# Habub Mohammad v. Thi Slate of Hyderabad

- **Citation:** [1954] 1 S.C.R. 506
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1954
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 59 of 1951
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/habub-mohammad-v-thi-slate-of-hyderabad-308
- **Pages:** 18

## Headnote

1953
Habub
Mohammad
v.
Thi Slate of
Hyderabad.
1953
Oct. SJ
5CX5
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
the court was fully seized of the case and by then the
sanction had been given.
Appeal allowed.
Conviction set aside.
Agent for the appellant: Rajinder Narain.
Agent for the respondent : G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, HARDOI
ti.
RAMA KRISHNA NARAIN AND OTHERS.
lMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and
JAGANNADHADAS JJ.]
U. P. Encumbered Estates Act, 1934, s.
11 (2)-Proceedings
under s. 11(2)-Appeal from order rejecting claim-Creditors who
did not take active steps-Whether necessary parties.
Creditors who did not take an active part in the proceedings
are not necessary parties
to
an appeal from an order rejecting a
claim made in a proceeding under section 11 (2) of the U. P.
Encumbered Estates
Act, 1934.
The technical rules of the Civil
Procedure Code regarding the impleading of parties should not be
applied to
such
proceedings.
The matter should be Yiewed in a
more liberal way,
regard being always had to the fact that there
is no collusion betv.reen the debtor and the claimant.
Rameshwar v.
Ajodhia Prasad
(A.I.R.
1941
Oudh 580),
Chaudhri Bishunath
Prasad v. Sarju
Saran
Tewar
(A.I.R. 1942
Oudh 16), Lakshmi Narain v. Satgurnath (A.LR. 1942 Oudh 339)
and Benam Bank Ltd. v. Bhagwandas
(A.LR.
1947
All. 18)
overruled.
APPELLATE
JuR1smcTION: Civil Appeal No. 59 of
1951.
Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the
22nd August, 1944, of the High Court of Judicature
at Allahabad
(Verma and Hamilton JJ.)
in First
Appeal No. 345 of 1940 arising out of the Judgment
and Decree dated the 24th August, 1940, of the Court
of the Special Judge, 1st Grade of Shahjahanpur in
Miscellaneous Case No. 52 of 1940 and Original Suit
No. 2 of 1938.
Chaudhry
Niamutuallah
( Gopalji
Mehrotra, with
him) for the appellant.
Onkar Nath Srivastava for respondent No. 5.
1953. October 8. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by MAHAJAN J.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
507
MAHAJAN J.-This appeal is before us on a certifi-
<:ate granted by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad under section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the only point it raises is whether the
appeal preferred by the appellant to the High Court
was
imperfectly constituted,
inasmuch
as
all the
creditors
were
not
impleaded
as
parties
to that
appeal.
The facts are that on the 28th October, 1936, Rama
Krishna Narain and others
submitted
an
application
under section 4 of the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act,
1934,
to the sub-divisional officer, Tilhar, Shahjahanpur, praying that the provisions of the said Act be
applied
to them.
This application was
eventually
transferred by the sub-divisional officer to the court of
the
special
judge,
first
grade, Shahjahanpur. The
landlords on 26th August, 1938, submitted a written
statement to the special judge under section 8 of the
Act and therein stated inter alia that they had a proprietary interest to the extent' of ten annas share in 52
items of taluqdari villages which formed part of taluka
'Bharawan. A notice of this application was published
as required by section 11(1) of the Act in the U.P.
·Gazette dated
13th
May, 1939. On 30th November,
1939, Raja Dev
Singh, who subsequently became a
ward of the Court of Wards, filed a claim petition
under section 11 (2) of the Act and alleged therein that
'he was the proprietor of 6! pies share in 47 items of
property mentioned in schedule (A) of the landlords'
written statement. This claim was disallowed by the
·special judge by an order dated 24th August, 1940,
and it was held that Raja Dev Singh was not the
·owner of the property claimed by him in his objection
petition. The Deputy Commissioner of Hardoi who is
the Court of Wards of Bharawan estate filed an appeal
:against this decision of the special judge to the High
·Court. All
the
applicant-landlords were impleaded
as respondents in the appeal along with the U nao
Commercial Bank Ltd., one of the creditors who had
taken part in the proceedings before the special j

## Text

_Characters 0–39,667 of 40,535. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39667 for what follows._

1953
Habub
Mohammad
v.
Thi Slate of
Hyderabad.
1953
Oct. SJ
5CX5
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
the court was fully seized of the case and by then the
sanction had been given.
Appeal allowed.
Conviction set aside.
Agent for the appellant: Rajinder Narain.
Agent for the respondent : G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, HARDOI
ti.
