# HANSRAJ H. JAIN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1993] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 216
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1993-07-14
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 3225 of 1993
- **Bench:** K. Jayachandra Reddy, G.N. Ray
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/hansraj-h-jain-v-state-of-maharashtra-and-ors-11948
- **Pages:** 21

## Headnote

Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
Sections 4, 6, l JA-Land acquisition-Acquisition of huge tracts of
C land for setting up township of New Bombay-Delay in acquisition proceedings-Effect of-Held, proceedings completed within time frame under Section II-A cannot be negatived on ground of inordinate delay even though
when acquisition started there was no time frame for completing the
same-Directions for allotting alternate sites to even those land owners whose
petitions had earlier been dismissed by this Cowt.
D
The respondent State issued notices under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 between February 1968 and February 1970 in order
to acquire huge tracts of land, covering 86 villages adjoining the city of
Bombay for the purpose of setting up a new township to be known as New
E . Bombay. Declarations under Section 6 of the Act were issued in 1971 and
1972. The acquisition proceedings were concluded by giving awards in 1985
and 1986. Validity of the acquisition was challenged ~y filing several writ
petitions which were dismissed by the High Court. The land owners filed
the appeal~ by special leave.
F
The appellants contended that (1) the acquisition proceedings were
invalid· on account of the inordinate delay in completing th& proceedings,
and the same could not be brought to life by making award within the
stipulated time with the help of Section 11-A of the Act; (2) the purported
acquisition proceedings were a colourable device in order to peg the price
G of the land as prevailing on the date of notification and were initiated
without framing a scheme or plan and without considering the actual
requirement; (3) non-exclusion of land comprising Gaothan, houses contiguous thereto and hamlets containing not less than ten households from
acquisition proceedings as per avowed policy of the Government was illegal
and void and; (4) in the event of the acquisition proceedings being held as
H valid, directions be issued for allotment o{ alternative plots as per the
216
H.H.JAIN v. STATEOFMAHARASHTRA
217
scheme formulated by the State Government in 1976 so that no effect to A
acquisition should be given without making the plots available to the
affected parties.
Dismissing the appeals, this Court
HELD: 1.1. The acquisition proceedings were not ma/a fide or invalid B
despite the lamentable delay caused in completing the same. The area
proposed to be developed into New Bombay is a very large area and the
lands appertained to about 86 villages. It is reasonably expected that
substantial time would be required for detailed planning for the develop·
ment of the area. Besides, about 25000 objection petitions had to be C
disposed of against the proposed acquisition. In a project of this magnitude, substantial time is required to complete the acquisition proceedings. [231-H; 232-A; 233-A-B)
Aflatoon and Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors., [1975) 1 SCR
802, relied on.
D
1.2. In view of the provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition
Act it cannot be said that the acquisition proceedings cannot be completed
within time frame under the Section even thought when acquisition
proceedings were started, there was no time frame for competing the same.
Acquisition proceedings completed within the time frame under Section E
11-A cannot be negatived on the ground of inordinate delay.
[233-D-E; 234-B]
Kaliyappan v. State of Kera/a & Ors., [1989) 1 SCC 113 and Gujarat
State Corporation v. Valiji Mulji Soneji and Ors., [1973) SCR 905, relied on.
F
2.1. It cannot be said that there was no planning for development of
acquired area and the acquisition proceedings were intitiated casually.
Goverment's decision to set ·up the new township by acquiring the land
appertaining to 86 villages was based on reports of expert committees. In G
order to develop the huge urban complex the Government brought into
force the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, and established 'City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra
Limited'. Ther

## Text

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A
HANSRAJ H. JAIN
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.
JULY 14, 1993
B
[K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY AND G.N. RAY, JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
Sections 4, 6, l JA-Land acquisition-Acquisition of huge tracts of
C land for setting up township of New Bombay-Delay in acquisition proceedings-Effect of-Held, proceedings completed within time frame under Section II-A cannot be negatived on ground of inordinate delay even though
when acquisition started there was no time frame for completing the
same-Directions for allotting alternate sites to even those land owners whose
petitions had earlier been dismissed by this Cowt.
D
The respondent State issued notices under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 between February 1968 and February 1970 in order
to acquire huge tracts of land, covering 86 villages adjoining the city of
Bombay for the purpose of setting up a new township to be known as New
E . Bombay. Declarations under Section 6 of the Act were issued in 1971 and
1972. The acquisition proceedings were concluded by giving awards in 1985
and 1986. Validity of the acquisition was challenged ~y filing several writ
petitions which were dismissed by the High Court. The land owners filed
the appeal~ by special leave.
