# Hamam Das v. State of U.P. A.LR. 1961 S.C. 1662, 1666--dictum applied

- **Citation:** [1977] 1 S.C.R. 616
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1976-09-16
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 291 of 1971
- **Bench:** P. N. Bhagwati, V. R. Krishna Iyer, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/hamam-das-v-state-of-u-p-a-lr-1961-s-c-1662-1666-dictum-applied-6967
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Code of Criminal Procedure, S. 99-A-Scope of-Whether 'Stutonent of
grounds' a mandatory provision.
The appellant Government passed an order under Section 99-A of the
Cr. P.C., for the forfeiture of a book entitled 'Ramayan : A true Reading' i.1
English and its translation in Hindi, by Periyar EVR, of Tamil Nadu, on the
ground that the book intended to outrage the religious feelings of a class of
citizens of India, namely, the Hindus. Thereupon, an application was made
by the respondent publisher of the book, under Section 99-C of the Code. to
the High Court, which by its special Bench, allowed the application and quashed
the notification on the ground that the State Government had failed to state
the grounds of its opinion as required in Section 99-A of the Code.
The appella,nt contended that a specific statement of grounds by the Government. is not a mandatory requirement under Section 99-A of the Cr.P.C., &
that it can be made by implication.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD : To relieve the State from the duty to state grounds of forfeiture, is
to permit raptorial opportunity for use of such power over people's guaranteed .
liberty. Section 99-A says that you must state the ground and it is no answer
to say that they need not be stated because they are implied. An order may
be brief but not a blank.
A formal authoritative setting forth of the grounds
is statutorily mandatory. Section 99-C enables the aggrieved party to apply to
the High Court to set aside the prohibitory order and the Court examines the
grounds of Government given in the order. The Court cannot make a roving
enquiry beyond the
grounds setforth in the
order and if the
grounds are
altogether left out, the valuable right of appeal to the Court is defeated. [6100-H,
620B-C, G-HJ
Hamam Das v. State of U.P. A.LR. 1961 S.C. 1662, 1666--dictum applied.
•
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Scheneck v. U.S. (1918) 249 U.S. 47, 52==63 L.ed. 470. 473-474;-Abrams
"'-
v. U.S. (1919) 250 U.S. 616, 629==63 L.ed. 1173, 1180; Bowm,•11 v. Secular
Society Ltd. (1917) A.C. 406, 466-7; Arun Ranjan Ghosh v. State of WeM Bengal
(I.L.R. 1957 2 Cal., 396), Jwalamukhi v. State of A.P. (I.L.R. 1973 A.P. 114)
referred to.
Mohammad Khalid v. Chief Commissioner (A.LR. 1968 Delhi 18 FB)
Chinna Annamalai v. State (A.I.R. 1971 Madras 448 F.B.), Bc1111e1 Coleman &
•G
Co. v. State of J & K (1974 .T & K L.R. 591) approved.
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## Text

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\':i 16
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
I'.
LALAI SINGH YADAV
September 16, 1976
[P. N. BHAGWATI, V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND
S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.J
Code of Criminal Procedure, S. 99-A-Scope of-Whether 'Stutonent of
grounds' a mandatory provision.
The appellant Government passed an order under Section 99-A of the
Cr. P.C., for the forfeiture of a book entitled 'Ramayan : A true Reading' i.1
English and its translation in Hindi, by Periyar EVR, of Tamil Nadu, on the
ground that the book intended to outrage the religious feelings of a class of
citizens of India, namely, the Hindus. Thereupon, an application was made
by the respondent publisher of the book, under Section 99-C of the Code. to
the High Court, which by its special Bench, allowed the application and quashed
the notification on the ground that the State Government had failed to state
the grounds of its opinion as required in Section 99-A of the Code.
The appella,nt contended that a specific statement of grounds by the Government. is not a mandatory requirement under Section 99-A of the Cr.P.C., &
that it can be made by implication.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD : To relieve the State from the duty to state grounds of forfeiture, is
to permit raptorial opportunity for use of such power over people's guaranteed .
liberty. Section 99-A says that you must state the ground and it is no answer
to say that they need not be stated because they are implied. An order may
be brief but not a blank.
A formal authoritative setting forth of the grounds
is statutorily mandatory. Section 99-C enables the aggrieved party to apply to
the High Court to set aside the prohibitory order and the Court examines the
grounds of Government given in the order. The Court cannot make a roving
enquiry beyond the
grounds setforth in the
order and if the
grounds are
altogether left out, the valuable right of appeal to the Court is defeated. [6100-H,
620B-C, G-HJ
Hamam Das v. State of U.P. A.LR. 1961 S.C. 1662, 1666--dictum applied.
