# Hanumant v. ·T lie State of Madhya Pradesh. Mahaian /

- **Citation:** [1952] 1 S.C.R. 1112
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1952
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 56 of 1951
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/hanumant-v-t-lie-state-of-madhya-pradesh-mahaian-212
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

1952
Hanumant
v.
·T lie State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahaian /.
1952
Oct. 16.
1112
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1952]
The result is that the consolidated appeal is allowed,
the judgments of all the three courts below are
set
aside and the appellants are acquitted.
Appellants acquitted.
Agent for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 56
of 1951 : Ganpat Rai.
Agent for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 57
of 1951 : Rajinder Narain.
Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.
STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND
'
OTHERS
v.
THE BOMBAY CO. LTD.
STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND
ANOTHER
v.
MICHAEL FREDERICK AND BROS.
STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND
ANOTHER
v.
STAGBROOK RUBBER AND TEA
ESTATES LTD.
UNION
OF
INDIA,
STATE OF
BOMBAY,
STATil
OF
MADRAS,
STATil
OF
HYDERABAD,
STATE
OF
PUNJAB,
STATil
OF
MYSORE,
STATE
OF 0RISSA
AND
STATE
OF
UTIAR PRADESH-Interveners.
[PATANJALI SAsrn1 C.J., MuKHERJEA, DAs,
VIVIAN BosE and Gnm.AM HASAN JJ.]
Constitution of India, Article 286( I) ( b )-Sales tax-Exemp.
tion of sales in the course of export or import-Meant"ng of "in the
course of"-..'iolcs tvhel'e property passes and sale is co1nplete before
r
' \
L
"•
J
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1113
goods move out of State, whether exempt-Interpretation of article
286 (!) (b)-Decisions on Commerce and Import-Export clauses
of American Constitution-Speeches of Members of Constituent
Assembly-Relevancy.
Whatever else may or may not fall within art. 286( 1) (b)
of the Constitution,
sales and purchases which themselves occasion the export or the import of the goods as the case may be,
out of or into, the territory of India come within the exemption.
The view that no sale or purchase can be said to take place
in the course of export or import unless tho property in the goods
is transferred to the buyer during their actual movement, as for
instance,
where
the
shipping
documents
are
indorsed
and
delivered within the State by the seller to a local agent of the
foreign
buyer after the goods
have been actually
shipped
or
where such documents are cleared on payment, or on
acceptance,
by the Indian buyer before the arrival of the goods within the
State, puts too narrow a construction upon art. 286(1)(b) and
is
not correct.
A sale by export involves a series of integrated activities
commencing from the agreement of sale with a foreign buyer and
ending with the delivery of the goods to a common carrier for
transport out of the country by land or sea.
Such a sale cannot
be
dissociated
from
the export
without
which it cannot
be
dtectuated an<l
the
sale and the resultant export form parts of a
single transaction. Of these two integrated activities which to·
gether constitute an export sale. whichever first occurs can well
he rer1rded as taking place in the course of the other.
Even in
cases where the property in the goods passed to the
foreign
buyers and the sales were thm completed, within the State before
the goods commence<l their journey from the State, the
sales
must be regarded as having taken place in the course of the
c~port and therefore ,.,;empt under art. 286(1)(h).
The
Commerce clause
(article
l,
section
8(3)) and the
Import-Export clauses [article I, sections 9 (5)
anJ 10 (2)] of
the American Constitution are widely different in language, scope
and purpose, .rnd a varying body of doctrines and tests have
grown around them interpreting, extending or restricting
from
time to time, their operation and application in the context of
I he expanding American commerce and industry
and
much help
qnnot be derived from them in the solution of the problems arising under article 286 of the Indian Constitution.
Speeches made by the members of the Constituent Assembly
in the course of the debates on the draft Constitution cannot
be
used as aids for interpreting the Constitution.
Administrator General of Bengal v. Prem
Nath Mullick
[22
LA. 107 at 1181, A. K. Gopalan v. The State [(1950) S.C.R. 881,
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association
[ 169 U.S. 290
at 318) referred to.
143
1952
State

## Text

1952
Hanumant
v.
·T lie State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahaian /.