F
The appellants contended that (1) the acquisition proceedings were
invalid· on account of the inordinate delay in completing th& proceedings,
and the same could not be brought to life by making award within the
stipulated time with the help of Section 11-A of the Act; (2) the purported
acquisition proceedings were a colourable device in order to peg the price
G of the land as prevailing on the date of notification and were initiated
without framing a scheme or plan and without considering the actual
requirement; (3) non-exclusion of land comprising Gaothan, houses contiguous thereto and hamlets containing not less than ten households from
acquisition proceedings as per avowed policy of the Government was illegal
and void and; (4) in the event of the acquisition proceedings being held as
H valid, directions be issued for allotment o{ alternative plots as per the
216
H.H.JAIN v. STATEOFMAHARASHTRA
217
scheme formulated by the State Government in 1976 so that no effect to A
acquisition should be given without making the plots available to the
affected parties.
Dismissing the appeals, this Court
HELD: 1.1. The acquisition proceedings were not ma/a fide or invalid B
despite the lamentable delay caused in completing the same. The area
proposed to be developed into New Bombay is a very large area and the
lands appertained to about 86 villages. It is reasonably expected that
substantial time would be required for detailed planning for the develop·
ment of the area. Besides, about 25000 objection petitions had to be C
disposed of against the proposed acquisition. In a project of this magnitude, substantial time is required to complete the acquisition proceedings. [231-H; 232-A; 233-A-B)
Aflatoon and Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors., [1975) 1 SCR
802, relied on.
D
1.2. In view of the provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition
Act it cannot be said that the acquisition proceedings cannot be completed
within time frame under the Section even thought when acquisition
proceedings were started, there was no time frame for competing the same.
Acquisition proceedings completed within the time frame under Section E
11-A cannot be negatived on the ground of inordinate delay.
[233-D-E; 234-B]
Kaliyappan v. State of Kera/a & Ors., [1989) 1 SCC 113 and Gujarat
State Corporation v. Valiji Mulji Soneji and Ors., [1973) SCR 905, relied on.
F
2.1. It cannot be said that there was no planning for development of
acquired area and the acquisition proceedings were intitiated casually.
Goverment's decision to set ·up the new township by acquiring the land
appertaining to 86 villages was based on reports of expert committees. In G
order to develop the huge urban complex the Government brought into
force the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, and established 'City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra
Limited'. There is no manner of doubt that lot of deliberations were made
by expert bodies before taking the decision to set up such a huge urban
complex. [231-C-E]
H
218
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A
State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. v. A. Mohammad Yousef & Ors., [1991)
4 sec 224, inapplicable.
2.2. Once it comes to the knowledge of the people concerned that
some areas are going to be developed into a new township close to the city
known as Greater Bombay, the prices of lands in those areas start increasB iog and the land speculators make all efforts in acquiring the lands in
those areas so as to make substantial profit in the business of real estate.
In the circumstances, it was necessary to issue notification under Section
4 of the Land Acquisition Act so as to discourage the land speculators in
the area and to make the acquisition proceedings and the scheme of new
C township economically viable. [231-F ·HJ
2.3. There is no firm foundation for coming to the conclusion that
. the acquisition proceedings had been initiated casually without any precise,
objective and initiation of the proceedings by issuing notifications UDder'
D Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was made with the sole intention to
peg down the prices for acquisition in remote future, thereby causing loss
and injury to the affected land owners. [232-G-H; 233A]
Khadim Hussain v. Union of India & Ors., [1976) 3 SCR 1; Satyam
Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Calcutta Improvement Trnst and Ors.,
E' AIR (1989) Calcutta 263; Radhey Shyam Gupta and Ors., 'v. State of
Haryana, AIR (1982) Punjab and Haryana 519 (F.B.) and P. Appalamurthy
and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., AIR (1981) Andhra Pradesh
278, held inapplicable.
F
3. So far as the acquisition of lands comprising Gaothan and hamG
lets against the avowed policy decision of the Government is concerned,
there is a serious dispute of the factual existence of Gaothan and hamlets.