RAMA KRISHNA NARAIN AND OTHERS.
lMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and
JAGANNADHADAS JJ.]
U. P. Encumbered Estates Act, 1934, s.
11 (2)-Proceedings
under s. 11(2)-Appeal from order rejecting claim-Creditors who
did not take active steps-Whether necessary parties.
Creditors who did not take an active part in the proceedings
are not necessary parties
to
an appeal from an order rejecting a
claim made in a proceeding under section 11 (2) of the U. P.
Encumbered Estates
Act, 1934.
The technical rules of the Civil
Procedure Code regarding the impleading of parties should not be
applied to
such
proceedings.
The matter should be Yiewed in a
more liberal way,
regard being always had to the fact that there
is no collusion betv.reen the debtor and the claimant.
Rameshwar v.
Ajodhia Prasad
(A.I.R.
1941
Oudh 580),
Chaudhri Bishunath
Prasad v. Sarju
Saran
Tewar
(A.I.R. 1942
Oudh 16), Lakshmi Narain v. Satgurnath (A.LR. 1942 Oudh 339)
and Benam Bank Ltd. v. Bhagwandas
(A.LR.
1947
All. 18)
overruled.
APPELLATE
JuR1smcTION: Civil Appeal No. 59 of
1951.
Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the
22nd August, 1944, of the High Court of Judicature
at Allahabad
(Verma and Hamilton JJ.)
in First
Appeal No. 345 of 1940 arising out of the Judgment
and Decree dated the 24th August, 1940, of the Court
of the Special Judge, 1st Grade of Shahjahanpur in
Miscellaneous Case No. 52 of 1940 and Original Suit
No. 2 of 1938.
Chaudhry
Niamutuallah
( Gopalji
Mehrotra, with
him) for the appellant.
Onkar Nath Srivastava for respondent No. 5.
1953. October 8. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by MAHAJAN J.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
507
MAHAJAN J.-This appeal is before us on a certifi-
<:ate granted by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad under section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the only point it raises is whether the
appeal preferred by the appellant to the High Court
was
imperfectly constituted,
inasmuch
as
all the
creditors
were
not
impleaded
as
parties
to that
appeal.
The facts are that on the 28th October, 1936, Rama
Krishna Narain and others
submitted
an
application
under section 4 of the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act,
1934,
to the sub-divisional officer, Tilhar, Shahjahanpur, praying that the provisions of the said Act be
applied
to them.
This application was
eventually
transferred by the sub-divisional officer to the court of
the
special
judge,
first
grade, Shahjahanpur. The
landlords on 26th August, 1938, submitted a written
statement to the special judge under section 8 of the
Act and therein stated inter alia that they had a proprietary interest to the extent' of ten annas share in 52
items of taluqdari villages which formed part of taluka
'Bharawan. A notice of this application was published
as required by section 11(1) of the Act in the U.P.
·Gazette dated
13th
May, 1939. On 30th November,
1939, Raja Dev
Singh, who subsequently became a
ward of the Court of Wards, filed a claim petition
under section 11 (2) of the Act and alleged therein that
'he was the proprietor of 6! pies share in 47 items of
property mentioned in schedule (A) of the landlords'
written statement. This claim was disallowed by the
·special judge by an order dated 24th August, 1940,
and it was held that Raja Dev Singh was not the
·owner of the property claimed by him in his objection
petition. The Deputy Commissioner of Hardoi who is
the Court of Wards of Bharawan estate filed an appeal
:against this decision of the special judge to the High
·Court. All
the
applicant-landlords were impleaded
as respondents in the appeal along with the U nao
Commercial Bank Ltd., one of the creditors who had
taken part in the proceedings before the special judge
at that stage. It does not appear from the record that
the other creditors had either filed written statements
1953
bejnit)
Commis.riontr,
Hardoi
v.
Ramd Krishna
Narain and
Others.
Mahajan J.
1953 -
Deputy
Commissioner,
Hardoi
v.
Rama Krishna
Narain and
~others.
'Mahajan].
508
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1954}
under section 10 or had made any allegation that the
landlords
had
secreted
any
property.
Their
n~mes.
· • were not mentioned in the memorandum of parties
annexed to the memo of costs, and in these circumstances they were not impleaded as respondents in the
appeal. Subsequently the
appellant made an application for impleading them as respondents in the appeal
and prayed that he
be given the benefit. of section .5 of
the
Indian
Limitation
Act. This application was
rejected,
and eventually the appeal was dismissed on
the ground that it was defective and could not be
entertained in the absence of all the .creditors as respondents in the appeal. The cross-objection filed by
the U nao Commercial Bank with respect to costs wa~
allowed.
