# HARCHARAN SINGH v. smv RANI AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1981] 2 S.C.R. 962
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1981-02-20
- **Bench:** V. D. Tulzapurkar, D. A. Desai, A. P. Sen
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/harcharan-singh-v-smv-rani-and-ors-7983
- **Pages:** 27

## Headnote

Service by refusal-Notice den1anding arrears and seeking eviction
is
sen'
by registered post but refused by the tenant-Whether the tenant could be
imputed rhe knowledge of the contents thereof so that upon his failure to com~
ply with the notice the tenant could be said to have committed wilful default
in payment of rent-U.P. Cantonment (Control of Rent and Eviction), (Central
Act X), 1952, section 14(1) scope of-General Clauses Act 1897, section 27,
Jndtan Evidence Act, section 114.
The appellant was inducted in the year 1964 as a tenant of the suit premises
on an yearly rental payable by December 31, every year. Since the appellant
did not pay the rent for the years 1965, 1966 a combined notice dated November
9, 1966 demanding payment of arrears and seeking ejectment on tern1ination
of tenancy, was sent by registered post by the
respondents. The appellant
refused to receive the notice on November 10, 1966. On his failure to comply
with the requisitions contained in the notice,
the
respondents
filed
a suit
against the appe11ant seeking eviction as well a'i recovery of rents and mesne
profits.
Having lost before the trial court and the first appellate court, the respon·
dents came up before the
High Court in second appeal. The
High
Court
accepted the findin of fact recorded by the first appellate court that there was
i:tervice of the notice on the appellant by refusal and held that when notice was
tendered to the tenant and when the latter refused to accept the same
knowledge of the contents of the notice must be imputed to him. The High Court
allowed the landlords' appeal and granted three months time to the appellant
to vacate the shop. Hence, the tenant's appeal after obtaining special leave
from this Court.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: (By majority) Pu Tulzapurkar, J. (On behalf of A. P. Sen, J.
and himself).
1 : t. The presumptiom that are raised under section 27 of the General
Chtuseli .Act, 1897 and section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, make it clear
that, when service is effected by
refusal of a
postal
communication,
the
addressee must be imputed with the knowledge of the contents thereof. [971
E-Fl
1 :2. Before the knowledge of the contents of the notice could be imputed1
it is not necessary tlmt the sealed envelope must be opened and read by the
addres•ee or when the addressee happens to be an illiterate pef'on the contents
ihould be read over to him by the post·man or someone else. Such things do
·not occur when the addressee is determined to decline to accept the sealed
<0nvelopo. [971 D-EJ
...
>
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HARCHARAN SINGH V, SHIVRANI
963
Van1an Vithal Kulkarni and Ors.
v.
Khanderao Ram Rao Sholapurkar.
A
A.I.R. 1935 Bom. 247, explained and dissented from.
Mahboob Bi v. Alva/a Lachmiah, A.I.R. 1964 A.P. 324, held inapplicable.
Sltri J.Vath and another v. Smt. Sartuwati Devi Jaiswal, A.I.R. 1964 All. 52;
Fanni Lal v. Smt. Chironja, (1972) Allahabad Law Journal 499; Ganga Ram
v. Smt. Phulwati, (1970) Allahabad Law Journal 336 (FB); Kodali Bapayya
B
and Ors. v. Yadavalli Venkataratnam and Ors., A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 884, approved.
Harihar Banerji and Ors. v. Ramshashi Roy and Ors., A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 102,
referred to.
2: I. The suit under section 14(1) of the U.P. Cantonment (Control
of
Rent & Eviction) Act (Central Act X of 1952), in the instant case was maintainabae. Under section 14(1) of the Central Act, which in pari materia with
0
section 3(1) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947,
permission of the District Magistrate was required if the landlord sought eviction of the tenant on any ground other than those specified in clauses (a) to
(f) and not when it was sought on any of the grounds specified in clauses
(a) to (f). [973 E-F]
B/wgwa11 Dass v. Paras Nath, [1969] 2 SCR 297, followed.
D
2 : 2. All the courts rightly dealt with the matter as being governed by the
U.P. Cantonments (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, X of 1952--a Central
Act and not by U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Ev

## Text

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962
HARCHARAN SINGH
v.
smv RANI AND ORS.
February 20, 1981
[V. D. TULZAPURKAR, D. A. DESAI AND A. P. SEN, JJ.J
Service by refusal-Notice den1anding arrears and seeking eviction
is
sen'
by registered post but refused by the tenant-Whether the tenant could be
imputed rhe knowledge of the contents thereof so that upon his failure to com~
ply with the notice the tenant could be said to have committed wilful default
in payment of rent-U.P. Cantonment (Control of Rent and Eviction), (Central
Act X), 1952, section 14(1) scope of-General Clauses Act 1897, section 27,
Jndtan Evidence Act, section 114.