}t, being a disputed question of fact cannot be decided in the instant
proceedings. [234-C-D]
1.4. In view of the statement on behalf of the respondents that the
policy decision of the Government to offer alternative sites to the affected
land owners will be faithfully implemented, it is reasonably believed that
such policy decision should be implem~oted properly so that the affected _
land owners do not suffer umnertited hardship for imporper implementaH tion of the policy decision. [234-E-G]
H.H.JAIN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
219
4.2. The authorities concerned are directed to offer the alternate site A
as per the scheme framed by the Government in 1976 to the affected land
owners on the basis of the actual cost of deveopment by charging the cost
of the acquisition and the development charges and no more. Such directions is required to be made particularly in view of the fact that acquisition
proceedings bad been pending for a number of years, as a result of which
the amount of compensation for the acquisition being referable to the
period when notices under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act were
issued, became insignificant and it is reasonably apprehended that unless
B
the land by way of alternative site as per the. scheme is offered to the
affected land owners at a subsidised rate, it will not be possible for the
land owners to take sncb allotment by paying usual price intended to be C
charged from them and the offer of alternative site will for all practical
purposes will be illusory; and many of such land owners would be exposed
t¥erious prejudices. [235-D, }'-H; 236-AJ
State of U.P. v. Smt. Pista Devi and Ors., [1986) 4 SCC 251, relied on. D
5. The petitioners in special leave petitions including the review petitions which bad been dismissed earlier should also be entitled to the directions contained in the instant judgment despite the fact that such special
leave petitions and review petitions stood dismissed. [236-BJ
E
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3225 of
1993.
From the Judgment and Order dated 9.9.1992 of the Bombay High
Court in Writ Petition.No. 1750 of 1986.
WITH
Civil Appeal Nos. 3226-50 of 1993.
G. Ramaswamy, AK. Ganguli, U.R. Lalit, V.N. Ganpule and AB.
F
Rohtagi; R.N. Karaojawala, AM. Khanwilkar and V.D. Khanna for the G
Appellant.
K.T.S. Tulsi, Addi. Solicitor General, K. Madhava Reddy, S.M.
Jadhav and A.S. Bhasme for the Respondents.
,.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H
220
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A
G.N. RAY, J. Lea".e granted in all these special leave petitions and
the learned counsels appearing for the respective parties made submissions. Since all these matters relate to common questions of law and fact,
the matter were heard analogously and are disposed of by this 'common
judgment. All these matters arise out of the judgment passed by the
B Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dismissing the Writ Petitions
moved before the said Higb Court inter a/ia challenging the validity of
acquisition of large tracts of land adjoining the city of Bombay for the
purpose of setting up a new township to be known as New Bombay. The
State of Maharashtra issued notices under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act between February, 1968 and February, 1970 for the purpose of
C acquiring huge tracts of lands covering 86 villages in Trans Harbour, Panvel
and Trans Thane Creek area for the purpose of planned development and
utilisation of the said lands for industrial, commercial and residential
purposes. Declarations under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act were
also issued in 1971 and 1972. The acquisition proceedings were, however,
D concluded after a long lapse of time by giving awards in 1985 and 1986.
Mr. G. Ramaswamy has appeared for the appellants in the appeal
arising out of special leave petition Nos. 13719 and 13459 of 1992. Mr. U.
Lalit has appeared for the appellants in the appeal arising out of Special
leave petition No. 14710 of 1992. Mr. AK. Ganguli has appeared in the
E apFal arising out of special leave petition No. 15359 of 1992. Mr. Ganpule
has appeared for the appellants in the rest of the appeals. As all these
matters ar~ disposed of by a common judgment, it is not proposed to refer
individual arguments raised by the learned counsels separately. The arguments advanced by the learned counsels for the appellants are to the
F following effect:
G
(1) There has been inordinate delay in completion of the acquisition
proceedings and such inordinate delay vitiates the acquisition proceedings
and the awards made therein.
(2) The purported acquisition proceedings are clearly a colourable
device and should be struck down in view of the fact that the sole object
of notification issued under Section 4 covering large tracts of lands in 86
villages in 1968 and 1970 was to peg the price of the land as prevailing on
the said date of the notification without having regard to the actual requireH men! of such land.
H.H.JAIN v.STATEOFMAHARASHTRA[G.N.RAY,J.]
221
(3) Acquisition proceedings sought to be initiated without framing a A
· Scheme or plan for fnlfilment of the stated object were premature and
liable to be quashed.
( 4) Lands comprising Gaothan, as shown in village records, houses
contiguous to existing gaothan and hamlets containing not less than ten
households were to be excluded from acquisition proceedings as per the
avowed policy of the Government and purported acquisition of the land
comprising gaothans and hamlets, in any event, must be held illegal and
void.
B
(5) Even if it is held that acquisition proceedings were valid, suitable C
directions sh'.Juld be given for allotment of alternative plots as per the
scheme formulated in 1966 so that no effect of acquisition should be given
without making the plots available to the affected parties.
