# HARISHANKAR v. RAO GIRDHARI LAL CHOWDHURY

- **Citation:** [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 933
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Bench:** B.P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur, M.H!Daya.Tullah, J.C. Shah
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/harishankar-v-rao-girdhari-lal-chowdhury-2577
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Revision App/ico,tion-Ooncu"ent findings of the co11rts
below-No provision in atature for second appeal-:-H igh court,
if dould
re-aaseaa
the
value
of
evidence-Distinction
between appeal and revision-Delhi di Ajmer Rent Control Act,
1952-(38 of 1952), sa, 34, 36 (1).
In an ejcctment suit under the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Con•·
trol Act, 1952, the trial Judge decreed the 1uit and on appeal
under s.34 of the Act the Additional District Judge confimied
1961
M/s. Mathra
l'rashad
"·
Stat1 of Punjab
Kapur J.
1111
D.....ml
19~1
Bari Shankar
v.
Rao Girtiluui Lal
Chowdh1Uy
9a4 SUPREME COURT REPO.R'fS [1962] SUP}>.
the decision.
The Act
did not provide
for a
second
appeal, and under s. 35 (I) a revision was filed against the
Order of the Additionaf District Judge. The single Judge
of. the Punjab High Court following a previous dcci,ion of the
same High Court, was of opinion that in assessment as all the
evidence was not considered
i~ was competent for him to
reconsider tlie concurrent findings of the courts below.
.
.
The ..question is whether the High Court in exercise of
its revisional powers is entitled ,to ·re-assess the value of the
evldence and to substitute i~s o;-yh cou~lusions of facts iii place
of those reached by the courts below.
Held, (per ,Sinha, C.]., Hidayatullah and Shah, JJ, that
though s. 35 cif the Delhi' and Ajn\er Rent Control Act is
worded in general terms,
but~ it ,..does not create a right to
have the case re-heard:
The distinction between ap. appeal.and revision is a real
one. A fight to app~al carries with it right of re-hearing
on law as well as fact, unltss the statute conferring the right
to appeal ~imits the re-hearing in scime way. The power
to hear a rcvision .. is~ generallyv given to a superior court so
thaJ.)it may satisfy, itself tha; a particular case decided accordingYto law. The phrase ''according t to law" in s. 35 of the
Act refers to the decision as a whole, and is not tq be eqUated
to e,rror~ of law or of fact simplicitor. All that the .High Court
can see is that these has been no mis'Carriage of justice and that
the decision is according to 18.w in the sense meiltioned.
per Kapur,J.-The power under s. 35 (I) of the Act of
interference by the High Court, is not restricted to a proper
trial according to Jaw or error in regard to onus of proof or
prop~r opportunity of being heard. It is very much wider than
that when in the opinion Of, the .High Court the decision is
erroneous on a question of law which affects
the merits of
the case or deciliion is manifestly unjust the High Court is
entitled to interfere.
Bell and Oo. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj (1938) 40 Bom. LR.
·125 approved.
C1vIL APPELLATE JurusnroTroN: Civil Appeal
No. 94 of 1959.
•
Appeal by speciaJ leave from the judgment
and decree dated May 7, 1957, of the Punjab High
Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in Civil Revision
Application No. 144-D of 1957.
,BiBhanNarain R. M~halingier and B. 0. Misra,
for the appellants.
•
•
(I) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
935
Gurbachan Singh and Harbans Singh, for the
respondent.
1961. December 5. The Judgment of Sinha,
C.J., Hirlayatullah and Shah, JJ., was delivered by
Hidayatullah, J. Kapnr, J. delivered a separate
judgment.
,961
H ari Shankar
••
Rao Girdhari Lil
Chowdiw•y
HIDAYATULLAH, J.-The appellants (in this
Hidayalu/lali J,
appeal by special leave) are the sons of one Gauri
Shankar, who owned a bungalow known as 5, Haily ,
Road, New Delhi. This bungalow was given to the
respondent by Gauri Shankar on a monthly rent of
Rs. 234-6-0, excluding taxes. The suit, out of
which this appeal arises, was brought by the appellants against the respondent, Rao GirdP.ari Lal
Chowdhury, for his eviction on the ground (among
others) that he had sub-let a portion of the bungalow
after the commencement of the Delhi and Ajmer
Rent Control Act, 1952 (38 of 1952) to one, Dr.
