# HARi CHAND AGGARWAL v. BATALA ENGINEERING CO. LTD

- **Citation:** [1969] 2 S.C.R. 201
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1968-09-24
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 681 of 1966
- **Bench:** J.C. Shah, Acting C.J, V. Ramaswami, A. N. Grover
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/hari-chand-aggarwal-v-batala-engineering-co-ltd-4485
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Defence of India Act, 1962, ss. 40, 29-Powers of Central Govern•
ment under s. 29 delegated to District Magistrates-District Magistrate
whether includes Additional District Magistrate-Effect of
notification
issued under s. 10(2) of Code of Criminai Procedure.
By notification under s. 40(1) of the Defence of India Act, 1962 the
powers of the Central Government in respect of certain sections of the
Act including s. 29 thereof were conferred on Collectors, District Magistrates, Deputy Commissioners and political officers in Nefa.
The Additional District Magistrate of Batala in the Punjab acting under s. 29 of
the Act passed an order requisitioning a shop belonging to the respondent
which was occupied by the appellant as a tenant. The appellant challenged the order of requisition in a writ petition to the High Court without success.
In appeal before this Court the question that fell
for
con.sideration was whether an additional
District Magistrate was em ...
powered under s. 10(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to exercise
the powers under s. 29 of the Defence of India Act delegated by the
Central Government to District Magistrates.
HELD : The powers of reguisitioning are of a very drastic nature
and involve the fundamental rights in respect of property guaranteed
under Art. 19 ( 1) (f) of the Constitution. The
Central
Government
while making the delegation of its power under s. 29 of the Act must
ordinarily be presumed to be fully conscious of this aspect of the matter
and it was for that reason that an officer or authority of the high status
of a District Magistrate in the District was empowered to exercise that
power.
The're was also no reason in the present case to deviate from the
normal rule that the expressions or wo'rds used in the notification must be
read as such and not in any other manner unless the context requires that
the latter course should be followed, and the words "District Magistrate"
could not be possibly read as "Additional District Magistrate". [207 B-D]
The notification issued under s. 10(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure could not serve to confer on the Additional District Magistr_.ei
the powers of the District Magistrate under s. 29 of the Defence of India
Act for the same reasons as prevailed with the Nagpur High Court in
Prab.hulal Ramkil Kdprd' case in denying to the Additional District
MagIStrate the . power of the District Magistrate under R. 26 of thi>
Defence of India Rules. [207 E, 206 E-F]
Prabhula! Ram/al Kabra v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1944 Nag. 84, approved and applied.
Aiaib Singh v. State of Punjab, [1965] 2 S.C.R. 845, Central Talkies
Ltd, Kw!pur v. Dwarka Prasad, (1961] 3 S.C.R. 495 and Guru Dutt v.
Sohan Smgh & Anr. I.L.R. 1965 Punj. 134, referred to.
OvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 681 of
1966.
L2Sup C!/69-14
202
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 2 S.C.R.
•
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
A
April 22, 1965 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No. 719
of 1964.
B. P. Maheshwari and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the appellant.
W, S. Barlingay, Brij Mohan Lal and Ganpat Rai, for respondents Nos. 1 and 3.
Hardev Singh, R. N. Sachthey, and B. D. Sharma, for respondents Nos. 2, 4 and 5.

## Text

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HARi CHAND AGGARWAL
v.
BATALA ENGINEERING CO. LTD.
September 24, 1968
[J.C. SHAH, ACTING C.J., V. RAMASWAMI
AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]
Defence of India Act, 1962, ss. 40, 29-Powers of Central Govern•
ment under s. 29 delegated to District Magistrates-District Magistrate
whether includes Additional District Magistrate-Effect of
notification
issued under s. 10(2) of Code of Criminai Procedure.
By notification under s. 40(1) of the Defence of India Act, 1962 the
powers of the Central Government in respect of certain sections of the
Act including s. 29 thereof were conferred on Collectors, District Magistrates, Deputy Commissioners and political officers in Nefa.
The Additional District Magistrate of Batala in the Punjab acting under s. 29 of
the Act passed an order requisitioning a shop belonging to the respondent
which was occupied by the appellant as a tenant. The appellant challenged the order of requisition in a writ petition to the High Court without success.
In appeal before this Court the question that fell
for
con.sideration was whether an additional
District Magistrate was em ...
powered under s. 10(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to exercise
the powers under s. 29 of the Defence of India Act delegated by the
Central Government to District Magistrates.
