappropriation and embezzlement of the moneys of the Board
and misappropriation and embezzlement is only to
be found ins. 5 (1) (c).
It is argued however that
s. 5 (I) (c) speaks of misappropriation or otherwise
conversion to his own use any property entrusted to
him or under his control by a public servant for himself. It aLo speaks of a public servant allowing
any other person to do so.
But the sanction seems
to show as if the appellant was to be prosecuted
for converting the property to his own use. There
is in our opinion no substance in this argument, for
the sanction speaks of misappropriation and embezzlement and there is nothing in the words to imply that
this was only with reference to conversion by the
appellant to his own
use.
As the words of the
sanction stand they would cover a case of misappropriation or conversion to his own use by the appellant himself or by allowing others to do so.
We are
therefore of opinion that the sanction was sufficient
for the purpose of giving jurisdiction .to the Special
Judge to take cognizance of the cases out of which
these appeals have arisen.
This brings us to the merits of the three appeals.
So far as this is concerned, learned counsel for the
appellant has not urged-and, in our opinion,
rightly--that the convictions are unjustified. The
only question that he has urged is that in view of
the established facts that the appellant was using the
Board's money in order to advance it to the officers
1963
Munna Lnl
v.
St11tt "! [)tllJT
Pr4tleJh
ivani<koo J.
Mumta Lal
••
Stal1 of lltt•r
Pr11,d1,fh
Wom;/afo · J.
98
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964) VOL.
and servant3 of the Board beginning with the highest
officer of the Board, namely, the Executive Officer
and that the evidence as found by the High Court
does not seem to establish that there was any conversion of the moneys by the appellant to his own
use, this is a case in which the appellant was more
sinned against than sinning.
It is conceded that as
the appellant was the cashier it was his dnty in law
to follow the rules with respect to the custody of the
cash of the Board entrusted to him and if he did not
do so he would be guilty. But it is urged that when
the highest officer of the Board, namely, the Executive Officer was himself taking out money from the
funds of the Board by sending slips to the cashier
and other officers and servants of the Board were
doing the same thing and this was well known, presumably also to the Chairman of the Board, it is not
just that the appellant should be made to suffer when
he was obliging the officers and servants of the Board
and might even. have felt compelled to grant the
demands of the Executive Officer and other officers
and servants of the Board, for he was serving under
some of them. We must say that the evidence discloses, a scandalous state of affairs which was allowed
to go on and even the. highest officer of the Board,
namely, the Executive Officer, was cognizant of this
state of affairs and was himself a party to it. The
appellant's case further was that even the Chairman
knew about it and was at times party to it and this
may also be not incorrect. In these circumstances
there is force in the contention on behalf of the
appellant that he was more sinned against than
sin.ning and that the misappropriation took place
because he had to oblige these officers and servants
of the Board or otherwise incur their displeasure
which he could hardly do.
So it is urged on behalf
of the appellant that as he has already been in jail
for more than ten months in the circumstances that
punishment along with the fact that the trial had
been prolonged for eleven years since 1949 should
...
--
..
.. . .
3 S.d.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
99
be sufficient punishment for him. Ordinarily this
Court does not intel'fere in the matter of sentence in
appeals under Art. 136; but we think in the circumstances
di~closed in the present appeals when the
officers and servants of the Board including the highest
officer were behaving as if the moneys of the Board
were their private property and the misappropriation
took place mainly because the appellant was obliging
these officers and servants of the Board, that the
sentence already undergone by the appellant would
meet the ends of justice.
We ought to add that
Mr. Mathur who· appeared for the respondent.
State did not feel justified-and we think rightlyin pressing for the confirmation of the reduced sentence passed by the High Court in appeal. We
therefore dismiss the appeals with the modification
that the sentence in each case is reduced to the period
already undergone. The appellant, if on bail, shall
be discharged from his bail bonds in respect of these
appeals.
Appeals dismissed.
Sentence reduced •
l96J
Munn!! Lal
v.
St1I~ of lJttar
Frat11sh
~Van(hoo I.