Coming to the contention of inordinate delay in completing the
acquisition proceedings thereby rendering acquisition proceedings invalid, D
the learned counsels have submitted that the Government of Maharashtra
was entirely responsible for the delay in completing the acquisition
proceedings. The acquiring authority miserably failed to explain the long
delay in completing the acquisition proceedings. Under such circumstan·
ces, in the absence of any valid explanation for such inordinate delay, E
particularly in the absence of any statutory permission or restrain against
passing of the awards, the exercise of power to acquire lands according to
convenience and caprices of the concerned authorities, becomes unreasonable and unfair. Every public authority i~nd to act reasonably
and fairly in exercise of power and arbitrary and~capricious action should
not be countenanced by law courts more so, when such arbitrary and F
unreasonable exercise of power clearly causes pr.ejudice and loss to the
citizens. It iS not open for the State to contend that it will keep the
notifications issued under Section 4 of tIJe Land Acquisition Act alive for
years together and then complete the acquisition proceedings according to
its own pleasure and pass awards at convenient and opportune time. Such G
contention is alien to tjte scheme formulated under the Land Acquisition
Act.
Referring to Section ll(A) of the Land Acquisition Act, the learned
counsels for the appellants very strongly contende!l that proviso to Section
· ll(A) merely enables the acquiring authority to ~
award within a time H
222
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] SUPP. l S.C.R.
A frame in a case where the declaration had already been published before
the commencement of the amending Act, but the proviso to Section ll(A)
should not be read as validating the proceedings which had already become
invalid ·because of initiation of a stale proceeding and arbitrary and
colourable exercise of power. It has been contended by the learned counB sels that acquisition proceedings which had become invalid due to inordinate delay could not be brought to life merely for making award within
the stipulated time as envisaged by Section ll(A) of the Land Acquisition
Act. Proviso to Section ll(A) being an enabling provision only authorises
the acquiring authority to complete the acquisition proceedings within the
time mentioned in Section ll(A), if the acquisition proceedings is otherC wise not invalid in view of the antecedent facts.
Coming to the second contention that the purported acqms1t1on
proceeding is a colourable device, it has been very strongly contended that
from the facts disclosed by the State Government itself, it is evident that
D the sole object of notifications issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act covering large tracts of lands in 86 villages as far back as in 1968
and 1970 was to peg the price of the lands as was prevailing on the date
of the said notifications without having regard to the actual requirement of
such lands. It has been contended that the facts disclosed reveal that the
government did not arrage for the funds neccessary for acquiring such
E large extent of land. It is quite apparent and evident that notifications
under Section 4 were issued for the purpose of pegging down the price of
the land on a likely future requirement. Such action being highly reprehensive, unfair and unjust must be held to be invalid thereby invalidating the
entire acquisition proceedings. In support of this contention reliance has
F been made to the decision of this Court in Khadim Hussain v. Union of
India & Ors., (1976] 3 SCR 1, Satyam Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v.
Calcutta Improvement Trnst and Ors., AIR (1989) Calcutta 263, Radhey
Shaym Gupta and Ors. v. State of Haryana, AIR (1982) Punjab and
Haryana 519 (F.B.) and P. Appalamurthy and Ors., v. State of Andhra
Pradesh and Ors., AIR (1981) Andhra Pradesh 278.
G
The learned counsels have also contended that on the score of
inordinate delay in moving the Writ Petitions for challenging the acquisition proceedings, the Bombay High Court had refused to interfere in the
Writ Petitions moved at a belated stage. The learned counsels have conH tended that such view, in the facts of the case, was clearly erroneous. The ·
'
H.H.JAIN v.STATEOFMAHARASHTRA[G.N.RAY,J,]
223
delay in approaching the writ Court is not by itself fatal in all cases. There A
is no law of limitation by which a person is obliged to approach the writ
Court within a particular time. Laches arising out a delay is one of the
considerations which must weigh with the Court in exercise of its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the instant
cases, the State Government and acquiring authorities were entirly responB
sible for the delay in concluding the acquisition proceedings without any
proper scheme and arrangement for funds· for making payment for acquired lands. The acquisition proceedings were initiated between 1%8 and
1970 with the sole object of acquiring the lands on the basis of the price
prevailing at the. time the notifications issued under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act.
