# HAJJ C.H. MOHAMMAD KOYA v. T. K. S. M. A. MUTHUKOYA

- **Citation:** [1979] 1 S.C.R. 664
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1978-09-12
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos. 12 and 865 E of 1978
- **Bench:** S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, P. N. SHiNGHAL
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/hajj-c-h-mohammad-koya-v-t-k-s-m-a-muthukoya-7524
- **Pages:** 37

## Headnote

Representation of People Act 1951-Sec. 123(3)(3A)-Publication of
n1aterial pron1oting hatr'ed between citizens-Seeking votes on religious and
communal grounds-Standard of proof-Beyond reasonable doubt of preponder~
ance of probabilities-What constitute.s<--How to be proved.
Press and Registration of Books Act 1861-Sec. 7-Presun1ption-Meaning
of Editor-Obiecl of the Act.
In the General Election to the ·Legislative Assembly of Kerala in March
1977 the petitioner and the appellant were the contesting candidates from
Malappuram constituency.
The Appellant was declared elected by polling
56,276 votes defeating the petitioner who secured 39,362 votes. The petitioner
filed an election petition alleging that the appellant had committed various
corrupt practices falling within the ambit of section 123(3)<(3A) and (4) of the
Representation of People Act 1951.
The main allegation was that the appellant was the Chief Editor of Malayalam daily paper called 'Chandrika' which
was the official organ of the Muslim League.
According to the petitioner the
paper contained articles, extracts of speeches and cartoons which
tended
to
ask the muslims to vote for the appellant on religious and communal grounds
and also pron1ted ill-will and hatred between two classes of citizens, namely,
the Janasangh and the Muslim. League.
At the hearing, the petitioner confined his case only to the corrupt practices alleged by him under section
123(3A).
The petition was contested by the appellant.
He took the stand
that he made no speech which offended section 123(3A) of the Act, nor was
he aware of any of the offending articles or cartoons published in Chandrika
prior to the election.
He denied that he was an editor of Chandrika and
admitted that he was the Chief Editor and, that too, only in name.1
He
denied that he had to do any thing with the editorial work of Chandrika
or the publication of the speeches. The High Court held that the petition was
maintainable. According to the High Court, the appellant was really the editor
of the paper and the presumption under section 7 of the Press and Registration
of Books Act 1867 would apply.
Allowing the appeal the Court,
llELD : The object of the Press Act is to regulate pnnting presses and
newspapers in order to preserve copies of newspapers and books.
In order
to avoid multiplicity of suits and uncertainties of liabilities, it was considered
necessary to choose one of the persons from the staff and make him liable
for all the articles or 1natters to be published in the paper so that any person
aggrieved may sue only the person so named under the provisions of Press
Act and a litigant is relieved from the necessity of making a fishing or roving
enquiry.
Under section 1(1) the Editor is defined to mean the person who
controls the selection of the matter that is to be published in a ne\11spaper.
Section 5 ( 1) requires t:p.at ..every copy of every newspaper shall contain the
names of the O\\'ner and editor, printed clearly on such copies and also the
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MOHD. KOYA V. MUTHUKOYA
665
<late of the publication.
Section 8A provides that where any person's namo
has appeared as an editor in a newspaper, alth9ugh he was not an editor,
he shall, Y:ithin two weeks of his becoming aware that his name has been so
published,, appear before a magistrate and make a declaration that he has
been incorrectly published.
In the present case, the following are the
facts
1. That the issues of Chandrika shown to us clearly and unmistakably mention the name of Aboobaket as the printer, publisher
and editor of Chandrika and does. not mention the appellant
as the Editor of Chandrika.
The appellant is merely shown as
the Chief Editor but this is an officer which is not at all contemplated by. the Press Act.
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2. That if the appellant was really the editor of the paper then
P.W. 2 Aboobaker ought to have resorted to section 8(A) to
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correct the mistake in the paper where his name was shown as
the editor but no such thing has been done. O

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664
HAJJ C.H. MOHAMMAD KOYA
v.
T. K. S. M. A. MUTHUKOYA
September 12, 1978
[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND P. N. SHiNGHAL, JJ.]
Representation of People Act 1951-Sec. 123(3)(3A)-Publication of
n1aterial pron1oting hatr'ed between citizens-Seeking votes on religious and
communal grounds-Standard of proof-Beyond reasonable doubt of preponder~
ance of probabilities-What constitute.s<--How to be proved.
Press and Registration of Books Act 1861-Sec. 7-Presun1ption-Meaning
of Editor-Obiecl of the Act.
In the General Election to the ·Legislative Assembly of Kerala in March
1977 the petitioner and the appellant were the contesting candidates from
Malappuram constituency.