Mohani Jain, without obtaining the consent in
writing of the landlord, as required bys. 13(l)(b)(i)
of the Act. The defence was that the original contract of t

## Text

-
(I) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
933
articles excluded from the schedule.
Section
11(6) which deals with reassessments at the relevant
time provided :
" If upon informa.tion which has come into
his possession the Assessing Authorit,i: is
satisfied. that any dealer has been liaOle to
pay tax under this Act in respect of any
period has failed to apply for registration,
the Assessing Authority shall .......... assess to
the best of his judgment the amount of
tax ............ due from the dealer."
The scheme of the Act and the rules made there·
under do not, in my opinion, show that the
exemption becomes operative for the whole year
whenever during the year the notification of
..,.
exemption is issued even though it may be on the
last day of the financial year.
I would therefore dismiss this appeal wi~h
costs.
BY Couar. In accordance with the judgment
of the majority, the appeal stands allowed with
costs.
HARISHANKAR
v.
RAO GIRDHARI LAL CHOWDHURY
(B.P. SINHA, C. J., J.L. KAPUR, M.H!DAYA.TULLAH and
J.C. SHAH, JJ.)
Revision App/ico,tion-Ooncu"ent findings of the co11rts
below-No provision in atature for second appeal-:-H igh court,
if dould
re-aaseaa
the
value
of
evidence-Distinction
between appeal and revision-Delhi di Ajmer Rent Control Act,
1952-(38 of 1952), sa, 34, 36 (1).
In an ejcctment suit under the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Con•·
trol Act, 1952, the trial Judge decreed the 1uit and on appeal
under s.34 of the Act the Additional District Judge confimied
1961
M/s. Mathra
l'rashad
"·
Stat1 of Punjab
Kapur J.
1111
D.....ml
19~1
Bari Shankar
v.
Rao Girtiluui Lal
Chowdh1Uy
9a4 SUPREME COURT REPO.R'fS [1962] SUP}>.
the decision.
The Act
did not provide
for a
second
appeal, and under s. 35 (I) a revision was filed against the
Order of the Additionaf District Judge. The single Judge
of. the Punjab High Court following a previous dcci,ion of the
same High Court, was of opinion that in assessment as all the
evidence was not considered
i~ was competent for him to
reconsider tlie concurrent findings of the courts below.
.
.
The ..question is whether the High Court in exercise of
its revisional powers is entitled ,to ·re-assess the value of the
evldence and to substitute i~s o;-yh cou~lusions of facts iii place
of those reached by the courts below.
Held, (per ,Sinha, C.]., Hidayatullah and Shah, JJ, that
though s. 35 cif the Delhi' and Ajn\er Rent Control Act is
worded in general terms,
but~ it ,..does not create a right to
have the case re-heard:
The distinction between ap. appeal.and revision is a real
one. A fight to app~al carries with it right of re-hearing
on law as well as fact, unltss the statute conferring the right
to appeal ~imits the re-hearing in scime way. The power
to hear a rcvision .. is~ generallyv given to a superior court so
thaJ.)it may satisfy, itself tha; a particular case decided accordingYto law. The phrase ''according t to law" in s. 35 of the
Act refers to the decision as a whole, and is not tq be eqUated
to e,rror~ of law or of fact simplicitor. All that the .High Court
can see is that these has been no mis'Carriage of justice and that
the decision is according to 18.w in the sense meiltioned.
per Kapur,J.-The power under s. 35 (I) of the Act of
interference by the High Court, is not restricted to a proper
trial according to Jaw or error in regard to onus of proof or
prop~r opportunity of being heard. It is very much wider than
that when in the opinion Of, the .High Court the decision is
erroneous on a question of law which affects
the merits of
the case or deciliion is manifestly unjust the High Court is
entitled to interfere.
Bell and Oo. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj (1938) 40 Bom. LR.
·125 approved.
C1vIL APPELLATE JurusnroTroN: Civil Appeal
No. 94 of 1959.