The appellant was inducted in the year 1964 as a tenant of the suit premises
on an yearly rental payable by December 31, every year. Since the appellant
did not pay the rent for the years 1965, 1966 a combined notice dated November
9, 1966 demanding payment of arrears and seeking ejectment on tern1ination
of tenancy, was sent by registered post by the
respondents. The appellant
refused to receive the notice on November 10, 1966. On his failure to comply
with the requisitions contained in the notice,
the
respondents
filed
a suit
against the appe11ant seeking eviction as well a'i recovery of rents and mesne
profits.
Having lost before the trial court and the first appellate court, the respon·
dents came up before the
High Court in second appeal. The
High
Court
accepted the findin of fact recorded by the first appellate court that there was
i:tervice of the notice on the appellant by refusal and held that when notice was
tendered to the tenant and when the latter refused to accept the same
knowledge of the contents of the notice must be imputed to him. The High Court
allowed the landlords' appeal and granted three months time to the appellant
to vacate the shop. Hence, the tenant's appeal after obtaining special leave
from this Court.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: (By majority) Pu Tulzapurkar, J. (On behalf of A. P. Sen, J.
and himself).
1 : t. The presumptiom that are raised under section 27 of the General
Chtuseli .Act, 1897 and section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, make it clear
that, when service is effected by
refusal of a
postal
communication,
the
addressee must be imputed with the knowledge of the contents thereof. [971
E-Fl
1 :2. Before the knowledge of the contents of the notice could be imputed1
it is not necessary tlmt the sealed envelope must be opened and read by the
addres•ee or when the addressee happens to be an illiterate pef'on the contents
ihould be read over to him by the post·man or someone else. Such things do
·not occur when the addressee is determined to decline to accept the sealed
<0nvelopo. [971 D-EJ
...
>
---.\
HARCHARAN SINGH V, SHIVRANI
963
Van1an Vithal Kulkarni and Ors.
v.
Khanderao Ram Rao Sholapurkar.
A
A.I.R. 1935 Bom. 247, explained and dissented from.
Mahboob Bi v. Alva/a Lachmiah, A.I.R. 1964 A.P. 324, held inapplicable.
Sltri J.Vath and another v. Smt. Sartuwati Devi Jaiswal, A.I.R. 1964 All. 52;
Fanni Lal v. Smt. Chironja, (1972) Allahabad Law Journal 499; Ganga Ram
v. Smt. Phulwati, (1970) Allahabad Law Journal 336 (FB); Kodali Bapayya
B
and Ors. v. Yadavalli Venkataratnam and Ors., A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 884, approved.
Harihar Banerji and Ors. v. Ramshashi Roy and Ors., A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 102,
referred to.
2: I. The suit under section 14(1) of the U.P. Cantonment (Control
of
Rent & Eviction) Act (Central Act X of 1952), in the instant case was maintainabae. Under section 14(1) of the Central Act, which in pari materia with
0
section 3(1) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947,
permission of the District Magistrate was required if the landlord sought eviction of the tenant on any ground other than those specified in clauses (a) to
(f) and not when it was sought on any of the grounds specified in clauses
(a) to (f). [973 E-F]
B/wgwa11 Dass v. Paras Nath, [1969] 2 SCR 297, followed.
D
2 : 2. All the courts rightly dealt with the matter as being governed by the
U.P. Cantonments (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, X of 1952--a Central
Act and not by U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947
much less by the later U.P. (Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972. [966 E-FJ
Per Desai, J. Contra.
!. Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction)
Act, 1972 is a socially beneficient statute and should be construed according to
well recognised canons of construction. The words used in the statute, if they
are plain and unambiguous must be applied as they stand, however, strongly it
may be suspected that the result does not represent the real intention of the
legislature.
However, if two constructions are possible and legitimate ambiguity arises from the language employed that which enlarges the protection of
a socially beneficient statute rather than one which restricts it should be preferred and adopted.
In other words the construction which would be more
consistent with the policy and attainment of the legislation which is to protect
the possession of the tenant unless the landlord establishes a ground for eviction should be preferred. Further where two constructions are possible the one
which would accord with reason and justice must be
preferred. [975 G-H,
976 A, D, G]
Inland Revenue Comn1issio11ers v. Hinchy, 1960 A.C. 748, H. L. at 767=
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(1960) 1 All India Reports 505 at 512; River Wear Commissioners v. Adam-
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son, (1877) 2 A.C. 743 & 765, quoted with approval.