1952
Oct. 16.
1112
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1952]
The result is that the consolidated appeal is allowed,
the judgments of all the three courts below are
set
aside and the appellants are acquitted.
Appellants acquitted.
Agent for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 56
of 1951 : Ganpat Rai.
Agent for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 57
of 1951 : Rajinder Narain.
Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.
STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND
'
OTHERS
v.
THE BOMBAY CO. LTD.
STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND
ANOTHER
v.
MICHAEL FREDERICK AND BROS.
STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND
ANOTHER
v.
STAGBROOK RUBBER AND TEA
ESTATES LTD.
UNION
OF
INDIA,
STATE OF
BOMBAY,
STATil
OF
MADRAS,
STATil
OF
HYDERABAD,
STATE
OF
PUNJAB,
STATil
OF
MYSORE,
STATE
OF 0RISSA
AND
STATE
OF
UTIAR PRADESH-Interveners.
[PATANJALI SAsrn1 C.J., MuKHERJEA, DAs,
VIVIAN BosE and Gnm.AM HASAN JJ.]
Constitution of India, Article 286( I) ( b )-Sales tax-Exemp.
tion of sales in the course of export or import-Meant"ng of "in the
course of"-..'iolcs tvhel'e property passes and sale is co1nplete before
r
' \
L
"•
J
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1113
goods move out of State, whether exempt-Interpretation of article
286 (!) (b)-Decisions on Commerce and Import-Export clauses
of American Constitution-Speeches of Members of Constituent
Assembly-Relevancy.
Whatever else may or may not fall within art. 286( 1) (b)
of the Constitution,
sales and purchases which themselves occasion the export or the import of the goods as the case may be,
out of or into, the territory of India come within the exemption.
The view that no sale or purchase can be said to take place
in the course of export or import unless tho property in the goods
is transferred to the buyer during their actual movement, as for
instance,
where
the
shipping
documents
are
indorsed
and
delivered within the State by the seller to a local agent of the
foreign
buyer after the goods
have been actually
shipped
or
where such documents are cleared on payment, or on
acceptance,
by the Indian buyer before the arrival of the goods within the
State, puts too narrow a construction upon art. 286(1)(b) and
is
not correct.
A sale by export involves a series of integrated activities
commencing from the agreement of sale with a foreign buyer and
ending with the delivery of the goods to a common carrier for
transport out of the country by land or sea.
Such a sale cannot
be
dissociated
from
the export
without
which it cannot
be
dtectuated an<l
the
sale and the resultant export form parts of a
single transaction. Of these two integrated activities which to·
gether constitute an export sale. whichever first occurs can well
he rer1rded as taking place in the course of the other.
Even in
cases where the property in the goods passed to the
foreign
buyers and the sales were thm completed, within the State before
the goods commence<l their journey from the State, the
sales
must be regarded as having taken place in the course of the
c~port and therefore ,.,;empt under art. 286(1)(h).
The
Commerce clause
(article
l,
section
8(3)) and the
Import-Export clauses [article I, sections 9 (5)
anJ 10 (2)] of
the American Constitution are widely different in language, scope
and purpose, .rnd a varying body of doctrines and tests have
grown around them interpreting, extending or restricting
from
time to time, their operation and application in the context of
I he expanding American commerce and industry
and
much help
qnnot be derived from them in the solution of the problems arising under article 286 of the Indian Constitution.
Speeches made by the members of the Constituent Assembly
in the course of the debates on the draft Constitution cannot
be
used as aids for interpreting the Constitution.
Administrator General of Bengal v. Prem
Nath Mullick
[22
LA. 107 at 1181, A. K. Gopalan v. The State [(1950) S.C.R. 881,
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association
[ 169 U.S. 290
at 318) referred to.
143
1952
State of
TravancoreCochin
and Others
v.
The Bombay
Co. Ltd.
1952
State of
Travancore·
Cochin
11nd Others
v.
TAc Bombay
Co. Ltd.
1114
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JuR1snicTioN : Civil Appeal No.
25 of 1952.
