# HARIDAS DAS AND ANR v. STA TE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1964] 7 S.C.R. 237
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964-03-16
- **Case number:** -Criminal Appeal No. 141 of 1961
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/haridas-das-and-anr-v-sta-te-of-west-bengal-and-ors-3110
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

•
'1 S:C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
237
HARIDAS DAS AND ANR.
v.
STA TE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS.
[A. K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR,
JJ.]
Penal Code-Bringing a false charge of a commission of
an offence-The offence charged need not be a crimi.,a!
offence-It may be an offence under a special !aw like Contempt of Court Act-Whether a proceedi."g under Contempt
Court Act a criminal proceeding-Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45
of 1860), ss. 40, 41 and 211.
The appellants were ordered to be proceeded against
und:er ss. 193, 199 and 211 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. They
apvealed to this Court against that order under certificate
granted under Art. 134(1) (c) of the Constitution.
It was contended before this Court that for a person to
be charged and Vied under s. 211 Penal Code he must either
have instituted a criminal proceeding or caused such proceeding to be instituted or he must have falsely charged a person
with having committed a criminal offence and since what the
appellants did was to initiate a proceeding for committal for
contempt of court they cannot be proceeded against under
s. 211 Penal Code.
Held: (per Sarkar, J.) Assuming that a proceeding for
committal for contempt of court is not a criminal proceeding
within the meaning of s. 211 Penal Code, falsely charging a
person with commission of an offence would be an offence
under that section. When that section .says that an offence
under it may be committed by falsely charging a person with
the commission of an offence it does not intend that the offence
must be one whiCh gives rise to a criminal proceeding. Offence
is defined by s. 40 of the Penal Code meaning an offence under
the Code or under any special law and taking the definition
of the special law contained in s. 41 as meaning a law applicable to particular subject it will be seen that an offence
under Contempt of Court Act is an offence within the ambit
of s. 211. The appellants have by falsely bring a cHarge of
Contempt of Court made themselves liable to be prcceeded
against under s. 211 Penal Code.
Empress v. Jamoona, (1881) I.L.R. 6 Cal. 620, Karim Buksh
v. Queen Empress, (1890) I.L.R. 17 Cal. 574 and Queen Empress
v. Karigowda, (1895) I.L.R. 19 Bombay 51, distinguished.
(per Hidayatullah, J.}: There can be no doubt that the
institution of contempt of court proceedings is institution of
criminal proceedings because a contempt of court can be
punished by imprisonment and fine and that brings an accusation charging a man with contempt of court within the expression "cri'!)inal proceedngs" in s. 211 Penal Code. Such proce<;dings we~e described . as quasi
~riminal proceedings by
Privy ~o:unc1l because with proceedmgs are not tried under
the Cnmmal Procedure Code. That Code is not exhaustive of
criminal proceedings and punishments of contempt by summary proce~ure bef!'re the superior courts are special criminal proceedmgs which the Code of Criminal Procedure does
1961
MarcA 16
238
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
1961
not even regulate. The High Court has therefore acted with
B
"da -dA jurisdiction to order a prosecution under s. 211 Pl'!nal Code.
an a Das an
nr.
v.
(per Mudholkar, J.): Making a false charge before any
S1a1e of w .. i Bengal person, whosoever he may be is covered by s. 499 Indian Penal
untl Others
Code. Section 211 Indian Penal Code is applicable to a case
where a false charge is made by the accused person against
another before a person competent to enquire into it and
either take proceedings himself or cause proceedings to be initiated. It is not limited to false charges made to a person whoalso has the power to try the accused or commit him for trial
by other court.
8arkar,J.
(iil It would not be right to read the words or "falsely
charges" as being in any way restricted by the words "institute or causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding". The
Legislature has clearly prpvided for two kinds of acts, one
the institution of proceedings and the other of making a false
charge and there is n

## Text

•
'1 S:C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
237
HARIDAS DAS AND ANR.
v.
STA TE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS.
[A. K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR,
JJ.]
Penal Code-Bringing a false charge of a commission of
an offence-The offence charged need not be a crimi.,a!
offence-It may be an offence under a special !aw like Contempt of Court Act-Whether a proceedi."g under Contempt
Court Act a criminal proceeding-Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45
of 1860), ss. 40, 41 and 211.
The appellants were ordered to be proceeded against
und:er ss. 193, 199 and 211 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. They
apvealed to this Court against that order under certificate
granted under Art. 134(1) (c) of the Constitution.