C
The learned counsels haV'e contended that since the cause of action
in these cases sprang from the inordinate delay on the part of the State
Government and malafide and colourable exercise of power, the question
of delay on the part of the appellants in not challenging the initiation notice I:
or the declaration within a reasonable time or at all should not be ·a ground
for refusing the relief asked for by the appellants. Where the cause of
action itself stems wholly or .in part from the allegations of unexplained
delay and procastination of the 'state, it can hardly lie in the mouth of the
State of make grievance thereof.
Coming to the third contention for challenging the acquisition
proceedings without framing a Scheme or plan for fulfilment of stated
object, it has been contended by the learned counsels that such acquisition
proceedings were premature and liable to be quashed. It was evi,dent from
E
the disclosed facts that the purported acquisition proceedings were for the
F
planned development and utilisation of the said lands in the Trans Harbour, Panvel and Trans Thane Creek area for industrial, commercial and
residential purposes. It is contended that a plan for the said purpose had
never existed either before or at time when the notifications were issued
under Section 4 of the Act and the plan was prepared for the first time in
1985. Therefore, when the notifications under Section 4 were issued for the G
-
so called planned development and utilisation of the lands, the object of
the planned development was conspicuously absent and the entire proceedings must be held to be bad, illegal and ma/afide. In this connection,
reliance has been made to the decision 9f this Court in State of Tamil Nadu
& Ors. v. A. Mohammad Yvusef and others, [1991) 4 SCC 224.
H
224
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] SUPP, 1 S.C.R.
A
On the question of invalidity of the acquisition proceedings in so far
as the lands comprising Gaothan as shown in village records, and houses
contiguous to existing gaothan and hamlets containing not less than ten
households are concerned, it has been contended by the learned counsels
for the appellants that the Government of Maharashtra, General AdB ministration Department vide its Circular letter No. LAO/MC /1070/U
dated April 20, 1971 laid down its policy that in all acquisition proceedings,
areas which have been shown as Gaothan in the village records together
with all houses which are contiguous to the existing Gaothan and also of
hamlets consisting of not less than ten households which have not been
C shown in the village records as Gaothan but shown as such (cluster of
houses) are to be excluded from the acquistion proceedings. Although,
there had not been any change in the'said policy and in fact it is the case
of the government that the said policy is being given effect to, yet in so
far as the present acquisitiOn Proceedings are concerned, it is the positive
grievance of the appellants that the said policy is not being fully impleD mented. The learned counsels for the appellants have submitted that this
Court should give positive direction for implementation of the said scheme
in toto so that injustice is not meted out to affected persons.
On the question of allotment of alternative plots as formulated in the
E scheme in 1976, the learned counsels for the appellants have submitted that
the State Government had formulated a scheme in 1976 wherein all persons
whose lands are acquired compulsorily are provided with alternative plot
of land to the extent of 10% of the land so acquired subject to maximum
of a plot size of 500 sq. mtrs. It is contended that the said scheme does
F
not do full justice to the owners of the lands many of whom are solely
dependent on the acquired land for their livelihood. Under the scheme;
out of the said 10% of the land to be allo.tted, 50% could be utilised by
the allottee concerned and the rest 50% goes to the common pool for the
purpose of roads and other infrastructure. It has been contended that
under the impugned awards, the land owners have been awarded a meagre
G sum of Rs.4 per sq. mtr. whereas while allotting plots to the land owners
under the said scheme they are asked to pay at the market rate charged
from other commercial organisation i.e. @ Rs.13,200 per sq. mtr. This is
per se arbitrary and unreasonable and is liable to be declared as such. In
this connection reference has been made to a decision of this Court in State
H of UP. v. Smt. Pista Devi and Others, [1986] 4 SCC 251. Relying on the sajd_
H.H.JAIN v. STATEOFMAHARASHTRA[G.N. RAY,J.J
225
decision it has been submitted by the learned counsels that since the lands A
are required for providing residential accun1mo<lation for others, the persons whose lands have been acquired and are being appropriated on
account of the acquisition proceedings, would be eligible for relief in the
hands of Development Authorities. The appellants, therefore, could at the
most be asked to pay for the plot to be allotted to them under the said
scheme covering the cost of acquisition and development charges and no
more. It has been submitted by the learned counsels that a clear direction
B
to this effect should be given by this Court in the interest of justice.
The learned counsels have also submitted that some of the similar
special leave petitions have been dismissed by this Court earlier and in one C
case even a Review Petition was also di ·lllissed. As the relevant submissions could not be made before this Court when the said special leave
petitions or the Rcveiw Petition were dismissed, in the interest of justice,
this Court should also give directions that the appellants in those special
leave petitions since dismissed, should also get similar reliefs as in these
cases and the dismissal of the said special leave petitions should not stand D
in the way of giving proper relief to .which the said appellants were entitled
to from the apex Court.
Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for
the respondents in these cases has submitted that the Bombay High Court
E
though held that the Writ Petitions were liable to be dismissed on the
ground of !aches of inordinate delay, it had examined all the questions
raised before the Court on merits and the Writ Petitions were also dismissed on merits by giving cogent reasons. In the instant cases, the
notificaitons under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act were issued
between 1968 and 1970 and the notifications under Section 6 of the Land
F
Acquisition Act were made in 1971 and 1972. The Writ Petitions were
moved only in Octorber 1985. The acquisition proceedings were sought to
be challenged in 1985 after a period over 15 years. The learned solicitor
has submitted that the delay may not be fatal in all cases but in the instant
gases, this inordinate delay has become fatal. If the appellants had moved G
the Writ Petitions in appropriate time, !aches even if any, on the part of
the acquiring authorities could have been rectified. The appellants accepted the notifications and put up with the acquisition proceedings for
about 15 years and only in order to get higher compensation in the event
the acquisition proceedings are struck down and fresh proceedings to be
initiated, the Writ Petitions were moved at a belated stage without any H
226
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A justifications whatsoever. In this connection, strong reliance was made by
the learned Solicitor in the decision of this Court in the case of Aflatoon
and Otlre1J v. Lt. Govemor of Delhi and Others, [1975) 1 SCR 802. In this
case the acquisition of large area for planned development of Delhi was
challenged on the ground that prior to issuance of the notifications, no
· Master Plan has been drawn up and that the notifications did not spell out
B.1.the actual use for various parcels of lands being acquired. This Court while
"" rejecting the contention held that acquisition generally proceeds development and that the petitioner could not be allowed to challenge the validity
of notifications on these grounds after a period of 12 years. It was held that
the Court would be puting a premium on dilatory tactics of the land owners
C who choose to sit on the fence and allow the Government to complete
acquisition proceedings.
The learned Solicitor .has contended that the principal ground of
attack of the appellants against the impugned notifications is that the
notifications are vague and lacking in material particulars. It has also been
D cotended that there was no plan for utilisation of the acquired land at the
time of issuance of the notifications and the notifications were issued
nialafide merely to peg down the prices to the detrirnenJ of the interest of
the land owners.
E
The learned Solicitor has submitted that the Bombijy High Court has
taken into consideration such contention and has indicated the facts in
detail that preceded the issuance of the notifications under Section 4 of
the Act. It appears from the impugned judgment of the Bombay High
Court that the Government of Maharashtra in the year 1966 appointed a
F Committee under the Chairmanship of Dr. D.P. Gadgil, the Director of
the Gokhale Institute of Politics and the Economics at Poona and subsequently holding the post of Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission,
to examine the requisite steps to be taken to meet the growing congestion
in Greater Bombay. Based on the recommendations of such Co1nmittee1
the Government brought into force the Maharashtra Re~onal and Town
G Planning Act, 1966, (hereinafter referred to as M.R.T.P. Act) and such, act
came into operation with effect from J a1mary 11, 1967. The legislation was
enacted to make provisions for planning the development and use of land
in regions established for the purpose and to make better provision for the.
preparation of development plans with a view to ensuring that town planH ning schemes are made in a proper rnanner and their execution is made
•
H.H.JAIN v. STATEOFMAHARASHTRA[G.N. RAY,J.]
227
effective.
A
In the year 1967 the State Government appointed another Committee
headed by Shri L.G. Rajwade, I.C.S., to submit a report in respect of
difficulties faced by major ,metropolitan cities like Bombay in view of
urbanisations, migration of people to the metropolis and deterioration in
conditions of sanitation, houseing, law and order etc. Rajwade Committee B
recommended regional plans by accepting the suggestions made earlier by
Gadgil Committee. Pursuant to the Report of the Rajwade Committee, the
State Government constituted Regional Planning Boards for three major
regions of Bombay, Poona and Nagpur. The Bombay Metropolitan exercise
and after consideration of various proposals, recommended that to tackle C
and prevent further deterioration of Greater Bc.nbay, some metropolitan
planning must be undertaken and the fresh approach should be brought
on future expansions. The Planning Board noticed that development of
large metro centres would be required and such metro centres should be
set up on either side of the Panvel Creek, the Northern portion between
Thane Creek and the Farmik Tunnel which area is commonly known as D
'Trans-Thane Creek Area' and the rest of the area in trans-harbour area
comprising of Panvel Urban and Nhava-Shavan. The Government o(
Maharashtra accepted the recommendations made by the Regional Plan- ·
ning Board. In accordance with the powers conferred under Section 113
of M.R.T.P. Ac~ a Company known as 'City and Industrial Development
E
Corporation of Maharashtra Limited' (CIDCO) was constituted on May
16, 1970. The Corporation in order to set up new township to be known as
"New Bombay" proposed to acquire large tracts of land adjoining the city
of Bombay and the land covered by several \illages were proposed lo be
acquired. Some of the lands were used as agricultural lands while there
were residential structures on the other.