Appeals from the
Judgment and Order dated the
10th day of
January, 1952, of the High Court
of
Judicature
of
Travancore-Cochin
at
Ernakulam
(Kunhiraman C.J. and Subramania Iyer J.) in Original Petitions Nos. 4, 23 and 24 of 1951 respectively.
T. N. Subramania Iyer, Advocate-Genet',a/ of Travancore-Cochin, (T. R. Balakrishna Iyer and M. R. Krishna
Pillai, with him) for the State of Travancore-Cochin.
N. C. Chatterjee (C.R. Pattabhirainan, with him) for
the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 25 of 1952.
C. R. Pattabhi112man for
the respondent
m
Civil
Appeal No. 28 of 1952.
N. C. Chatterjee (Thomas Vellappally, with him) for
the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 29 of 1952.
M. C.
Setalvad, Attorney-General
for
India, and
C. K. Daplitary, Solicitor-General of India ( G. N. foshi,
with them) for the Union of India.
1952. October 16. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
PATANJALI
SAsmI
C.J.-These
arc
connected
appeals from the judgment and order of
the
High
Court of Travancore-Cochin
quashing the assessments
under the United State of Travancore and Cochin Sales
Tax Act (No. 11 of 1125 M.E.) (hereinafter referred to
as "the Act"') on the respondents on the turnover of
the sales of the commodities ( coir products in C.A. 25,
lemon grass oil in C.A. 28 and tea in C.A. 29) in which
they respectively deal.
The dealings followed more or less the same pattern
in all the cases and consisted of
export sales of the
respective commodities to foreign buyers on c.i.f.
or
f.o.b. terms as the case may be.
The respondents in each case claimed exemption
from assessm<;nt in respect of the
sales
effected
by
them on the ground, inter alia, that
such sales . took
place "in the course of the export of the goods out of
the territory of India" within the meaning of
article
•
....
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1115
286(1) (b) of the Constitution. The Sales Tax Authorities rejected the contention as, in their view, the
sales. were completed before the goo<ls
were
shipped
and could not, therefore, be considered to have taken
place in the course of the export.
Thereupon the
respondents
by
separate petitions
applied t'O the High Court of the United States of
Travancore and Cochin (hereinafter referred to as the
State) under article 226 of the Constitution for issue
of writs of certiorari
and
prohibition
quashing
the
assessments
made
on
them and
prohibiting such
assessment in future.
The applications
were
heard,
along with nine 9ther applications for
similar reliefs
by dealers iri
cashew
nuts,
by
a Division Bench
(Khunhiraman C.J. and Subramania Iyer J.) who upheld the claim of exemption and quashed the assessment orders in respect of the transactions
subsequent
to the commencement of the Constitution. From that
decision
the
State has preferred appeals in all the
cases on a certificate granted by the High Court under
article 132 ( 1) of the Constitution.
As the appeals involved important questions of
law
which may have a bearing on the sales tax legislation
Qf the various States in
India,
this
Court directed
notice of these proceedings
to
the
Attorney-General
for India and the Advocates-General of those States,
and they have intervened and
participated
m
the
debate at the hearing of these appeals.
When the argument had proceeded for some time, it
was discovered that the material facts relating to the
·course of dealings in cashew nuts, which were more
complex in character, had not been clearly ascertained
and consequently the relative appeals were
remitted
to the High Court for findings on certain points
·agreed upon by the parties.
These three appeals were,
'however, fully heard as they were found to admit of
·disposal on the materials on record.
Article 286(1), on which
the
respondents
found
their claim to exemption, runs thus :
1952
State of
TravancoreCochin
and Others
v.
The Bombay
Co. Ltd.
Patanjali
Sastri C. /.
1952
State of
Travancorc·
Cochin
and Others
v.
The Bombay
Co. Ltd.
Patanjali
Sastri C. /.
1116
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the
imposition of, a t!lx on the sale or purchase of goods
where such sale or purchase takes place-
( a) outside the State; or
(b) in the course of the inwort of the goods into,
or export of the goods out of, the territory of India.
Explan11tion.-For the purposes
of sub-clause
(a),
a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place
in the State in which the goods have actually been
deliYered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for
the purpose of consumption
in that State,
notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating
to sale
of goo<ls
the property in the goods has by
reason of such sale or purchase passed
m
another
State.