•
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Scheneck v. U.S. (1918) 249 U.S. 47, 52==63 L.ed. 470. 473-474;-Abrams
"'-
v. U.S. (1919) 250 U.S. 616, 629==63 L.ed. 1173, 1180; Bowm,•11 v. Secular
Society Ltd. (1917) A.C. 406, 466-7; Arun Ranjan Ghosh v. State of WeM Bengal
(I.L.R. 1957 2 Cal., 396), Jwalamukhi v. State of A.P. (I.L.R. 1973 A.P. 114)
referred to.
Mohammad Khalid v. Chief Commissioner (A.LR. 1968 Delhi 18 FB)
Chinna Annamalai v. State (A.I.R. 1971 Madras 448 F.B.), Bc1111e1 Coleman &
•G
Co. v. State of J & K (1974 .T & K L.R. 591) approved.
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CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 291
of 1971.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
19-1-1971 of .the Allahabad High Court in Crl. Misc. Case No. 412/
70).
D. P. Uniyal and 0. P. Rana, for the Appellant.
S . .N. Singh, for the Respondent.
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UTTAR PRADESH v. LALA! SINGH YADAV (Krishna Iyer, J.)
617
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J. Some cases, apparently innocent on their face-
:and this appeal is one such-may harbour beneath the surface profoundly disturbing problems concerning freedoms, the unfettered enjoyment of which is the foundation for a democracy to flourish.
A
The present appeal, by special leave, relates to the forfeiture or a
B
book captioned 'Ramayan : A True Reading' in English and its translation in Hindi, by the late political figure and leader of the Rationalist
Movement, Periyar EVR, of Tamil Nadu, by an order of the State
<Government of Uttar Pradesh, purporting to be passed under s. 99A -
of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
In the view of the appcllantgovernment this book was sacrilegiously, outrageously
objectionable,
being 'deliberately and maliciously intended to outrage the religious
C
feelings of a class of ctizens of India, viz., Hindus by insulting their
religion and religious beliefs and the publication whereof is punishable
under s. 295A IPC'.
This notification contained an appendix setting
out in tabular form the particulars of the relevant pages and lines in the
English and Hindi versions which, presumably, were the materials
which were regarded as scandalizing. Thereupon an application was
made by the respondent who was the publisher, under s. 99C of the
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Code, to the High Court which, by its special Bench, allowed the
application and quashed the notification.
The aggrieved
State has
appea.Jed to this Court, by special leave, and counsel for the appellant
has urged before us that the Government notification does· not suffer
from the vice which, according to the High Court, invalidated it and
that the impugned book makes a foul assault on the sacred sentiments
of the vast Hindu population of the State since the author anthematised
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in unvarnished language the great incarnations like Sree Rama and
disdainfully defiled the divinely epic figures like Sita and Janaka all of
whom are worshipped or venerated by the Hindu commonalty. Sidestepping this issue the High Court, by majority judgment, struck down
the order on the short ground that 'the State Government did not state
the grounds of its opinion as required in s. 99A of the Code. For that
reason alone the petition has to be allowed and the order of forfeiture
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set aside in Court'.
The anatomy of s. 99A falls to be studied at the threshold so that
the pathology, if any, of the impugned order may be discovered. Shorn
of phraseological redundancies (from the point raised in this case) the
pertinent components of the provision, empowering forfeiture of materials manifesting written expression by citizens, are threefold, as flow
G
from a reproduction of the relevant parts :
"99-A(l)-Where-
(a) any newspaper, or book ... or
(b) any document,
wherever printed, appears to the 'State Government to contain any . . . . or any matter which promotes or is intended
to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 S.C.R.
classes of the citizens of India or which is deliberately and
maliciously intended to outrage the religious feelings of any
such class by insulting the religion or the religious beliefs of
that c:ass, that is to say, any matter the publication of which
is punishable under
section 124-A or Section
153-A or
Section 295-A of the Indian Penal Code, the State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, stating the
grounds of its opinion, declare every copy of the issue of the
newspaper containing such matter, and every copy of such
book or other document to be forfeited to Government. .. "
•
The triple facets of a valid order therefore are :
(i) that the book or document contains any matter;
•
(ii) such matter promotes or is intended to promote feelings of
enmity or' hatred between different classes of the citizens
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of India; and
(iii) a statement of the grounds of Government's oinion.