It was contended before this Court that for a person to
be charged and Vied under s. 211 Penal Code he must either
have instituted a criminal proceeding or caused such proceeding to be instituted or he must have falsely charged a person
with having committed a criminal offence and since what the
appellants did was to initiate a proceeding for committal for
contempt of court they cannot be proceeded against under
s. 211 Penal Code.
Held: (per Sarkar, J.) Assuming that a proceeding for
committal for contempt of court is not a criminal proceeding
within the meaning of s. 211 Penal Code, falsely charging a
person with commission of an offence would be an offence
under that section. When that section .says that an offence
under it may be committed by falsely charging a person with
the commission of an offence it does not intend that the offence
must be one whiCh gives rise to a criminal proceeding. Offence
is defined by s. 40 of the Penal Code meaning an offence under
the Code or under any special law and taking the definition
of the special law contained in s. 41 as meaning a law applicable to particular subject it will be seen that an offence
under Contempt of Court Act is an offence within the ambit
of s. 211. The appellants have by falsely bring a cHarge of
Contempt of Court made themselves liable to be prcceeded
against under s. 211 Penal Code.
Empress v. Jamoona, (1881) I.L.R. 6 Cal. 620, Karim Buksh
v. Queen Empress, (1890) I.L.R. 17 Cal. 574 and Queen Empress
v. Karigowda, (1895) I.L.R. 19 Bombay 51, distinguished.
(per Hidayatullah, J.}: There can be no doubt that the
institution of contempt of court proceedings is institution of
criminal proceedings because a contempt of court can be
punished by imprisonment and fine and that brings an accusation charging a man with contempt of court within the expression "cri'!)inal proceedngs" in s. 211 Penal Code. Such proce<;dings we~e described . as quasi
~riminal proceedings by
Privy ~o:unc1l because with proceedmgs are not tried under
the Cnmmal Procedure Code. That Code is not exhaustive of
criminal proceedings and punishments of contempt by summary proce~ure bef!'re the superior courts are special criminal proceedmgs which the Code of Criminal Procedure does
1961
MarcA 16
238
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
1961
not even regulate. The High Court has therefore acted with
B
"da -dA jurisdiction to order a prosecution under s. 211 Pl'!nal Code.
an a Das an
nr.
v.
(per Mudholkar, J.): Making a false charge before any
S1a1e of w .. i Bengal person, whosoever he may be is covered by s. 499 Indian Penal
untl Others
Code. Section 211 Indian Penal Code is applicable to a case
where a false charge is made by the accused person against
another before a person competent to enquire into it and
either take proceedings himself or cause proceedings to be initiated. It is not limited to false charges made to a person whoalso has the power to try the accused or commit him for trial
by other court.
8arkar,J.
(iil It would not be right to read the words or "falsely
charges" as being in any way restricted by the words "institute or causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding". The
Legislature has clearly prpvided for two kinds of acts, one
the institution of proceedings and the other of making a false
charge and there is no compelling reason for reading the section as if it is limited to institution of a complaint upon a false
charge.
(iii) The word offence under s. 211 would also include
a thing punishable under a special law and the law of contempt being a special law an offence under Contempt of Court
Act wou!CI be an offence under s. 211 and therefore th» order
of the High Court was right.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION-Criminal Appeal
No. 141 of 1961. Appeal from the judgment and order dated
January 5, 1959 of the Calcutta High Court in Civil Revision
No. 3 of 1957.
Sarjoo Prasad and P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellants.
Niharendu Dutt Majumdar, P. K. Chakravarty and P. K.
Bose, for respondent No. I.
S. C. Majumdar, for respondents Nos. 2 to 4.
March 16, 1964. The following judgments were delivered.
SARKAR, J.-The High Court at Calcutta made an order
directing the Registrar of the Court to file a complaint in the
Court of a magistrate against the appellants under ss. 211,
199 and other appropriate sections of the Indian Penal Code.
The Registrar thereupon filed a complaint against the appellants under ss. 193, 199 and 211 of the Code. The appellants
have appealed against ihe order of the High Court under a
certificate granted under Art. 134(l)(c) of the Constitution.
It appears that the appellants had moved the High Court
for committal for contempt of court of certain respondents.
whom I will call the Monda! respondents, for breach of an
injunction issued in a suit. That injunction prohibited the respondents from disturbing the appellants' possession of some
property. It was said by the appellants. that the Mond~l re.spondents attempted to enter forcibly into the properties m
. ..
'.1 S.C.R.