On the scope and meaning of clause (b ), the learned
Judges expressed their view as follows :-
"The words 'in the course of' make the scope of
thi.s clause very wide. It is not restricted to the point
of time at which goods are imported into or exported
from India. The series of transactions which necessarily precede export or
import of
goods
will
come
within the purview of this clause.
Therefore, while in
the course of that: senes of transactions, the sale has
taken place, such a sale 1s exempted from the levy of
sales tax.
The sale may have taken place within the
boundaries of the State.
Even then sales
tax
cannot
be levied if the sale had taken place while the goods
were m the conrse of import into lndia or
Ill
the
conrse of export out of India.
We
arc
stressing
this point because
both parties
111
what
we
may
describe as
the
cashew
nut
cases
entered
into a
lengthy discussion as
to
the
exact
point
of time
when the sale became completed and as to the exact
place where the goods were when the sale became a
completed transaction."
On this interpretation, local purchases "made
for
the purpose of export" were held by the learned Judges
to be "integral parts of the process of exporting".
In
support of this construction the learned Judges referred
•
f
'
...
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1117
~ to the debates in the Constituent Assembly
on clause
264-A of the draft Constitution which corresponded
to article 286 and quoted from the speech of one of
t the members
who
unsuccessfully moved
an amendment defining export as meaning the last transaction
and import as meaning the first transaction.
~
In view of the wide construction thus
placed
upon
clause (b) of article 286 ( 1), the arguments before us
ranged over a large field, and as many as four different
':) views as to its scope and meaning were pressed upon
us for our acceptance :-
( 1) The exemption is limited to sales by export and
purchases by import, that is to say, those sales
and
purchases which occasion the export or import as
the case mav be. and extends to no other transactions
-•
however diiectly- or immediately connected, in intention or purpose, with such sales or purchases,
and
wheresoever the property in the goods may pass to the
buyer.
Thi~ is the view put forward on behalf of the
'
State of Madras.
The Advocate-General thought that
a State_ could not impose sales tax though title passed
within State limits while the goods were still under
•
transport on the high seas and no question of exemption could •herefore arise. He said. however, that no
such case had actually arisen.
-
(2) In addition to the sales and purchases of
the
kind described above, the
exemption covers the last
purchase by the exporter and the first sale by the importer, if any, so directly
and proximately connected
with the export sale or import purchase as
to form
_) part of the same transaction.
This view was sponsored
by the Attorney-General who
was
also
inclined
to
think, as advised at the moment, that sales or purt-
chases made while the goods were on the high seas
would be exempt, but he would prefer not to go into
the wider question,
because,
whatever
view
was
'\ taken, sales such as those
involved
m
lhe present
-• cases must, in any event, be exempt.
•
(3) The exemption
covers only those
sales
and
purchases under which the property
m
the
goods
1952
State of
TravancoreCochin
and Others
v.
The Bombay
Co. Ltd.
Pataniali
Sastri C. /.
1952
State of
T ravancoreCochin
and Others
v.
The Bombay
Co. Ltd.
Patanjali
Sastri C. /.
1118
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952)
concerned is transferred from the seller to the buyer ('
during the course of the transit, that is, after the goods
begin to move and before they reach
their
foreign
destination. This view is supported by
the
State of •
Bombay and certain other States.
( 4) The view which found favour with the learned
Judges of the High Court in the passage already ex- ~
tracted.
It will be seen that the construction first mentioned
1s the narrowest and the last mentioned the widest.
We arc clearly of op11110n that the sales here in
question, which occasioned the export in
each
case,
fall within the scope of the exemption under article
286(1)(b). Such sales must of necessity be put through
by transporting the goods by rail or ship or both out •
of the territory of India, that is to say, by employing
the machinery of export. A sale by export thus involves a series
of
integrated
activities commencing
from the agreement of sale with a foreign buyer and
~
ending with the delivery of the goods to a common
carrier for transport out of the country by land or sea.
Such a sale cannot be dissociated from the export with-
•
out which it cannot be effectuated, and the sale and
resultant export form parts of
a
single transaction.