Thereupon the State Government may, by notification, declare every
·.:opy of the issue containing such matter to be forfeited.
Does the present notificati01! fulfil the third requisite of legal viability or is it still-born, being mortally wounded by absence of the statement of grounds ? The High Court holding this vital ingredient
missing, has voided the order, but Sri Uniyal, counsel for the State,
submits that though there is no express enunciation of the grounds for
Government's opinion, the appendix makes up for it. He argues that
the numbers of the pages and Jines of the offending publication supply
both the 'matter' and the 'grounds', the latter being so patent that the·
omission is inconsequential.
More explicitly, the c;:ontention is that a
mere reference to the inatter, sufficiently particularised, functionally
supplies, by implicit reading or necessary implication, the legal requirement of statement of grounds. The office of furnishing the reason or
foundation for the governmental conclusion is substantially, though
not formally, fulfilled where the appendix, an integral part 'of the order.
sets out self-speaking materials.
When the grounds are selt-evident,
silence is wispered speech and the law does not demand their separate
spelling out as a ritualistic formality.
The counter-contention is that
express conditions for barricading the fundamcnta1 freedoms of expre~
sion designedly imposed by the Code cannot be whittled down by the
convenient doctrine of implication, the right being too basic
to
be
manecled without strict and manifest compliance with the specific
stipulations of the provision.
After all fundamental rights are fundamental in a free Republic, except in times of national emergency, where
rigorous restraints, constitutionally sanctioned, are
clamped
down.
We are dealing with the Criminal Procedure Code and Penal Code and
these laws operate at an times.
We have therefore to interpret the
law in such a manner that liberties have plenary play, subject of course
to the security needs of the nation, as set out in the Constitution and'
the laws.
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UTTAR PRADESH v. LALA! SINGH YADAV (Krishna Iyer, J.)
G 19
'
.
Even so, counsel for the appellant contends that the references m
the forfeited book, as indicated in the appendix to the order, are so
loudly repulsive and malevolently calumnous of Sree Rama, Sita and
Janaka that the court must vicariously visualize the outraged feelings
of the Hindus of Uttar Pradesh and held that the grounds are written
in the order in invisible ink.
When we assess the worth of this submission we have to notice
(a) the constitutional perspective, i.e.,
whether the basic freedoms are sought to be legally handcuffed; and
(b) t.he existence of alternative possibilities of popular understanding
of the prescribed publication which necessitate some statement of the
circumstances and the reasons \Vhich induced the government in the
given conditions of ethos and otherwise to reach the opinion it has
recorded.
A
B
The State, in India, is secular and does not take sides with one
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religion or other prevalent in our pluralistic society. It has no direct
concern with the faiths of the people but is deeply obligated not merely
to preserve and protect society against breaches of the peace and
violations of public order but also to create.conditions where the sentimenJs and feelings of people of diverse or opposing beliefs and bigotries
are not so molested by ribald writings or offensive publications os to ·
provoke or outrage groupS' (nto possible violent action. Essentially,
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good government necessitates ·peace and security and whoever violates
by bombs or books societal tranquillity will become target cf legal
interdict by the State.
We propose to view the issue before us both from the textual angle
and from the larger standpoint and are led to the conclusion, . ·by an
interaction of both, that the Hi!!h Court was not wrong and the appeal
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must fail.
The various High Courts in India have had occasion to
consider this question but have come to divergent conclusions as will
presently appear.
A drastic .restriction on the rieht of a citizen when imposed by
statute, calls for a strict construction, especially when quasi-penal
cmisequences also ensue.
The imperial authors of the Criminal ProF
cedure Code have drawn up s. 99A with concern for· the· subject and
cautionary mandates to government. The power can be exercised only
in the manner and accordin)? to the procedure laid down by the ·law.
Explicitly the section compels the government to look at the matter
which calls for action to consider it as to the clear and present danger
it constitutes in the shape of promoting feelings of enmity and hatred
between different segments of citizens or as to its strong tendency or
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intendment to outrage the reli)!ious feelings of such seements (there
are other proclivities also stated it!. the section with which we are not
concerned for the present.purpose) and, quite importantly, to state
the grounds of its opinion. We are concerned with the last ingredient.
When the section says that you must state the grounds it is no answer
to say that they need not be stated because they are implied. You do
not slate a thing when you are expressively silent about it. To state
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'is to declare· or to set forth, esrecially in a precise, formal or authoritative manner: to say (something), especially in an emphatic way
t~
a~rt' (Random House Dictionary).