•
Appeal by speciaJ leave from the judgment
and decree dated May 7, 1957, of the Punjab High
Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in Civil Revision
Application No. 144-D of 1957.
,BiBhanNarain R. M~halingier and B. 0. Misra,
for the appellants.
•
•
(I) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
935
Gurbachan Singh and Harbans Singh, for the
respondent.
1961. December 5. The Judgment of Sinha,
C.J., Hirlayatullah and Shah, JJ., was delivered by
Hidayatullah, J. Kapnr, J. delivered a separate
judgment.
,961
H ari Shankar
••
Rao Girdhari Lil
Chowdiw•y
HIDAYATULLAH, J.-The appellants (in this
Hidayalu/lali J,
appeal by special leave) are the sons of one Gauri
Shankar, who owned a bungalow known as 5, Haily ,
Road, New Delhi. This bungalow was given to the
respondent by Gauri Shankar on a monthly rent of
Rs. 234-6-0, excluding taxes. The suit, out of
which this appeal arises, was brought by the appellants against the respondent, Rao GirdP.ari Lal
Chowdhury, for his eviction on the ground (among
others) that he had sub-let a portion of the bungalow
after the commencement of the Delhi and Ajmer
Rent Control Act, 1952 (38 of 1952) to one, Dr.
Mohani Jain, without obtaining the consent in
writing of the landlord, as required bys. 13(l)(b)(i)
of the Act. The defence was that the original contract of tenancy was entered into sometime in 1940
and a term in the contra.ct gave the tenant a right
to sub-let, It was alleged that a letter written by
the tenant which embodied the terms of the tenancy
was in the possession of the landlord and a demand
was made for its production, The case of the
tenant was that the sub-tenancy commenced in the
year 1951, that is to say' before the passing or the
Act of 1952, and the tenant was not required to
obtain the written consent of the landlord to sublet. Admittedly, in this case, no written consent
was proved. We need not mention the other allegations and counter-allegations which are usual in
proceedings between landlords and tenants, the
most important or them being about the arrears
of rent, which the tenant under permission of the
Court ultimately deposited in Court.
1961
Ho.ri Sleaniar
••
llao Gi,.Jluui Lal
Cltowdhur;·
Hidayatul/ah J.
1136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
Tho issue on which the decisions below have
differed was frnmed by tho ::-ub-Judge, First Class,
Delhi, in the following terms :
"Did the plaintiff consent to the sub-letting
of parts or tho demised premises by the defendant? If so, when and to what effect."
The trial Judge found that there was no evidence that tho landlord was ever consnlt€d before
a portion uf the bungalow was sublet to Dr. MohAni
Jain, and further that tho sub-ttna11cy was crl'ated
after J unc 9, 1952, the dato on which the Act came
into force. In reaching the latter conclusion, the
trial Judge made a reference to a dispute between
the tenant and Dr. Mohani Jain for fixation of
standard rent before the Rent Control authorities.
In those proceedings, Dr. Mohani Jain ha.d alll'ged
that she was living as a sub-tonant from the end of
1951, but the tenant had denied this fact. The
proceedings before the Rent Control authorities
ended in a compromise, but the admission of the
tenant was relied upon to support the conclusion
that the sub-tenancy commenced after the Act.
The trial Judge decreed the suit. The decision of
the trial Judge was confirmed on appeal by tho
Additional District Judge, Delhi.
Though Dr.
Mohani Jain gave oral ovidence in this case that
her sub-tenancy commenced in December 1951, the
Additional District Judge found categorically that
the sub-tenancy commenced sometime after the
coming into force of the Act. He held that even
if Dr. Mohani Jain was living there even from
before it was a guest and not as a sub-tenant.
Against the order of the Additional District
Judge, a revision was filed under s. 35 ( 1) of the
Act. That section reads as follows :
"The High Court may, at any time, call
for the record of any C&Be under this Act for
the purpose of satisfying itself that a decision
,
I
•
'
I ,_
, '
(l) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
937
made therein is according to law e.nd may
pass such order in relation thereto as it thinks
fit."