The Appellant was declared elected by polling
56,276 votes defeating the petitioner who secured 39,362 votes. The petitioner
filed an election petition alleging that the appellant had committed various
corrupt practices falling within the ambit of section 123(3)<(3A) and (4) of the
Representation of People Act 1951.
The main allegation was that the appellant was the Chief Editor of Malayalam daily paper called 'Chandrika' which
was the official organ of the Muslim League.
According to the petitioner the
paper contained articles, extracts of speeches and cartoons which
tended
to
ask the muslims to vote for the appellant on religious and communal grounds
and also pron1ted ill-will and hatred between two classes of citizens, namely,
the Janasangh and the Muslim. League.
At the hearing, the petitioner confined his case only to the corrupt practices alleged by him under section
123(3A).
The petition was contested by the appellant.
He took the stand
that he made no speech which offended section 123(3A) of the Act, nor was
he aware of any of the offending articles or cartoons published in Chandrika
prior to the election.
He denied that he was an editor of Chandrika and
admitted that he was the Chief Editor and, that too, only in name.1
He
denied that he had to do any thing with the editorial work of Chandrika
or the publication of the speeches. The High Court held that the petition was
maintainable. According to the High Court, the appellant was really the editor
of the paper and the presumption under section 7 of the Press and Registration
of Books Act 1867 would apply.
Allowing the appeal the Court,
llELD : The object of the Press Act is to regulate pnnting presses and
newspapers in order to preserve copies of newspapers and books.
In order
to avoid multiplicity of suits and uncertainties of liabilities, it was considered
necessary to choose one of the persons from the staff and make him liable
for all the articles or 1natters to be published in the paper so that any person
aggrieved may sue only the person so named under the provisions of Press
Act and a litigant is relieved from the necessity of making a fishing or roving
enquiry.
Under section 1(1) the Editor is defined to mean the person who
controls the selection of the matter that is to be published in a ne\11spaper.
Section 5 ( 1) requires t:p.at ..every copy of every newspaper shall contain the
names of the O\\'ner and editor, printed clearly on such copies and also the
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MOHD. KOYA V. MUTHUKOYA
665
<late of the publication.
Section 8A provides that where any person's namo
has appeared as an editor in a newspaper, alth9ugh he was not an editor,
he shall, Y:ithin two weeks of his becoming aware that his name has been so
published,, appear before a magistrate and make a declaration that he has
been incorrectly published.
In the present case, the following are the
facts
1. That the issues of Chandrika shown to us clearly and unmistakably mention the name of Aboobaket as the printer, publisher
and editor of Chandrika and does. not mention the appellant
as the Editor of Chandrika.
The appellant is merely shown as
the Chief Editor but this is an officer which is not at all contemplated by. the Press Act.
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2. That if the appellant was really the editor of the paper then
P.W. 2 Aboobaker ought to have resorted to section 8(A) to
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correct the mistake in the paper where his name was shown as
the editor but no such thing has been done. On. the other hand,
P.\\1• 2 Aboobaker tacitly and clearly admits that he is the
editor of the paper.
3. That the petitioner has not at all pleaded in his petition the
t nature of the duties performed o.r responsibilities shouldered by
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the
appellant as Chief Fditot.
There is no averment at all
in the petition that the appellant controls the selection of matter
that is published in the newspaper which alone would make him
an editor as defined in section 1 ( 1) of the Press Act. The word
'Chief Editor' is clearly absent from the Press Act and in fact
foreign to it because the Press Act has selected only one person
who as a special status and that is the editor who can be sued
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if necessary or can sue and against whom alone a presumption
under sec.tion 7 of the
Press Act can be drawn.
While holding that the presumption under section 7 is available the High
'Court has completely overlooked the aforesaid aspect. [671 D-E, 672 A-C,
()73 E-H, 674 A-Cl
State of Maharashtra v. Dr. R. B. Chowdhury and Ors. [19671 3
S.C.R. 708 and D. P. Mishra v. Kamal Narain Sharma and Ors.,
[1971] 3 S.C.R. 257 and Nardsingh C.hara11 Mohanty v. Surendra
Mohanty, [19741 2 S.C.R. 39; relied on.
In the present case, the paper clearly shows the name of Shri Aboobakar
as the editor.
There is sufficient evidence both led by 'the petitioner and the
appellant that Aboobaker was incharge of the paper and that he was function·
ing as the editor. · The Court came to this conclusion on a detailed appreciation of the evidence of witnesses examined by both the sides. [685 H, 686 AG]
The petitioner failed to prove either that the appellant was an editor of
the paper or that he was performing the functions, duties or shouldering the
responsibilities of the editor.
The presumption under section 7 of the Press
Act could be drawn tb.at only the person concerned was the editor within the
meaning of the Pl<lss Act.
The High Court had )lo justification to draw a
presumption against the appellant under section 7 of the Act. [686 H, 687 A-BJ
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666
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979) 1 S.C.R.