The conclusion is inescapab'e
8-l234SCI/76
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 S.C.R.
that a formal authoritative setting forth of the grounds is statutorily
mandatory.
If you laze and omit, the law visits the order with voidness and this the State Government must realize especially because
forefeiture of a book for a penal offence is a serious matter, not a
routine act to be executed with unconcern or indifference. The wages
of neglect is invalidity, going by the text _of the Code.
These considerations are magnified in importance when we regard the changeover
from the Raj to the Republic and the higher value assigned to the great
rights of the people. Where there is a statutory duty to speak, silence
is lethal sin for a good reason disclos.ed by the scheme of the fasciculus
of sections. For s. 99C enables the aggrieved ·party to apply to the High
Court to set aside the prohibitory order and the Court examines the
grounds of Government given in the order and affirms or upsets it.
The Court cannot make a roving enquiry beyond the grounds set forth
in the order and if the grounds are altogether left out what is the
Court to examine? And, by this omission, careless or calculated, the
valuable right of appeal to the Court is defeated.
A construction of
the section, fraught with such pernicious consequence and tampering
with the basic structure of the statutory remedy, must be frowned upon
. by the Court if the liberty to publish is to be restricted only to the
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limited extent the law allows. This reasoning is reinforced by Harnam
. Das v. State of U.P.(1) wherein this Court observed:
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"What then is to ha_ppen when the Government did not
state the grounds of its opinion ? In such a case if the High
Court upheld the order, it may be that it would have done so
for reasons which the Government did not have in contemplation at all. If the High Court did that, it would really
have made an order of forfeiture itself and not upheld such
an order made by the Government. This, as already stated,
the High Court has no power to do under s. 99-D. It seems
clear to us, therefore, that in such a case the High Court must
set aside the order under s. 99-D, for it cannot then be
satisfied that the grounds given by the Government justified
the order. You cannot be satisfied about a thing which you
do not know."
We do not mean to say that the grounds or reasons linking the
primary facts with the forfeiter's opinion must be stated at learned
length. That depends. In some cases, a laconic statement may be
enough, in others a longer ratiocination may be proper but never !aches
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to the degree of taciturnity.
An order may be brief but not a blank.
This conclusion establishes a constitutional rapport between the
penal section 99A and the fundamental right Art._ 19. To relieve the
State from the duty to state grounds of forfeiture, in the face of the
words of s. 99A, is to permit raptorial opportunity for use of such
power over people's guaranteed liberty. Why do we say so ? Surely,
H
security of the State and peace of society demand restrictions on individual rights and we are the slaves of the Jaw that we may be free.
(!) A.LR. 1961 S.C. 1662, 1666.
•
'UTTAR PRADESH v. LALA! SINGH YADAV (Krishna Iyer, J.)
621
The fighting faith of our founding fathers respected Mills' famous
statement and Voltaire's inspired assertion. We quote :
"If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and
only one person were of the contrary opinion,
mankind
would be no more justified in silencing that one person than
he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind."
(Mill in his essay 'on Liberty', pp.
19-20 :
Thinker's
Library ed., Watts)
"I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the
death your right to say it."
(Attributed to Voltaire in S. G. Tallentyre, The Friends of
Voltaire, 1907)
Rights and responsibilities are a complex system and the framers
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.of our Constitution, aware of the grammar of anarchy, wrote down
:reasonable restrictions on libertarian exercise of
freedoms.
Dr.
Ambedkar, in the Constituent Assembly, argued that it is incorrect
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.to say that fundamental rights are absolute and quoted from Gitlow
11. New York two self-speaking passages:
"It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the
freedom of speech and of the press, which is secured by the
Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speak or
publisb, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or
an unrestricted and unbridled licence that gives immunity
for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom."
x
x
x
x
x
. x
x
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"That a State in the exercise of its police power may
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punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical
to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, invite to crime or disturb the public peace, is not open to
,question ..... "
Section 99A of the Code, construed in this candescent constitutional conspectus, bears out our interpretation.
In the interests
of
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public order and public peace, public power comes into play
not
because the heterodox few must be suppressed to placate the orthodox
many but because everyone's cranium must be saV!ed from mayhem
before his cerebrum can have chance to simmer.
Hatred, outrage
and like feelings of large groups may have crypto-violent proneness
and the State, in its well-grounded judgment, may prefer to stop the
circulation of the book to 'preserve safety and peace in society.
