# HARBANS SINGH AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF PUNJAB - **Citation:** [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 104 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1962 - **Bench:** P. B. Gajendb.Agadkab, A. K. Sabkar, K. N. Wanohoo, K. C. Das Gupta - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/harbans-singh-and-another-v-state-of-punjab-2408 - **Pages:** 20 ## Headnote Appeal agail&d tJ«JUittal-lflW/u...u by appellaU rourt, whtn ptrmiuibk-Dyfftg ~orroboralion, if neceut1ry. • Thr. High Court set aside the Trial Court's order of ...< acquittal of the appellants and convictr.d them on a charge of murder under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code. On appeal by the appellants by special leave. H•IJ., that this Court in its earlier decisions emphaaised that interference with an order of acquittal should be baaed only on "compelling and substantial reasons" and held that unless such reasons were present an Appeal Court should not interfere with an order of acquittal, but this Court did not try to curtail the powers of the appellate court .un~er s. 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Though 1n •ts more recent pronouncements this Court hid less emphasis on • (1) s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 105 "compelling reasons" the principle has remained the same. That principle is that in deciding appeals against acquittal the Court of Appeal must examine the evidence with particular care and must also examine the reasons on which the order of acquittal was based and should.interfere with the order only when satisfied that the view taken by the acquitting judge was clearly unreasonable. Once the Court came to the conclusion that the view of the lower court was unreasonable that itsel{ \\·as a "compelling rcasan" for interference. Once it was found that the High Court applied the correct principles in setting aside the order of acquittal this Court will not ordinarily interfere with the High Court's order of conviction in appeal against acquittal o- enter into the evidence to ascertain whether the High Court was right in its view of the evidence. Only such examination of the evidence would ordinarily be necessary as is needed to see that the High Court approached the question properly and applied the principle correctly. If the judgment of the High Court did not disclose a careful examination of the evidence in coming to the conclusion that the view of the acquitting court was unreasonable or if it appeared that the High Court erred on questions of Jaw or misread the evidence or the judgment of the trial court, this Court would, unless the case was sent back to the High Court for re-hearing, appraise the evidence for itself to examine the reasons on which the lower r.ourt based its order of acquittal and then decide whether the High Courts view that the conclusions of the lower court was unreasonable, Was correct. If on such examination it appeared to this Court that the view of the acquitting court was unreasonable the acquittal would be set aside and if on the other hal)d· it appeared that the view was not unreasonable the order of acquittal would be restored. Suraj Pal Singh v. State, [1952) S.C.R. 191, Ajmer Singh v. State oJ Punjab, [1953]S.C.R. 418, Puran v. State of Punjab A.LR. 1953 S.C. 459, Ohinta v. State of M. P., Cr. A. No. 178 of 59 and Aahrajkha Haibatkha Palhan v. State of Bombay, Cr. A. No. 38 of 1960, referred to. It was neither a rule of law nor of prudence that a dying declaration should be corroborated by other evidence· before a conviction could be based thereon. Ram Nath v. Sia~ of M. P. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 420, referred to. Khualial Ram v. State of Bombay, [19581 S.C.R. 552, followed. A dying declaration did not become 1'1'5 credible if a Rwnber of petson1 were names as culprits. lf~l Harhans Sin1h v. Stall uj Punjab IHI H.,b...,8U.,h •• St•te •J hnjd Das Gu;i. J. 106 SUPID.."ME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. Khurahaid 81W;ain. v. Emperor, (1941) 43 Cr.L.J. 59, held erroneous. CRIMINAL APPELLATE Jurusmc1·10:-1: Criminal Appeal No. 115 of 1959. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order UBT REPORTR (1962] SUPP. story that he actually reaohed the village of occurrenoe on that very night and consequently doubtful about any statement h"ving been made by Hazura Singh to him on that night. In any case, he thought Hazura Singh's dying declaration had little probative value because as many ae six persons had been named and that it could not be relied upon witibout oorroboration. The lea.med Judge was a!Bo not satisfied that Bhag Singh (Prosecution Witneaa) "was present in the village or at his house at the time of the occurrence" since "his statement waa not recorded in the Inquest Report prepared by the polioe at midnight". The learned Judge also thought it unsatisfactory that nobody other than these two near relatives, that is, the father and uucle of the deceased persons had been examined as witne81168 of the occurrence. These were the main reasons for which he came to the conclusion thi.t the case had not been