Mohd. Shafi v. Additional District & Stssions Judge (VII), Allahabad antl
Others, [1977] 2 S.C.C. 226; Gurucharan Singh v. Kamla Singh & Ors.,
[1976] 2 S.C.C. 152; H. H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia
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B"/:_°!_uedr of Gwalior & Ors. v. Union of India & Another, [1971] 1 S.C.C. 85,
...,...,,.1 .
964
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1981] 2 S.C.R.
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2 : 1. The substitution of the expression, "arrears of rent for not less than
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four months'" in sub-clause (a) of sub·section (2) of section 20 of the Uttar
Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 is
a contemporaneous legislative exposition bringing out clearly the legislative in·
tention that the landlord would be entitled to evict the tenant if the rent is ill
arrears for not less than four months.
Before the landlord can commence
action under sub-clause (a): (i) the tenant must have committed default in
payment of rent for a period of four months, and
(ii) a notice has to be
served, giving the tenant locus poenitentiae to repair the default within month.
[978 B-CJ
2 : 2. Two ingredients emerge from the expression "the tenant is in arrears.
of rent for not less than four months" : (i) that the rent is payable by month
and (ii) the tenant has committed default in payment of rent for four different
months and that this default subsists and continues on the date when the land·
lord invokes the provision of clause (a) and proceeds
to serve a notice of.
demand.
Again, if within a period of one month from the date of receipt of
notice, the tenant pays up thy arrears of rent he does not lose the protection of
the R~nt Act. [978 G-H, 979 Al
2 : 3. It is implicit in the expression "the tenant is in arrears of rent for not
less than four months" that the legislature clearly intended to cover those cases
of default in payment of rent under clause (a) where the contract of lease pro--
vided for payment of rent every month meaning thereby that the unit for liabi·
lity to pay rent is one month and secondly the tenant has committed default on
four different occasions of four different months or four different units agreed
upon for payment of rent and that too after the liability to pay the same has
acoepted. [979 A-CJ
2 : 4. Section 20(2) (a) of the Rent Act, 1972 does not attract cases whert•
the landlords ac:cept rent on an yearly basis. The language of the section doesnot admit of a construction, namely, that even if the rent is payable by year,
once the year is over and a period of four months has elapsed he could be said
to be "a tenant in arrears
of rent for not less than four months". In tbe
instant case, the parties are ad idem that the rent is payable by year at the rate
of Rs. 100/· per annum. In such a <:ase it could not be said that this tenant
was in arrears of rent for not less than four months.
His case would not be
covered by section 20(2) of the Rent Act and, therefore, the landlord would
not be entitled to a decree for eviction on this ground and that was the sole
ground on which eviction has been ordered. [980 C-D, 981 A·B]
3. The amended section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code restricted the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal only if the High Court
was satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of law. Sub-section
G
(4) cast a duty on the court to formulate such substantial questiOn of law and
the appeal has to be heard on the question so formulated. It would also be
open to the respondent at the hearing of he appeal to contend that the case
does not involve such a question. Thus, the High C.Ourt ordinarily <:annot and
did not interfere with the concurrent :findings of fact arrived at by the courts
below. [981 G-H, 982 A]
H
In the facts of this case, there was a concurrent :finding that the statutory
notice as required by section 20(2)(a) was not served upon the tenant and,
therefore, the High Court was in error in interfering with this finding of fact.
[982 B-C]
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HAR CHARAN SINGH V. SHIVRANI
965
R. Ramachandrmi Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar, [1963] 3 S.C.R. 605; Mst.
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Durga Chaudhrain v. lawahar Choudhary, 1890 LR 17 IA, 122;
Goppulal v.
Dwarkadhishji, [1969] 3 S.C.R. 989, reiterated.
4 : 1. Mere refusal of a registered letter would not permit a presumption to
be raised that not only the service was legal, but the refusal was the conscious
act flowing from the knowledge of the contents of the Jetter. [987 CJ
B
4 : 2. This concept that the registered envelope properly addressed and returned with an endorsement of refusal must permit a rebuttable presumption
that the addressee refused it with the knowledge of the contents is
wholly
borrowed from the western jurisprudence. Not considering the specific Indian
conditions and the approach of rural Indian to registered letters, but merely going in with the technical rules of Evidence Act would cause more harm and
lead to injustice through Jaw. [985 G-H, 986 A]
4 : 3. The Rent Act does not seek to evict a mere defaulter. That is why
a provision for notice has been made. H even after notice the default continues, the tenant can be condemned as wilful defaulter. He could not be dubc
bed guilty of conscious, wilful, contumacious, intentional conduct even when he
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did not know what was in the registered envelope. It would be atrocious to
impute any such knowledge to a person who has merely been guilty of. refusing
to accept the registered notice.
