# HANUMANT v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH. RAOJIBHAI ti, THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

- **Citation:** [1952] 1 S.C.R. 1091
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1950-03-09
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 56 of 1951
- **Bench:** Mehr Chand Mahajan, Das, Bhagwati
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/hanumant-v-the-state-of-madhya-pradesh-raojibhai-ti-the-state-of-madhya-pradesh-210
- **Pages:** 22

## Headnote

Criminal trial-Circumstantial evidence-Sufficiency of evidence for conviction-Caution against basing conviction on guess or
suspicion-Admission-Must be taken as a whole.
In dealing with circumstantial evidenee there is always the
danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal
proof. It is therefore right to remember that in cases where the
evidence is of a circumstantal
nature,
the
circumstances
from
which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first
instance be fully established and all
the
facts
so
established
should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused.
Again, the circumstances should
be
of
a
conclusive
nature and tendency, and they should be such as to exclude
every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved.
In
other
words; there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not
to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent
with
the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that
within all human probability the act must have been
done
by
the accused.
Reg. v. Hodge [(1838) 2 Lew. 227] referred to.
An admission
made
by a person whether amounting to a
confession or not cannot be split up and part of it used against
him. It must be used either as a whole or not at all.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JuRISDicTION
Criminal
Appeal No. 56 of 1951.
Appeals by special leave from the Judgment and
Order dated the 9th March, 1950, of the High Court of
Judicature at Nagpur
(C. R. Hemeon J.) in Criminal
Revisions
Nos. 152
and 153 of
1949 arising out of
Judgment and Order dated the 24th March, 1949, of
the Court of the Sessions: Judge, Nagpur, in Criminal
Appeals Nos. 26 and 27 of 1949 and Judgment and
Order dated the 15th January, 1949, of the Court of
the Special Magistrate, Nagpur, in Criminal Case No. 1
of 1948.
15-1 O S. C. India 71
1952
Sepl. ZJ,
1952
Hanumant
'v:"·
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh,
1092
Sl]PRE!vfE COURT REPORTS
[19?2]
N. C. Chatterjee (B. Bannerjee and A. K. Datt, with
him) for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 56 of
1951.
Bakshi Tek Chand (K. V. Tambay, with him) for the
appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 57 of 1951.
T. L. Shiv de,
Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh
(T. P. Naik; with him) for the respondent.
1952. Sept. 23.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
MAHAJAN
J.-This
1s
a consolidated
appeal by
special kave from the two orders of the High Court of
Judicature at Nagpur passed on the 9th March, 1950,
'in Criminal Revisions Nos. 152 and 153 of 1949.
, On a complaint filed by the
Assistant InspectorGeneral
of
Police,
Anti-Corruption
Department,
Nagpur, the appellant in
Criminal Appeal No. 56 of
1951
. (H.
G.
Nargundkar,
Excise
Commissioner,
Madhya
Pradesh),
and
tne
appellant in
Criminal
Appeal No. 57 of 1951 (R. S. Patel) were tried in the
court
of _Shri
B. K.
Chaudhri, Special
Magistrate,
Nagpur, for the
offence of
conspiracy to secure the
contract of Seoni Distillery from April, 1947, to March
1951 by
forging the tender,
Exhibit P-3A, and for
commission of
the offences of
forgery of the tender
(Exhibit P-3A)
and of another document, Exhibit
P-24.
The
learned-Special
Magistrate
convicted both
the appellants on all the three charges. He sentenced
R. S.
Patel to
rigorous
imprisonment for one year
under each charge and to pay fines of Rs. 2,000, Rs.
2,000, and Rs. 1,000, under the first, second and third
charges respectively.
The
appellant
Nargundkar
was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months
under each charge and to pay fines of Rs. 2,000, Rs.
2,000 and Rs. 1,000, under the first, second and third
charges respectively.
Each of the appellants appealed
against
their respective
convictions
and sentences to
_the Court of the Sessions Judge, Nagpur.
The learned
. Sessions
Judge
quashed
the
conviction of both the
appellants under the first charge of criminal conspiracy
under section
120-B,
I. P. C.,
but
maintained ~he
l
.'
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1093
conv1ct1ons and sentences under section 465, I.P.C., on
the charge

## Text

_Characters 0–39,822 of 46,251. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39822 for what follows._

I
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
HANUMANT
v
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH.
RAOJIBHAI
ti,
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH.
1091
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, DAS and BHAGWATI JJ.]
Criminal trial-Circumstantial evidence-Sufficiency of evidence for conviction-Caution against basing conviction on guess or
suspicion-Admission-Must be taken as a whole.
In dealing with circumstantial evidenee there is always the
danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal
proof. It is therefore right to remember that in cases where the
evidence is of a circumstantal
nature,
the
circumstances
from
which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first
instance be fully established and all
the
facts
so
established
should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused.
Again, the circumstances should
be
of
a
conclusive
nature and tendency, and they should be such as to exclude
every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved.
In
other
words; there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not
to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent
with
the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that
within all human probability the act must have been
done
by
the accused.
Reg. v. Hodge [(1838) 2 Lew. 227] referred to.