proved against any of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and a.ocordingly am1uitted the aocused. The High Court was of opinion that the learned Judge was wholly "wrong in holding that Bh~ Singh was not mentioned in the Inquest Report"; that he had mierea.d the time of the first Information Report as 4·30 P. 111. for 4-30 A. M. and that he was again in error in concluding that "the Btatemtmt made by Hazura Singh to the police on their arrival at 1-15 A. M. was inadmissible". After pointing out these "errors" in the reasoning 0f the learned Trial Judge the High Court said:- "We have no hesitation in concluding that for the said reasons the judgment of the learned Additional Sesaions Judge is wholly erroneous resulting in complete miscarriage of justice. After having gone through the teatimony of both of the eye-witn- and eu.mining the other material, particularly the two dying • ,. 1 - ' (1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 109 declarations, we are of the view that the prosecution case was substantially true and have been proved. As regards complicity of Harbans Singh and Major Singh, there appears to he no doubt. Both of them had been assigned participation and were responsible for the fatal blow on each of the deceased. In this respect the testimony of both of the witnesses and the dying declarations are consistent. They are accordingly held guilty under section 302, Indian Penal Code." The main contention raised by Mr. Chatterjee on behalf of the appellants is that the High Court had no sufficient reasons for interfering with the order of acquittal made by the Additional Sessions Judge and that the High Court itself had been guilty of "errors", especially as the High Court has misread the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge and had attributed to him statements which are not to be found in his judgment. ... The question as regards the correct principles to be applied by a Court hearing an appeal against acquittal of a person has engaged the attention of this Court from the very beginning. In many cases, especially the earlier ones, the Court has in laying down such principles emphasised the necessity of interference with an order of acquittal being based only on "compelling and substantial reasons" and has expressed the view that unless such reasons are present an Appeal Court should not interfere with an order of acquittal. (Vide Suraj Pal Singh v. The State (1 ); Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab ('); Puran v. State of Punjab ('). The use of the words "compelling reasons" embanassed some of the High Courts in exercising their jurisdiction in appeals against acquittals and difficulties occasionally arose as to what this Court had meant by t.he (I) [19521 S. C.R. 19+. 12) [1953] S. C.R. 418. (3) A. I. R. (1953) S. C. 459. 1961 /{arbans Singh '· Sta ft of Pu'lj ai Das G'11p1a J. 1961 H .. t.,,, Sm,h v. SttlU of Punjo6 l'as Oiipta J. 110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPl>. words "compelling reMonR". In later years the C',ourt hRs often avoided emphasis on "compelling reason.~" but nonetheless adhered to the view expressc d earlier that bf>fore interfering in appeal with an order of acquittal a Court must examine not only questions of law Rnd fact in all their aspects but must. also closely and carefully examine the reasonA which imp(llled the lower courtll to acquit the accu~cd and should interfere only if sati8fied after such examination that the conclusion reached by the lower court that the guilt of the person has not been proved is unreasonable. (Vide Chinta v. Tiu>. StnU>. of Madhya PradMh( 1); Aslirafklta llaibatl·ha Pathan v. The State of Bombay('). It iH c]P.ar that in emphasising in many eases the necessity of "compelling reasons" to justify an intcrfC'rcnec with an order of acquittal the Court ditl not in any way try to curtail the power bestowed on ap1wllat<' c-ourts und"r s. 42:i of the Code of Criminal Procedure when hearing appcal11 against acquittal; but con.~cious of tho intense dislike in our jurisprudence c1f the conviction of innocent persons and of the facts that in many syst<:>ms of jurisprudence the law cloes not provide :it all for any dppcal against iin onlcr of acquittal tlie Conrt was anxious to imprrss c1n the appellate courts the importance of bestowing special care in the sifting of evidence in appeal agai'lst acquittals. As has already been pointed out less cmphai;is is boing given in the moro recent pronouncrmcnts of this Court on "compelling rra.sons". But, on olosc analysis, it i~ clear that the principles laid down by the Court i11 this matter have remained the same. What may be caller! the golden thr"a.d running throu~h nll these decisions is th11 rul" that in deciding appeals Rgainst acquittal the Court of Appeal must examine \I l Criminal Arpeal No. 178 or 1!)59 decided on 1°-11·60. (2l Criminnl Apptal No. 38nf1960 decided on 14·12-fiO. - (1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 111 the evidence with particular care, must examine also the reasons on which the order of acquittal was based and should interfere with the order only when satisfied that the view