The appellant on 21st November, 1944, filed a petition for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. It
was alleged in this application that the valuation of
the subject-matter of the appeal in the trial court, in
the High Court and before His Majesty in Council was
over Rs. 10,000 and that though in
the
result
the
judgment and decree of the High Court affirmed the
judgment and decree of the trial court, a substantial
question of law affecting not only
the parties but of
general interest was involved. The High Court without deciding whether the appeal raised
a substantial
question of law granted leave to the appellant under
section
llO of the Code of Civil Procedure on the
ground that the judgment of the High Court being one
of variance,
and the value
of the
subject-matter in
dispute in the trial court as well as in the appeal t<>
His Majesty in Council being over Rs. 10,000, the case
fulfilled the requirements of that section.
Mr. Srivastava who represented the
debtors-landlords before us raised a preliminary objection that the
certificate under section llO of the Civil Procedure
Code was defective and the appeal was thus incompetent and could not be entertained by us. He contended
that the only variation made by the High Court in
the judgment of the trial judge was in respect of costs
and such a variation in the matter
of costs
only did
not make the decree a decree of variance, and that
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
509
being so, the ground on which the High Court had
granted the certificate was erroneous and the certificate being defective this appeal could not be heard.
In our opinion, this contention is without force. It is
no doubt true that costs are not taken into consideration and are treated as
extraneous
to
the subjectmatter of a suit, and variation in the matter of costs
does not make the decree of the appellate court a
decree of variance ; but
as
already stated, the appellant did not pray for the .certificate on that ground.
He had expressly alleged that the decree being one of
aflirmance he was entitled to a certificate, because the
subject of the suit as well as of the appeal was a sum
of over Rs. 10,000 and the case involved
a substantial
<}Uestion of law. It is obvious that the ground on
which the appeal was dismissed by the High Court
raises
a question of law of importance
to the parties
and that being so, on that ground alone the appellant
was entitled to a certificate under section llO, Civil
Procedure
Code.
The certificate
therefore
is
good,
though the ground on which it was granted is erroneous. It is always open to an appellant to support the
certificate
on grounds other than those
on which it
has been
actually
ordered to be given. The preliminary objection therefore fails.
In order to determine whether the creditors are
necessary parties in proceedings under chapters 3 and 4
of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act, 1934, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act.
The law was enacted for giving relief to encumbered
estates in U. P. Section 4 provides that any landlord,
who is subject to or whose immoveable prnperty or
any part thereof
is
encumbered with
private
debts,
may make an application in writing to the Collector
of the district, stating the amount of such private
debts and also of his public debts both decreed and
undecreed and requesting that the provisions of this
Act•be applied to him. The section gives an option
to the landlord who is subject to private debts to make
an application for obtaining relief under the provisions
of the Act. The Collector then transmits the applica-
. tion to the special judge appointed un4er
the
Act.
1953
Depuly
Commissioner,
Hardoi
v.
Rama Krishna
Narain and
Others.
.Mahajan J.
1953
Deputy
Commissioner,
Hardoi
v.
Rama Krishna
Narain and
Others.
Mahajan].
510
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
119541
The direct consequence of the acceptance of such an
application by the collector is that the creditors are
deprived of their rights of proceeding against such a
landlord in civil or revenue courts in respect of their
debts
and
all
attachments
made
in
execution
of
decrees become null and void and no process in
execution can issue after that
date.
The
provisions of the Act are clearly
detrimental to
the
contractual rights of the creditors and to their remedies
in civil law and such a statute can by no stretch
of imagination be described to have been enacted for
the benefit of creditors. Section 8 of the Act confers
power on the special judge of calling upon the applicant to submit to him within a period to be fixed by
him in this behalf, a written statement containing full
particulars respecting the public and private debts to
which he is subject or with which his immoveable property is encumbered ; of the nature and extent of his
proprietary rights in land ; of the r;ature and extent
of his property which is liable to attachment and sale ;
and lastly, of the names and addresses of the creditors,
so far as can be ascertained by him. If the applicant
fails
to submit a written statement as called for · or
furnish the information referred to in the proviso to
sub-section (2), the special judge is empowered to dismiss the application. The landlord is not required to
implead any .creditors as
party respondents in his
written statement, but he has
to furnish information
regarding the names and addresses of his creditors so
far as they are known to or can be ascertained by him
and his failure to give information may result in a dismissal of the
application.