Where service of notice is a condition precedent, a dubious service held established by examining the postman who must be
delivering hundreds of postal envelopes and who is ready to go to the witness
box after a long interval to say that he offered the envelope to the addressee
and he refused to accept the same, would be travesty of justice. And if this
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condition precedent is not fully satisfied, the subsequent conduct cannot be said
to be wilful. [987 E-G]
Fanni/al v. Smt. Chironja, (1972) All. Law J. 499 (D.B.) dissented to.
Appabhai Motibhai v, Laxmichand Zaverchand & Co., A.I.R. 1954 Bom.
F'
159, held inapplicable.
Mahboob Bi v. Alvala Lachmiah, A.I.R. 1964 A.P. 314; Amarjit Singh Ber/I
v. Lachman Das; Waman Vithal Kulkarni &: Others v. Khant!era Ram Rao
Sholilpurkar, A.I.R. 1935 Born. 247, quoted with approval.
5. The argument that it would be impossible to serve the notice as statuG
torily prescribed, once it is held that no knowledge of the contents of the
refused letter could be imputed to the tenant, is incorrect. The notice is required to be served in the manner prescribed by section 106 of Transfer of
Property Act which, inter alia, provides for affixing a copy of the notice on the
premises in possession of the tenant. Therefore, it cannot be said that the
approach of the Court would render it impossible for the landlord to meet with
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the statutory requirement of service of notice before commencing the action fot
oeviction. [988 B-C]
966
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1981] 2 S.C,R.
A
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1402 of
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1979.
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Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment
and Order dated
16-2-1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 430/
70.
P. C. Bhartari for the Appellant.
L. M. Singhvi and Pramod Swarup for the Respondent.
The Jndgment of V. D. Tulzapurkar, J. and A. P. Sen, J. was delivered by Tulzapurkar, J. D. A. Desai, J. gave a dissenting Opinion.
TULZAPURKAR, J. This is a tenant's appeal by special leave directed
against the judgment and decree passed by the Allahabad High Court
on February 16, 1979 in Second Appeal No. 430 of 1970 whereby
the High Court decreed the respondents' (landlords) suit for ejectment
against the appellant (t~nant) and the only question of substance raised
in the appeal is whether when the landlords' notice demanding arrears
and seeking eviction is sent by registered post and is refused by the
tenant the latter could be imputed the knowledge of the contents thereof
so that upon his failure to comply with the notice the tenant could be
ilaid to have committed wilful default in payment of rent ?
The question arises in these circumstances : The appellant occupied
shop No. 5 in Ivanhoe Estate, situated at Landure Cantonment, Mussorie, originally owned by one Parvij Waris Rasool, on an yearly rental
of Rs. 250 payable by December 31, every year.
The property at
all material times was admittedly governed by the U.P. Cantoment,.
(Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, X of 1952-a Central Act and, in
my view, all the Courts below rightly dealt with the matter as being
governed by that Act and not by U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent
and Eviction Act, 1947, much less by the later U.P. (Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.
The respondents purchased the aforesaid EState
form its previous owner on November 27, 1964 and the previous owneI
attomed the tenancy of the appellant to the respondents along with
the rental due from him for the year 1964. The appellant continued
to be the tenant of the shop during the years 1965 and 1966 as well
but since he did not pay the rent the respondents on November 9, 1966
gave a combined notice demanding paym_ent of arrears and seeking
ejectment on termination of tenancy which was refused by him on
November, 10, 1966.
On his failure to comply with the requisitions
contained in the notice the respondents filed a suit against the appellant seeking eviction as well as recovery of rents and mesne profits.
i.
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HARCHARAN SINGH v. SHIVRANI (Tulzapurkar, J.)
967
The suit was resisted by the appellant, inter alia, on the ground
that the rent of the accommodation payable to the previous owner was
Rs. 250 per annum less 10% rebate on account of repairs; that in
1964 at the intervention of some common friends he agreed to vacate
and did surrender the residential portion of the shop comprising two
rooms, one kitchen, one bath room and one varandah at the back of
the shop in consideration of respondents relinquishing the rental of Rs.
250 due from him for the year 1964; that for the years 1965 and
1966 the rental for the remaining shop was reduced by agreement to
Rs. 50 per annum less rebate for repairs and that he had sent a cheque
for the amount due to the respondents. He denied that he has committed default in payment of rents and averred that no notice of demand and ejectment was served on him and consequently prayed for
dismissal of the suit.
On an appreciation of the evidence led by the parties before it the
Trial Court came to the conclusion that initially the rent fixed
was
Rs. 250 per year but after the respondents' purchase of the property
the appellant vacated the residential portion of the shop under an agreement arrived at between the parties whereunder there was relinquishment of rent due for 1964 and that the rent for the main shop was fixed
at Rs. 100 per annum and that no rebate of any kind had been agreed
to at any time on account of repairs.