An admission
made
by a person whether amounting to a
confession or not cannot be split up and part of it used against
him. It must be used either as a whole or not at all.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JuRISDicTION
Criminal
Appeal No. 56 of 1951.
Appeals by special leave from the Judgment and
Order dated the 9th March, 1950, of the High Court of
Judicature at Nagpur
(C. R. Hemeon J.) in Criminal
Revisions
Nos. 152
and 153 of
1949 arising out of
Judgment and Order dated the 24th March, 1949, of
the Court of the Sessions: Judge, Nagpur, in Criminal
Appeals Nos. 26 and 27 of 1949 and Judgment and
Order dated the 15th January, 1949, of the Court of
the Special Magistrate, Nagpur, in Criminal Case No. 1
of 1948.
15-1 O S. C. India 71
1952
Sepl. ZJ,
1952
Hanumant
'v:"·
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh,
1092
Sl]PRE!vfE COURT REPORTS
[19?2]
N. C. Chatterjee (B. Bannerjee and A. K. Datt, with
him) for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 56 of
1951.
Bakshi Tek Chand (K. V. Tambay, with him) for the
appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 57 of 1951.
T. L. Shiv de,
Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh
(T. P. Naik; with him) for the respondent.
1952. Sept. 23.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
MAHAJAN
J.-This
1s
a consolidated
appeal by
special kave from the two orders of the High Court of
Judicature at Nagpur passed on the 9th March, 1950,
'in Criminal Revisions Nos. 152 and 153 of 1949.
, On a complaint filed by the
Assistant InspectorGeneral
of
Police,
Anti-Corruption
Department,
Nagpur, the appellant in
Criminal Appeal No. 56 of
1951
. (H.
G.
Nargundkar,
Excise
Commissioner,
Madhya
Pradesh),
and
tne
appellant in
Criminal
Appeal No. 57 of 1951 (R. S. Patel) were tried in the
court
of _Shri
B. K.
Chaudhri, Special
Magistrate,
Nagpur, for the
offence of
conspiracy to secure the
contract of Seoni Distillery from April, 1947, to March
1951 by
forging the tender,
Exhibit P-3A, and for
commission of
the offences of
forgery of the tender
(Exhibit P-3A)
and of another document, Exhibit
P-24.
The
learned-Special
Magistrate
convicted both
the appellants on all the three charges. He sentenced
R. S.
Patel to
rigorous
imprisonment for one year
under each charge and to pay fines of Rs. 2,000, Rs.
2,000, and Rs. 1,000, under the first, second and third
charges respectively.
The
appellant
Nargundkar
was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months
under each charge and to pay fines of Rs. 2,000, Rs.
2,000 and Rs. 1,000, under the first, second and third
charges respectively.
Each of the appellants appealed
against
their respective
convictions
and sentences to
_the Court of the Sessions Judge, Nagpur.
The learned
. Sessions
Judge
quashed
the
conviction of both the
appellants under the first charge of criminal conspiracy
under section
120-B,
I. P. C.,
but
maintained ~he
l
.'
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1093
conv1ct1ons and sentences under section 465, I.P.C., on
the charges of forging Exhibits P-3 (A) and P-24.
Both
the appellants went up in revision against this decision to the H'.1gh Court but without any success.
An
application was then made under article 136 of the
Constitution of India for special leave to appeal and
this was allowed by this Court on 24th March, 1950.
The appellant,
Nargundkar,
1s a
member of the
Central Provinces & Berar Provincial Service and held
the
substantive
post
of
Deputy
Commissioner
for
several years.
In April, 1946, he was appointed Excise
Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh, and continued to hold
that office till tl.ie 5th September, 1947.
The appellant, R. S. Patel, is a sugar Technologist
and
Chemical
Engineer.
He
received his technical
education and practical trainirtg in America and after
working as
Chief
Chemist and General Manager in
factories in Madras for five years, came to the Central
Provinces m 1944, when the Provincial Government
gave him a licence to set up a distillery for the manufacture of industrial spirit.
On the 11th September, 1946, Nargundkar m his
capacity
as Excise
Commissioner
invited tenders for
working the Government distillery at Seoni and supplying spirit to certain specified districts for a period
of four years from 1st April, 1947, to 31st March, 1951.
The last date for submitting the tenders was the 31st
October, 1946.
In response to this tender notice, five
tenders were filed including those filed by ( 1) appellant,
R. $. Patel, (2) K. B. Habibur Rahman, (3) Zakirur
Rahman, and (4) Edulji P.
Doongaji (P. W. 4), in
sealed covers
with
the Excise
Commissioner on the
31st October, 1946, and he handed them over with the
seals intact to the office superintendent, S. W. Gadgil
(P. W. 13), for
safe custody.
Gadgil took them to
his room and kept them under lock and key in the
office safe.
The case for the prosecution 1s that on the gth
November,
1946,
accused
Nargundkar took
these
sealed tenders home, that the tenders were opened b-y
him at his house, that the rates of the tender (Exhibit
1952
Hanumant
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
1952
Hanumant
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan /.
