# HARBHAJAN SINGH v. KARAM SINGH AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1966] 1 S.C.R. 817
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1965-09-16
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 447 of 1963
- **Bench:** A. K. Sarkar, Raghubar Dayal, V. Ramaswami
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/harbhajan-singh-v-karam-singh-and-others-3633
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

c
D
E
East Punjab (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act,
1951-s. 42-Whether State Government has power to review an order
passed on an application under s. 42.
In accordance with a scheme for consolidation of holdings under the
East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation)
Act, 1948, parcds of land were re-allotted to the appellant and the first
and eight respondents.
Being dissatisfied with the allotments, these two
respondents preferred appeals at first under s.
23(3) and then under
s. 23(4) of the Act. The first appeal was dismissed, but in the oecond
ap,Peal, the first respondent's claim was partially allowed by the AssistaDJ
Director, Consolidation of Holdings.
The appellant then moved the State Government under s. 42 of the
Act for revision of the Assistant Director's order and in doing eo, submitted two copies of the requisitei application under s. 42
On the first
copy, the Director of Consolidation of Holdings passed an order on the
17th Febrllary, 1958, that application should be put up with previous
papers. On the second copy he passed an order on the 3rd Apnl, 1958,
dismissing the application. Thereafter, on the first copy, the Director
heard the parties and by an order dated 29th August 1958, allowed the
appellant's application and set aside the Assistant Director's order.
The first respondent then filed a petition in the High Oourt under Art.
226 for a writ to quash the Director's order of the 29th August, 1958,
and this petition was allowed on the ground that in view of his order
dated the 3rd April 1958, dismissing the application, the Director was
not competent to pass the order of the 29th August 1958.
F
On appeal to this Court.
G
HELD :The order of the Director dated the 29th August, 1958, w ..
ultra vires and without jurisdiction. [820 A-BJ
There is no provision in the Act granting express power of review
to the State Government with regard to an order under s. 42 of the Act.
In the absence of any such express power, it is manifest that the Director
could not review his previous order of 3rd April 1958, dismissing the
Appellant's application under s. 42.
[819 HJ
Drew v. Willis, [1891) 1 Q.B. 450, Hession v. Jones, [1914) 2 K-B.
421 and Anantharaju Shetty v. Appu Hegada, A.I.R. 1919 Mad. 244.
BaijTUJth Ram Goenka v. Nand Kumar Singh, 40 I.A. 54, referred to.
Patel Chunibhai Dajibhai v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar and
H
Anr., [1965) 2 S.C.R. 328. followed.

## Text

817
A
HARBHAJAN SINGH
v.
KARAM SINGH AND OTHERS
September 16, 1965
B
[A. K. SARKAR, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.)
c
D
E
East Punjab (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act,
1951-s. 42-Whether State Government has power to review an order
passed on an application under s. 42.
In accordance with a scheme for consolidation of holdings under the
East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation)
Act, 1948, parcds of land were re-allotted to the appellant and the first
and eight respondents.
Being dissatisfied with the allotments, these two
respondents preferred appeals at first under s.
23(3) and then under
s. 23(4) of the Act. The first appeal was dismissed, but in the oecond
ap,Peal, the first respondent's claim was partially allowed by the AssistaDJ
Director, Consolidation of Holdings.
The appellant then moved the State Government under s. 42 of the
Act for revision of the Assistant Director's order and in doing eo, submitted two copies of the requisitei application under s. 42
On the first
copy, the Director of Consolidation of Holdings passed an order on the
17th Febrllary, 1958, that application should be put up with previous
papers. On the second copy he passed an order on the 3rd Apnl, 1958,
dismissing the application. Thereafter, on the first copy, the Director
heard the parties and by an order dated 29th August 1958, allowed the
appellant's application and set aside the Assistant Director's order.
The first respondent then filed a petition in the High Oourt under Art.
226 for a writ to quash the Director's order of the 29th August, 1958,
and this petition was allowed on the ground that in view of his order
dated the 3rd April 1958, dismissing the application, the Director was
not competent to pass the order of the 29th August 1958.
F
On appeal to this Court.
G
HELD :The order of the Director dated the 29th August, 1958, w ..
ultra vires and without jurisdiction. [820 A-BJ
There is no provision in the Act granting express power of review
to the State Government with regard to an order under s. 42 of the Act.
In the absence of any such express power, it is manifest that the Director
could not review his previous order of 3rd April 1958, dismissing the
Appellant's application under s. 42.
[819 HJ
Drew v. Willis, [1891) 1 Q.B. 450, Hession v. Jones, [1914) 2 K-B.