Acting in accordance with a decision of the
Punjab High Court as to the ambit of this section,
the learned single Judge, who heard the revision
application, thought that it was competent for -him
to reconsider the concurrent findings about the
time when the sub-tenancy commenced. He held
that Dr. ;\fohani Jain's statement showed that the
_ sub-tenancy -commenced prior to the passing of the
Act, and that the landlord's consent in writing was
not necessary. In reaching this conclusion, the
learned Judge was of opinion that all the evidence
was not considered by the two Courts below, and
that he was entitled, in view of the interpretation
placed upon the section above quoted, to go into
the matter afrel'h, and decide the question of fact.
It may be pointed out that while the suit was
pending before the Subordinate Judge, an application was made for the production of the letter referred to in the written statement of the tenant, to
which a passing reference has already been made.
A letter was produced, and it is Ex. D-1. That
letter does not disclose all the terms of the tenancy
and it would appear, therefore, that the terms of
the origins.I tenancy have not been proved in this
case, and there is no material on which it can be
said either way as to whether a right to sublet was
conferred upon the tenant. The defendant did not
insist in the Court of first instance that there was
yet another Jetter, and the argument to that effect
in this Court cannot be entertained.
In reaching the conclusion that all the evidence pertinent to the issue was not considered, the
learned Judge of the High Court stated that Ex.P-19,
which was the petition filed by Dr. Mohani Jain
under e. 8 of the Act to get the standard rent fixed
was not taken into account by the Additional District Judge. That petition contained an averment
1961
Hari Shankar
v.
Rao Girdhari Lal
Chowdhury
Hida,YatuJ/ah J.
1961
Hari Shanl.ar
v.
Rao G ifiiha1 i La'
Chowdlr11.ry
Hidayatullah J.
938 SUPREME COURT REFOR'IS (lll62] SOPP.
that her sub-tenancy commenced on December
l, J951 with a. rent of Rs. 100/· per month, a.nd that
a cheque for Rs. 1,800/· as advance rent for 18
months was given by her in the name of tho
daughter of the tenant, because the tenant represented that he had no aceo1mt in the bank and
therefore a. cheque should be given in the name of
his daughter. This; the learned Judge felt, adequately supported the statement of Dr. Mohani
Jain to the tiamo effect as a witness in this case.
The learned Judge was in error in thinking that
Ex. P-19 was not taken into account by the Additional District Judge. The latter bad, in fact, considered Ex. P-19, thii petition of Dr. Mobani Jain,
before the Rent Control authorities. Ex. P-20, the
reply of the tenant to that petition and Ji:x. P-21,
tho petition of compromi.6e; but be cited Exe. P-20
and P-21 only. Thern is internal eTidenoo to show
tba.t Ex. P-rn wa.s, in fact, considered, because after
mentioning the two Exhibits, the learned Additional
District Judge goes on to say as follows:
'
"The first of these is the written state-
• ·
ment of the present appellant which be had
filed in a case brought by Dr. Mohani Jain
against him for the fixation of fair rent. There
be had completely denied somewhere in the
year 1953 that Dr. Mohani Jain waa his subtenant and could not sue for fixation of rent.
Thia was enough to show that right up to the
year 1953 the appellant himself did not regard
Dr. Mohan~ Jain a.e a sub-tenant."
·.,....
This clearly shows that the le&rned Additional
District Judge was weighing Ex. P-19 as against
Ex. P20 and was aoting on Ex. P-20, which contain·
ed a material admission by the tenant before the
present dispute had begun. The lea.med single Judge
was, therefore, in error in departing from a concurrent finding of fact on a wrong supposition.
• I
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
939
But the question that arises in this appeal is
one deeper than a mere appraisal of the evidence.
It is whether the High Court in the exercise of its
revisional power is entitled to re-assess the value
of the evidence and to substitute its own conclusions
of fact in place of those reached by the Court below.
This question requires an examination of the powers
of revision conferred on the High Court by s. 35 of
the Act. That question is one of common occurrence
in Acts dealing with some special kinds of rights and
remedies to enforce them. Section 35 is undoubtedly worded in general terms, but it does not
create right to have the case reheard, as was supposed by the learned Judge. Section 35 follows s. 34,
where a right of appeal is conferred; but the
second sub-section of that section says that no
second appeal shall lie.