1094
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952J
P-6) of E. J. Doongaji (P. W. 4) were
divulged to
accused 2 (R. S. Patel), who was allowed to substitute
another
tender
(Exhibit P-3A),
containing
rates
lower
than those of
Doongaji, that thereafter these
open tenders were brought to
the office on the 11th
November, 1946, and given to Amarnath (P.W. 20) who
was
the Assistant
Commissioner of Excise, for submitting a report and that on the recommendation of
Nargundkar
the
tender of
accused 2
(Patel) was
accepted and the contract was given to him. In May,
1947, on receipt of. an application (Exhibit P-1) from
one Dilbagrai (P. W. 14), enquiries were started by
the
Anti-Corruption Department.
Both the accused
became aware of the enqmry.
In order to create
evidence in their
favour they
brought into existence
a
letter
(Exhibit P-24) and
antedated it
to
20th
November, 1946.
This document was forged with the
intention of committing fraud and of causing injury
to, Amarnath
(P. W. 20)
and also
to Doongaji
(P. W. 4). Exhibit P-24 is alleged to have been typed
on a typewriter (Article A) which was purchased on
the 30th December, 1946, by
the National Industrial
Alcohol Co., Nagpur, of which accused Patel was the
managmg director. It was further alleged that the
endorsement made by accused 1 (Nargundkar) in the
said letter "No action seems necessary. File'', and
marked to Superintendent "S"
was not made on the
21st November, 1946, which date it bears. This letter
was handed over
by accused
1 to the Office Superintendent, S. W. Gadgil (P. W. 13) about the middle
of August, 1947, and thereafter accused 1 wrote a letter
(Exhibit P. 26), on the 2nd October, 1947, to Sri
S. Sanyal (P. W. 19) who was then the Excise Commi5.'ioner, requesting that
this letter
(Exhibit P-24)
and a
note
sheet
(Exhibit P-27)
be kept in safe
custody.
••
'
Both the
accused
denied
the
commission of the
offences
of
criminal conspuacy, forgery
and
abet-
/
ment
thereof.
Nargundkar denied having attended
office on the 9th November, 1946.
He denied having
taken
the
tenders
home.
According to him, the
tenders
were opened
by
him in the office on the
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1095
11th
November,
1946.
Accused 2 denied that
the
). tender of Doongaji was shown to him by accused
1 between the 9th and 11th November, 1946. He stated that the tender
(Exhibit P-3A)
was the original
t
tender submitted by him on the
31st October, 1946.
As regards
Exhibit P-24,
it was
denied that it was
fabricated or antedated. Accused 2 stated that it was
not typed on article A. He also alleged that the allegat
tions made in exrubit P-24 were correct.
Accused
'
Nargundkar stated that the endorsement was made by
him on the 21st
November,
1946.
The first charge
..
having failed, nothing need be said about it herein.
In order to prove the second charge the prosecution
had to establish that Gadgil,
P. W. 13, handed over
the sealed tenders on the 9th November, 1946, to
accused Nargundkar, that the latter took them home,
that between the 9th and the 11th November he met
Patel
at
his
house or elsewhere and
that accused
Nargundkar
showed or communicated the particulars
of the tender of Doongaji to accused Patel who substituted Exrubit
P-3A
for his
original tender before
)
the 11th November, 1946. Admittedly there is no direct
evidence to prove any
of these facts except the first
one, and the nature of the case is such that recourse
could only be had to circumstantial evidence to establish
those facts.
The fact
that the
sealed tenders were
handed over by Gadgil to accused Nargundkar on the
9th November has been held proved solely on the uncorroborated testimony of Gadgil as against the denial
of Nargundkar, Gadgil was himself a suspect in the
case.
He was kept by the police away from the office
for alxmt eight
months during the · investigation, he
I
was asked to proceed on leave at the instance of the
police and ills
leave was
extended at their request.
On the expiry
of his
leave he
was kept off duty
without salary for a period of about five months but
:..
later on he was paid his full salary after he had given
evidence in support of the prosecution. He made additions and improvements on vital points from stage to
,.
stage of his deposition
and in certain particulars his
-. statement was contradicted by Ramaswami, P. W. 30 .
. •'~ On his ,own admission he is an accomplice in respect
1952
Hanumant
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan /.
' .
1952
Hanumant
v.
The Stat.e of
Madhya
Pradesh.
,-.
Mahaian ].
' .
'
1096
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952)
of the forgery of Exhibit P-27, one of the documents
alleged to have been forged for purposes of. the defence
but concerning which
no prosecution
was
started.
Exhibit P-27. bears date 31st October, 1946.
Gadgil's
statement about it is as follows :
~, I
'
.
"He (Nargundkar) put down his signature and the
date 31st October, ,1946. This. order was actually written
by Sh. Nargundkar \n the note-sheet, Exhibit P-27,
in the month of July or August, 1947. The dates were
antedated. In the margin of the note sheet I have put
down my .,initials S. W. G. and put
the date 31st
October, 1946.
This
note-sheet was not prepared on
31st October, 1946. He asked me to keep it in my
custody."
The wit:lless admittedly became a party to the preparation of a forged document.
Whether he was telling the truth, or he was telling a lie, as appears likely
from his cross-examination, he is in either event, not
a person on whom any relian.ce could be placed.