Section 9 requires the
special judge to publish in the official gazette a notice
in English calling upon all persons having claims in
respect of private debts both decreed and undecreed
against the person or the property of the landlord to
present to the special judge within three months from
the date of the publication of the notice, a w.ritten
statement of their claims. He is also required to cause
copies of such notice to be published in such paper or
papers as he may direct and to exhibit it at his own
office,
at
the office of the collector and at some
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
511
conspicuous place where the landlord resides. He is
further directed to send a copy of the notice and a copy
of the written statement under sub-section (1) of section 8 by registered post to each of, the creditors whose
names and addresses ·are mentioned in the statement
under clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 8. Section ·
10 prnvides that every claimant referred to in section
9 shall in the written statement of his claim give full
particulars thereof and shall state so far as they are
known to or can be ascertained by him, the nature and
extent of the landlord's proprietary rights in the land
and the nature and extent of the landlord's property
other than proprietary rights in land. The provisions
of this section not only require a creditor to give particulars of his own debt but also give him opportunity
to contend that the landlord
has secreted some property. Section
11(1) of the Act directs the special_
judge
to publish a notice specifying
the property
mentioned by the applicant under section 8 or by any
claimant under section 10. The object of the provisions made in section 11 ( 1) is to find out the extent
of the property that can be utilized towards liquidation of the debts ascertained under the subsequent
prov1s10ns
of the
Act.
Section
11 (2)
provides
as
follows:-
"Any person having any claim to the property
mentioned in such notice shall, within a period of three
months, from the date of the publication of the notice
in the official gazette make an application to the special
judge stating his claim and the special judge shall
determine whether the property specified· in the claim,
or any part thereof is liable to attachment sale or
mortgage in satisfaction of the debts of the applicant."
Sub-section (3) directs the special judge to determine
such claims before he proceeds to determine the amount
due to anv creditor under section 14. He is further
directed
n~t to pass any decree under section 14 until
the expiry of a period of one month from the last day
on which he determines a claim under section 11.
Sub-section ( 4)
of section 11 provides that any order
passed by the special judge under this section shall be
1953
Deputy
Commissioner,
Hardoi
,
,.
Rama Krishna
Narain and
Others.
Mahajan].
•
1953
Deputy
Commissioner,
Hordoi
u.
Rama Krishna
Narayan and
Others.
Ma.~ajanJ.
512
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
deemed to be a decree of a civil court of competent
jurisdiction.
Section
13
enacts
that every
claim,
decreed or undecreed against the landlord shall, unless
made within the time
prescribed be
deemed for
all
purposes and on all occasions
t.o have been duly discharged.
Section
14
lays
down the
procedure for
determination of the amount of debts.
The
judge
is directed to g' vc notice of the date of enquiring into
the claims of the creditors to the different claimants
and to the person who has made the application under
section 4.
He is directed to examine each claim after
hearing all such parties as desire to be heard and after
considering the evidence,
if any,
produced
by them.
The section lays down the mode of calculating interest
on the amount of such claims and provides for
the
application of the provisions
of the Usurious Loans
Act to the prrJceedings under the Act. Sub-section (7)
provides as follows :-
"If the special judge finds that any amount is due
to the claimant he shall pass
a simple money
decree
for such amount together with any costs which he may
allow in respect of proceedings in his court and of proceedings in any civil court stayed under the provisions
of this Act, together with pendente lite and future interest at a rate
not
greater than the rate specified in
section 27 and if he finds that no amount is due, he
may pass a decree for costs
in favour of the landlord.
Such decree shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil
court of competent
jurisdiction but no decree against
the landlord
shall be executable within the United
Provinces except under the provisions of this Act."
Section 18 provides that subject to the right of
appeal or revision, the effect of a decree of the special
judge under sub-section (7) of section 14 shall be to
extinguish the previously existing rights, if any, of the
claimant, together with all rights, if any, of mortgage
or lieu by which the same are secured and, where any
decree is given by the special judge to substitute for
those rights a right to recover the amount of the
decree in the manner and to the extent specified in the
Act.
Section 45 provides
for
appeals and revisions
:against orders and decrees of the special judge.
:S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
513
It is app1rent from the provisions of the Act cited
:above that the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act is no
more, nor less than, a code for the administration of
the assets of the landlord-debtor and for giving relief
lo him in a number of ways against the ;:ontractual
rights of his creditors. It clearly deprives the creditors
of any remedies
that they would ordinarily
have
in
ordinary civil courts
and extinguishes the
mortgages
held by them. Section 11 (2) deals with claims of third
parties
to the property alleged by
the
landlord as
belonging to him and the judge is required to determine whether such property is liable to attachment or
sale. It is noteworthy that under section 14(1)
the
special judge is directed to follow a certain procedure,
but no such procedure is prescribed under section 11(2).
In section 14 he is required to fix a date and to give
notice of tl1e date of inquiring into the claims of the
·creditors to all the claimants. There is no such parallel
requirement in respect of claims of third parties under
section 11 (2), though as a matter of practice similar
procedure is also followed in an enquiry under this
section.