SUPRElllE COURT REPORTS
239
breach of the injunction and "in the course of such attempt
1961
.broke open the gate, cut down one tree and also broke down Harida.-! ~;n<I Anr.
the gate". The High Court ieferred the matter to the Subv.
ordinate Judge for a report on the allegation about breach State
01 J:!'•Ot•t1Bengal
'd
.
f h
••• "''
.of injunction and on a cons1 eratJon o t at report came to
the conclusion that the appellants "could not reasonably be
Sarkar, J.
believed" and expressed its agreement with the Subordinate
Judge's view that "the allegations made by the petitioners
are not true". The petitioners referred to are the appellants.
The petition for committal for contempt of court was thereupon dismissed. Thereafter the Monda! respondents moved
the High Court and obtained the order directing a complaint
to be lodged as earlier mentioned. Their case was that deliberate false statements had been made in affidavits used
by the appellants in connection with their application for
the committal of the Monda! respondents for contempt of
court.
Mr. Sarjoo Prasad appearing for the appellants has first
said that the order in so far as it directed a complaint under
ss. 193 and 199 of the Code could not be supported as there
was no definite finding in the order dismissing the application for contempt of court that any false statement had been
made. I have earlier set out the relevant parts of that order
and I think that it contains such a finding. The High Court
held that "the allegations ............ are not true". It is unnecessary to pursue this question further for Mr: Sarjoo
Prasad's contention is obviously unsustainable.
Another point made by Mr. Sarjoo Prasad was that
there was no case for lodging a complaint under s. 211 of
the Code. He said that in order that an offence under that
section might be committed by a person, he must either have
instituted a criminal proceeding or caused such proceeding
to. be in~tituted o~ he must have falsely charged a person
with havmg committed an offence. It was said that the appellants c~uld not be said to have done any of these things. His
conkt1tlon was that, what they had done was to start a proceed!ng for committa.l ~or contempt of court and such proceedmg was not a crunmal proceeding.
I will assume that a proceeding for committal for con-
!Cmpt of court is n~t a criminal proceeding within the meanmg of that expression as used in s. 211. On this basis no
doubt, it cannot be said that the appellants had instituted or
c:iusect to be instituted any criminal. proceeding. But the sect1~n . also says that falsely charging a person with the comm1ss1on of an offence would be an offence under it and it
seems to me that the appellants did so charge the Monda!
respondents. Mr. Sarjoo Prasad's answer was that the charge
240
SUPREME COURT REPOR'.L'S
[19641
1964
contemplated by the section had to be a charge which would
Haricltu Daaand A.-. give rise to a criminal proceeding. I am unable to agree.
v.
Btate of West Ben_qal
Mr. Sarjoo Prasad based his contention on three cases,
and Others
none of which, in my opinion, supports him. The first case
J
was of Express v. Jamoona('). There it was held that the
Sarkar, .
charge had to be made to a person competent to act upon
it, a person having the power to investigate and send up for
trial. The next case was Karim Buksh v. The Queen Empress(') and it held that the making of a false complaint to
the police of a cognizable offence was the instituting of a
criminal proceeding within the meaning of that expression
in the second paragraph in s. 211 which entailed a higher
punishment. The last case referred to was Queen Empress v.
Karigowda(') where it was held that the words 'falsely charging' in s. 211 were used in a technical sense and the making
of an imputation of the commission of an offence in evidence
given in a departmental enquiry was not the making of a
charge in that sense. Quite clearly we are not concerned with
any of the questions discussed in these cases or the view there
taken.
As, however, in all these cases the charge alleged to have
been made related to an offence triable in a criminal proceeding, all the judgments incidentally referred to institution of
criminal proceedings in connection with the charge. In none
of them, however, was the question with which we are con~
cerned, namely, whether a false charge can be made in respect of an offence which could be tried by a proceeding
which was not a criminal proceeding, raised. It was not, and
could not have been, intended in these cases to say that the
offence in respect of which a false charge had been brought
must be one which was triable by a criminal proceeding
only. Therefore, I have said that these cases do not support
the proposition for which Mr. Sarjoo Prasad contends.
As a matter of construction, and that is all that we have
to go by in the absence of any authority, I agree with the
view of the High Court that when the section says that arr
offence under it may be committed by falsely charging a
person with the commission of an offence, it does not intend that the offence must be one which gives rise to a criminal proceeding. There is no warrant for a contrary view. Inrked the definition of the word offence in s. 40 of the Code
shows that such a contrary view would be wrong. Under that
definition the word 'offence' in s. 211 means an offence
punishable under the Code or under any special or local law
(') (1881) I.L.R. 6 Cal. 620.
('l (1890) I.L.R. 17 Cal. 574.