Even if it is assumed that the appellant was the editor the presumption
un<ler section 7 is rebuttable and thC evidence in the case
shows
that the
presumption has been sufficiently rebutted. [687 B.C]
The publication of the material promoting hatred between two classes of
citizens is undoubtedly a corrupt practice.
It is well settled by long course
of decisions of this Court that such practices must be clearly alleged and all
the necessary particulars must be proved not by the standard of preponderance
of probabilities but beyond reasonable doubt.
Mohan Singh v. Bhanwar Lal and Ors., A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 1366,
MaKrai Patadia v. R. K" Bir/a and Ors., [19711 2 S.C.R. 118, D.
Venkara Reddy v. R. Sultan & Ors. [1976] 3 S.C.R. 445, Ramanbhai
Nagibhai Pat~l v. Jaswant Singh Udesingh Dabhi and Ors .• A.I.R.
1968 S.C. 1162: relied on.
Neither the writer of the article nor the speaker who delivered the speech,
nor the reporter, nor even the 'manuscript of the speeches, had been produced
befote the Court.
All these articles and speeches are inconsequential until
they are shown to have been made with the knowledge and consent of the
appellant. [689 B.Cl
The following facts meaningly emerge :-
1. The petitioner has not mentioned the name -of a single penion
who had actually heard the speech and made a report.
2. According to the evidence of P. W. 1 he was present at the
place where the speech was delivered · by the appellant and yet
this fact, though a very material particular, does not find men~
tion in the avemment in the petition referred to above.
3 .. It is not indicated in the petition as to how and in what manner
the speech
tended to pro1note
feelings of" enmity or hatred
between two classes of citizens against whom hatred was preached by the speaker bas not been mentioned. [691 C-E]
The allegations in the petition are vague.
No evidence was produced by
the petitioner to prove whether the extract of the speech was correct ·and was
·a reproduction of the' very words used by the appellant.
It is welt settled
that the admis~ion unless it is separable has to be taken :as a whole or not
at all. [691 F, G, 692 A]
llanumant v. Th< State of Modhya Pradesh, [1952] S.C.R. 94, Palvinder Kaur v. The State of Punjab, [1953] S.C.R. 94 and Dadarao
v. The State of Maharashtra, [19741 3 S.C.C. 630; relied on.
Even frorr1 the extract of the speech it is dear that the speech was not
intended to preach hatred or enmity hehveen t.he two classes of l;itizens.
Thb
petitioner has not produced either the reporter who was present at the meeting
when the appellant spoke, nor has he ca.lied for the script of the ~peech, the
extract of which was given in the newspaper.
It is very difficult to interpret
a part of the 'speech completely tom from its context.
The entire speech
was made against political background and for a political purpose.
The
petitioner has not examined any independent member of the public belonging
to the (place where a speech was delivered to show that the speech tended
to promote enmity or hatred between different communities. [694 C, D, F-G-H,
696 Dl
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MOHD. KOYA v. MUTHUKOYA (Fazal Ali, J.)
667
The reliance placed on the cartoon in para 11 of the petition is as
!\lnder :-
"In Chandrika dated 12-3-1977 on the frout page-a cartoon is publi>hed.
It is depicting Janasangh as a Pig and Shri E. M. Sankaran
Namboodiripad the Marxist Leader, cutting the flesh
of the pig
and serving it to the Muslim. This is an attmpt to promote feelings
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of enmity and hatred between different classes of citizens of India on
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grouods of religion.
It is well-known that to eat pork is pardial
amthma (haram) for true Muslims.
The publication of this cartoon
in Chandrika is with the consent and knowledge of the respondent
which promoted hatred of the Muslims against the United Front of
Marxist Party and J:inata party
and Muslim League (Opposition)
of which the petitioner is a candidate from the concerned constituency."
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The petitioner has failed to prove that the cartoon was published with the
consent and knowledge of the appellant. The term consent is a much stronger
word than knowledge because it implies assent. There is nothing to show that
the appellant gave his consent to the :Publication of the cartoon at any time.
There is no evidence either of consent or knowledge.
On the contrary, there
is evide11ce to negative this fact [697 F, H, 698 A-CJ
The Court came to the conclusion that the petitioner has not beeD. able
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to establish the corrupt practices alleged against the appellant.
There is no
lcaal or satisfactory evidence to prove that the speech made by the appellant
promoted or tended to promote a feeling of enmity and hatred between two
claascs of citizens.
There is no evidence to prove the knowledge or consent
<>f the appellant to the publication of the cartoon. [699 B-C, E-G]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 12 and 865
E
of 1978.
From the Judgment and Order dated 19-12-77 of the
Kerala
High Cou..-i in Election Petition No. 16 of 1977.
F. S. Nariman, S. Narayanan Poli, J. B. Dadachanji and K. J.
John for the Appellant, (In CA 12 and Respondent in C.A. 865/
F
78).