The question
that requires consideration in these
circumstances is whether the rules of the first schedule
to the Code of Civil Procedure should be rigorously
applied to proceedings under the Encumbered
Estates
Act, and whether the creditors who are no doubt
persons interested in those proceedings and who would
ultimately be entitled to recover their decretal debts
from the property the extent of which falls for determination in an enquiry under section 11, are necessary
parties in the enquiry, or are merely proper parties
thereto and as such entitled only to notice of the pro-
·Ceedings. Order 1, Rules 1 and 3 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, provide in regard to the persons who are to
be joined as plaintiffs or those who have to ·be joined
as defendants in suits. Rule 1 is in these terms :-
"All persons may be joined in one suit as plaintiffs
in whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out
of the same act or transaction or series of acts or
transactions
is
alleged
to
exist,
whether
jointly,
1953
D'fJuty
Commissioner,
Hardoi
v.
Rama Krishna
Narain and
Others.
Mahajan].
1953
Deputy
Corrim!ssioner
HarJoi
v.
Rama Krishna
Nara-in and
OtJ.,..,,
Mahajan].
,
514
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541'
severally or in the alternative, where, if such persons.
brought separate suits, any .common question of law or
fact would arise."
Rule 3 provides :-
"All persons
may be joined as defendants
against
whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of
the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or
in the alternative, where, if separate suits were brought
against such persons, any common question of law or
fact would arise."
It is apparent that Hrictly speaking the prov1S1ons.
of these rules cannot be applied to the proceedings.
contemplated
by the U. P. Encumbered Estates
Act.
These proceedings cannot be
described
as suits. It
was conceded at the Bar that an inquiry into third
party claims under section
11(2)
cannot be described
as a suit.
Neither section 8 nor section 11
provides
that the creditors have
to be im pleaded as
parties
respondents
in
such
an
objection application. As.
already said, the section
provides
that
the
applicant
has to give information about the names of the creditors and the amounts due to them. Till the time that
a decree is passed under section 14 in favour of any of
the creditors it, cannot be said that any one of them is
entitled to share in the property of the debtor. It is
only when a claim has been made under section 10 by
a creditor and it has ripened into a decree that he is.
entitled to share in the assets of the landlord. But if
he commits a default in submitting a written statement of the claim under section 10, the claim stands
discharged under section 13. In this particular case
it is not clear whether any of the creditors except the
Unao Commercial Bank had made a claim under section 10. It is also not clear whether any decree under
section 14 has been passed fo
favour
of any
of the
creditors. An inquiry for
the determination of the
quantum of the debts of the landlord can only be made
after third party claims have been settled under the
provisions
of section 11(2).
In view
of these
provisions it seems difficult to hold that the technical and
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
515
strict rules as to impleading of parties can have application to proceedings under section 11 of the U.P.
Encumbered Estates
Act. It is true that the creditors
must be given notice and opportunity to say whether
the landlord has secreted any property, but if they do
not do so and are content with the disclosures made
by the landlord they cannot be said to have any
further interest in the quantum of the property which
the landlord has mentioned under the provisions of
section 8 in his written statement. In that situation,
if a third party claims any item of property mentioned
by the landlord in the written statement, the controversy at that stage lies only between the landlord and
the claimant, though in the result the creditors may
either be benefited or deprived of some of the assets
which the
landlord discloses
in the
application as
liable to
attachment and sale towards payment of
decrees that may be passed in favour of the creditors.
It can well be assumed that the fight at that stage
being a bona fide fight between the objector and the
landlord, the interests of the creditors will be fully
represented by the landlord and any decision obtained
in his favour or against him would be binding on all
the creditors on the principles enacted
in explanation
6 to section 11, Civil Procedure Code. If, . therefore,
in such a contest the claimant loses and the landlord
succeeds, then in an appeal against that decision he
need only implead the landlord as. a party respondent
and it is not necessary to implead all . the creditors as
respondents merely on the ground that ultimately they
would be affected by the result, either to their benefit
or to their detriment. The court has power, if it considers that the presence of the creditors is necessary at
the hearing, to give them notice of the appeal so that
they may have the opportunity of placing their contentions before it. The observance of such a procedure
may well conduce to a fair hearing of the appeal, even
if the creditors have raised no plea of any kind before
the
special judge. In a case, however, where the
creditors raise a plea that the landlord has secreted
certain Property and it should be included in the
schedule and such property is then claimed by a third
1953
Deputy
Commis.1ionu·
Hardoi •
v.
Rama Kri"shna
Narain and
~Others.
Mahajan].
1953
Deputy
Commi.s£iontr
• Hardoi
v.
Rama Krishna
Narain and
Otherse
-Maha;anJ.