(') (1895) I.L.R. 19 Bom. 51.
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
241
as defined in it. Section 41 defines a special law as a law
1964
applicable to a particular subject. Now the Contempt of Barillas n.;.,.u ..
Courts Act is an Act dealing with the subject of contempt
v.
of courts and is, therefore, a special law. It also. pro~ides
81•
1•.~d ~:;:,~•ayal
for punishment for contempt of court by simple 1mpnson-
-
ment up to six months. subject to certain conditions menSa.r!-ar, J.
tioned: see ss. 3 and 4. A charge of having committed a
contempt of court is, therefore, a charge of having committed
an offence within the meaning of s. 211. Such a charge was
admittedly brought in this case and that charge was furthermore preferred to the only person who could act upon it,
namely. the High Court, for without its sanction no complaint for lodging a false charge of contempt of court could
have been made. The order to lodge the complaint in regard
to an offence under s. 211 was unobjectionable.
I. therefore. think that there is no substance in this
appeal and would dismiss it.
HIDAYATULLAH, J.-The High Ccurt of Calcutta has mdayat1dla1',.I.
ordered the Registrar of that Court to make a complaint in
writing against the appellants for their prosecution under ss.
193, 199 and 211 of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court,
however, certified the case as fit for appeal under Art. 134(1)
(c) of the Constitution and the present appeal is the result.
The appellants had obtained a temporary injunction
from the High Court against respondents 2 to 4 restraining
them from disturbing possession of the appellants over certain properties. The appellants made an application to the
High Court alleging that the respondents in defiance of the
order tresspassed on the property breaking down a gate and
cutting down a tree. In that application they asked for action
under the Contempt of Courts Act. The High Court remitted the case for enquiry. It was reported that the allegation
was false. The High Court came to a like conclusion and
ordered the Registrar to file a complaint for the prosecution
of the appellants. At the hearing, preliminary objections were
raised about the competency of the appeal, but were subrnquently withdrawn when we intimated that we were not disposed to interfere with the order of the High Court on merits.
This Court will not ordinarily do more than examine
in such cases whether the High Court has fairly considered
a case to reach the conclusion that prima facie there is good
reason to launch the prosecution, that there is reasonable
prospect of conviction and that it is expedient'in the interest
of justice to order a prosecution. Judged from this angle, I
am satisfied that the High Court correctly viewed the case.
. It is, however, contended that s. 211 of the Indian Penal
Code cannot apply because no offence under s. 211 can
242
SUPRE:.\IE COURT REPORTS
[1964}
1964
prima facie be held to be committed by the appellants when
Harid.,DasarnlAnr they made the application which has led to their prosecuv.
· tion. S. 211 reads as follows: -
State of ~Vest Bengal
arnl OtA."
"211. False charge of offence made with intent to
-
injureHidayatuUah, J.
Whoever, with intent to cause injury to any
person, institutes or causes to be instituted any
criminal proceeding against that person, or falsely
charges any person with having committed an
offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful
ground for such proceeding or charge against
that person, shall be punished with.imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend
to two years, or with fine, or with both; and if
such criminal proceeding be instituted on a
false charge of an offence punishable with death,
imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for seven
years or upwards, shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to seven years, and sliall also be
liable to fine."
It is quite clear that prima facie the intention of the appellant would be to cause injury to the respondents if their
/
report to the High Court was false. The only question really
is whether they instituted a criminal proceeding. An application to take proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act
..
undoubtedly can be regarded as causing a criminal proceeding
to be instituted. There is no substance in the contention that
the application neither charged the respondents with any
offence, nor instituted a criminal proceeding against them.
There may be some dispute as to whether it charged the respondents with an offence and as to that I say nothing, but,
in my judgment there can be no doubt that it amounted to
the insitution of a criminal proceeding because a contempt
of court can be punished by imprisonm_11nt and fine and that
brings an accusation charging a man with contempt of court
within the wide words 'criminal proceedings'. Such proceedings were descJibed as quasi criminal proceedings by the Privy
Council because such proceedings are not tried under the
Criminal Procedure Code. That does not render it any the
less a criminal proceeding because the Criminal Procedure
Code is not exhaustive of criminal proceedings and punishments of contempts by summary procedure before the
superior courts are special criminal proceedings which the
Criminal Procedure Code does not even seek to regulate. If
there was no just or lawful ground for commencing this proceeding for contempt in the High Court (and it is held by the
High Court that there was none) then the requirements of
7S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
243
s. 211 of the Indian Penal Code must be taken to be prima
1964
facie satisfied. In my opinion, the High Court acted withHariclaallaaandA.,.
jurisdiction to order a prosecution under s. 211 of the Indian
v.