Y. S. Ch1ta/e and N. Sudhakaran for the Respondent (In C.A. 12
and Appellant in C.A. 865/78).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL ALI, J.
This election appeal is directed against the order
of the High Court of Kera!a dated 19th December, 1977 by which
the election of the appellant Haji C. H. Mohammad Koya has been
set aside and be has been disqualified from tal.:ing part in the elections for a period of six years under the provisions of th~ Representation of tile People Act, 1951 (hereinafter called the Act).
For the purpose of brevity we shall refer to
the
respondentpetitioner as the Petitioner and Haji C. H. Mohammad Koya as · t!Je
appellant.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 1 s.c.R.
In the general election held to the Legislative Assembly of Kerala
on 20th March, 1977 the petitioner and the appellant were the contesting candidates from No. 34
Malappnram
Constituency.
The
counting of votes took place on the 20th March,
1977
and
the
appellant was declared elected on the same date. The total votes
polled were 56.276.
The appellant secured 39,362 votes and thus
defeated the petitioner by a margin of 20,000 votes. Aggrieved by
the election results, the petitioner filed an election petition in
the
High Court alleging that the appellant had committed various corrupt practicee falling within the ambit of sections 123(3), (3A) and
( 4) of the Act. It was mainly alleged that before the elections, the
appellant was the Chief Editor of a Malayalam daily paper called
Chandrika which was the official organ of the Muslim League. It is
further alleged by the petitioner that the appellant held shares worth
Rs. 3 lakhs in the Printing and Publishing Company which published
Chandrika. This paper, according to the petitioner, contains several
articles, extracts of speeches and cartoons which tended to ask the
Muslims to vote for the appellant on religious and communal grounds
and also promoted ill-will and hatred between two classes of citizens,
namely, the Janasangh and the Muslim League. It appears, however,
that at the hearing the petitioner confined his case only to the corrupt practices alleged by him under section 123(3A) of the Act. In
this connection, the learned Judge of the High Court observed as
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follows:-
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"Though in the petition sub-sections 3, 3A and 4 of
section 123 of the Act are specifically referred to, from the
evidence tendered in the case it would appear that applicability of sub-section 3A of section 123 alone falls
for
decision".
The petition was contested by the appellant who filed a counteraffidavit denying the assertions and averments made by the petitioner
and took the stand that he made no speech which offended section
123 (3A) of the Act nor was he aware of any of the offending articles
or cartoons published in Chandrika prior to the elections. He also
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denied that he was an Editor of Chandrika, but admitted that he was
the Chief Editor and that too only in name. Being an important and
an influential person he was able to collect lot of
money for
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Chandrika from the Gulf States and that is why he was assigned an
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important role in Chandrika as Chief Editor for the purpose of decidr
ing the larger policies of the paper. The appellant further denied
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that he had anything to do with the editorial work of Chandrika or
the publication of the speeches or articles etc. It may be pertinent
to note here that even the petitioner in his petition has not at all
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MOHD. KOYA v. MUTHUKOYA (Fazal Ali, !.)
669
alleged or described the nature of the duties which the
appellant
performed as Chief Editor nor has he stated that a& Chief Editor he
was controlling the materials published in the paper so as to ascribe
constructive knowledge to him of the articles published in Chandrika.
All that the petitioner pleaded in his petition on this subject may be
extracted thus :-
"The respondent is the Chief Editor of Chandrika, a
daily newspaper published from Calicut. It is published by
the Muslim Printing and Publishing Company Limited. The
major shares of this company is owned by
the
Muslim
League Party and the respondent holds share
worth
of
Rs. 3 lakhs in the above company. The daily Chandrika is
the official organ of the Muslim League Party. It is submitted that in the daily Chandrika of which the respondent
is the Chief Editor, is published reports and articles appealing to the members of the Muslim community not to vote
for the candidates of the Muslim League (Opposition) in
the name of religi.on and community".
As regards the speech while the petitioner admitted that he did
make a speech as would appear from the extract Ex. P.1 (a)
but
denied that he ma.de any communal allegations against the
Janasangh but stated that some of the words used by him in the speech
were used purely in a figurative sense. When the appeal was heard
before us counsel for the parties agreed that the only · items
of
evidence which could be relied upon against the appellant were. (!)
his speech Ex. P.1 (a), (2) Cartoon Ex. P.5 ~nd (3) other offend-.
ing speeches and articles which were published in the paper of which
he was the Chief Editor. It was conceded by Dr. Chitale, counsel for
the petitioner that if he was not able to prove that the appellant was
really the Editor of the paper then the presumption under section 7
of the Press and Registration of Books Act 1867 (hereinafter called
the Press Act) would not apply and the case of the petitioner would
stand or fall on Ex. P .1 (a) and Exhibit P .5. It is also not disputed
that although the High Court has relied on a number of articles and
extract of speeches published in the various issues of Chandrika yet
none of these have been proved according to law by examining the
writer or the reporter or producing the original script of the paper.