It is
curious that this aspect of the evidence of Gadgil has
not been noticed by any of the three courts below.
When the ~ourt of first i~stance a~d the court of
appeal arnve .. ~t concurrent. findings of fact after believing the evidence of a witness, this court as the final
court does not disturb such findings, save m most
exceptional cases.
But where a finding of fact is arriv-
~d at on the testimony. of a witness of. the character
of Gadgil and the courts below depart from the rule of
prudence that such . testimony
should not be accepted.
unless it is
corroborated
by some
other evidence on
'
...
the record, a finding of that character in the circum,
stances of a particular. case may well be reviewed even.
OU ,special leave if the other circumstances in the c;l.Se
require . it,, and
sμbstantial
and grave
injustice has
resulted.. After £ully examining t;he material on tht;
record we have reached the conclusion that the courts
below were in
error in
accepting the uncorroborated
testimony of Gadgil to find . the. fact that he handed,
..
over the
tenders . to
Nargundkar.
on . the
9tli .,
November, 1946.
The witness was not allowed to live
ill a free
atmosphere
and
was kept
under poliC:e
'
..
t ..
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1097
surveillance during the whole of the period of investi·
gation and the trial and was rewarded with payment
of his full salary after he had given evidence to the
satisfaction of the prosecution.
He
~s a person who
(elt no hesitation in deposing on oath that he willingly'
became a party to the forgery of Exhibit P-27.
1'952
Hanumant
v.
The State df
Maahya·
Pradesh;
Assuming that the accused
Nargundkar had taken
Mahaian /.
the tenders to his house, the prosecution, in order to
bring the guilt home to the accused, has yet to prove
the other facts referred to above.
No direct evidence
was, adduced in
proof of
those facts.
Reliance was
placed by the prosecution and by the courts below on
certain circumstances,
and
intrinsic
eyidence contained
in the impugned document, Exhibit P-3A.
In
dealing with circumstantial evidence the rules specially
applicable to such evidence must be borne in mind.
In such cases there is always the danger that conjecture or. suspicion may take the place of legal proof
and therefore it is right to recall the warning addressed by Baron Alderson to the jury in Reg v. Hodge (1)
where lie said :-
"The mind was apt to take a pleasure in adapting
.circumstances to
one another,
and even in straining
them a little, if need be, to force them to form parts
of one connected whole; and the more ingenious the
mind of the
individual, the
more likely was ii:, considering such matters, to overreach and mislead itself,
to supply some little link that is wanting, to take for
granted some fact consistent with its previous theories
and necessa·ry to render them complete."
It is
well to
remember
that in cases where the
evidence is
of a
circumstantial
nature,
the circum~
stances from which
the
conclusion of guilt is fo be
drawn should in the first instance be fully established,
and all the facts so established should be consistent only
with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused.
Again,
the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency and they should be such as to exclude every
hypothesis, but the
one proposed
to be proved.
In
(1) (1838) 2 Lew. 227.
1952
Hanumant
.v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
MahajiJ11 f.
1098
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far
complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a
conclμsion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be
such as to show that within all
human probability the
act must
have been done by
the
accused.
In spite
of
the
forceful
arguments
addressed to us by
the learned
Advocate-General on
behalf of the State we have not been able to discover
any
such
evidence
either
intnns1c
within
Exhibit
P-3A or outside and we are
constrained to observe
that the courts below have just fallen into the error
against which warning was uttered by Baron Alderson
in the above mentioned case.
The trial magistrate was of the opinion that friendship between the
two accused
was of a very rapid
growth and that
their
relations were
very intimate
and accused 2 was in a position to influence accused 1.
He thus found that there was motive for the commission of the
crime.
The learned
Sessions Judge disagreed with this
finding and the High Court agreed
with the Sessions Judge on this point. It observed that
the evidence
which
tended to prove · friendship or
undue favour was not such as to form the basis for a
finding.
It further found that there was nothing to
show that the
appellant Nargundkar received
any
illegal reward
or the
promise
of
one for showing
Doongaji's tender to accused R. S. Patel.
The first
circumstance
therefore on
which
the
trial
Judge
placed
considerable
reliance
was
negatived
by
the
court of appeal and in revision.
It having been found
that there was no motive whatsoever for accused
Nargundkar to show the tenders to accused Patel and
to· take a substituted tender from him, the main link in
the chain
of
reasoning
of the
trial court vanishes.
Amiable relations
between the
two accused or their
official relationship could not be regarded· as sufficient
motive for committing the crime of forgery.
The mainstay of the prosecution case is the intrinsic
evidence of the contents of Exhibit· P-3A itself which
according to the
courts below are
unusual, peculiar
and strange
and which according to
the AdvocateGeneral could
not
be there if it was · a genuine
~ ,
.\
f
·-
)
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1099
document.
The argument would have force provided
the premises on which it is based are correct.
Having
examined the
contents of
Exhibit P-3A, we do not
find
anything
very
unusual
or extraordinary in it
which could not be
there
without its author having
seen Exhibit P-6.
1952
Hanumant
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
We now proceed to examine the
s0-called peculiar
Mahajan /.
features m Exhibit P-3A.