Penal Code in the present case. Of course, the appellants State~ ~h! ~
will be entitled to raise any plea of law or fact in the case and
•
•
I will only say that what has been said by the High Court Hidayatullah, J.
or by this Court in relation to the facts, should not stand in
their way of substantiating any plea or pleas. I agree for these
reasons that the appeal be dismissed.
MUDHOLKAR, J.-The question raised before us in this
appeal by a certificate granted by the Calcutta High Court
is whether that Court was right in directing a complaint
Mu'11wlkar, Ji
to be filed against the appellants for offences under ss. 199
and 211 of the Indian Penal Code.
The matter arose like this. The respondents 2, 3 and 4
purchased at a sale held for the realization of rent, plot No.
365 of village Jagdispur, district 24 Parganas on or about
April 7, 1951 and obtained delivery of possession through
court. But apparently they were able to get only paper possession. On September 25, 1951 the appellant No. I Haridas Das
instituted a suit in the court of Munsif at Sealdah for a declaration that his. right, title and interest had not been effected by the sale, for confirmation of his possession over the
land and for a permanent injunction restraining the respondents 2 to 4 from disturbing his possession. He also made
an application for a temporary injunction restraining the respondents from disturbing his possession. The application
was, however, dismissed by the Munsif ancl his order wa.s
affirmed in appeal by the Third Additional District Judge at
Alipore. The appellant thereupon preferred an. application
for revision before the High Court from the order of the
Additional District Judge. By order dated May 3, 1954 B. K.
Gulla, J., granted temporary injunction to the appellant No.
I restraining the respondents 2 to 4 from disturbing · his
possession till the disposal of the suit and observed in his
order that no serious inconvenience would be caused to
them if they were asked in substance to possess the property
jointly with the appellant No. I.
On or about June 12, 1956 the appellant No. I filed an
.,.
application in the High Court under the Contempt of Courts
Act; 1926 alleging, inter alia, that on June 7, 1956 respondents 2 to 4, along with others, attempted to enter forcibly
into the plot with respect to which an injunction had been
granted by the High Court. In the course of that ;ittempt they
broke open the gate and cut down a tree standing on the plot.
He further averred that the police then arrived on the scene
and restored peace. According to him the respondents 2 to
4 had by this action mmmittP.d a breach of the injunction
244
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1964
granted by the High Court. This application was verified by
Barida.DasanclAnr.an affidavit affirmed py the second appellant Jyotish Kumar
v.
Seal who said that the facts set out in all the paragraphs
lilal•
0~:;-:i:fe::ga1 of the application were true to his knowledge.
After the
application was made the Court issued a rule calling upoa
MudTwlkar, J.
the respondents 2 to 4 to show cause why they should not
be committed and punished for contempt of court for violating the order of injunction. The parties were heard on July
25, 1956 and the Bench which heard it directed the Subordinate Judge, Alipore to make an enquiry and submit a repo(t. In accordance with this direction the Subordinate Judge
examined the witnesses named by the appellants and in addition examined as court witness the Officer-in-charge of the
Police Station, Rajarhat, to whom a report of tlle incident
had also been made by the .appellants. The Subordinate
Judge then submitted his report to the High Court. After
its receipt the High Court heard the parties, considered the
report on August 30, 1957 and made an order discharging
the rule. In the course of the order the High Court observed
•
as follows: -
" .................. in the opinion of the learned Subordinate Judge, the allegations made by the petitioner
are not true. We have ourselves gone through
the evidence and agree with the view obviously
taken by the learned Subordinate Judge. It may
be, as stated by Jyotish Kumar Seal, that some
persons of the opposite parties did go to the garden and enquire -who authorised him to construct
the hut, which he was doing, but the story that
the members of the opposite parties broke open
the gate, and cut down the tree, cannot reasonably be believed.· Inspite of what the witnesses
have spoken, it is worth remembering, as pointed by the learned Subordinate Judge that in the
report to the Officer-in-charge, Rajarhat, nothing
was said about any golmal or any looting or any
damage done to the garden or to the trees."
On September 17, 1957 the respondents 2 to 4 filed an
application under s. 466 read with s. 195 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure before the High Court for making a
complaint against appellants under s. 211. I.P.C. and/or
any other appropriate section in relation to the proceeding
in the contempt matter before the High Court. The High
Court issued a rule to the appellants, heard them in answer
to the application and come to the conclusion that. it )'Vas
expedient in the interests of justice that a complaint should
be made. The High Court, therefore, made the rule absolute
and directed the Registrar, Appellate Side to file a com-
'
'1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
245
plaint against the appellants under ss. 211 and 199 l.P.C.