If, therefore, the petitioner fails to establish that the appellant was
virtually the Editor of Chandrika or at any rate performed the duties
of the editor then no constructive knowledge of these articles can
be attributed to him.
The High Court framed the following issues : -
1. Whether the petition is maintainable ?
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 1 s.c.R.
2. Whether the election is vitiated by all or any of the
corrupt practices alleged in the petition? .
3. Regarding reliefs and costs.
As 1egards issue No. 1 the High Court held that the petition was
maintainable and decided this issue against the appellant. This finding has not been challenged by the appellant before us and we therefore affirm the same.
The main issue in the case was issue No. 2 and we should have
expected the High Court to have framed a more detailed issue giving
the nature and character of the corrupt practices
alleged
by
the
petitioner against the appellant in order to give a clear picture to the
parties regarding the matters which were to be decided by the court.
However, as both the parties understood what the allegations were
and proceeded to trial on that basis the vagueness of the issues framed
by the High Court has not caused any prejudice to any of the parties.
The main corrupt practice pleaded against the appellant by the
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petitioner and which has been vehemently argued before us is to be
found in paragraph 5 of the petition which is regarding the inflammatory speech Exhibit P.1 (a) said to have been made by the appellant and which according to the petitioner fell within the mischief of
section 123(3A) of the Act.
Another important averment made in the petition was in paraE
graph 11 of the petition which refers to the cartoon and may be
extracted thus :-
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"In Chandrika dated 12-3-1977 on the front page a
cartoon is published. It depicting J ansangh as a Pig and
-Shri E. M. Sankaran Namboodiripad, the Marxist Leader,
cutting to the flesh of the pig and serving it to the Mnslim.
This is an attempt to promote feelings of enmity and hatred
between different classes of citizens of India on grounds of
idigion. It is well known to eat pork is pardial ansthma
(haram) for true muslims. The publication of this cartoon
in Chandrika is with the consent and knowledge
of the
respondent, which promoted hatred of the Muslims against
the United Front of Marxist Party and Janata Party and
Muslim League (opposition) of which the petitioner is a
candidate from the concerned constituency".
It is clearly pleaded that the cartoon was published in Chandrika with
the consent and knowledge of the appellant. Thus, in other cases,
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consent and knowledge were not expressly pleaded by the petitioner,
who sought to rely only on the presumptions to be drawn
under
section 7 of the Press Act.
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MOHD. KOYA v. MUTHUKOYA (Fazal Ali, J.)
67 I
We shall first take up, therefore, the question whether the petitioner can avail of the presumption to be drawn under section 7 of
the Press Act. The High Court has found that in th~ circumstances of
the case, section 7 of the press Act fully applies to the facts of the
present case. We are however for the reasons that we shall give hereafter unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court.
Before dealing with the various provisions of the Press Act, it
may be necessary to divide this question into two parts : (1) the
legal aspect, and (2) the factual aspect. The legal aspect concerns
the effect of the various provisions of the Press Act and the extent
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of their applicability to the appellant. The actual aspect would take
within its fold the duties and responsibilities performed by the appelC
!ant as the Chief Editor. We will first take up the legal aspect.
The Preamble to the Press Act runs thus:-
"Whereas it is expedient to provide for the regulation
of printing-presses and of newspapers, for the presewatlon
of copies of every book and newspaper printed in India and
for the registration of such books and newspaper,
it
is
ht:reby enacted as follows" :
It would thus appear that the object of the Press Act was to regulate
printing presses and newspapers in order to preserve copies of newspapers and books. Moreover, in order to avoid multiplicity of suits
and uncertainties of liabilities, it was considered necessarv to choose
one of the persons from the staff and make him liable· for all the
articles or matters published in the paper so that any person aggrieved may sue only the person so named under the provisions of the
Press Act and is relieved from the necessity of making a fishing or
roving enquiry about persons who may have been individually responsible for the offencjing matters published in
the
paper.
Our
opinion in this regard is
however re-informed by
the
statement,
object and reasons accompanying the Press Act which may be extracted thus :-
"Whereas it is expedient to repeal the Indian Press
Act, 1910 and the newspapers (Incitements to
Offences)
Act, 1908, and to make further provision in the Press and
Registration of Books Act, 1867, for the liability of editors
of newspapers in civil and criminal proceedings and
to
make certain amendments in that Act in order to facilitate
the registration of printers and publishers; and to provide
in the Sea Customs Act, 1878, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, for the
seizure and disposal nf certain documents; it is lie re by
9-549 s Cil78
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 1 s.c.R.
encted as follows ·"
It was with this avowed object that the Press Act
clearlv
defines
'Editor' who has a clear legal stains under the Press Act. -Section 1
(1) of the Press Act defines 'Editor' thus :
"Editor" means the person who controls the selection
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of the matter that is published in a newspaper".