In order to appreciate the
points
made by
the
learned
Advocate-General it is
necessary to set out certain facts.
Exhibit P-9 is the
notice calling for
tenders
for the
supply of country
spirit in the Seoni distillery area.
The rates which
were called for by this notice were as follows :
1. Flat rate for four years.
2. Rates on sliding scale for four years,
3. All-in-rate on the sliding scale for one year
1947-48.
4. Flat rates on the
basis of
the price of mahua
flowers for three years 1948-51.
5. All-in-sliding scale rate on the basis of the price
of mahua flowers for three years 1948-51.
The trial
magistrate held on a
construction of it
that no rate or rates of separate years were asked for
in this notice and that one flat rate was only asked
for, for
four
years.
Habibur Rahman and Zakirur
Rahman in their tenders, Exhibits P-4 and P-5, quoted
one flat rate for four years and did not mention separate flat
rates for
separate years.
Doongaji m his
tender, Exhibit
P-6,
mentioned
separate
flat
rates
for each separate year
also.
He
did so because he
consulted one Mr.
Munshi,
Personal Assistant to the
Excise
Commissioner, whether
he should quote each
rate separately and Mr. Munshi told him that he could
give flat rate for the
combined
years as well as flat
rates and also sliding scale rates for each year separately.
Admittedly
accused
2 was
working as an
agent
of
Habibur
Rahman
and
his
son
Zakirur
Rahman for
the
distillery
contracts of
Betul
and
Seoni, and, therefore, he
must have been the author
not only of his own tender but of the tenders submitted
bv Habibur Rahman and Zakirur Rahman, Exhibits
1952
Hanumant
v.
The Stat~ of
Madhya
Pradesh,
Mahajan·/,
llOO
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
P-4 and P-5.
All of them were acting together with
the object of getting the contract though they were
submitting three separate tenders.
The trial magistrate held that
as
Habibur Rahman and Zakirur
Rahman gave one flat' rate for four years as called for by
Exhibit P-9, but accused 2, the author of all these
tenders, did not do it in Exhibit P-3A, but followed
the method of Doongaji in giving the rates of each
year separately as well as the rate for the combined
four years.
He must have done so as he was shown the
tender Exhibit P-6.
The question arises whether the
circumstance that the
accused
Patel and Habibur
Rahman and' Zakirur Rahman were acting together
was such from which a necessary inference arises that
the
accused
Patel
must
have
been
the
author
of all the three tenders and, if he were, that he
could not have
departed
from
the
method adopted
by
him .in preparing· Exhibits
P-4
and P-5 unless
and until he had seen Exhibit P-6.
We are clearly
of. the
opm10n
that
from
the
premises
stated
this inference does
not· necessarily
follow.
Doongaji
even . aft~r i;eadfr1g Eiil~ibii: P-9, could not make up his
mind whether to submit the tender with one flat rate
for all th~ four years or whether to submit it by giving
separate flat rates for .each of the four years and made
enquiry from .the
office of
the Excise
Commissioner
and then quoted separate rates for each of the four years
separately also:
Patel
~ho has
admittedly considerable . experien~e ,of
distillery contracts and about the
method. 0f submitting
tenders
might very well have
thought that it was best to quote a flat rate for all the
years as well
as a flat
rate for each year separately.
The circumstance that he did, not .do so in the other
two tenders prepared by him does
not materially
advance. the
prosecution
case. . The
very object of
submitting several tenders on behalf
of three persons
acting. in unison
was to indiCate to the excise authorities that they were being submitt,ed by three different
persons. If there . were no. variations whatsoever between tho;e
tend~rs that woi'.il<l have ' defeated the ,/ery
purpose of submitting them.
Moreover,. a. variation
of this trifling nature between Exhibits P-3A and P-4
(
f ,_
)
S.C.R.
SuPREME COURT REPORTS
1101
and P-5 cannot be said to be of such an unusual or of
such
an
extraordinary
character
as to
warrant the
inference that it could not
have been
made except
without a look at the tender of Doongaji. The circumstance is of a neutral character and the trial magistrate
and the learned
Sessions Judge
gave undue importance to it
being
obsessed with
the idea that such
'
'
b
a quotation of flat rates
for each year could not
e
mentioned in a
tender by a
contractor merely on a
construction of Exhibit P-9 and without any further
inquiry or without seeing the _tender of somebody else
who had followed that method.
The next <;ircumstance on
which considerable reliance is placed is that accused 2 studiously maintained
rates
below
the rates
of Doongaji
throughout, that
when Doongaji lowered his rates for the second year
accused 2 did the same, and when Doongaji raised his
rates for the third and fourth years accused 2 also did
so, at the
same time maintaining
rates lower than
Doongaji's rat~s. , It is said
that the system followed
by Habibur Rahman
and Zakirur
Rahman and Patel
originally must have been the same as Patel was the
author of
all the
three
tenders,
that Habibur Rahman' s rates were
higher .. than Zakirur
Rahman's by
six pies and this variation was
constant throughout,
that in Patel's original tender which must have follow-
~d the same.
system his rates·. would be lower than
Habibur Rahman's by three pies throughout. Exhibit
P-3A, however, shows
that this is
not so.