1961
and/or ariy other appropriate section to the Chief Presidency Haridallla<-;;.i..! ,
Magistrate, Calcutta. In pursuance of this direction the Rev.
• •
gistrar lodged a complaint on January 16, 1959 under ss. 193, State 01 Weal Be•1al
199 and 211, I.P.C. in the court of the Chief Presidency
•n<I °'~'
Mag~trate, Calcutta. The appellants made an application
Mudlwlkar, J.
before :tie High Court under Arts. 133(1)(c) and 134(1)(c)
of the Constitution for grant of a certificate of fitness for
appeal to this Court. By Order dated May 8, 19N the High
Court granted the certificate, overruling the objections made
on behalf of the respondents. The ground on which the
High Court granted the certificate was that the decision in
The 'Empress v. Jamoona(') where it was held that for a conviction under s. 211 of the Penal Code it was necessary that
the false charge should have been made to a Court or an
officer having jurisdiction to investigate and send it up for
trial, was not noticed by the High Court. With regard to
the objection raised on behalf of the respondents that the
order of the High Court directing that a complaint be lodged
was not a final order, the High Court held that whether it
is a final order or not is not free from doubt and that the
benefit of that doubt ought to be given to the appellants.
Before us Mr. Sarjoo Prasad has. placed reliance upon
the decision referred to in the order of the High Court
granting certificate and also on the decision of Ranade, J.,
in Queen Empress v. Karigowda('). In the first of these cases
one Jamoona appeared before Captain Simpson, Adjutant,
11th M.N.I., and Station Stall Officer and charged a noncommissioned officer with rape. An enquiry was held by
Captain Simpson and the charge was found to be false. The
Commanding Officer caused the appellant to be prosecuted
in a criminal court under s. 211 l.P.C. She was committed
for trial and was convicted by the Judicial Commissioner with
respect to that offence. On appeal the High Court held that
the Station Stall Officer having neither magisterial nor police
powers, s. 211 was not attracted. In the course of his judgment Mitter, J., observed:
"We do not think it unduly refining the words to say
that the false charge must be made to a Court
or to an officer who has. powers to investigate
and send up for trial."
Section 211, I.P.C. reads thus:
"Whoeyer •. with intent to cause ~jury to any person,
mstitutes or causes to be mstituted any criminal
proceeding
against that person, or falsely
(') (1881) IL.R. 6 Cal. 620.
(') (1895) l.L.R. 19 Bom. 5L
246
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1164
Harifaa [)(Uand.A.nr.
charges any person with having committed an
office, knowing that there fa no just or Ia wfal
gr'!und for such proceeding or charge against
v.
State of W.., Bengal
and Others
Mudholkar, J.
that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;
and if such criminal proceeding be instituted on a
false charge of an offence punishable with death,
imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven
years or upwards, shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to seven years, and shall also be
liable to fine."
Breaking up the section, it is clear that before it can be
invoked three things have to be proved: (a) that the accused
had intended to cause injury to any person; (b) that with that
object he instituted or caused to be instituted a criminal proceeding against that person or in the alternative falsely
charged him with having committed an offence and (c) that
he did so with the knowedge that there may be no just or
lawful ground for such proceeding or charge against that
person. Does the section mean that a false charge made before any person is punishable thereunder or is it restricted
to such charge being made to a person holding a particular
position? It seems to me that since making of l!- false charge
before any person, whosoever he may be, is covered by s. 499.
I.P.C., it would be appropriate to construe this section as
being applicabe only to a case where a false charge is made
by the accused person against another before a person who
is competent to enquire into it and ,either take proceedings
himself or cause proceedings to be initiated. I do not, however, think that it is limited to false charges made to a person who also has the power to try the accused or commit
him for trial by another court Such an interpretation is
sufficient to prevent any overlapping of the provisions of this
section with those of s. 500 and it is not necessary to go
further than this.
In the other case the facts were these:
One Karigowda was tried for an offence under s. 211.
Indian Penal Code for having falsely deposed in an enquiry
into bribery by a District Magistrate that he had paid bribe
of Rs. 300 to a Magistrate in the District of Bijapur, named
Jehangir. After the conclusion of the enquiry Jehangir obtained permission from the Government to pro8ecute Karigowda for an offence under s. 500, I.P.C. A complaint was
also made against him of an offence under s. 211, l.P.C.