Regarding the arrears of rent
outstanding against the appellant the Trial Court held that rent for the
years 1965 and 1966 had not been paid and was due from him but it
held that the notice dated November 9, 1966 was not served on the
appellant and hence he could not be held to have committed wilful
default in payment of arrears of rent.
In this view of the matter the
Trial Court dismissed the suit insofar as the relief of eviction was
.
/
concerned but decreed 1t for arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 100 per
annum.
Aggrieved by that judgment and decree the respondents filed
an appeal to the District Court, Dehradun. The learned District Judge
concurred with the findings of the Trial Court that the rental for the
year 1964 h.ad been relinquished and that the rental of the front portion
of the shop had been fixed at Rs. 100 per annum. He further held
that the notice was tendered to the appellant on November 10. 1966
but he declined to accept it and hence there was service by refusal, but
in his opinion despite such service it could not be presumed that the
appellant had knowledge about the contents of that notice and consequently he could not be said to have committed any wilful default in
the payment of rent. In the result the appeal was dismissed.
The
reS1POndents preferred Second Appeal No. 430 of 1970 to the High
Court. In that appeal the tenant sought to reagitate the question
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968
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1981] 2 S.C.R.
whether or not the notice was tendered to him and was refused by him
on the ground that the finding had been recorded by the District Court
without application of mind to the statement on oath made by him to
the effect that no postman had ever gone to him with a registered letter
either on 9th or 10th November, 1966 and he had not declined to receive
any registered letter but the High Court refused to entertain the contention inasmuch as it found that the learned District Judge had referred
to this part of the appellant's evidence as also the postman's evidence
on the point and that on an appreciation of such rival evidence on record he had recorded a finding that the notice was tendered to the
appellant but it was refused by him; in other words in the absence of
animus being attributed to the postman the District Judge had preferred
the postman's evidence to that of the appellant's.
The High Court,
therefore, accepted the finding of fact recorded by the District Court
that there was service of the notice on the appellant by refusal. On the
further question as to whether when such refusal had been established,
the appellant could be imputed with the knowledge of the contents of
the notice, the High Court, following its two previous decisions in
Shri Nath and another v. Smt. Saraswati Devi Jaswal(I) and Fanni Lal
v. Smt. Chironja("), held that when notice was tendered to the tenant
and when the latter refused to accept the same, knowledge of the contents of the notice must be imputed to him. The District Judge's view
in this behalf was thus reversed and since there was failure on the part
of the appellant to pay the rent within one month of the service of
notice upon him, the High Court held that he had committed wilful
default within the meaning of s. 14(a) of the Act.
Accordingly the
High Court allowed the appeal and the respondents' prayer for ejectment was granted but the appellant was given three months' time to
vacate the accommodation.
The tenant has come up in appeal to this
Court .
Counsel for the appellant venement!y contended before us that the
High Court was in error·in taking the view that when service by refusai
had been effected the tenant must be deemed to have knowledge about
the contents of the notice, for, no such presumption could be drawn
especially wheu it was clear ou evidence that neither the registered envelope was opened either by the tenant or by the postman nor the cone
tents thereof read before the same was returned to the postman.
He
further urged that the envelope bore the seal of Shri S. P. Singh, Advocate and the appellant could not, therefore, know that the notice was
from his landlords; he also pointed out that the appellant was illiterate
and did not know English and since ·the address on the envelope as
(I) A.LR. 1964 All. 52.
(2) 1972 A.L.J. 499.
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HARCHARAN SINGH v. SHIVRANI (Tulzapurkar, l.)
969
well as the seal of the lawyer were in English the appellant could not
even know who the sender of the notice was.
Counsel, therefore, urged
that in the peculiar circumstances of the case the learned District Judge
had rightly recorded a finding that the knowledge of the contents ct the
notice could not be imputed to the appellaut and, therefore, the appellant could not be regarded as a wilful defaulter in the matter of payment of rent. In support of this contention strong reliance was placed
by him on the decision of the Bombay High Court fo. the case of Vaman
Vithal Kulkarni and Ors. v. Khanderao Ram Rao Sholapurkar(') where
the following observations of Beaumont, C. J., appear at page 251 :
"In case of defendants 4 and 5 a registered letter containing the notice was sent to them duly addressed, and service
is alleged to have been refused. In fact the refusal was not
proved, as the postman who took the letter and brought it
back was not called.
But in any case, even if the refusal had
been proved, I should not be prepared to hold that a registered letter tendered to the addressee and refused and brought
back unopened, was well served.
There are, I know, some
authorities in this Court to the contrary, but it seems to me
impossible to say that a letter has been served so as to bring
the contents to the notice of the person to whom the letter
is addressed, if the agent for service states that in fact the
notice was not served, although the reason may have been
that the addressee declined to accept it. One cannot assume
that because an addressee declines to accept a particular
·sealed envelope he has guessed correctly as to its contents."