Patel
abandoned . the
system
when he . found
that
his
rates on his original scheme would be higher than the
corresponding rates of Doongaji.
~earned Advo~ate
General
contended
that it was
impossible for Patel
unless he had seen
Exhibit P-6, to quote rates of a
large number of items numbering about 197, in every
case lower than the rates given in Exhibit P-6 and the
circumstance that in not a single case. he has quoted a
higher rate than Exhibit P-6 is conclusive of the fact
that he had done so after he had seen Exhibit P-6.
It
~as al.so said that there is no satisfactory explanation'
why Patel abandoned the
scheme adopted by him in
1952
Hanumant
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan J.
1952
Hanumant
v.
Tht Stat• of
Madhya
Pradesh.
MahaJan /.
1102
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
drawing up
Exhibits
P-4 and P-5
and his original
tender.
In our view,
this
circumstance
again is not so
strange or peculiar as · was
made out by the learned
Advocate-General or in the courts below. In the first
place, there is no material whatsoever for the assumption that the so-called
original tender was drawn up
on the same scheme as Exhibits P-4 and P-5 or that
there was a constant variation in rates between it and
Habibur Rahman's tender.
It has been assumed on
!J1ere surmise that the
first five rates in the tender,
Exhibit P-3A, are the
rates that
had been originally
quoted.
The original "tender
is not forthcoming and
there is no evidence at all about its contents.
Moreover, in the deposition of Doongaji it was elicited that
in the year 1942 when tenders for the Seoni distillery
contract were called for, the rates quoted by Ratanshah were lower than his rates for all items. He, however, voluntarily added that Ratanshah obtained his
rates of the previous contracts before he submitted his
tender for the year
1942 and
that he had made a
reduction of annas two to three in those rates but he
was forced to admit that the rate of Ratanshah in the
tender was not only lower than his but was also lower
throughout than ·the rates of Laxminarain, Haji Ismail
and
Habibur
Rahman
even
without seeing
their
tenders.
From this
statement it is
quite clear that
even without seeing the tenders of different tenderers a
eontractor may quote rock-bottom rates of all items
on
his own calculation or impelled by the desire of taking
the contract
anyhow.
We do
not follow why Patel
could not do in 1946 what was done by Ratanshah in
his tenders in 1942 and quote rates lower in all particulars and regarding all items than the rates of Doongaji. If a person is out to give rockbottom rates and
his calculation is such that his rates work out lower
than tihe rates of others, it may well be that he may
quote lower rates in respect of all items.
.
It was then said that Patel had adopted a particular
plan in
submitting the
three
tenders, . of
himself,
Habibur Rahman and
Zakirur Rahman and that his
plan was that his rates should be
l<Jss by three pies
(
'
f.
-I
>
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1103
. than the rates he
had quoted for Habibur Rahman,
that in the first five items of Exhibit 145 he stuck to
that plan and did not alter the rates of those items as
originally submitted by him, as those rates were lower
than the rates of
Doongaji but from the sixth item
onwards he substituted new rates for the ones he had
originally
submitted and he
departed from the plan
so that his rates for each item were to be lower only by
three pies as
compared
with
the rates of Habibur
Rahman.
It is no
doubt
true that Patel did not
adhere to the plan
that he adopted
in the first five
items
of his
tender but
is
that a circumstance
from which any inference can be drawn that the first
five items are a part of his original tender or that he
did so depart from them because he had seen Exhibit
P-6 and he wanted to underbid Doongaji. As we have
already said,
the object of submitting three separate
tenders ostensibly by persons who were acting together
was to secure the contract in one or the other name
and Patel who was the author of all the three documents
may
very
well in his own
document have
quoted
much lower
figures
than were
quoted
by
Habibur Rahman
and
Zakirur Rahman, in order
also to give the impression that all these tenders had
not been submitted by one and the same person.
Be
that as it may, a closer examination of the tenders of
Doongaji
and
Patel
completely
negatives
the
theory
of
the courts
below.
The
rates
quoted
in the first five items of Exhibit P-145 are lower than
the rates of Doongaji by 102, 69, 18, 12 and 9 pies
respectively.
Even
in
the
subsequent
quotations
except in one case where the disparity in the rates of
Doongaji and Patel is only two pies, the disparity in
the rates is from 9 to 11 pies.
Patel is certainly a
businessman and the whole object of quoting the rates
was to earn the maximum profit.
If he had seen the
tender of Doongaji he would have modelled the rates
in a manner that would give him the highest profit.
The learned
Advocate-General could
not suggest any
reason
whatsoever
why
Patel
would
maintain
his
quotation
for
the
quantity
of
50,000
gallons
at
Rs. 2-10-6 when the rate of Doongaji was Rs. 3-3-0.
1952
Hanumant
1'.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahaian /.
1952
,_,_
Hanumant
. v.
The State of
' Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan /.
1104
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
••
~
. i.
i ~
' j
-
•
.
~
[195~]
He, could easily raise the quotation to Rs. 3 and similarly in all other cases he could have underbid Doongaji by 2, 3 or 6 pies at the most. He need not have
maintained a
disparity
of
9 to
11
pies between
his
rates and the
rates
of Doongaji.