The trying magistrate, at the end of the trial, struck out the
,-
...
•
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
247
charge under s. 500 and convicted him of an offence under
1964
s. 211 only. On appeal the Joint Sessions Judge reversed Haridaalla8antlAnr.
the conviction under s. 211. The Government then preferred
v.
f
H. h C
Th H' h C
t
d State of Wut R,.gaJ
an appeal be ore the
1g
ourt.
e
1g
our !everse
and OthD•
the acquittal of Karigowda under s. 500 and maintamed the
-
conviction under s. 211, I.P.C. Jardine, J., one of the two
Mudlw/1-, J.
Judges who heard the case, referring to Jamoona's case(')
said that that case was inapplicable and then observed:
"The present case, however, seems to me to be taken
out of section 211 by the fact that Karigowda
did not apparently intend to set the criminal law
in motion. He had been produced before Mr.
Monteath against his will; and though what he
said is 'information' under section 191, clause
c. of the Procedure Code, and 'defamation' under
the Penal Code, I am of opinion, after considering the Full Bench case(') that the imputations
do not make up a 'false charge'." (p. 61-62).
Ranade J., however, has made certain observations upon
which Mr. Sarjoo Prasad has placed strong reliance. Those
observations are :
"The words 'falsely charging' used in that section
must be construed along with the words which
speak of the 'institution of proceedings'. These
latter words are obviously used in a technical
and exclusive sense, and by parity of reasoning.
the same restricted sense must be given to the
words which relate to a false charge." (p. 69).
He also agreed with Jardine, J., that Karigowda had
not made a complaint of his own accord and what he said
was simply in answer to certain question put to him at the
departmental enquiry. In my judgment it would not be
right to read .the words "or falsely charges" as being in any
way restricted by the words "institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding". The legislature has clearly
provided for two kinds of acts: one the institution of prcr
ceedings and the other of making a false charge and I see.
no q>mpelling reason for reading the section as if it is limited t? the insti~tion of a complaint upon a false charge. Such
an mterpretation would completely shut out criminal prcr
ceedings in which no charge of an offence has been made.
!• ther~fore, agree with the view taken by the Full Bench
m Kanm Bux's case('), to which Jardine, J., had referred.
(') (1881) I.L.R. 6 Cal. 620.
(') I.L.R. 17 Cal. 574.
248
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
~
With regard to the interpretation to be placed upon the
BaridiiaDa•""4Anr. two phrases used .in s. 211 Wilson, J., who delivered judgB
,, w•·
ment of the court m that case observed, inter alia ·
tat-e oJ
eat Bengal
·
and Ot,,.r
"I agree that we must take it that the legislature did
Mudholkar, J.
not regard the two phrases (that is, 'institutes
criminal proceedings' and 'falsely charges') as coextensive in meaning but considered that there
were or might be cases to which one would apply
and not the other." (p. 578).
As illustrations of proceedings in which no charge of
an offence is made Wilson, J., has referred to proceedings
under s. 107 and s. 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
As an illustration of a false charge which does not amount
to institution of a criminal proceeding, he has 1 eferred to
a charge made to a judge of civil court in order to obtain
sanction to prosecute another (which was a prerequisite for
prosecution before the amendment by Act 18 of 1923) and
pointed out that this would not be. the institution of a criminal proceeding. In my opinion, therefore, the point raised
by Mr. Sarjoo Prasad must fail.
Apart from the offence under s. 211, the complaint
against the appellants embraces two more offences: one is
for giving false evidence which is punishable under s. 193
and the other of making a false statement in a declaration
which is by law receivable as evidence under s. 199, I.P.C.
There could be no impediment to a complaint being made
with regard to these two offences. Mr. Sarjoo Prasad, however, says that the High Court, after it received the report of
the Subordinate Judge, did not find that it was wholly false
but found that it was partly false and in this connection
draws our attention to the following observations of the High
Court:
"It may be, as stated by Jyotish Ktimar Seal, that some
persons of the opposite parties did go to the
garden and enquire who authorised him to construct the hut, which he was doing, but the story
that the members of the opposite parties broke
open the gate, and cut down the tree, cannot
reasonably be believed."