HELD : The powers of reguisitioning are of a very drastic nature
and involve the fundamental rights in respect of property guaranteed
under Art. 19 ( 1) (f) of the Constitution. The
Central
Government
while making the delegation of its power under s. 29 of the Act must
ordinarily be presumed to be fully conscious of this aspect of the matter
and it was for that reason that an officer or authority of the high status
of a District Magistrate in the District was empowered to exercise that
power.
The're was also no reason in the present case to deviate from the
normal rule that the expressions or wo'rds used in the notification must be
read as such and not in any other manner unless the context requires that
the latter course should be followed, and the words "District Magistrate"
could not be possibly read as "Additional District Magistrate". [207 B-D]
The notification issued under s. 10(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure could not serve to confer on the Additional District Magistr_.ei
the powers of the District Magistrate under s. 29 of the Defence of India
Act for the same reasons as prevailed with the Nagpur High Court in
Prab.hulal Ramkil Kdprd' case in denying to the Additional District
MagIStrate the . power of the District Magistrate under R. 26 of thi>
Defence of India Rules. [207 E, 206 E-F]
Prabhula! Ram/al Kabra v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1944 Nag. 84, approved and applied.
Aiaib Singh v. State of Punjab, [1965] 2 S.C.R. 845, Central Talkies
Ltd, Kw!pur v. Dwarka Prasad, (1961] 3 S.C.R. 495 and Guru Dutt v.
Sohan Smgh & Anr. I.L.R. 1965 Punj. 134, referred to.
OvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 681 of
1966.
L2Sup C!/69-14
202
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 2 S.C.R.
•
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
A
April 22, 1965 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No. 719
of 1964.
B. P. Maheshwari and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the appellant.
W, S. Barlingay, Brij Mohan Lal and Ganpat Rai, for respondents Nos. 1 and 3.
Hardev Singh, R. N. Sachthey, and B. D. Sharma, for respondents Nos. 2, 4 and 5.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Grover, J. This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Punjab High Court in which the sole question involved is whether the Additional District Magistrate, Gurdaspur
who had been invested with all the powers of the District Magistrate under s. 10(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure could
make an order under s. 29(1) of the Defence of India Act, 1962,
hereinafter called the "Act", requisitioning a shop belonging to
Batala Engineering Co. Ltd. which was in occupation of the
appellant as a tenant.
The facts may be shortly stated.
The appellant claims to
have been carrying on the business of a Commission Agent in
machines in the said shop at Batala for the last 10 years as a
tenant on a monthly rental of Rs. 20. According to the allegations made by the appellant herein in the petition whfch he filed
in the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution,
Batala Engineering Co. Ltd. (respondent No. 1 herein)
had
filed an application for his ejectment in January 1964 before the
Rent Controller, Batala but realising the weakness of its case
the said respondent resorted to the device of getting the shop requisitioned at the instance of the Labour Commissioner who
wrote to the Additional District Magistrate that the shop was required for setting up a Cooperative Consumer Store. On March
24, 1964, the Additional District Magistrate (respondent No. 2
herein) issued a requisitioning order purporting to be under
s. 29 of the Act requisitioning the shop in question and directing
the tenant to surrender and deliver possession thereof to the
Manager, Cooperative Consumer Store, Batala, within two days
of the service of the order. The requisitioning order was challenged by means of a writ petition on two grounds; the first was
that it had been made mala fide and the second was that the notification which had been issued under s. 40 (1) of the Act by the
Central Government empowering among
others
the District
Magistrate to exercise powers which were exercisable by the Central Government under s. 29 in addition to other sections (which
it is unnecessary to mention) was illegal and invalid. The petition was resisted by respondents 1 and 2 and the assertions and
contentions of the appellant were controverted.
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HAR! CHAND v. BATALA ENG. co. (Grover, J.)
203
The Division Bench of the High Court (the writ petition had
been referred by a learned Single Judge to a Division Bench)
held that the allegation of ma/a fides had not been proved. It
further held that the Additional District Magistrate was competent to make the requisitioning order since he had been empowered
to exercise the p<Jwers of a District Magistrate under s. 10(2) of
the Cr. P. Code. The writ petition was consequently dismissed.
It is necessary first to notice certain provisions of the Act.