In our
opinion, therefore, no conclusion of any character
could be drawn
from the
disparity in
the rates of
Doongaji or of Patel or of the expected uniformity in
the rates of Habibur Rahman or of R. S. Patel which
would establish that Exhibit P-3A had been prepared
by having a look at Exhibit P-6.
Another· circumstance on which reliance was placed
was that certain rates in Exhibit P-3A are lower than
the corresponding rates in Exhibit P-6 by only one or
two pies.
There is no doubt that one or two rates are
lower by two
pies than the rates in Exhibit P-6 but
'nothing follows
from that innocent circumstance, unless one starts with a presumption of guilt. Once it is
assumed that the
tender of Doongaji was shown to
Patel, all
these
circumstances might
to some extent
fit in with the
view that in
certain respects it may
have been copied from Exhibit P-6.
The courts below
fell into this error and departed from the rule that in
a criminal case an accused · person is to be presumed
to be innocent and that it is for thP. prosecution to
establish his guilt conclusively.
Next it was urged that in the covering letter
Exhibit P-3 sent
by Patel he
m·emions three appen-
·dices numbered 1, 2 and 3. The same expressioP. finds
place in the covering letter
Exhibit P-4 of Habibur
Rahman and
Exhibit P-5 of
Zakirur
Rahman, that
appendices 1 to 3 of the tender of Habibur Rahman
·and Zakirur Rahman correctly answer to the reference
in the covering
letters but
this is not so in Patel's
case; on the other hand, instead of appendix 1, Patel
has appendix l(a) and l(b) and the _number of his
appendices thus
goes' up t<i
four and this departure
from Exhibits P-4 and P-5 came about because of his
having seeri
Exhibit P-6 and
the number of appendices annexed to it.
It was urged that 'the original
tender
of
Patel
must ·have contained
three
appendices
like· those
of
Habibur
"Rahman
amt
. ' .
!
.. -
•
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1105
.
.
Zakirur Rahman and not appendix l(a) and I(b) as
now found and that this circumstance
showed
substitution of the tender.
The
learned magistrate,
in
our
opinion, in giving importance to this circumstance
mislead
himself
completely.
In
the
first
place, it is not accurate to say that the expression
appendices 1, 2 and 3 was
common
to
the
covering letters Exhibits
P-4
and
P-5.
In
Exhibit P-5 the appendices are marked A, B and C.
Therefore, no uniform method was adopted by Patel
in marking
the
appendices
to
the
tenders,
Exhibits P-4 and P-5.
Secondly, there is no conflict in
the expression of the appendices of Habbibur Rahman
and Patel. They have been marked as 1, 2 and 3 and a
mere subdivision of the first appendix into (a) and (b)
could not be taken to be a departure from the method
adopted in the
description
of
the
appendices.
It
may further
be observed
that
the
covering
letter
signed by Patel mentions four appendices,
while
the
covering
letters of
Habibur and
Zakirur
Rahman
only mention three appendices. The trial magistrate
as well as the Sessions Judge ignorc;d all these differences in the method of the description of the appendices
and assumed
that they
had been uniformly
described.
The
result
therefore is
that all these so-called
peculiar features found by the courts below
in
Exhibit P-3A should be eliminated
from
consideration
and it must be held that there are really no cucumstances inconsistent
with
Exhibit
P-3A
being
a
genuine document.
It could have been
made
out
without
looking at Exhibit P-6.
In this
view
of
the case the whole basis on
which
the
judgments
of
the
courts
below
are
founded
vanishes,
and
in the absence of any evidence of motive, we are of
the opinion that the facts did not on any just or legal
view of them warrant a conviction, and although the
proceedings are taken
to
have
been unobjectionable
in form, justice has gravely and injurious1y miscarried.
We therefore set aside the convktion of both the appellants on the second charge and acquit them.
1952
Hanumant
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan /.
1952
Hanumant
v.
The Stai. of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan /.
1106
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
In order to appreciate the third charge, it Is necessary to set out the terms of Exhibit P-24 which it IS
said was antedated in order tt> create evidence for the
defence of the accused and to miure Amarnath.
It
is in these terms :
"
Congress Nagar,
Nagpur, 20th November, 1946.
The Commissioner of Excise,
C. P. & Berar, Nagpur.
Dear Sir,
I beg to submit few of my complaints for such
action as you may be
pleased
to take,
which
aie
as under.
I went to see Mr. Amarnath last week, at his residence in connection with Seoni Distillery work. I saw
Mr. Edulji and his partner with Mr. Amarnath in the
office room of his residence
with
some
office
files.
From the papers I could recognize my tender open on
the table in front of them.
As soon as I went there,
all of them were astonished and they could not speak
with me for a moment, and then they carried on some
dry general conversation with me.
Same way after about a week, when I went to Seoni
for mahua bill, when
Mr.
Amarnath
visited
for
sanctioning the advance, I had the opportunity to see
Mr. Amarnath in dak bungalow at about 9-30 p. m.
when I saw Mr. Mehta the ex-manager of Mr. Edulji
(who ii also the manager of Seoni Electric Co.) with
Mr. Amarnath near table with the same file of the
tender. No doubt after seeing
the
above
two
incidents I requested Mr. Amarnath to be fair in this
affair.