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Section 5 of the Press Act provides that no newspaper shall be published except in conformity with the rules hereinafter
laid
down.
Section 5 ( 1) runs thus :-
"Without prejudice to the provisions of section 3, every
copy of every such newspaper shall contain the names of
the owner and editor thereof printed clearly on such copy
and also the date of its publication".
It would thus be clear that under section 5 (1) of the Press Act the
legal requirement is that every newspaper shall contain the name of
the owner and the editor printed clearly, so that there is
no
confusion in the minds of the people on this account. Sub-section (2)
of section 5 of the Press Act makes it incumbent on the printer and
the publisher to appear before the authorities mentioned
m
that
section and make a declaration.
Sub-rule (2) of rule 8 of the Rules made under the Press Act runs
thus :
"Every copy of every newspaper shall
have printed
legibly on it the names of the printer, publisher, owner
and euitor and the place of its printing and publication in
the following form :
Printed by . . . . . . . . and published by . . . . . . . . . . on
behalf of . . . . . . . . . . (name of owner) . . . . . . . . . . and
printed at . . . . . . . . (place
of printing) . . . . . . . . and
published at . . . . . . . . (place
of
publication ....... .
Editor .......... "
This rule enjoins that the name of the printer, publisher, owner and
editor must be clearly indicated. The note to this rule is
extracted
thus:-
"Note : This form may be modified to suit the circumstances of each paper, for example, where the printer, publisher and owner are the same the imprint line can be
Printed, published and owned by ... , .. The editor's name,
however, should be given separately in every case".
This requires that the editor's name,
however,
should
be
given
separately in every case. Rule 6 requires every publisher to submit
an annual statement to the Press Registrar. It is not disputed in the
·~
MOHD. KOYA v. MUTHUKOYA (Fazal Ali, I.)
67 3
present case that this statement was not made by the appellant but
by P.W. 2 Aboobaker who was the editor, publisher and printer of
Chandrika.
The annual statement which has to be filed in form 2
contains one of the columns where the editor's name has to be shown.
Section 7 of the Press Act runs thus :-
\
"In any legal proceeding whatever, ,1s well
civil
as
criminal, the production of a copy of such declaration as is
aforesaid, attested by the seal of some (',ourt empowered
by this Act to have the custody of such declarations, or, in
the case of the editor, a copy of the newspaper containing
his name printed on it as that of the editor shall be held
j.
.
\
(unless the contrary be proved) to be sufficient evidence,
as against the person whose name shall be subscribed to
such declaration, or printed on such newspaper as the case
may be. that the said person was printer or publisher, or
printer and publisher (according as the words of the said
declaration may be) of every portion of every newspaper
whereof the title shall correspond with the title of the newspaper mentioned in the declaration or the editor of every
portion of that issue of the newspaper of which a copy is
produced".
•
Section 8(A) of the Press Act provides that where any person's
name has appeared as an editor in a paper although he was not an
editor he shall within two weeks of his becoming aware
that
his
name has been so published, appear before the District, Presidency
or Sub-Divisional Magistrate and make a declaration that his name
has been incorrectly published and get a certificate from the Magis-
-~ate that the provisions of section 7 shall not apply to him. It may
r be interesting to note the following facts here :-
l, That the issues of Chandrika
shown to us clearly
and unmistakably mention the name of Aboobaker as the
printer, publisher and editor of Chandrika and does not
mention the appellant as the Editor of
Chandriku. The
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appellant is merely shown as the Chief Editor but this is
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an officer which is not at all contemplated hy the Press Act.
2. That if the appellant was really the editor of the
paper then P.W. 2 Aboobaker ought to have resorted to
section 8 (A) to correct the mistake in the paper where his
name was shown as tbe editor but no such thing has been
done.
One the other hand, P.W. 2 Aboobaker tacitly and
clearly admits that he is the editor of the paper.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] l s.c.R.
3. That the petitioner has not at all pleaded in his petition the nature of the duties performed or responsibilities
shouldered by the appellant as Chief Editor. There is no
, averment at all in the petition that the appellant controls
the selection of matter that is published in the newspaper
which alone would make him an editor as defined in section
1 ( 1) of the Press Act. The word 'Chief Editor' is clearly
absent from the Press Act and in fact foreign to it because
the Press Act has selected only one
person who has a
special status and that is the editor who can be sued, if
necessary, or can sue and against whom alone a presumption under section 7 of the Press Act can be drawn.
While holding that the presumption under section 7 of the Press Act
is available to the petitioner, the High Court has completely overlooked the aforesaid aspects mentioned by us. The law on .the subject is absolutely clear and there are a number of decisions of this
Court which have interpreted the relevant sections of the Press Act.