No
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enlightened State, would use this power to suppress advanced economic views, radical rational criticisms or fearless exposure of primitive
.obscurantism but ordered security is
a constitutional value wisely to
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1977] 1 S.C.1'.
be safeguarded if progressives and regressi ves are to peacefully coexist.
This is the spirit of s. 99A of the Code.
The actual exercise
will depend not on doctrinnaire logic but practical wisdom.
While
the American theory of clear and present danger as the basis of restriction on fundamental rights does not necessarily apply in India,
the illuminating observations of Holmes J., serve to educate the administrator and Judge.
In Sclzeneck v. U.S.(') Holmes J drove home
the true test :
"We admit that in many places and in ordinary time~
the defendants, in saying all that was said in the circular,
would have been within their constitutional rights.
But the
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in
which it is done. . .
The law's stringent protection of free
speech, would not protect a man in falsely shouting 'fire'
in a theatre, and causing panic. It does not even protect a
man from an injunction against uttering words that may
have all the effect of force ... The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substaative evil that Congress has a right to prevent.
It is a question of proximty
and degree."
Developing this theory in a famous passage in Abrams v. U.S.(") he
said :
"Persecution, for the expression of opinions, seems to
me perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your
heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep
away all opposition.
To allow opposition by speech seems
to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a
man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not
care whole-heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either
your power or your premises.
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations
of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market; and that truth is the only ground
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
That,
at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution.
It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment."
Again, in Bowmen v. Secular Society Ltd.,( 3 ) Lord Summer underscored the dyaamism of liberty and safety at
once luminous and
elegant, in a purple passage :
(1) (1918) 249 U.S.47. 52=63 L. E.d. 470. 473-474.
(2) (1919) 250 U.S. 616, 629 =63 L. ed. 11.73, 1180.
(3) (1917) A.C. 406, 466-7.
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•UTTAR PRADESH v. LALA! SINGH YADAV (Krishna Iyer, !.)
623
'The words, as well as the acts, which tend to endanger
society differ from time to time in proportion as society is
stable or insecure in fact, or is believed by its reasonable
members to be open to assault.
In the present day meetings or processions are held lawful which a hundred and fifty
years ago would have been deemed seditious and this is not
because the law is weaker or has changed, but because, the '
times having changed, society is stronger than before.
In
the present day reasonable men do not apprehend the dis-
.solution or downfall of society because religion is publicly
assailed by methods not scandalous.
Whether it is possible
.that in the future irreligious attacks, designed to undermine
fundamental institutions of our society, may come to be
·criminal in themselves, as constituting a public danger, is a
matter that does not arise.
The fact that opinion grounded
on experience has moved one way does not in law preclude
the possibility of its moving on fresh 'experiences in
the
other; nor does it bind succeeding generations, when conditions have again changed.
After all, the question whether
a given opinion is a danger to society is a question of the
times and is a question of fact.
I desire to say nothing that
would limit the right of society to protect itself by process of
law from the dangers of the moment, whatever that right
may be, but only to say that, experience having proved dangers once thought real to be now negligible, and dangers
once very possibly imminent to have now
passed
away,
there is nothing in the general rules as to blasphemy and
irreligion ... which prevents us from varying their application to the particular circumstances of our time ni accordance with that experience."
Such is our constitutional scheme, such the jurisprudential dynamics and philosophical underpinnings of freedom and restraint, a
delicate area of fine confluence of law and . politics which judges by
duty have to deal with.
The journey's end has now arrived.
Government has the power
and responsibility to preserve societal peace and to forfeit publications
which endanger it.
But what is thereby prevented is freedom
of
e:xpression, that promoter of the permanent interests of human progress.
Therefore, the law (s. 99A) fixes the mind of the Administration to the obligation to reflect on the need to restrict and to state
the grounds which ignite its action.
To flail here is to fault the orda.
That is about all.
Before concluding, we clarify that we express no view on the
merits of the book or its provocative vitriol.
It depends on a complex of factors.
What offends a primitive people may be laughable
for progressive communities.
What is outrageous heresay for one
religion or sect or country or time may be untouchably holy
for
another.
Some primitive people may still be outraged by the admonition of Swami Vivekananda :
'Our religion is in the kitchen,
our
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[ 1977] 1 S.C.R.
God is the cooking pot, and our religion is 'don't touch me, r am
holy' (quoted at p. 339 by Jawaharlal Nehru in Discovery of India).
The. rule of h~man ~~vance is free thought and expression but the
surv~val of society enJ?ms reasonable curbs where public interest calls
~or. 1!.
Th~ balance 1s struck by governmental wisdom overseen by
Judicial review.