Counsel also referred to some other decisions including that of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mahboob Bi v. Alvala Lachmiah(')
but. these other decisions do not touch the aforesaid aspect of visiting
the addressee with the knowledge of the contents of the refused notice
but have expressed the view that refusal of registered notice without
more may not amount to proper service and hence it is unnecessary to
consider them.
But placing strong reliance upon the observations of
Chief Justice Beaumont quoted above counsel for tile appellant urged
that the High Court ought to have confirmed the finding of the learned
District Judge that the appellant could not be presumed to have known
the contents of the notice or that the notice was one demanding arrears
<Jf rent simply because he refused to accept the same.
On the other hand, counsel for the respondents contended before us
that both under s. 2 7 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and s. 114 of
(I) A.J.R. 1935 Born. 247.
(2) A.I.R. 1964 A.P. 324.
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(1981] 2 S.C.R.
the Indian Evidence Act presumption of due service could arise if the
notice was sent to the tenant by properly addressing the same, prepaying and sending the same by registered post and it was pointed out
that in the instan~ case as against the denial by the appellant there was
positive oath of postman (Kund Ram P.W. 2) who was examined by the
respondents to prove the fact that the registered letter containing ~e
notice was tendered to the appellant and when he declined to accept it
the postman bad made endorsement in his hand on the envelope "Refused.
Returned to the sender". Counsel, therefore, urged that in
view of such positive evidence of postman led by the respondents which
had been accepted by the learned District Judge, the High Court was
justified in holding that the appellant must be imputed wit)1 the knowledge of the contents of the notice. In this behalf counsel for the
respondents placed reliance on the Privy' Council decision in Harihar
Banerji and Ors. v. RamshciShi Roy and Ors.(') and Madras decision
in Kodali Bapayya and Ors. v. Yadaval/i Venkataratnam and Ors.(')
and the two decisions of the Allahabad High Court relied upon by the
IUgh Court.
Counsel pointed out that the Madras High Court in
Koda/i Bapayya's case (supra) and the Allahabad High Court in its
Full Bench decision in Ganga Ram v. Smt. Phulwati(8 ) have dealt with
the Bombay decision and have expressed their disagreement with the
view expressed therein.
Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 deals with the topic-
'Meaning of service by post' and says that where any Central Act or
Regulation authorises or requires any document to be served l)y post,
then unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed
to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting it by registered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary
is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would
be delivered in the ordinary course of post.
The section thus arises a
presumption of due service or proper service if the document sought to
be served is sent by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post to the addressee and such presumption is raised irrespective of whether any acknowledgement due is received from the addressee
or not. It is obvious that when the section raises the presumption that
the service shall be deemed to have been effected it means the addressee
to whom the communication is sent must be taken to have known the
eontents of the document sought to be served upon him without anything more.
Similar presumption is raised under Illustration (f) to
s. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act whereunder it is stated that the Court
(I) A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 102.
(2) A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 884.
(3) 1970 A.L.J. 336.
•
•
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HARCHARAN SINGH v. SHIVRANI (Tulzapurkar,l.)
971
may presume that the common course of business has been followed in
a particular case, that is to say, when a Jetter is sent by post by pre-paying and iProperly addressing it the same has been received by the addreseee.
Undoubtedly, the presumptions both under s. 27 of
the
General Clauses Act as well as under s. 114 of the Evidence Act are
rebuttable but in the absence of proof to the contrary the presumption
of proper service or effective service on the addressee would arise.
In the instant case, additionally, there was positive evidence of the
postman to the effect that the registered envelope was actually
tendered by him to the appellant on November 10, 1966 but the
appellant refused to accept.
In other words, there was due service
effected upon the appellant by refusal.
In such circumstances,
we are
clearly of the view, that the High Court was
right in coming to the conclusion that the appellant must be imputed
with the knowledge of the contents of the notice which he refused to
accept. It is impossible to accept the contention that when factually
there was refusal to accept the notice on the part of the appellant
he could not be visited with the knowledge of the contents of the
registered notice because, in our view, the presumption raised under
s. 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under s. 114 of the Indian
Evidence Act is one of proper or effective service which must mean
service of everything that is contained in the notice. It is impossible
to countenance the suggestion that before knowledge of the contents
of the notice could be imputed the sealed envelope must be opened
and read by the addressee or when the addressee happens to be an
illiterate person the contents should be read over to him by the postman or someone else. Such things do not occur when the addressee
is determined to decline to accept the sealed envelope.
It would,
therefore, be reasonable to hold that when service is effected by
refusal of a postal communication the addressee must be imputed.
with the knowledge of the contents thereof and in our view, this
follows upon the presumptions that are raised unde.r
s. 27 of
the
General Clauses Act,
1897 and s.