Section 29 empowers the Central Government or the State Government to requisition any inrmoveable property in the circumstances mentioned in the section by an order in writing. Section
40 which provides for the power to delegate may be set out in
C · entirety :
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"S. 40(1) The Central Government may, by order,
direct that any power or duty which by this Act or by
any rule made under this Act is conferred or imposed
upon the Central Government shall, in such circumstances and under such conditions, if any, as may be
specified in the direction, be exercised or discharged
also-
(a) by any officer or authority subordinate to the
Central Government, or
(b) whether or not the JJQwer or duty relates to a
matter with respect to which a State Legislature
has power to make laws, by any State Government or by any officer or authority subordinate to such Government, or
( c) by any other authority.
(2) The State Government may, by order, direct
that any power or duty which by this Act or by any rule
made under this Act is conferred or imposed on the
State Government or which, being by this Act or any
such rule conferred or imp<Jsed on the Central Government, has been directed under sub-section ( 1) to be
exercised or discharged by the State Government, shall,
in such circumstances and under such conditions, if any
as may be specified in the direction, be exercised or discharged by any officer. or authority not being (except
in the case of a Union territory) an officer or authority
subordinate to the Central Government."
On December 13, 1962 the Central Government promulgated a
notification delegating its power under certain sections of the
Act including s. 29. This notification need not be set out in
extenso. Its material part is as follows :-
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"G.S.R. 1716-In exercise of the powers conferred
by sub-section ( 1) of s. 40 of the Defence of India
Act 1962 (5 of 1962) and of all other powers enabling
it in this behalf, the Central Government hereby directs
that the powers exercisable by it under the provisions
of the said Act specified in column (2) of the Schedule
hereto annexed shall also be exercisable by each of the
authorities mentioned in the
corresponding entry in
column (3) of the said schedule in respect of any immovable property situated within its jurisdiction.
Schedule
S. No.
Provisions of the Act
Authorities.
1
2
3
c:
1. Sections 29, 30
(except the provise
thereto), 31, 32, 33,
35, and 36
and sub-ss. (1) and (3) of s. 37.
(a) All Collectors, District Magistrates and Deputy Commissioners
D·
in the States and all political
officers in Nefa.
It is necessary now to turn to the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code in order to determine whether the Addi·
tional District Magistrate would be one of the authorities men- E
tioned in column 3.
In Part II which is headed 'Co'nstitution
and Powers of Criminal Courts and Offices', s. 6 gives the classes
of criminal courts and s. 7 deals with Sessions,
divisi~ and
districts.
Section 9 provides for establishment of court of Session. Section 10 lays down that in every district outside the
presidency towns the State Government shall appoint a Magistrate
of the first class who shall be called the District Magistrate. It J.t
is further provided that the State Government may appoint any
Magistrate of the first class to be an Additional District Magistrate and such Additional District Magistrate shall have all or
any of the powers of a District Magistrate under the Code or
under any other law for the time being in force as the State Government may direct. It may be mentioned that in the State of G
Punjab after the separation of judiciary from the executive by
the Punjab Separation of Judicial & Executive Functions Act,
1964 (Act XXV of 1964) certain amendments were made in
s. 10 but in the present case we are not concerned with them
because the impugned order requisitioning the shop in question
was made before the said Act (XXV of 1964) came into force.
It is well known that the object of appointing an Additional
District Magistrate is to relieve the District Magistrate of some
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HAR! CHAND v. BATALA ENG. co. (Grover, J.)
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of his duties and that he is subordinate to the District Magistrate
to the extent specified in sub-s. (3) of s. 10. It is equally well
known that the District Magistrate occupies a very important
position in the district and is the head of the Executive there and
he exercises powers of superintendence and control over the
other Magistrates in the district. Apart from the powers which
have been conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure on him
the District Magistrate is also known as the Collector for purposes of revenue laws.
He is variously called Collector in some
States and Deputy Commissioner in other States. Under s.
11
of the Code whenever in consequence of the office of District
Magistrate becoming vacant, any officer succeeding temporarily
to the Chief executive administration of the district such officer
< also exercises all the powers and performs all the duties conferred
and imposed by the Code on the District Magistrate. The Additional District Magistrate as has previously been noticed, can
similarly exercise all or any of the powers of a District Magistrate
if the State Govermnent makes a direction under s. 10(2) of the
Code but even an officer who heads the chief executive administra-
:n tion of the district temporarily under s. 11, exercises
all the
powers of a District Magistrate. The scheme of s. 10 of the Code
leaves no room for doubt that the District Magistrate and the
Additional District Magistrate are two different and distinct
authorities and even though the latter may be empowered under
sub-s. (2) to exercise all or any of the powers of a District
Magistrate but by no stretch of reasoning can an Additional
~ District Magistrate be called the District Magistrate which are
the words employed in sub-s. (1) of s. 10.