516
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
party, they may well be regarded as real parties to the
controversy and failure to implead them may result in
the
appeal
being
imperfectly
constituted. In the
situation that arises
in
the present case
the appeal
should have been held to be properly constituted because all those who raised any controversy whatsoever
as to the ownership of the property ·in dis1:mte were
imp leaded.
\Ve are fully conscious of the fact that the view
that we have expressed above is not in conformity
with a number of decisions of the Oudh Chief Court and
the Allahabad High Court.
It is therefore
necessary
to examine those decisions in order to see whether the
reasons given therein are sound or erroneous.
In Rames/ubar v. Ajodhia Prasad(') a Bench of the
Oudh Court held that all the creditors who were
impleaded as parties to the application under the Act
are necessary
parties to
an appeal by
the objector
against an adverse order passed against him under
section 11. This judgment proceeds on the assumption that all the creditors having been impleaded as
parties to the application and not having been made
respondents in the appeal, the appeal became imperfectly constituted. In this case the question whether
under the provisions of the Encumbered Estates Act
an applicant is required to implead creditors as parties
to the application was neither argued nor c012sidered ;
on the other hand, it was assumed
that all
the
creditors have to be impleaded as parties in the application made by · the claimants under the Act. That
assumption is, of course, erroneous. Under section 4
the applicant is entitled to request the collector, that
the provisions of the Act be applied to him and relief
given to him under its provisions. He is not required
even
to
give
information
about
the
names
and
addresses of creditors and no question of impleading
anyone as
a respondent arises
at that stage. \Vhen
the
collector
has forwarded this
application
to
the
special judge, then the special judge is empowered to
call upon the applicant to file a written statement and
therein he is bound to give information about the
(1) A.I.R. 1941 Oudh 580.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
517
names and addresses of his creditors so far
as they
are known to him or can be ascertained by him. In
the written statement which he is called upon to file
on a requisition by the special judge he is not called
upon to implead any persons as parties, in the sense
in which that term is used in the Code of Civil Procedure. This decision therefore is not of any help on
the point that was argued before us.
In
Chaudhri Bishunath Prasad
v.
Sarju Saran
Tewari('), another Bench of the Oudh Court held that
an enquiry into the indebtedness of the landlord is to
be carried out by the special judge in the presence of
all the creditors, that though it is
true that each
creditor is
interested in establishing his own debt
against the landlord, he is further interested that the
landlord should not be allowed to withhold any property
from
the ·court,
and
that if a claimant
under section
11
sets up a title to the property
shown by
the
landlord
to belong to him, although the real contest may for
the time being be
between the claimant on the one hand and the landlord on the other hand, it is to the ultimate interest of
the
entire
body of the
creditors
that the
property
should be held to belong to the landlord, and if the
decision is in favour of the landlord, all the creditors
will be entitled to have ·their debts satisfied out of
such property ; but if, however, the decision is against
them, the property will go ot:t of the reach of the
creditors and will not be available to them for the
satisfaction of their debts. It was further held that as
all the creditors had not been joined as parties to the
appeal and as they were interested in the result of the
appeal, it could not be held that they were< wholly unconcerned in the result of the case and therefore the
appeal was not maintainable. It seems to us
that in
making these observations the learned fudges did not
clearly bear in mind the distinctions between the provisions of sections
11 and 14 of the Act. Section 14
fays clown a definite procedure so far as the enquiry
ihto the claims of creditors is concerned. Each creditor
has
1 to establish his· · claim against the landlord as he
(1) A.J.R. 1942 Oudh 16.
1953 -
Deputy
CommisJiontr
Hardoi
v.
Rama Krishna·
Narain and
Others. --
Mahajan].
~
Depv;y
Commissioner
Hardoi
v.
Rama KriJhna
Narain and
O!_hm.
Mahajan].
518
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
would do if he had filed a suit against him. This
enquiry is made after the quantum of the property of
the debtor has been ascertained under section 11. As
already pointed out, if any creditor raises any dispute
as to the quantum of the property as he is entitled to
raise such a dispute in his written statement filed under
section 10, in that situation it may well be held that
such a creditor is directly interested in the enquiry
under section 11 ; but it is difficult to see that all
other creditors who have accepted the list of property
filed by the debtor as true are directly interested in
the enquiry under that section and are as such necessary parties and that without impleading them the
enquiry cannot proceed. Rules 1 and 3 of Schedule I
of the Code of Civil Procedure do not lay down that
every person who is ultimately interested in the result
of a suit should be impleaded as a defendant. All that
these rules insist upon is that all persons should be
joined as defendants against whom any right to relief
is alleged to exist, provided that such right arises in
respect of the same act or transaction or series of acts
or transactions and the case is one where common
question of law or fact would arise. It is not possible
to hold that the objector can claim any right to relief
against the creditors
as such. The right to relief in
the enquiry under section 11 is only against the landlord who alleges himself to be the owner of the property which the claimant says belongs to him, and
creditors have no right of interest in the property
claimed by the objector. The test of ultimate benefit
therefore laid down by the Oudh Court for holding
that all creditors are necessary parties in the enquiry
under section 11 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act
does not fulfil the conditions laid down in the Code
for impleading parties as plaintiffs or as defendants.