The distinction between an appeal and a
revision is a real one. A right of appeal carries
with it a right of rehearing on law as well as fact,
unless the statute conferring the right of appeal
limits the rehearing ii:J. some way as, we find, has
bet>n done is second appeals arising under the Code
of Civil Procedure. The power to hear a revision
is generally given to a superior Court so that it may
satisfy itself that a particular case has been decided
according to law. Under s. 115 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. the High Court's power a_re limited to
see whether in a case decided, there ·has been an
assumption of jurisdiction where none existed, or a
refusal of jurisdiction where it did, or there has been
material irregularity or illegality in the exercise of
that juriadiction. The right there is confined to
jurisdiction and juri,sdiction alone. In other acts, the
power is not so limited, and the High Court is enabled
to call for the record of a case to satisfy itself that
the decision therein is according to law and to pass
such orders in relation to the case, as it thinks fit.
The phrase "according to law" refers to the
decision a.11 a whole, and is. not to be equated to
1961
HtJTi B~ankar
v.
Rao Girdhari Lal
Oltowdhury
H idayatullah J.
I
i
'
I
19Sl
Hari Shankar
v.
Ra11 Girrlhari Lal
Chowdhury
_
Hidaya!Ullah J.
940
SUPRfilIE COURT REPORTS .(1962] SUPP.
errors of law or of fact simpliciter. It refers to the
overall decision, which must be according to law
which it would not be, if there is a miscarriage of
justice due to a mistake of law.
The section is thus
framed to confer larger powers than 1he power to
-correct error ofjurisdiction to which s.115 is limited.
But it must not be overlooked that the dection-in
spite of its apparent width oflanguage where it confers a power on the High Court to pass such order as
the High Court might think fit-is controlled by the
opening words, where it says that the High Court
may send for the record of the case to satisfy itself
that the decision is "according to law". It stands to
reason that if it was considered necessary that there
should be a rehearing, a right of appeal would be a
more appropriate· remedy,· but the Act says that
there is to be no further appeal.
The section we are dealing with, is almost the
same as a. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts
Act. That section has been considered by the High
Courts in numerous cases and diversi> interpretations have been given. The powers that it is said to
confer would make a broad spectrum commencing,
at one end, with the view that only substantial errors
of Jaw can be corrected under it, and ending, at
the other with a power of interference a little better
than what an appeal giTes. It is useless to discuss
those cases in some of which the observations were
. probably made under compulsion cif certain unusual
· facts. It is sufficient to say that we consider that
the most accurate exposition of the meaning of such
sections is that of Beaumont, C. J. (as he then was}
in Bell & Co. Ltd. v. WamanHemraj('} where the
learned Chief Justice, dealing with s. 25 of the
Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, observed:
"The object of s. 25 is to enable the High
Court to see that there has been no miscarriage
of justice, that the decision was given according to law. The section does not enumerate
(1) (1938) 40 Bom. L. R. 125.
•
•
•
•
•
•
'
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
94J
the cases in which the Court may interfne in
revision, as does s.115 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and I certainly do not propose to
attnmpt an exhaustive definition of the circumstancPs which may justify such interference ;
but instances whi~h readily occnr to the mind
are cases in which the Court which made the
ord1•r had no jurisdiction or in which the Court
has based its decision on evidence which
should not have been admitted, or cas<>s whPre
the unsuccessful party has not been given a
proper opportunity of bPing heard, or the
burden of proof has bc<'n placed on the wrong
shoulders. Wherever the court comes to the
conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not
had a proper trial according to law, then
the Cnurt can interfere. But, in my opinion,
the Court ought not to interfere merely because
it thinks thrtt possibly the ,Judge who heard
the case may have arrived at a conclusion
which the High Court would not have arrived
at.,,
•
1
This observation has our full concurrence,
What the learned Chief Justice has said applies
to s. 35 of the Act, with which we are concerned.
Judgt>d from this point of view, the learned single
Juclge was not justified in interfering wit.h a plan
finding of fact and more so, because he himself
proceeded on a wrong assumption.
The appeal thus surceeds, and is allowed
with costs.
The order under appeal is set aside,
and that of the Additional District Judge restored.
As regards eviction, the respondent has given an
undertaking that he would vacate the house on or
before April 25, 1962, and this has been accepted
by the appellants.