The argument which prevailed in the High Court and which
the appellant has had to seriously meet in this Court, is that the
p Additional District Magistrate when invested by the State Goverrmrent under s. 10(2) of the Code with all or any of the powers
of the District Magistrate under the Code or under any other
law for the time being in force, would squarely fall within the
expression "District Magistrate" employed in column 3 of the
notification dated December 13, 1962 by means of which the
Central Goverrmrent delegated its power under certain sections
'G of the Act including s. 29. The reasoning of the High Court was
that on a proper construction of the notification it was clear that
the "Central Goverrmrent was desirous of delegating its
power
in favour of the officers in fact and actually discharging duties
and functions in exercising the powers of Collectors, District
Magistrates and Deputy Commissioners. The High Court also
1I looked at the other provisions in respect of which the powers had
been delegated and drew the conclusion that the delegation was
not confined only to officers appointed as such under s. 10 (1 ) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. Learned counsel for the appel-
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[1969] 2 S.C.R.
lant has assailed the decision of the High Court principally on
two grounds; for which he has sought support from a decision of
the Nagpur High Court in Prabhulal Ram/al Kabra v. Emperor(').
In that case an order had be.en made under Rule 26 of the
Defence of India Rules by the Additional District Magistrate of
Raipur directing the detention of one Bharatchandra Kabra. That
Rule conferred power of detention on the Central Government
and the Provincial Government but by virtue of the provisions
relating to delegation the District Magistrate had been empowered
by the Provincial Government to exercise those powers. The
Additional District ·Magistrate who made the order of detention
had been conferred powers under s. 10(2) Cr. Pr. Code almost
in similar terms as are to be found in the present case. In other
words he could exercise all the powers of a District Magistrate
under the Code or under any other law for the time being in
force.
Two points were agitated before the Nagpur court; the
first was that the word "law" in "any other law" occurring in
s. 10(2) of the Code was not meant to include an executive
order but only legislative enactments, and rules, regulations or
orders which had the force of law. The second was that the Act
ancl the Rules made thereunder were special laws enacted to meet
an emergency and they conferred extraordinary
and drastic
powers on the executive and it was precisely for that reason that
it was imperative that those powers must be exercised· with due
sense of responsibility and with circumspection by an officer or
authority of a certain status and experience and, therefore, that
power had been delegated to the District Magistrate. Both
these contentions prevailed with the Nagpur High Court and it
was held that the Additional District Magistrate
could not
exercise powers under Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules
simply by virtue of the notification under s. 10(2) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. There is an exhaustive discussion on the
first point in the Nagpur judgment but it is altogether unnecessary
to examine its correctness because we are of the opinion that
most of the reasons given in support of the determination of the
second point are clear and cogent and must be accepted as
correct. These reasons may be summarised as follows (i) very
wide, almost autocratic, powers are conferred on the Government in the matter of detention and therefore they must be exercised with a due sense of responsibility and circumspection by
an officer of a certain status and experience; (ii) when the Government delegates its power to an officer or authority subordinate
to it, is not unreasonable to assume that it fully considers the fitness of the delegate before making the order in respect of delegation; (iii) the Additional District Magistrate who is invested
with the powers of a District Magistrate does not thereby attain
the status of a District Magistrate as there can be only one person
(1) A. 1. R. 1944 N•g. 84.
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HAR! CHAND v. BATALA ENG. co. (Grover, I.)
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in the district who can be a District Magistrate and (iv) the
Government when it conferred the power on the District Magistrate conferred it on the officer actually holding the office of the
District Magistrate and no one else.
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It has not been disputed that the powers of requisitioning are
of a very drastic nature and involve the fundamental rights in respect of property guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(f) of the Consti·
tution.
The Central Government while making the delegation
of its power under s. 29 of the Act must ordinarily be presumed
to be fully conscious of this aspect of the matter and it was for
that reason that an officer or authority of the high status of a
District Magistrate in the district was empowered to exercise that
power.