Mr. Solicitor has submitted that for the purpose of setting up a new
township, large tracts of land were .require to be acquired. There was no
dispute about the need for setting up a new township and Section 125 of
F
the M.R.T.P. Act, clearly provides that any land required for any new town G
shall be deemed to be land needed for a public purpose. Mr. Solicitor has
also contended that it is undoubtedly true that acquisition proceedings
remained pending for a considerable long time but in the facts and circwnstances of the case, such delay in completing the acquisition proceedings was also ine\itably. The Government was required to acquire large H
228
SUPREME COURT REPORTS f1993J SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A area of land and pay compensation to the holders of the land. The
Government had taken decision to set up a new township and published
notification and as a consequence of such planning for development the
land value in the area started increasing. The Government had to take
precaution to ensure that the development of the new township is not
B fettered by speculative increase of prices in the land values and therefore
published notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act covering a very large area. The awards could not be made quickly because
various steps were required to be undertaken before making the award and
also to make founds available for the payment of compensation.
c
Mr. Solicitor has subitted that in the aforesaid circumstances, it
cannot be contended that without any definite .policy of establishing new
township, a casual approach was taken to initiate acquisition proceedings
at a premature stage only with the ~ole intention of pegging the price. He
has submitted that il is quite evident that after considering the recammenD
dations of various expert bodies as indicated hereinbefore, a decision for
establishing a new township had been taken and for the purpose of implementing the said scheme, notifications unden Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act were issued.
E
Mr. Solicitor has also contended that it could not be demonstrated
F
with any convincing _material that the acquiring authority was deliberately
causing delay only for the purpose of pegging down the prices in a malafide
manner. Accordingly, the decisions sought to be relied on that by the
appellants are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of these cases.
Mr. Solicitor has also contended that the learned counsels for the
appellants have contended that Section llA of the Land Acquisition Act
only enables the acquiring authority to complete the acquisition proceedings after the amending Act, within the lime frame but such provision does
not permit the acquring authority to take resort to a colourable exercise of
G power by arbitrary and capricious action and unreasonable delay and
!aches over the years. He has contended that factually there is no foundation that colourable or malafide exercise of power has been made in these
cases. He has submitted that there had been no deliberate !aches and
negligence in the instant cases and the High Court was fully satisfied about
H the bonafide of the concerned authorities. It has been explained to the
'
-(
fl.H.JAIN v. STATEOFMAHARASHTRA[G.N. RAY,J.]
229
satisfaction of the court that in such an extensive and delicate scheme, to
A
complete the proceedings comprising large tracts of lands appeartaining to
86 villages considerable time was bound to be taken. It has been submitted
by the learned Solicitor that it is not the case that the awards were not
made within the time frame under Section llA of the Act. The learned
Solicitor has submitted that if the statute permits the acquiring authority
to complete the acquisition .proceedings within the time frame and if the
acquisition proceedings are completed within such time frame, it cannot
be contended that the acqusition proceedings were pending as far back as
from 1970 and hence they became stale and invalid thereby rendering the
provision of Section llA inapplicable.
In this connection, the learned Solicitor has referred to a decision of
this Court in Kaliyappan v. State of Kera/a and Others, [1989] 1 SCC 113.
It has been held by this Court in the said decision that it may not be correct
to set aside acquisition or the ground of delay by applying its own standard
B
c
of speed and that it would be safer to rely upon the statute for guidance D
as regards the maximum time that can be taken to make an award. This
Court has also held that otherwise, varying standards may come to apply
in different case even when the maximum time to two years as under the
proviso has not been exceeded.
Mr. Solicitor has aJso referred to another decision of this Court in
Gujarat State Corporation v. Valji Mulji Soneji and Others, [1973] SCR 905.