Of these
two
integrated
activities,
which
together
constitute
an
export sale, whichever first occurs can
well be regarded as taking place in the course of the
other. Assuming without deciding that the
property
in the ·goods in the present cases passed to the foreign
buyers and the sales were thus completed within the /
State before the goods
commence<!
their journey a~ \.c..
founcl by the Sales Tax Authorities, the sales must,
nevertheless, be regarded as having taken place in the
course of the export and are, therefore, exempt
under 1
article 286(1) (b ).
That clause, indeed, assumes
that
the sale had taken place within the limits of the State
and exempts it if it took place in the course of
the (
export of the goods concerned.
·
In the foregoing discussion we have assumed that
the word "sale" used in the Constitution has the same
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1119
'"'\meaning as in the law relating to the sale of goods,
but it has been suggested in the course of the argument that it imports a wider concept than the passing
• of title from the seller to the buyer which under that
law is determined by
highly technical rules
based
upon the presumed intention of the parties and liable
to
be displaced by their
expressed intention.
We
' leave
the point
open as it is unnecessary
for
the
purpose
of
these appeals to pronounce any opinion
upon it.
It was said that, on the construction we
have indicated above, a "sale in the course of export" would
become practically synonymous
with
"export'',
and
would reduce clause (b) to a mere redundancy, because
article 246 (1), read with entry 83 of List I of the
Seventh Schedule, vests legislative power with respect
.. to "duties of customs including
export
duties"
exclusively in Parliament, and that would be sufficient
to preclude State taxation of such transactions.
We
sec no force in this suggestibn. It might well be argued,
), in the absence of a provision like clause (b)
prohibiting in terms the levy of tax on the sale or purchase of
• goods where such sales
and purchases
are
effected
through the machinery of
export
and import,
that
both the powers of taxation, though exclusively vested
in the Union and the States respectively,
could
be
exercised in respect of the same sale by export or purchase by
import, the sales tax and . the export duty
being regarded as essentially of a different
character.
A similar argument induced the Federal Court to hold
in Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna and Sons(')
J that both central excise duty and provincial sales tax
could be validly imposed on the first sale of groundnut
oil and cake by the manufacturer or producer as "the
_. two taxes are economically two
separate and
distinct
imposts".
Lest similar reasoning should lead to
the
imposition of such cumulative burden on the export-
"'-import trade of this country which is of great impor_w:ance
to
the nation's
economy,
the
Constituent
ft\ssembly may well have thought' ;t necessary to exempt
(J) [1942] F.C.R. 90.
1952
State of
TravancoreCochin
and Others
v.
The Bombay
Co. Ltd.
Pataniali
Sastri C. /.
1952
State of
"Travancore~
Cochin
.and Others
v.
The Bombay
Co. Ltd.
Patan1ali
.Sastri C. f.
1120
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
in terms sales
from sales tax
Constitution.
by export and
purchases
by
import r
by inserting article 286 (1) (b) in the
We are not much impressed
with
the contention t
that no sale or purchase can be said to take place "in
the course of" export or import unless
the
property
in the goods is transferred to the buyer during their 4
actual movement, as for instance, where the shipping t
documents are indorsed and delivered within the State
.
by the seller to a local agent of the foreign buyer after
the goods haYc been actually shipped, or where such ff
documents are cleared on payment, or on acceptance,
by the Indian buyer before the arrival of the goods
within the State.
This view, which lays undue stress
on the etymology of the word "course"
and formulates a mechanical test for the application of clause (b ),
places, in our opinion, too narrow a construction upon
~
that clause, in so far as it seeks to limit its operation
only to sales and purchases effected during the transit
of the goods, and would, if accepted, rob the
exemption of much of its usefulness.
j
V'fe accordingly hold that whatever else may or may
not fall within article 286 (l)(b), sales and
purchases
which themselves occasion the export or the import of
the goods, as the case may be, out of or into the territory of India come within the exemption and that
is
enough to dispose of these appeals.