KAPUR J.-I agree that the appeal should be
allowed and that the High Court was in error in
interfering with the findings of fact, but in my
1961
Hari Shankar
"·
Rao (irdha·i Lal
Chou:dhll•)'
HidU;,yrJ/ut/ah .J.
KapurJ.
IHI
Hati Shankar
v.
Rao GirdhMi Lal
Clwwdlw•:1
Kapur J.
942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
opinion the power of reviaion nPder s. 35( I) of the
Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act is not so restricted
as was held hy Beaumont, C. J., in Bell & Co. Ltd.
v. Wam11n Hemmi('), a C'\Se under s. 25 of tha
Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The section
provides that the order passed shoulrl be in accordance with Jaw and if it does not then the High
Court can pass such order as it thinks fit. The language used in s. 35(1) of the Act is almost identical
with the words of the proviso to s. 75(1) of the
Provincial Insolvency Act.
The power under that
proviso has heen thus commented upon by Mulla
in his Law of Insolvency at page 787 of 2nd
Edition:
"The power given to the High Court by
this proviso is very wide.
In the exercise of
this power the High Court may set aside any
order if it is not 'according to law'."
The power under the Insolvency Act has not, hy the
Courts in India, been considered to be no restricted
as the observations of Beaumont, C. J. in Rell & Co.
Ltd. v. WamanHemraJ(') seem to suggest. in regard
to s. 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act. This power
of interference by the High Court is not, in my
opinion, restricted to proper trial according to law
or error in regard to onus of proof or proper
opportunity of being heard. It is very much wider
than that. When, in the opinion of the High Court,
the decision is erroneous on a question or Jaw whioh
e.ffocts the merits of the ca..qe or decision is Tl'anifestly unjust the High Court is entitled to interfere.
The error ma.y not necessarily be as to the interpretation of a. provision of la.w, it may be in rnuard
to evidence on the record. Thus when material
evidence on the record is ignored or a finding is such
tha.t on the evidence taken a.s a whole no tribunal
could, a.s a matter of legitimate inference arrive a.t.
rt is neither possible nor desira.ble to enumerate all
(I) [1938) 4-0 llom. L. R. 125.
I
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I
/"-
l .
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11. I
(I) S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
943
cases which would fall within the jurisdiction of
the High Court under s. 35(1) of the Act but it is not
to be narrowly interpreted nor to be so widely
interpreted as to convert the revision into an appeal
OD facts.
Appeal allow~.
SATISH CHURAN LAW
!),
H.K.GANGULY
(B. P. SINHA, C.J., J. L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH,
J.C. SHAH and J. R. MuDHOT.KAR, JJ.)
Company Law-Winding uir-Examinntion ~f •x-Director-Applicatian of Liquidator accompanied by •igned •tatement-Ex parte ordtr-Modijication or vacating of-Right to
insptct statement filed by Liquidator-Whether statement confidtntial-(Jompaniea Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), •· 477-0ompani"
(Oourt) Rules, 1959, "· 243, 244 and 249.
A company was ordered by the High Court of Calcutta
to be wound up. The Official Liquidator submitted an application accompanied by a signed statement for an order that
the appellant, an ex-director of the company, be examined
concerning the affairs of the company under s. 4 77 Companies
Act, 1956, and that he be ordered to produce certain records.
The application was granted ex-parte. The appellant applied
for an order vacating or modifying of the order and for supplying copies of or facility for inspection of all documents including
the signed statement of the Liquidator. The Company Judge
rejected the application holding that the ex-parte order wa1
final and he had no power to review it and that the appellant
was not entitled to a copy of or to in•pect the signed statement
of the liquidator. On appeal Court held that the application
to modify or vacate the order was maintainable, but in the
circumstances of the case the Court held that the order was
"desirable and necessary" and that the appellant was not
entitled to an inspection of the signed statement of the
liquidator.
Held, that the ex-parte order was not final and it was
open to the Company Judge to modify or vacate. it on the
ground that it had been obtained without placing all the
requisite materials before the court or by ·mis-statement of
1961
Hari Shanlcat
v.
Rao Girdhari Uil
Chowdhury
Kapur J,
1961
Decemhtr 6