It has been held in the said decision that when the statute prescribes time
withi~ which a certain power can be exercised, the prescription of time
inheres a belief that the nature and quantum of power and the manner in
which it is to be exercised would consume at least that much time which
the statute prescribes as reasonable. This Court, therefore, held that exercise of pow~r within that time could not be negatived on the ground of
unreasonable delay. This Court has further held that in view of the history of
legislation ii? the context of con1pensation to the owner after the legislature
E
F
has stepped in prescribing a sorl of period of limitation, it was not necessary
to go in search of a further fetter on the power of the Government by raising G
the question of delay by implication. (emphasis supplied)
Mr. Solicitor has submitted that in the instant cases, draft plan was
prepared within one year of the notification under Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act on the basis of extensive research and report of various H
230
SUPREME COURT REPORTS · (1993] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A committees. More than 25,000 objections were received under Section 5 A
from various land owners, which had to be considered and decided.
Similar situation was taken into consideration by this Court in
Aflatoon 's case and the delay of twelve years was not considered fatal. In
the special facts of the case, it must be held that there had not been any
B deliberate !aches of negligence from which any inference of colourable
exercise of power can be made. The decisions of the Calcutta, Andhra
Pradesh and Punjab and Haryaila High Courts are therefore not applicable
in the facts and circumstances nf these cases.
C
Mr. Solicitor has also contended that pursuant to the policy adopted
by the Government, the lands comprising Gaothan and hamlets had already
been exempted from acquisition. The learned Solicitor has strongly disputed the correctness of the existence of alleged Gaothans and hamlets as
contended by the appellanl,. The learned Solicitor has submitted that the
contentions raised by the appellants about the existence of Gaothan is
D factually incorrect, and the ·factual position can be amply demonstrated by
referring to the correct maps.
The learned Solicitor has also submitted that the question of the land
owners being entitled to alternative land is not denied by the respondents.
E It has been categorically stated by the learned Solicitor that the appellants
will be entitled to the alternative sites as per the scheme prepared for the
purpose of M.R.T.P. Act.
On the question of price of the alternative site, it has been submitted
by the learned Solicitor that after acquisition, the lands in New Bombay
F arc vested in the Corporation for development and disposal. All the costs
incurred on the development are to be met by disposing the saleable land.
In the process, the Corporation has spent huge amounts on development
of infrastructure in the form of roads, water, sewerage, electricity, transport
etc. In the process of disposal of land, certain lands are required to be
provided to the social institutions, project affected persons, economically
G weaker sections and· tower income groups at nominal and subsidise4 rate
and the shortfall accruing from such. subsidised disposal has to be
recovered by the sale of other lands viz. higher income group and commercial user. The commercial areas are sold by the Corporation by tender
system and such areas draw much higher rate. Bnt the ratio of such
H disposal at higher rate in the entire process is around 1 % only.
\.
H.H.JAIN v.STATEOFMAHARASHTRA[G.N.R~Y,J.]
231
Mr. Solicitor has also submitted that these cases are connected A
matters to special leave petition No. 14829 of 1992 Ragltunath Ghanekar v.
State of Maharashtra and Another, which was dismissed on December 16,
1992 by this Court and 15 other connected matters were also dismissed by
this Court. This Court having accepted the correctness of the decision of
the Bombay High Court dismissed the special leave petitions and also the
Review Petition made in Special Leave Petition No. 14829 of 1992. Such
rejection was made on a proper consideration of the merits of the case and
no different decision need be made in these which should also be dismissed.
B
After giving our anxious consideration to the respective contentions C
made by the learned counsels for the parties, it appears to us that on the
basis of reports of the expert Comm;ttees as indicated hereinbefore, the
Government took a decision to set up a new township by acquiring large
tracts of lands appertaining to 86 villages in Trans Harbour, Panvel and
Trans Thane Creek area. In order to develop such huge urban complex, D
the M.R.T.P. Act was enacted and CIDCO was established. There is no
manner of doubt that lot of deliberations were made by expert bodies
before taking the decision to set up such huge urban complex to be known
as New Bombay. It, therefore, cannot be contended with any seriousness
that there was no planning for development of the acquired areas and the
acquisition proceedings were initiated casually with the sole intention to
peg do\<n the prices by issuing notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act for a future project. The learned Solicitor has made
submissions by drawing the attention of the Court to the finding of the
Bombay High Court in the Writ Petitions that in view of the planning for
development of the areas comprising Trans Harbour, Panvel and Trans
Thane Creek area, price of the land in those areas started increasing. There
E
F
is no difficulty in understanding the reason for such an increase in the
prices because once it comes to the knowlege of the people concerned that
some areas are going to be developed into a new township close to the city
known as Greater Bombay, the land speculators will make all efforts in
acquiring the lands in those areas so as to make substantial profit in the
G
business of real estate.