421 and Anantharaju Shetty v. Appu Hegada, A.I.R. 1919 Mad. 244.
BaijTUJth Ram Goenka v. Nand Kumar Singh, 40 I.A. 54, referred to.
Patel Chunibhai Dajibhai v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar and
H
Anr., [1965) 2 S.C.R. 328. followed.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 447 of
1963.
USap.C·I./65 9
818
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1966] l S.C.R.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
A
April 19, 1960 of the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal
No. 128 of 1960.
Gopal Singh, for the appellant.
K. R. Chaudhuri, for respondent No. 1.
B
0. P. Malhotra and R. !V. Sachthey, for respondent No. 2 to
7.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Ramaswaml, J.
This appeal is brought by Special Leave from
the judgment and decree of the Punjab High Court dated 19th C
April, 1960 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 128 of 1960.
In the year 1955, consolidation proceedings under East
Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (hereinafter called the Act) were started in the
village Bholpur of District Ludhiana.
In accordance with the proD
visions of the Act, a scheme for consolidation of holdings was published on 29th March, 1956.
On 14th May, 1956 that scheme
was confirmed under s. 20 of the Act.
The Consolidation Officer
accordingly re-allotted parcels of land to the appellant and respondents Nos. I and 8 in the village of Bholpur.
Being dissatisfied
with the allotment, respondents I and 8 preferred appeals under
JI:
s. 21 (3) of the Act but these appeals were dismissed by the Settlement Officer.
Respondents 1 and 8 thereafter preferred further
appeals under s. 21 ( 4) of the Act to the Assistant Director, Consolidation of Holdings.
The Assistant Director partially allowed
the appeal of respondent No. 1 by his order dated 29th October,
1957 but dismissed the appeal of respondent No. 8.
On 10th
11
February, 1958, the appellant moved the State Government und~r
s. 42 of the Act for revision of the order passed by the Assistant
Director in the appeal of respondent No. 1.
The Revision Petition
was ul!imately accepted on 29th August, 1958 by t11e Director,
Consolidation of Holdings.
The Director held that the original
G
order made by the Assistant Director on 29th October, 1957 was
contrary to the scheme and was based upon a mistake of fact.
The
Director accordingly allowed the Revision Petition of Harbhajan
Singh on 29th August, 1958.
It appears that Harbhajan Singh had filed two copies of the
H
application under s. 42 of the Act and on one copy the Director of
Con!!Olidation of Holdings passed an order on 17th February, 1958
that the application should be put up with previous papers. On
-
HARBHAJAN SINGH v. KARAM SIGH (Ramaswami, J.)
819
A
the second copy of the application the Director passed an order on
3rd April, 1958 to the following effect :-
"The order of Assistant Director, Consolidation of
Holdings, under s. 21 ( 4) need not be amended. File.
Inform."
B
On the copy of the application on which the order of 17th February, 1958 was passed, the Director heard the parties and passed his
order on 29th August, 1958 by which he allowed the application of
Harbhajan Singh and set aside the order of the Assistant Director.
Respondent No. 1 thereafter moved the Punjab High Court under
Art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order of the Director,
C
Consolidation of Holdings, made on 29th August, 1958. The application was allowed by the High Court on 11th January, 1960 on
the ground that the Director, Consolidation of Holdings, was not
competent to pass the order dated 29th August, 1958 in view of his
previous order dated 3rd April, 1958 dismissing the application of
Harbhajan Singh. The appellant took the matter in appeal under
D
Letters Patent but the appeal was dismissed on 19th April, 1960.
The question of law presented for determination in the appeal
is, whether the Director, Consolidation of Holdings, had power to
review his previous order dated 3rd April, 1958 dismissing
Harbhajan Singh's application, and whether his subsequent order
E
made under s. 42 of the Act dated 29th August, 1958 is legally
valid?
F
G
H
S. 42 of the Act states :
"The State Government may at any time tor tne purpose
of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any
order passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition
made by any officer under this Act call for and examme
the record of any case pending before or disposed of by
such officer and may pass such order in reference thereto
as it thinks fit :
Provided that no order, scheme or repartition shall
be varied or reversed without giving the parties interested
notice to appear and opportunity to be heard except in
cases where the State Government is satisfied that the
proceedings have been vitiated by unlawful consideration."
There is no provision in the Act granting exoress power of
review to the State Government with regard to an order made under
s. 42 of the Act.
In the absence of any such express power, it is
820
SUPREMB COURT REPORTS
(1966] I S.CR.
manifest that the Director, Consolidation of Holdings, cannot
A
review his previous order of 3rd April, 1958 dismissing the application of Harbhajan Singh under s. 42 of the Act.