I am bringing these incidents to your notice, as I
fear that something underhand may not be going on,
and I am afraid that my tender may
be
tampered
with.
Hoping to get justice,
Yours faithfully,
Sd. R. S. Patel."
•
'
..
t
(
•
-
I
t
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1107
The words "Congress Nagar, Nagpur, 20th November, 1946" are in manuscr
11pt, while the rest of the
letter has been typed.
The digit 6 of the year 1946
has been over-written on digit 7 written in continental
style and i't is apparent to the naked eye
that originally the writer wrote 7 and subsequently changed it
to 6.
It was contended
by
the
learned AdvocateGeneral,-and this is the finding of the courts below,
-that this letter was written some time during the investigation of the case in July or August
1947,
and
was antedated in order to implicate
Amarnath
and
to use it as evidence in defence.
The point for decision is whether there is any evidence whatsoever
to
establish this fact.
We have not been able to discover any such evidence on the reconi; on the other
hand the instrinsic evidence in the letter proves that
most likely jn came into existence on the date It
bears.
The relevant facts are that the tenders
were
opened by accused Nargundkar on the
11th November, 1946, he handed them over after
making
the
endorsements
to
Amarnath and
Amarnath had
to
submit a report about them.
It is alleged
in
thi~
letter· that "last week", i.e., during the
week
commencing on the 11th November, 1946, accused
Patel
went to
see
Amarnath
and there
he
saw
Edulji
Doongaji with him with his tender open on his table in
front of him and that he was astonished at
it, that
about a week later he again went to Seoni and had
the opportunity to see
Amarnath and Mr.
Mehta, exmanager of Edulji Doongaji, was with him and the
tender file was lying there.
It was stated that he had
requested Amarnath to be fair in this affair and
the
Commissioner was asked that he should see
that his
tender was not tampered with and he got justice. The
whole purpose and object of this letter was to protect
himself against
any underhand dealing in the grant
ing of the contract. In his
statement under section 342, Cr. P. C., Patel said that he saw
Amarnatt
on the morning of the 15th or 16th November, 1946,
and he met Amarnath at Seoni
at the distillery premises on the 16th November, 1946, and on the sam<!
16-10 S. C. India 71
1952
Hanumant
v.
The State of
Madhya
Prades/J.
Mahajan/.
1952
Hanumant
v.
TheState of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan J.
1108
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1952]
day he met him at about 9 p.m. at:
the Seoni dak
bungalow and that he agam met Him on the 17th
November, at 10 a.m.
He also stabed that he had
gone to see Amarnath at his residence at Nagpur between the dates 12th and 18th November.
It was contended
by
the
learned
Advocate-General that
his
statement was inconsistent with the recitals contained
111
Exhibit P-24.
We see nothing inconsistent between this statement
and
the recitals.
If
accused
Patel saw Amarnath on the 12th, the
letter having
been written on the 20th November, it would be quite
a correct thing to say
that he saw him "last week"
and the next recital when he said that about a week
thereafter he saw him again is quite
consistent
with
his going and seeing him on the 16th or 17th November.
That would be about a week after the first visit.
To draw any conclusion adverse to 'the accused from a
slight inaccuracy in the description of dates and
to
conclude therefrom that it was established
that
the
accused Patel had seen Amarnath on the 9th November,
1946,
amounts
to
unnecessarily
stretching
a
point against the accused.
The recitals m the letter,
true or
false,
are quite
consistent with
the letter
bearing date 20th November, 1946.
The
magistrate
observed that the vagueness about the date and the
week
shows
that the allegations
therein
are
not
correct.
We have not been able to understand how
the vagueness about the date could lead to the conclusion arrived at.
Emphasis was laid on the
overwriting of the figure 6 over the figure 7 in the manuscript part of the letter. It was said that the normal
expenence is that
it becomes
a subconscious habit
•o automatically write the year correctly when several
months have
elap~ed after · the change
of the year
2nd that by sheer force of habit the correct year must
have been put down when the date was entered in the
letter Exhibit P-24 and that the
figure
was
subsequently changed to 6 and this fact was an indication
tliat the letter was written some time in the year 1947.
In our view this argument again involves an element
' •
'
\_
I
r
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1109
of conjecture.
The mistake may well have been
inadvertently made and the correction made there and
then.
That such mistakes are not
very
uncommon
or unusual and occur in official
documents
is
fully
established on the record, in para 93 of the judgment
of the learned
Sessions
Judge and
it
is said
as
follows:
"The appellants have produced a file
which is
Exhibit ID-35. It contains a sheet which bears pages 9
and 10.
On the 10th page there are two office notesone is written by A. M. Naidu
and the
other by
the appellant Nargundkar.
A. M. Naidu below his
signature
has
written
'6-4-1948'.
The
appellant
Nargundkar below his signature has written '6-4-1947'.
The other notes in
the office
file show
that
the
correct date of the two signatures was
6th August,
1947. Thus in this sheet there are two mistakes
in
mentioning the number of the month and one mistake
in mentioning the number of the year. The appellants
contend that such mistakes are possible.