·
It is true that the High Court has not said that the respondents 2 to 4 di_d not visit the p~o_t at all; but the injunction did not restrain them from VISltmg the plot. What they
were restrained from doing was to disturb the possess!on
of the appellant No. 1 and, ther~fore, there was no question
.of their rendering themselves hable for contempt, because
they visited the plot. Indeed that was not t!te p-avamen of
the charge against him in the contempt apphcat10n made by
•
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
249
the appellant No. I. The gravamen of the charge was that
~~
they in fact disturbed his possession and caused damage tOHaridasDas...aA,.,.
property. This was the crucial allegation ~nd this allegation State of W.;,.1 Bengal
has not been found to be true by the Htgh Court. In the
and Other.
circumstances there was clearly a prima facie case for proceeding against the appellants not only under s. 211 but also
Mwlhollcar, J.
under ss. 193 and 199, l.P.C.
Mr. Sarjoo Prasad, however, said that he would be able
to show by reference to the evidence recorded by the Subordinate Judge during the enquiry made by him that the
statement of the Station Officer upon which the High Court
has placed reliance is not correct and that his statement to
the effect that in the report made to him nothing was said
about "any golmal or any looting or any damage done to
the garden or to the trees." It is sufficient to say that we
are not sitting in judgment over the order of the High Court
by which the rule for committing the respondents 2 to 4
for contempt was discharged. The appeal before us is against
another order and that is the order directing a complaint to
be filed against the appellants.
Mr. Sarjoo Prasad then contended that the false charge
referred to in s. 211 must be with respect to an offence under
the Indian Penal Code and that by making an application
of the kind which the appellant No. 1 made he had not
charged the respondents 2 to 4 with any offence under the
Penal Code. The word 'offence' is described in s. 40 of the
Indian Penal Code. The relevant part of the definition runs
thus:
"Except in the chapters and sections mentioned in
clauses 2 and 3 of this section. the word 'offence'
denotes a thing made punishable by this Code.
In chapter IV. chapter VA and in the following sections, namely, sections 64, 65 ........ ., 211, 213,
. . . . . . . . . the word 'offence' denotes a thing
punishable under this Code, or under any
special or local law as hereinafter defined ...... .
"
It will thus be clear that the word offence used in s. 211
woul? also include a thing punishable under a special law.
Special la:v is defined in s. 41 as a law applicable to a particular subiect. The law of contempt is a particular subject
an:l the High Court has inherent power to punish a person
for .th_e off~nce_ of conten:ipt co.mmitt~d by him by disobeying
a.n m1unct1on issued ~gamst h1~. Disobedience of an injunction is.sued b!' the High Court 1s not something with respect
to which action under s. 24 or s. 95 of the Code of Civil
Procedure could alone be taken but being contempt of the
250
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
1964
.
-
Htgh Court's order, is punishable by it in its discretion in
Hor;,Z...DasondAnr.exercise of its inherent powers. The only limitation which
State of ;.,t Bengal the statute has placed is with regard to the punishment that
and Ot.v,.,
the High Court can meet out to the contemner. I am, therefore, satisfied that the Order of the Hi.~h Court was right and,
Murlholkar, J.
-
accordingly, I dismiss the appeal.
Upon the view which I have taken, it is not necessary
to consider whether the proceeding before the High Court
was a criminal proceeding. In support of the contention that
it is not a criminal proceeding, Mr. Sarjoo Prarnd has placed
reliance upon the decision of the Privy Council in S. N.
Ba•inerjee v. Kuchwar Lime and Stone Co., Ltd.('). In that
case, their Lordships held that a committal for contempt for
breach of an injunction was not criminal in its nature, and
referred to the decisions in Radha Krishna Das v. Rai Krishn
Chand(') and Scott v.
Scott('). Since we did not hear full
arguments upon this question, I do not feel called upon to
express any opinion on the point.
Before parting with the appeal, I would like to point
out that two preliminary objections were raised before usone by Mr. Niharendu Dutt Majumdar on behalf of
respondent No. I and the other by Mr. S. C. Majumdar on
behalf of respondents 2 to 4. Mr. Dutt Ma.iumdar's preliminary objection was that the order of the High Court was
not a final order and he addressed a long 1rgument in support of it. The objection of Mr. S. C. Majumdar was that
the appellants had failed to prefer their appeal within the
time allowed by the rules of the Court and that they had
made false allegations in support of their application for
condoning the delay and, therefore, the condonation be revoked. We have heard both at considerable length on these
points. At the conclusion of Mr. Sarjoo Prasad's arguments
we made it clear to the respondents that we did not want to
call upon them to reply on merits and enquired whether in
the circumstances they pressed their preliminary objections.
Both of them said that in the circumstance.s they did not
want to press those objections. No order on these two preliminary objections is, therefore, necessary.
Appeal dismissed.
(') I.L.R. 17 Pat. 770.
(') 28 I.A. 182.
(') (1913) A.C. 417 at 456.