Apart from these considerations we see no reason to deviate
from the normal rule that the expressions or words which have
been used in the notification must be read as such and not in any
other manner unless the context requires that the latter course
should be followed.
In the present case the words "District
Magistrate" could not possibly be read as Additional District
Magistrate and it is only by resorting to the notification issued
under s. 10(2) of the Code that the Additional District Magistrate can be said to have empowered to exercise the powers of
the District Magistrates.
The reasons which prevailed with the
Nagpur court and which have already been summarised adequately meet the contrary view that the Additional District
Magistrate should be held to be competent to act under s. 29 of
the Act even though the Nagpur case was one of detention.
Coming to the decisions of this Court not much assistance can
be derived .from them. In Ajaib Singh v. State of Punjab (1 ) the
Additional District Magistrate of Amritsar who had be.en invested with the powers of a District Magistrate under s. 10(2) of
the Code was incharge of the office of the District Magistrate
when the latter was transferred. He passed an order detaining a
person under Rule 30(1) (b) of the Defence of India Rules
1962. It was held that the Act and the Rules showed unmistakably that the powers of detention could be exercised only by the
State Government or by an officer or authority to whom it might
be delegated but who shall, in no case, be lower in rank than a
District Magistrate. The Additional District Magistrate was below the rank of a District Magistrate and even though he had
been invested with all the powers under the Code and also under
any other law for the time being in force he was still not the
District Magistrate unless the Government appointed him as such
under s. 10(1). This case would have been most apposite for
the present case but for the clear distinction that iri provisions
(1) [1965] 2 S.C.R. 845.
208
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 2 S.C.R.
under which the detention was made it was provided that the
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powers could be delegated to no one who was lower in rank than
a District Magistrate. There is no such provision in the matter
of delegation in the present case.
One rule, however, emerges
quite clearly which is even. otherwise unexceptionable that unless
a person has been appointed under s. 10 (1) of the Code he cannot be called a District Magistrate and that an Additional DisB
trict Magistrate is below the rank of a District Magistrate.
The Central Talkies Ltd. Kanpur v. Dwarka Prasad(') on
which reliance was placed by the counsel for the respondents
related to interpretation of certain provisions of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act 194 7. Section 3 of that
Act enabled a landlord to file a suit for eviction of the tenant
with the permission of the District Magistrate.
Section 2(d)
defined District Magistrate as including an officer authorised by
the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under the
Act. By a notification issued under s. 10 ( 2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure one Mr. Seth was appointed as an Additional
District Magistrate with aU the powers of the District Magistrate.
The landlord applied to the District Magistrate for permission to file
a suit for ejectmeuit against the tenant.
The District Magistrate transferred that application to the Additional District Magistrate who granted permission. The tenant challenged the same on the ground that the permission granted by the
Adclitional District Magistrate was invalid as the District Magistrate mentioned in s. 3 of the ·aforesaid Act was persona
designata. This contention was repelled by this Court and it was
observed that a persona designata was a person selected as an
individual in his private capacity, and not in his capacity as filling
a particular character or office. This case is clearly distinguishable on the ground that under s. 3 of the U.P. Act the District
Magistrate himself could authorise any officer to perform any of
his functions.
That showed that the legislature did not intend
that the functions to be performed under s. 3 must be performed
by the District Magistrate alone and by no one else.
Counsel
for the appellant has called attention to a Bench decision of the
Punjab High Court in Guru Datt v. Sohan Singh & Another(')
in which a question arose whether the Deputy Commissioner
for the purposes of an election petition under the Punjab Panchayat Samities and Zila Parishads Act 1961 and the Rules
framed thereunder was a persona designata and it was held that it
was the Deputy Commissioner alone who could perform the functions which the statute and the rules conferred on him even
though the Governor had made an order declaring the ex-cadre
11osts of Additional Deputy Commissioners to be equivalent in
(!) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 495.
(2)1.L.R.1965Punj.134.
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status to the cadre posts of Deputy Commissioners. This decision may be open to some criticism owing to the observations
made in Central Talkies' case( I). However, in the present case
we are not basing . our decision by taking into consideration the
line of argument of persona designata.
For the reasons which have already been stated the appeal i>
allowed with costs, with the result that the writ petition filed in
the High Court succeeds and the impugned order shall stand
quashed.
G.C.
Appeal allowed .
(l) [1961! 3 S.C.R. 495.