If they are not necessary parties in the true sense of
the term in the enquiry under section 11, a fortiori
failure to implead them as respondents in the appeal
i:annot make that appeal defective.
In Lakshmi Narain v. Satgurnath(') another Bench
of the Oudh Court took the same view. In this case
(t) A.1.R 1940 Oudh 339·
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
519
the earlier decisions of the Oudh Court were followed.
The view was reiterated that creditors are parties in
the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act.
In Benares Bank Ltd., Benares v. Bhagwandas (' ),
a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court considered
this
question
and
expressed
the
same
-0pm1on as had been expressed in the Oudh decisions
referred
to above.
Mr.
Justice
Braund,
who
was one of the Judges constituting the Full Bench,
with great
reluctance
shared
the opinion of
the
majority merely out of respect for the opinion of
Pathak J. and it appears that, left to himself, he would
have held otherwise.
The majority
judgment was
<lelivered by Pathak J. He enunciated two tests for
deciding whether a certain person was a necessary
party in a proceeding : ( 1) that there must be a
right to some relief against such party in respect of
the matter involved in the proceedings in question,
and (2) it should not be possible to pass an effective
decree in the absence of such party, and proceeded to
observe that the creditors of a landlord who have
claimed relief under the Encumbered Estates Act are
necessary parties to the proceedings under that Act
and that the object of the Act is to compel the landlord to surrender his entire property for the benefit of
his creditors and to liquidate the debts of alt the
,creditors in accordance with and to the extent permitted by
the Act. There can be no question that
these are the true tests for determining whether a
person is a necessary party to certain proceedings but
the question is whether judgc<l on these tests the
-creditors of a landlord under the U. P. Encumbered
Estates Act can be said to be necessary parties in an
enquiry under section 11. It seems to us that in the
first instance it is an incorrect assumption to make
that the object of the Act is to grant relief to the
aeditors of a landlord ; it is quite the converse. The
object of the Act is to grant relief to the landlord
whose estate
is
encumbered with
debts, by scaling
<iown the debts and by depriving the creditors of their
(1) A.J.R. 1947 All· 18.
1953
De pray
,. Commissioner
'
Hardoi
v.
Rama Krishna
Narain and
Others.
MahqjanJ.
1953
Deputy
Commissioner
Hardoi
v.
Rama Krishna
Narain and
Others.
Mahajan],
520
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954}
civil remedies. The creditors are allowed to
prove
their debts and obtain decrees from the special judge
according to the provisions of and to the extent allowed by the Act and they lose all their rights on
securities held by them. Coming to the application
of the tests laid down by the learned Judge, it is not
possible to hold that any right of relief exists in an
objector under section 11
as against the creditors. It
is also difficult to see how an effective decree cannot
be passed as regards title to the property in the
absence of creditors. One test of tlie effectiveness of
a decree is whether that decree can be executed without the
presence
of
creditors
as
regards
property
decreed in favour of a claimant. It is obvious that in
execution proceedings a warrant of attachment and
for delivery of possession can only be issued against
the owner, viz., the landlord, and not against the
creditors. In these proceedings the special judge can
give no relief to the objector against the creditors.
So on the tests
mentioned by the learned judge it is.
clear that the creditors of a debtor are not necessary
parties in these administrative proceedings under the
Encumbered Estates Act, though they may be _ given
notice of
those
proceedings
and afforded opportunity
to watch those proceedings in order to see that no
property is secreted from them and it is preserved for
satisfacti1on of decrees that may eventually be passed
in their favour.
In his judgment Pathak J. proceeded to observe
that though the landlord is
a party to the dispute
under section 11, it is obvious that the
main party
who is vitally interested in that dispute is the entire
body of creditors, because the issue that arises out of
such a claim is whether the property which is the
subject matter of the claim is liable for the satisfaction
of the debts due to the entire body
of creditors. This
statement also, in our opinion, is not very precise. It
is not correct to say that the result of a decision in
such a claim makes the property liable for satisfaction
of debts due to the entire body of creditors who had
made claims at that stage. The property
is
only
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
521
liable for satisfaction of decrees that may be passed
subsequently under section 14.