It follows therefore that the order of the Director dated 29th August, 1958 is
~lira viri;s and without jurisdiction and the High Court was right
ID quashmg that order by the grant of a writ under Art. 226 of the
Constitution.
B
In Drew v. Willis('), Lord Esher, M. R. pointed out that
'no court (and I would add 'no authority') has .... a ,
power of setting aside an order which has been properly
made, unless it is given by statute'.
In another case Hession v. Jones(') Bankes, J. pointed out that C
the court, under the statute, has no power 'to review an order
deliberately made after argument and to entertain a fresh argument upon it with a view to ultimately confirming or reversing it
and observed :
"Then as to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. Before
the Judicature Acts the Courts of common law had no
jurisdiction whatever to set aside an order which had
been made.
The Court of Chancery did exercise a certain limited power in this direction.
All Courts would
have power to make a necessary correction if the order
as drawn up did not express the intention of the Court;
the Court of Chancery however went somewhat further
than that, and would in a proper case recall any decree or
order before it was passed and entered; but after it had
been drawn up and perfected no Court or Judge had any
power to interfere with it.
This is clear from the judgment of Thesiger L.J. in the case of in re. St. Nazaire
Co. (!879) 12 Ch. D. SS."
The same principle was laid down hy the Madras High Court in
Anantharaju Shetty v. Appu Hegada(') in which Sesbagiri Aiyar,
J. observed :
"It is settled law that a case is not Ol)Cn to appeal
unless the statute gives such a right.
The power to
review must also be given by the statute. Prima facie
a party who has obtained a decision is entitled to keep
it unassailed, unless the Legislature had indicated the
mode by which it can be set aside.
A review is practically the hearing of an appeal by the same officer who
(2) [191412 K.B. 421.
(3) A.l.R. 1919 Madras 244.
D
E
F
G
ti
.·
•
-
HARBHAJAN SINGH v. KARAM CHAND (Ramaswami, J.) 821
A
decided the case.
There is at least as good reason for
saying that such power should not be exercised unless
the statute gives it, as for saying that another tribunal
should not hear an appeal from the Trial Court unless
such a power is given to it by statute."
B The same principle has been affirmed by the Judicial Committee
in Baijnath Ram Goenka v. Nand Kumar Singh(') in which a
mahal was sold for arrears of revenue.
Two appeals to annul
the sale were preferred to the Commissioner under the Bengal Land
Revenue Sales Act, 1859, s. 33, as amended by the Bengal Land
Revenue Sales Act, 1868.
One of these appeals was by the resC pondent, a co-sharer of the mahal, and was dismissed on the ground
that the auction purchaser had not been made a defendant.
A
Second Appeal was preferred hy the other co-sharers in the mahal,
and in this appeal the Commissioner, on March 23, 1900, made
an order annulling the sale on the ground of an irregularity in the
sale notice.
This order related to the entire mahal.
On June 21,
D
l 900, the Commissioner having come to the conclusion that his
order of March 23, 1900, was wrong in law, reviewed it, and made
an order upholding the sale.
The respondent thereupon brought
the suit giving rise to the appeal to the Judicial Committee praying for a declaration that the order of June 21, 1900, was ultra
vires and illegal.
The Additional Subordinate Judge declared
E that the order setting aside the sale was a final order and was not
open to review.
The High Court concurred with the decision of
the Additional Subordinate Judge.
While dismissing the appeal
of the defendant-appellant, Lord Atkinson said :
F
"Their Lordships are clearly of opinion that the
order of March 23, 1900, was final and conclusive, and
that, so far as the Commissioner was concerned, he had
no power to review that order in the way in which he has
reviewed it."
The same principle has been reiterated by this court recently in
Patel Chunibhai Dajibhai etc. v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar
G and Another( 2 ). In that case respondent No. 1 was a landlord
and the appellant was a tenant.
On May l, 1956, respondent
No. 1 gave a notice to the appellant under s. 14 of the Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Bombay Act LXVII
of 1948) terminating his tenancv.
On December 25, 1956 respondent No. 1 gave another noiice to the appellant under s. 31
H
terminating the tenancy.
On July 10, 1957, respondent No. 1
filed an application under s. 29 read with s. 14 for recovery of
(I) 40 I.A. 54.
(2) (1965] 2 S.C.R. 328.
822
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
[1966] l S.C.R.
possession of the lands.
By an order dated Dxember 25, 1957
A
the Mahalkari allowed respondent No. 1 's application under s. 29
read withs. 14 filed on July IO, 1957, and directed that the tenancy
be terminated and possession of the lands be delivered to respondent No. 1.