Our attention was called, in the course of the debate,
I
to various American decisions which
hold
that the
power "to regulate" inter-State commerce
vested
exclusively in the Congress by article 1 section 8(3) of;
the American Constitution (the Commerce clause) ex- \L
eludes by implication the
States'
power
of
taxation
only when the goods enter "the export stream", and
until then such goods form part of "the general mass .,
of property in the State" subject, as such, to its jurisdiction to tax, and that this principle was also applicable to cases arising under article 1
section
9(5) and/
section 10(2)
(the Import-Export clause),
[see
e.g.,
Empresa Sidernrgica v. Merced Co.(1)]. These clauses{
(1) 337 U.S. 154.
•
-.
•
)
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1121
are widely different in language, scope and
purpose,
and a varying body of doctrines and tests have grown
around them
interpreting,
extending
or
restricting,
from time to time, their operation and application in
the context of the expanding American commerce and
industry, and we are of opinion that not much help
can be derived from them in the solution of the problems
ansmg
under
article
286 of the
Indian
Constitution.
It remains only ~o point out that the use made by
the learned Judges below
of the
speeches
made by
the members of the Constituent Assembly in the course
of the
debates on the draft Constitution is unwarranted. That this form of extrinsic aid to the interpretation of statutes is not admissible has been
generally
.iccepted in England, and the same rule has 1been
observed in the construction
of
Indian
statutes-see
Administrator-Genet<al
of
Bengal
v.
Prem
Nath
Mallick(1). The reason behind the rule was explained
by one of us in Gopalan's case(2) thus :-
"A speech made in the course of the debate on a bill
could at best be indicative of the subjective intent of
the speaker, but it could not reflect the inarticulate
mental process lying behind the majority
vote
which
carried the bill.
Nor is it reasonable to assume that
the minds of all those legislators were in accord,"
or, as it is more tersely put in an American case-
"Those who did not speak may not have agreed with
those who did; and those who spoke might differ from
each
other-United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight
Association (3)."
This rule of exclusion has not always been adhered
to in America, and sometimes distinction is made between using such material to ascertain the purpose of a
statute and using it for ascertaining its meaning.
It
would seem that the rule is adopted in
Canada and
Australia-see Craies on Statute Law, 5th Ed., p. 122.
(!) (1895) 22 I.A. 107, 118.
(3) 169 U.S. 290, 318.
(2) [ 1950] S.C.R. 88.
1952
State of
TravancoreCochin
and Others
v.
The Bombay
Co. Ltd.
Patanjali
Sastri C. ].
1952
State of
Travancore~
Cochin
and Others
v.
The Bombay
Co. Ltd.
Patanjali
Sastri C. /.
1952
Oct. 20.
1122
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19521
In the result,
agreeing with the conclusion of the
High Court, though on different grounds,
we dismiss
the appeals with costs.
Appeals dismissed.
Agent for the appellants : P. A. Mehta.
Agent for the respondent in C. A. No. 25 of 52 :
M. S. K. Sastri.
Agent for the respondent in C. A. No. 28 of
52 :
Sardar Bahadur.
Agent for the respondent in C. A. No. 29 of 52 :
V. P. K. Nambiyar.
.
Agent for
the Interveners (Union of India, State
of Bombay, State of Madras,
State of Hyderabad,
State of Punjab, State of Mysore, and State of Orissa) :
P. A. Mehta.
•
~
Agent for the State of Uttar Pradesh : C. P. Lal.
SHRIMA TI HIRA DEVI AND OTHERS
v.
DISTRICT BOARD, SHAHJAHANPUR
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA
ArYAR and BHAGWATI JJ.)
U.
P.
District Boards Act (X of 1922), ss.
71, 90-District
Board-Dismissal
of
secretary-Resolutions
far
dismissal,
and
suspension pending decision of appeal to Government-Validity of
suspension.
Section 71 of the U. P. District Boards Act, 1922, as
amend~
cd in 1933 provided that a resolution of the Board for the
dis~
missal of its secretary shall not take effect until the period
of
one month has expired or until the State Government have
passed orders on any appeal preferred by him.
A District
Board
passed a resolution for dismissal of its secretary and also for his
suspension till the matter oi his
dismissai
was
deci<led
unde:r
section 71
of the Act on an appeal if any
preferred by
the
secretary : H'lld, that under section 90 of the
Act
a
secretary
could be suspended only as a
punishment or pending inquiry or
•
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