In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Dr. R. R. Chowdhary &
Ors.(') this Court observed as follows :
•
"The term 'editor' is defined in the Act to mean a
,
J
,/
••
person who controls the selection of the matter that is published in a newspaper. Where there is mentioned an editor
as a person who is responsible for selection of the material
section 7 raises presumption in respect of such a person.
The name of that person has to be printed on the copy of
the newspaper and in the present case the name of Madane
admittedly as printed as the editor of the Maharashtra in
the copy of the Maharashtra which contained the defamatory
article. The declaration in Form I which has been produced
before us shows the name of Madane not only as the printer
and publisher bnt also as the editor. In our opiuion the
presumption will attach to Madane as having selected the
material for publication in the newspaper . . . . . . . . . . In
the circumstances not only the
presumption
cannot
be
drawn against the others who had not declared themselves
as editors of the newspaper but it is also fair to leave them
cut because they had no concern with the publishing of
the article in question".
~
I
(I) [1967] 3 S. C. R. 708.
MOHD. KOYA v. MUTHUKOYA (Fazal Ali, J.)
67 5
This case, therefore, clearly holds that where a person is not shown
in the paper to be its editor no such presumption under section 7 of
the Press Act can be drawn but it must be held that he has no con·
cern with the pubhshing of the. article.
To the same effect is another decision of this Court in the case of
D. P. Misra v. Kamal NaY(iin Sharma & Ors.(''). In this case which
was also an election matter a newspaper called Mahakoshal was
published from Raipur and one Shukla was registered as the printer,
publisher and editor with the Press
Registrar.
The
defence
of
\
Shukla was that he had appointed one Tarangi as the
editor of
' Mahakoshal in June 1962 and was not present at the relevant time.
•
This Court pointed out that the proceedings for naming a person who
is found responsible for publication of an offending matter and for
eonstituting a corrupt practice are in the nature of
quasi-criminal
proceedings. It follows therefore that being a corrupt practice it has
to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and not by the measure of
preponderance of probabilities.
The Court observed in this connec·
tion as follows :
"Section 7 raises a presumption that a person whose
name. is printed in a copy of a newspaper is the editor of
every portion of that issue.
The presumption must be rebutted by evidence .............. The presumption under
section 7 of the Press
and Registration of Books Act
undoubtedly arises, but in a charge .under section 123 ( 4)
of the Representation of the People Act the presumption
under ;ection 7 of the Press and Registration of
Books
Act, 1867 would come with greater or less force, accord-
'ing to the circumstances to the aid of a person claiming
that the editor was responsible for the publication and that
the publication was to the knowledge of editor".
"Granting that there was close
association
between
Mishra and Shukla and even granting that Mahakoshal was
exclusively carrying on propaganda on behalf of Mishra,
unless there is evidence to prove that Shukia had
either
authorised the publication of the offending matter, or had
undertaken to be responsible for all the publications made
in the Mahakoshal, no inference that the offending publications were made to the knowledge and with the consent
of Shukla may be raised".
"TI1e statement filed by Shukla is not inconsistent with
the case set up by him in this proceeding. Responsibility for
publication was accepted by him but be had clearly stated
(I) [1971] 3 S. C. R. 257
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676
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] l s.c.R.
that the publication of news-items from the correspondents
were attended. to by the Sub-editors and that he generally
laid down the policy of the newspaper and gave general
directions. He admitted
his
responsibility
because
he
personally had with knowledge published the article which
constituted contempt of Court".
We may mention here that in this case Shukla in his statement has
clearly stated that the publication of the news-items in the paper were
attended to by Sub-editors and he generally laid down the policy
of the newspaper and gave general directions. No such allegation /
or evidence is forthcoming in the instant case because it has neither j
been alleged nor proved that the appellant was in any way controlling selection of the matters published in the paper.
In the case of
Narasinjh
Charan
Mohanty
v.
Surendra
Mohanty(') this Court pointed' out that consent or agency could not
be inferred but had to be proved affirmatively like any other fact.
In this connection the Court observed as follows :--
"Consent or agency cannot be inferred from
remote
causes. Consent cannot be inferred from more close friendship or other relationship or political affiliation. As pointed
out in D. P. Mishra's case (snpra) however close the relationship unless there is evidence to prove that the person
publishing or writing the editorial was authorised by the
returned candidate or he had undertaken to be responsible
for all the publications, no consent can be inferred".
It was. further held in this case that the · presumption under section 7 of the Press Act is a rebuttable presumption and the so called
editor can rebut the presU.11.ption by showing that he had nothing to .
do with the publication of the editorial m the news report. In our'\
opinion, even if any presumption is sufficiently "'butted by him not
,
only from the evidence adduced by the appellant but also by the evidence adduced by the petitioner.