The appellant applied to the Collector of Baroda
on August 9, 1958 and again on August 26, 1958 under s. 17A
for revision of the Mahalkari"s order dated December 25, 1957.
B
On or about August 14, 1958, the Collector called for the recmds
from the Mahatkari, but the recf'fds did not reach the office of
the Collector until December 24, 1958.
On or about October
3, 1958 the Collector rejected these revision applications.
On
October 6, 1958 the appellant again applied to the Collector for
revision of the Mahalkari's order, but this application also was
C
disposed of by the Collector on October 17, 1958. On November
7, 1958, the local Congress Manda! Samiti passed a resolution
requesting the Collector to reconsider his previous orders.
A copy
of this resolution was sent to the C01lector on November 10, 1958.
On November 14, 1958,
th~ appellant again applied to the D
Collector under s. 76A for revision of the Mahalkari's order. On
February 17, 1959, the Collect0r acting under s. 76A reversed
the Mahalkari's order and directed that possession of the disputed
lands be restored to the appellant.
S.
76-A of the Rombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1958 (Bombay Act LXVII
of 194 8) provides as follows :
I:
"Where no appeal has been filed within the period
provided for it, the CollcctN may, .mo motu or on a
reference made in this behalf by the Divisional Officer
or the Stale Government at any time,-
{ a) call for the record of any enquiry or the proceedings of any Mamlatdar or Tribunal for the purpose
of any order passed by, and as to the regularity of the
proceedings of such Mamlatdar or Tribunal, as the case
may be, and
(b) pass such order thereon as he deems fit:
Provided that no such record shall be called for after
the expiry of one year from the date of such order and no
order to such Mamlatdar or Tribunal shall be modified,
annulled or reversed unless opportunity has been given
to the interested parties to appear and be hearcl."
'
G
An application for revision preferred by respondent No. 1 on H
March 24, 1959 was dismi<scd by the Tribunal on February 23,
1961.
An application under Art. 227 of the Constitution pre-
-
..
'
HARBHAJAN SINGH v. KARAM CHAND (Ramaswami, J.) 823
A ferred by respondent No. 1 on June 15, 1961 was allowed by the
High Court on November 5, 1963. In this state of facts, it was
held by this court that in the absence of any power of review the
Collector had no power to reconsider his previous decisions dated
October 3, October 4 and October 17, 1958 and the subsequent
order of the Collector dated February 17, 1959 re-opening the
B matter was illegal, ultra vires and without jurisdiction.
The majority judgment of this Court states :
c
D
E
G
H
"Though s. 76A, unlike s. 76, does not provide for
an application for revision by the aggrieved party, the
appellant properly drew the attention of the Collector
to his grievances and asked him to exercise his revisional
powers under s. 7 6A.
Having perused the applications
for revision filed by the appellant, the Collector decided
to exercise his suo motu powers and called for the record
on August 14, 1958 within one year of the order of the
Mahalkari.
But before the record arrived and without
looking into the record, the Collector passed orders on
October 3, October 4 and October 17, 1958 rejecting the
applications for revision.
By these orders, the Collector
decided that there was no ground for interference with
the Mahalkari's order .......... All these orders were
passed by the Collector in the exercise of his suo motu
power of revision.
These orders as also the previous
order calling for the record could be passed by the
Collector only in the exercise of his revisional power
under s. 76-A.
As he refused to modify, annul or
reverse the order of the Mahalkari, he could pass these
orders without issuing notice to the 2nd respondent.
These orders passed by the Collector in the exercise of
his revisional powers were quasi-judicial, and were final.
The Act does not empower the Collector to review an
order passed by him under s. 76A. In the absence of
any power of review, the Collector could not subsequently reconsider his previous decisions and hold that there
were grounds for annulling or reversing the Mahalkari's
order. The subsequent order dated February 17, 1959
re-opening the matter was illegal, ultra vires and without
jurisdiction.
The High Court ought to have quashed
th~ order of the Collector dated February 17, 1959 on
thIS ground."
We are of the opinion that the same principle applies to the
present case and the Director, Consolidation of Holdings had no
824
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
(1966) I S.C.R.
power to review his previous order dated 3rd April, 1958 rejecting
A
the application of Harbhajan Singh under s. 42 of the Ac!.
It
foUows that the subsequent order of the Director, Consolidation
of Holdings dated 29th August, 1958 allowing the application of
Harbhajan Singh was ultra vires and illegal and was rightly quashed
by the High Court.
Accordingly we dismiss the appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
B
-
.