114 of the Indian Evidence
Act.
g.
Turning to the. Bombay decision in Vaman Vithal's case (supra),
G~
we would like to point out two aspects that emerge clearly from the
very observations which have been strongly relied upon by counsel
for the appellant.
In the first place, the observations clearly show
that the refusal to accept the notice was not satisfactorily proved in
!he case inasmuch as the postman who took the letter and brought
Hi
1t back had not been examined; consequently the further observations
made by the leaned Chief Justice were unnecessary for decision on
the point and as such will have to be regarded as obiter.
972
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1981] 2 S.C.R.
A
Secondly, while making those observations the learned Chief Justice
was himself conscious of the fact that there were some authorities
of that Court taking the contrary view.
Having regard to these aspects it is difficult to hold that the concerned observations lay down
the correct legal position in the matter.
In any
event we approve
of the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in its three decisions,
B
namely, Sri Nath's case, Fanni Lal's case and Ganga Ram's case
(supra) and would confirm the High Court's finding on the point in
favour of the respondents.
D
E
F
H
Counsel for the appellant then faintly argued that the respondents
suit was not maintainable under s. 14 (1 ) of the Act
inasmuch as
no permission of the District Magistrate had been obtained by the
respondents before filing the suit as
required by s. 14 and in
this
behalf reliance was placed on s. 14(a) of the Act which ran
thus :
·'14. Restrictions on eviction.-No suit shall, without the
permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any Civil
Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds,
namely :
(a) that the tenant has wilfully failed to make payment
to the landlord of any arrears of rent within one
month of the service upon him of a notice of de·
mand from the landlord."
According to counsel for the appellant the aforesaid provision cleady
shows that under the Act two safeguards were available to a tenant-
(i) eviction could not be had by any landlord except on one or more
of the grounds specified in els. (a) to (f) of s. 14 and (ii) no suit
for eviction even on those gronnds specified in els. (a) to (f) could
be instituted without the permission of the District Magistrate, and
admittedly the landlords in the instant case had filed the suit against
the appellant without obtaining the permission of the District Magistrate.
He, therefore, urged that the Civil Court ha.d no jurisdiction
to entertain the suit and the decree was without jurisdiction.
It must be observed that no such contention was raised by the
appellant in any of the Courts below presumably because the appellant
as well as this lawyer knew how an identical provision
contain~
ed in s. 3 (I) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction
Act, 1947,-an allied· enactment, had been judicially interpreted by
this Court in Bhagwan Dass v. Paras Nath(').
Section 3 of the U.P.
Act 3 of 1947 ran thus :
(1) [19691 2 S.C.R. 297.
•
-
l , ...
•
•
HARCHARAN SINGH v. SHIVRANI (Desai,/.)
973
"3. Restrictions 011 evictions.-Subji;ct to any order passed
under sub-section ( 3), no suit shall without the permission
of the District Magistrate, be filed in any Civil Court
against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation,
except on one or more of the following groun\is :
(a) that the tenant is in arrears of rent for more than
three months and has failed to pay the same to the
landlord within one month of the service upon him
of a notice of demand."
This Court in Bhagwa11 Dass case Asupra) has explained at page 305
Of the report the legal position arising on a grammatical construction
of s. 3(1) thus :
"Section ( 3) 1 does not restrict the landlord's right to evict
his tenant on any of the grounds mentioned in els. (a)
to (g) of that sub-section. But if he wants to sue his tenant
for eviction on any ground other than those mentioned in
B
c
those clauses then he has to obtain the permission of the
D
District Magistrate whose discretion is subject to any order
passed under sub-s. (3) of s. 3 by the Commissioner. These
are the only restrictions placed on the power of a landlord
to institute a suit for eviction of his tenant."
It would be conducive to judicial discipline to interpret an identical
B
provision contained in s. 14(1) of the U.P. Cantonment (Control of
Rent & Eviction) Act, 1952 in a similar manner.
In other words,
under s. 14(1) of the concerned Central Act permission of the District Magistrate was required if the landlord sought eviction of his
tenant on any ground other than those specified in els. (a) to ( f)
and not when it was sought on any of the grounds specified in els. (a)
F
\
to (f).
(If may be stated that both the enactments have since been
·<i.
repealed). It is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention of
the counsel for the appellant that the instant suit filed by the respondents against the appellant could not be entertained by the
Civil Court.
G
•
...
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. However, having
regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no
order as to costs and we grant the appellant six months time to
vacate.
DESAI, J.-I have very carefully gone
through the
judgmen~
8i
prepared by my learned brother Mr. Justice V. D. Tulzapurkar, but
I regret my inability to agree with the same.
A
c
D
E
F
G
974
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1981] 2 S.C.R.