We shall presently deal with this
facet of the matter, namely the factual aspect of this question.
The
court further observed as follows :-
"When once it is established that neither the editorial
(ext. 1) nor the news report (Ext. 2) were published by
the respondent or by some one else with his consent or that
the speech alleged to be made by Biju Patnaik even if it
amounts to corrupt practice, was made without the consent
of the respondent, and that Biju Patnaik was not his agent.
It is unnecessary to consider the question
whether
the
---
(1) [1974] 2 S. C. R. 39.
'
\
y
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MOHD. KOYA v. MUTHUKOYA (Fazal Ali, J.)
677
editorial and the news report as well as the speech of Biju
Patnaik did in fact cO'llstitute corrupt practice under subsection (3) of section 123 of the Act".
As against this Dr. Chitale, counsel appearing for the petitioner
submitted two points before us. In the first place, he argued that the
provisions of rule 8 thereof have not at all been complied with, and,
therefore, the appellant cannot escape his liability even though he
was the Chief Editor. It was argued that the note to rule 8 as also
the form mentioned in rule 8 sub-rule (2) dearly provide that the
editor's name must be separately shown in every paper and in the
instant case the issue of the paper Chandrika shows in a composite
form that the editor, printer and publisher of the paper was P.W. 2
Aboobaker. It was thus contended that the provisions of rule 8(2)
have not been complied with because the name of the editor has not
been separately shown. In these circumstances, it was argued that
as the name of the Chief Editor was separately shown he must be
taken to be the editor of the paper under the provisions
of
the
Press Act and the rules made thereunder. We are however unable
to accept this argument. In the first place, the paper clearly shows
the name ot the editor as Aboobaker. As the printer, publisher and
the editor was one and the same person it cannot be said that merely
because the name of the editor was not shown at a separate place
he was absolved of his responsibilities as the editor. The intention of
the rule is merely to clarify who the editor of the paper is and once
this is shown then there is a substantial though not a literal compliance of the rule. Secondly, the Press Act does not recognise any
other legal entity except the editor insofar as the responsibilities of
that office are concerned. Therefore, mere mention of the name of
the Chief Editor is neither here nor there, nor does it in any way
attract the provisions of the Press Act particularly section 7. Thirdly,
it is not even pleaded in the petition, much less proved,
that
the
appellant being the Chief Editor, it was part of his duty to edit the
paper and control the selection of the matter that was published in
the newspaper which rn fact has been demonstrably disproved
by
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the appellant. Thus, we are unable to accept the finding of the High . G
Court that any presumption under section 7 of the Press Act can be
drawn against the appellant.
This brings us to the factual aspect of the matter. In this connectfon, the definite case of the appellant is that although he has been
shown as the Chief Editor of Chandrika he was not at all connected
H
with any editorial function but his name was lent tll the paper because
of his past services to Chandrika and because he used to get lot of
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678
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 1 s.c.R.
money for this paper being an influential man. This has been proved
not only by the evidence led by the appellant but also by the
evidence adduced by the petitioner.
Before taking the evidence on this point we might
mention a
few adrnittec\ facts which loom large in our minds (I) that !lie petitioner proceeds on the footing in his petition that the appellant was
the Chief Editor and no where he has been mentioned as th-e editor
of Chandrika, (2) there is no pleading by the petitioner that
the
appellant was an editor within the meaning of section 1 (I) of
the
Press Act particularly when the paper Chandrika was the pivot and
the sheet anchor of his case and which clearly showed that the appel•
!ant was not the editor but P.W. 2 Aboobaki!r was
officially
and
factually the editor of the paper and yet there is no positive denial
of this fact in the petition; (3) no particulars of the functions, duties
and powers of the appellant as Chief Editor have been pleaded. On
the other liand, it has been pleaded that the appellant held shares
worth Rs. 3 lakhs in the company but that will not attract the provisions of the Press Act at all; and ( 4) as Aboobaker was admittedly the editor of the paper Chandrika as clearly admitted by the petitioner himself in his evidence, the onus was clearly on the petitioners
to allege and prove that the duties of the editor were actually performed not by P.W. 2 Aboobaker but by the appellant. In this background wc would now discuss the evidence of the parties on this
point.
P.W. I Thangal (Petitioner) categorically stales thus:-
"V. C. Aboobaker is the editor and printer of Chandrika".
He further admits that Aboobaker's responsibility is to submit the
reports and the speeches supplied by the appellant. He also admitted
that Ab0obaker does the editing. The witness no doubt says that he
had seen the appellant in the Chandrika office twice but that by itself would not show that the appellant was the editor of the paper.
Strong reliance was placed by counsel for the petitioner on the
statement of P.W. 1 to the effect that the appellant was doing
the
day-to-day editorial work of Chandrika.