taken by the acquitt· ing Judge ts clearly unreasonable. Onee the appellate court comes to the conclusion that the view taken by the lower court is clearly an un· reasonable one that itself is a "compelling reason" for interference. For, it is a court's duty to convict a guilty person when the guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt, no less than it is its duty to acquit the accused when such guilt is not so established. Wht>n the High Court's judgment sho'll:S clearly that the matter h"8 been approached in the proper manner and the correct principles have been applied, there is very little scope for _this Court to interfere with an order made by the High Court convicting an accused person in an appeal against acquittal. Once it is found that the principles laid down by this Court have been corri:ctly applied thia Court will not ordinarily embark upon a reappraisal of the evidence to ascertain whether the High Court was right in its view of the evidence. The only examination of the evidence that this Court may find itself called upon to undertake will ordinarily be just so milch as is necessary to see whether tho High Court has approached the qnes· tion properly and applied the principles correctly. The position may however be different if the '• judgment of the High Court while indicating its conclusion that in its opinion the view taken by the lower court is unreasonable does not disclose a careful examination of the evidence for coming to such conclusion. Or it may appear Crom the High Court's judgment that the High ( ourt has erred on questions of law or has obviously misre'ld the evidence on the record or the judgment of the Trial Court. What is this Court to do in such cases ? We are unable to agree 1961 Htu6t1111 Sb11h •. Sl•le of Punja• Das Gupta J. 11161 lla1ban1 Sineh v. Stalt of Punjab 112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. with Mr. Chatt<>rjre that th11 only proper course for this Court to take is to set. aside the order made by the High Court nnrl restore the order of acquittal. For, even where the High Court's judgment sufft•rs from any of t he~e clefects it may very we II be that the High Court's conclusion that the view of the low<'r eon rt is unrcngonab!f' is correct. P.rJ, nnleHs this Court thinks fit to senvirknce i.i confine fact that his statement was not recorded, the High Court was not justified in attributing to the Trial Judge something which he did not say. It i8 also not quite clear how the learned ,Judges said about the appellant Major Singh that he had been assigned participation and was responsible for the fatal blow on each of the deceased. In fact,, neither of the two who claim to be the eye· wit1.rsses of the occurrence has said that Major 8ingh Das a.,,, a 7. 114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP. fact takon with tho fact that the report did not reaoh th~ Magistra.to Shri Pa.sricha. before 8.45 P.M. on the 24th July that ma.de the learned Judge think that the First Information was made &t the Police Station a.t 4.30 P.M. He has unfortunately not noticed that the record l)f the First Information Report Ex. PPl shows the time of record as 4.30 A.M. He also overlooked Narendra.nath's own evidence in cross-examination in these words: "I have peruRed the Roznamoha entries a.nd find that this special report was despatched by me through Cha.nan Singh Foot Constable a.t 5.15 A.M. I cannot say why he did not deliver it to the Magistrate till 8.45 P.M." It is quite clear that 5.15 A.M. as rec· orded in the printed record in Na.render Nath's cross-examination i1 not a mistake for 5.l!i P.M, If that had been so there would have been no point in his saying that he could not say why the Conata.hie did not deliver it to the Magistrate till 8.45 p,Jlf. When this statement in cro&Hlxamina.tion is considered along with the recording of the time in Ex. PPl itself there is no escape from the conclusion that 4.30 P.M. as stated in Na.render Nath's Examination·in-Chief was a. slip of tongue and the correct time of the record was 4.30 A.M. and that the fact that it reached the Magistrate at 8.45 P.M. that day may well be due to thEI fact that the Constable was negligent and tl)ok his own time a.bout going to th11 Magistrate or to some other reason not clear from the record. The reasoning of the Trial Judge based on his wrong view about the time of recording of the formal First Information Rt>port that the complainant party was not able to Ray who the 111111&ilants were and so delay Wiil! made, th11refore falls t-0 the ground. The l<'amed Judge he.a also misdirected himself in thinking that the dying declaration had very little probative value because as mnny as six accused pt"rsons had been named and that no conviction could in law be baaed on such dying dee] aratiPn without corroboration. The law does not mak11 any ... '" (1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 115 distinction between a dying declaration in which on' person is named and a dying declaration in which several persons are named as culprits. A dying declaration implicating one person may well be false while a dying declaration implicating several