The relevant facts leading to the appeal by special leave have
been succinctly set out in the main judgment and therefore, I would
straightway proceed to deal with the three important questions raised
in this appeal.
The first and the principal question which goes to the root of
the matter is about the construction of
section 20(2) (a)
of the
Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation
of Letting, Rent &
Eviction) Act, 1971 ('Rent Act' for short). It reads as under:
"20. Bar of suit for eviction of tenant except on specified
grounds;-
(2) A suit for the eviction of a tenant from a building
after the determination of
his
tenancy may be
instituted on one or more of the following grounds
namely:
(a) that the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than
four months, and has failed to pay the same to the
landlord within one month from the date of service
upon him of a demand : "
There is a proviso to this sub-section which is not material for
the purpose of this appeal.
A brief resume of concurrently found facts which would
highlight the question of construction would be advantageous.
Appellant was inducted as a tenant of the premises by its former owner
on a rent of Rs. 250 /- per annum in the year 1964, on a request
by the then landlord, appellant-tenant surrendered a portion of the
premises, comprising two rooms, a
kitchen,
a
bathroom and a
verandah at the back of the shop; retaining only possession of the
shop, consequently reducing the rent by
agreement
between
the
parties at the rate of Rs. 100/- per annm11. It is thus an
agreed
and incontrovertible fact that the appellant-tenant is a tenant of a
shop on an yearly rent of Rs. 100/-, payable at the end of every
year.
The focus should immediately be turned to the provision of Jaw
under which the landlord seeks to evict this tenant.
According to
respondent-landlord she served notice dated
Nov~ber 9,
1966,
terminating the tenancy of the appellant as the appellant-tenant was
a defaulter within the meaning of s. 20(2) (a)
and,
therefore, she
8
was entitled to a decree for eviction as she has satisfactorily proved
all the requirements or ingredients of s. 20(2)(a).
Accepting the
finding of fact that the appellant is a tenant liable to
pay
rent
'
•
<
r
I ._ .
HARCHARAN SINGH v. SH!VRANI (Desai, J.)
975
(ii! Rs. 100/- per annum, the crux of the matter is whether his case
is covered by s. 20(2) (a).
What does s. 20(2) (a) postulate and what are its
components
which when satisfied, the landlord would be entitled to evict the
tenant?
On analysis following ingredients of
s. 20(2)(a)
would
A
emerge each of which will have to be satisfied before the landlord
B
•
would be eligible to obtain a decree for eviction, viz :
;.
(i) Tenant must be a tenant of premises governed by
the Rent Act;
(ii) That the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less
than four months;
(iii) That such a teua\1t has to pay rent in arrears within
a period of one month from the
date of service
upon him of a notice of demand.
, In this case, the tenant is a tenant of premises governed by the
c
Rent Act.
D
The crucial question is whether the second ingredient,
as
extracted above, is satisfied by the landlord.
The attention has to be
focused on the expression 'in arrears of rent for not less than four
months'.
What does this expression
signify?
As
contended on
behalf of the respondent that whatever be the default in payment of
E
rent, the notice can be served after the default has continued for a
period of four months, and failure to comply with the requisition in
the notice would disentitle the tenant to the protection of Rent Act.
Altednatively it was contended that the expression in arrears of rent
for not less than four months' on a literal grammatical construction
would signify that rent is payable by the month and that the tenant
F
has committed a default in payment of four monthi' rent and further
~
failed to comply with the requisition made in the notice within the
stipulated period of one month and only then the protective umbrella
of the Rent Act would be removed and the tenant would be exposed
to a decree for eviction.
•
J
The two rival constructions raised a question of construction of
a sub-section in a statute primarily enacted as can be culled out from
the long and shon title of the Rent Act, being regulation of letting
and rent and arbitrary eviction of tenant from the premises to which
the rent Act would apply. It is a socially benefi.cient statute and
G
in construing such statute cenain well recognised canons of construen
tion have to be borne in mind.
Undoubtedly, the dominant purpose
in construing the statute is to ascertain the intention of the legisla-
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
B
976
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ll981] 2 S.C.R.
ture.
This intention, and, therefore, the meaning of the statute, is
primarily to be sought in the words nsed in the statute itself, which
must, if they are plain and unambiguous, be applied as they stand,
however strongly it may be suspected that the result does not represent the real intention of legislature (see Inland Revenue Commissioner v. Hinchy) Cl. In approaching the matter from this angle,
it is a duty of the Court to give fair and full effect to statute which
is plain and unambiguous without regard to the particular consequence in a special case.
Even while giving liberal construction to
socially beneficient legislation, if the language is plain .and simple
the making of a law being a matter for the legislature and not cowts,
the Court must adopt the plain grammatical construction (see River
Wear Commissioners v.