We speak not of emergency situations nor of cons·
titutionally sanctified special prescriptions but of ordinary times and
of ordinary laws.
A parting thought which we put to appellant's counsel may be
stated here. If the State Government, judging by current circumstances, feels impelled to invoke s. 99A against the book in question
it is free to do so, subject of course to fulfilment of the requirement
to state the grounds of its opinion and the operation of s. 99C of the
Code.
Our detailed discussion disposes of'the question of law and resolves
the conflict immanent or apparent in the rulings of the various High
Courts ranged against each other.
They are : Arun Ranjan Ghose
v. The State of West Bengal('); and Jwalamukhi v. State of A.P.C)
.,_
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which support the view propounded by the appellant; and Mohammad
Khalid v. Chief Commissioner('); China Annamalai v. State(') and
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Bennet Coleman & Co. Ltd v. Stdte of J & K(') which held with the
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Allahabad judgment under appeal.
Perhaps there is no need to discuss the ratio in each of the above cases as the rival points of view
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have been already covered in the earlier part of this judgment.
The possible invocation of the powers under s. 99A of the Code
of Criminal Procedure by various State Governments on several occasions induces us to enter a caveat.
Basic unity amidst diversity notwithstanding, India is a land of cultural contrarities, co-existence of
many religions and anti-religions, rationalism and bigotry, prim.itive
cults and materialist doctrines.
The compulsions of history
and
geography and the assault of modern science on the retreating forces
of medieval ways-a mosaic like tapestry of lovely and
unlovely
strands-have made large and liberal tolerance of mutual criticism,
even though expressed in intemperate diction, a necessity of life. Governments, we are confident, will not act in hubris, but will weigh these
hard facts of our society while putting into operation the harsh directives for forfeiture.
From Galileo and Darwin, Thoreau and Ruskin
to Karl Marx, H. G. Wells, Barnard Shaw and Bertrand Russel, many
1rrcat thinkers have been objected to for their thoughts
and
state-
~1ents-avoiding for a moment great Indians from Manu to Nehru.
Even today, here and there, die-hards may be found in ~ur country
who are offended by their writings but no Government will be antediluvian enough to invoke the power to seize their great writings because a few fanatics hold obdurate views on them.
·--
-----·--
~· (Ol.L.R. [1957] 2 Cal. 396.
(2;i I.L.R. [1973] A.P. 114.
(3) AIR 1968 Delhi 18 (F.B.).
(4) AIR 1971 Mqdrns 448 (FB).
(5) 1974 J & K L.R. 591.
•
f
"'
(._
.,,
•·
UTTAR PRADESH v. LALA! SINGH YADAV (Krishna lyer, J.)
625
A well-known Mao thought aptly expresses the liberalist approach
to divergent schools of philosophy :
"Letting a hundred flowers blossom
and a
hundred
schools of thought contend is the policy for promoting the
progress of the arts and sciences."
Hai:9ld Laski, who influenced many Indian progressives, in his 'A
Grammar of Politics' states a lasting truth :
•'•
"There is never sufficient certitude in social matters to
make it desirable for any government to denounce it in the
name of the State.
American experience of the last
few
years has made it painfully clear that there will nevei; be present in constituted authority a sufficient nicety of discrimination to make it certain that the opinion attacked is one
reasonably certain to give rise to present disorder."
x
x
x
x
"It is, no answer to this view to urge that it is the coronation of disorder. If views which imply violence have a
sufficient hold upon the State to disturb its
foundations,
there is something radically wrong with the habits of that
State."
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
"Almost always-there are rare cases in which persecution has proved successful-the result of free expression
is such a mitigation of the condition attacked as to justify
its use; almost always,' also, to prohibit free speech is to drive
the agitation underground.
What made Voltaire dangerous
to France was not his election to the Academy, but his voyage'
to England.
Lenin was infinitely more dangerous to Czarist
Russia in Switzerland than he would,have been in the Dume.
Freedom of speech, in fact, with the freedom of assembly
therein implied, is at once the kathersis of discontent and
the condition of necessary reform.
A government can always learn more from the criticism of its opponents than
from the eulogy of its supporters.
To stifle that criticism
is-at least ultimately-to prepare its own destruction."
A note of circumspection.
In the current context of constitutionally proclaimed emergency, the laws have perforce to act in the
narrow limits inscribed in the Emergency provisions and this decision
relates to the pre-Emergency legal order.
We dismiss the appeal.
A
B
c
D
E
F·
G
M.R.
Appeal dismissed
H