It may· well be that
of the persons who have been disclosed as creditors
under section 8, a number of them may not at all be
interested in the result of the decision of the claim
under section .11.
It is
an overstatement to make
that the main party who is vitally interested in the
dispute is the entire body of creditors. The dispute
relates to title to propetry and according to all principles of impleading of parties it is not the eventual
benefit that a person may derive from a certain decision that is the crucial test in deciding whether a
party is a necessary party or merely a proper party.
Pathak J. proceeded to observe as follows :
"Could it be suggested that in a suit under Order
XXI, rule 63, Civil Procedure Code, the decreeholders
who desire to seize the property belonging to the
judgment-debtor are not necessary parties ?"
Witl1 great respect again, this analogy is not very
happy or apposite. Under Order XXI, rule 63, it is
only the attaching creditor who has the right to file
a suit or of being impleaded as defendant in a suit by
t11e judgment-debtor. All
the
creditors of the
judgment debtor who have not attached the property are
not necessary parties in a suit under Order XXI, rule
63, though after the decision in that suit they may
be entitled to share in the rateable distribution of the
property if they make an application for that purpose.
In a way it is true to say that in all suits by a
creditor against a debtor where the debtor owes to a
number of creditors, every other creditor is interested
in seeing that that creditor's suit is dismissed or his
debt is considerably cut down ; but from that it does
not follow that in a suit on a promissory note by a
creditor against the debtor all the other creditors are
necessary parties. The eventual interest of a party
in the fruits of a litigation cannot be held to be the
true test of impleading parties under the Code of Civil
Procedure and it is rather difficult to hold that where
that is not the true test under the Code, that should
be adopted as a test in proceedings of an administrative
4-94 S. C. India/ 59
1953
Deputy
Commissioner
Hardoi
v.
Rama Krishna
Narain and
Others.
MaluijanJ.
l953
lkpr4J
Commissic1#11
Hardoi.
v.
Ra.fl/! KriJhna
Narain tmd
OIMrs.
Mahaja•].
522
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f1954l
character under the U. P. Encumbered Estates
Act.
It
cannot
be
forgotten
that under the provisions
of section 11 no provision has been made for issuing
notice
to all the
creditors. Reference
may
also
be
made to rule 6 framed under the Encumbered Estates
Act. This rule provides that the proceedings under
this Act shall be governed by the Code of Civil Procedure so far
as
they are
applicable. As already
pointed out, the provisions of Order I, rules 1 and 3,
cannot aptly be held applicable in such proceedings.
We cannot uphold the view of Pathak J. that all
creditors become parties to the proceedings under the
Act in the technical sense of the term after a notice
has been served upon them and in any event after
they
have
filed
the written statements, that thev
continue to
remain
as
parties until
the
debts are
liquidated
or
proceedings
terminated
in
accordance
with the provisions of the Act. This seems to be too
wide a statement of the law on the point. Can it be
said
that
after each
individual
creditor obtains
a
decree in respect of his claim under section
14, each
one of these creditors has to be impleaded as a party
in an appeal preferred by that creditor or by the
debtor. It is not possible to give an answer in the
affirmative to such
a proposition. We have
therefore
no
hesitation
in
saying that Mr.
Justice
Braund,
thou.1rh he ultimately abandoned his view, was right
in thinking that in these administrative proceedings
technical rules
of the First Schedule of the Code of
Civil
Procedure
regarding
impleading
of
parties
should not be invoked and that the matter should be
viewed in a more liberal way, regard always being
had to the fact that there is no collusion between
the
debtor
and
the
claimant and
that there are
persons
who
are
bona fide litigating . in
respect
of
the title of the claimant under section 11, and if there
has been such a bona fide fight which results in a
decree in an appeal against that decree it is sufficient
that those who took an active part in the proceedings
under section
11 are impleaded. It is not necessarv
to implead each and every creditor who either did
not appear or put forward
a written statement under
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
523
section 10 or took no active part in the proceedings
under section 11(2). In the view that we have taken
it is not necessary to decide the question whether the
High Court was right in not exercising its powers under
Order XLI, rule 20, in impleading the creditors as respondents to 'the appeal.
For the reasons given above we allow this appeal,
set aside the judgment of the High Court and remand
the case to that court for hearing the appeal in accordance with law on its merits. If the High Court
thinks fit that the presence of any creditors would
help the court in arriving at a true decision of the
matter it in its
discretion may give notice
to the
creditors of the date of hearing. We leave the parties
to bear their own costs of this appeal.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellant : C. P. Lal.
Agent for respondent No. 5 : S. S. Shukla.
' ANGLO-FRENCH TEXTILE CO. LTD.
ti.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS.
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VIVIAN BosE and BHAGWATI JJ.]
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India
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