persons may be true. Just as when a number of persons are mentioned as culprits by a person claiming to be an eye-witness in his evidence in court the court has to take c·are in deciding whether he has lied or ma.de a mistake a.bout any of them, so also when a number of persons appear to have been mentioned as culprits in a dying declaration the court has to scrutinise the evidence in respect of each of the accused. But it is wrong to think that a dying declaration becomes less credible if a number of persons are named as culprits. The contrary view taken in the Lahore High Court in Klmrshaid Hussain v. Emperor(') on which apparently the Trial Judge has relied is clearly erroneous. The learned Judge appears to have relied also on what was said by this Court in Ram Nath v. State of Madhya Pradesh( 1) on the need of corroboration for a dying declaration. Speaking for the Court Mahajan J. (as he then was) observed in that case:- "It is settled law that it is , not safe to convict an accused person merely on the evidence furnished by a dying declaration without further corroboration because such a statement is not made on oath and is not subject to croBB-examina.tion and because the maker of it might be mentally and physically in a state of confusion and might well be drawing upon his imagination while he was making the declaration." The question was however considered again by this Court in Khu.9hal Rao v. Stare of Bombay(•). After pointing out that in Ram Nath's Case (Supra) the (I) (1941) 45 Criminal L.J. 59. (2) A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 420, 425. (5) [19511] S.C.R. 552. 5'8. 1961 Harbans Singh v. Stale of Purijab Dai Gupta J. HahatuSi•th Y, Stau of Plllliu D11 Oupl• ], 116 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. Court after a. careful examination of the facts of that caee distinctly came to the conclusion that the dying declaration wa.s not true and could not be relied upon this Court stated in the later case that the observations of the Court in Ram Nath'e ca.~e lvere in the nature of obiter dicta. The Court then proooeded to review the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and of the decided <'&Res in the different High Courts in India a.nd in this Court and stated the law in these words: - "that it cannot be laid down as an absolut-0 rule of law that a d~·ing declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; (2l that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made; (3) that it cannot be laid down as a general position that a. dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence; ( 4) that a. dying declaration stands on the 8&llle footing as another piece of evidence and haa to be judged in the light of surroundin)? circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence ; ( 5) that a dying declaration which ha.s been recorded by a competent magistrat-0 in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of quest.ions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer ... from all the infirmities of human memory an. witness, though w1doubtedly some special considerations arise in the assessment of dying declarations which do not a.rise in the case of &BRessing the value of a statement made in Court by a person claiming to be a witness of the occurrence. In the first place, the Court has to make sure as to what the statement of the dead man actually was. This iUielf i3 often a ditticult task, specially where the statement had not been put into writing. In tho second place, the court has to be certain a.bout the identity of the persons named in the dying deolaration-a difficulty which does not arise where a person gives hi~ depositions in Court and identifies t.he person who is present in court as the person whom he ha.a named. Other speoial considerations which arise in assessing the value of dying declarations have been mentioned by this Court in Khushal Roo v. Swte of Bomb"y(') and need not be repeated here. In view of this latest pronouncement of this Court on the question of need of corroboration of a dying declaration by other evidence, it must be held that the Trial Judge was wrong in thinking that he could not a.ot on the dying declaration of Ha.zura Singh w1lC88 it was corroborated by other evidence. In view of the several defect.I in the reasoning uf the Trial Judge, it is necel!llary for us to examine the evidenoe on the reoord to see whether the High Court was right in thinking that the view taken by the learned Judge was clearly unreasonable. The most important evidence in the ca11e i.s furnished by the dying declaration made by Hazura. Singh. The Investigating Officer, Devender Singh has said that on July 22, 1056 he had gone to the village Rikhala on an excise raid and from there he went to Malian at about 2 P.111. on July 23, to investigate a. case under section 392 of the Indian Penal Code. His further evidence is that it was on the same night at about midnight that he started for Dhurkot from Malian. We aee (I} [1958] S.C.R. 552, 568. • - .. I ........ I (1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 119 no roason tct doubt the truth of his statement that he did reach Dhurkot shortly after midnight of the 23rd July and that when on hearing that a murder had taken place near the Dharamsha.la he came to the Dharamshala. Hazura Singh who was lying injured on a cot there madtJ a statement to him, he recorded the statement correctly. That statement has been marked Ex. PP. The1 substance of this statement is that at about 9 P.M. on the night of the occurrence his brother Munshi Singh came and complained about the conduct of Bant Singh, Harbans Singh and other sons of Bhag Singh and that shortly after this on hearing shouts of Bant Singh and others near the !Jharamshala, Munshi Singh went towards that place followed by Hazura Singh and his father Hira Singh and that when they reached the place they found Harbans Singh and the other accused persom all armed with weapons raising uproar and when Munshi Singh reached the place and returned the abuee Herb11ns Singh gave the first blow to Munshi Singh with a Sela in his hand hitting him on the front of the chest after which others of the 'party also gave blows and when Hazura Singh stepped forward to rescue his brother, Harbans Singh gave him a blow with a Sela in his hand which hit him on the abdomen and the other accused also gave him blows. The blow given by Major Singh hit him on his left wrist. It is clear that this statement was made by Hazura Singh shortly after midnight i.e., within about four hours after the ocoun-enoe. It has to be remembered that Hazura Singh had one single serious injury viz., the penetrating wound on his abdomen. We are satisfied from the evidence of the witnesses that there was sufficient moonlight that to enable &zura Siugh to recognize clearly the ~asailant who stmok the blow which caused this injury. He could have therefore made no mistake about the indentity of his aBS&ilant. Nor is it likely that he l.961 Harbans Sitz&li v. Stat1 of Fu1lfah Das GuptaJ, HarlHlllS Siri.t;h v. StaU of P11.,1ab Das Gupta]. 120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP. .. woultl withiu a few hours of the occurrence ascriLc this fa.ta.I blow on him to somebody other than the real assailant. The several injuries on Hazura. Singh and the numerous injurie~ on Munshi Singh justify the conclusion that there was more than one assailant in the attacking party. Whether or not Hazura Singh could have mado a mi;;take about the identity of th'1 other assailants or could have implicated 8omc of them at least falsely, it will be unreasonable to think that he would substitute another porson for the one assailant who gave him the fatal blow. On 'I. consideration of these circumstanoes wo are therefore satisfied that it would be unreasonablo to doubt or disbelieve the truth of Hazura Singh'e statement when he said that Harbans Singh struck him with the Sela in his haningh's evidence was what he contiidered t.ho great delay in lodging the forms.I First Information Report. That r<'aaon, as we have already pointed out, does not exist. On an examination, it seems to us quite likely that Hira Singh also accompanied Ha.zura. Singh when the latter followed Mull8hi Singh towards the Dhara.mshala a.nd it also seems to us improbable that he would give the main part in the assault falsely to Harbans Singh if somebody else was respoll8ible for the blow which caused Hazura Singh's death. In our view the learnoc! Trial Judge acted unreasonably in doubtiug the truth of Hira Singh's evidence against Harbans Singh. On a consideration of the evidence wo are therefore satisfied that the conclusion reached by the High Court that the viow taken by the Trial , • I Court a.a regards Harbans Singh's guilt W'l.8 clearly 'iim unreasonable is correct and that the only reasonable view on the evidence can be that Harbans Singh cQmmitted murder by ca.using the death of Hazura Singh and also committed murder by ca.using the death of Munshi Singh. The position ia however different as regards Major Singh. As has already been pointed out the High Court is wrong in thinking that the evidence shows that Major Singh ga.ve any of the fa.ta.I blows. Hazura Singh in his first dying declaration mentioned Major Singh aa having given a below on him on his left wrist. Apart from Bhag Singh only Hira Singh has ascribed any specific part to Major Singh in addition to saying generally that he took part in the attack. The evidence therefore leaves scope for thinking that Ha.zura. Singh has made a mistake a.bout Major Singh or ha.s wrongly implicated him. We are not therefore prepared to say that the view t&ken by the Trial ,Judge as regards Major Singh is clearly uw·oaaonablo. ( 1) s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 123 We therefore allow the appeal of Major Singh set aside the order of conviction and sentence ma.de against him by the High Court and restore the order of acquittal made by the Trial Court. The appeal of Harbans Singh is dismissed. Major Singh should be set at liberty at once. Appeal o.f appellant 2 allowed. Appeal of appellant 1 dismissed. HAJJ Sk. SUBHAN v. MADHORAO (K. N. WANCHOo, K. C. DAS GuPTA, J.C. SHAH and RAGHUBAR DAY.AL, JJ.) Execution Proc.eedings-Objection& t-0 executability-De.cree for po•se•sion-Enactment prot•iiing Jo1· ve