# HARNAM DAS v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

- **Citation:** [1962] 2 S.C.R. 487
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 74 of 1961
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. c. DAS GUPTA, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/harnam-das-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-2268
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

High Court, Powers of-Forfeiture of seditious publicationsOrder passed by Government-Application to High Court to set aside
order-Grounds of opinion not stated in order- Order, if liable to
be set aside-Code of Criminal Procedure, r898 (Act V of r898),
SS. 99A, 99B, 99C, 99D.
The respondent passed an order under s. 99A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure forfeiting two books written by the appellant as in its opinion they contained matter the publication of
which was punishable under s. l53A and 295A of the Indian
Penal Code. The order did not state the grounds on which
the respondent had formed this opinion as was required by
s. 99A. The appellant applied to the High Court under s. 99B
of the Code to set aside the order. Section 99D of the Code provided that the High Court shall set aside the order of forfeiture
if it was not satisfied that the book contained seditious or other
matter of such a nature as was referred to in sub-s. (r) of s. 99A.
The High Court was of the view that it could not set aside the
order under s. 99D for the reason that the order did not set out
the grounds on which the. Government had formed its opinion
and that its duty was only to see whether the books in fact
came within the mischief of the offence charged. Upon examining the books for itself the High Court came to the conclusion
that their contents were obnoxious and highly objectionable and
dismissed the application.
Held (Per Gajendragadkar, Sarkar, Wanchoo and Ayyangar, JJ. Das Gupta, J. contra) that on the failure of the respondent to set out the grounds of its opinion as required bys. 99A
of the Code the High Court should have set aside the order under
s. 99D. It is the duty of the High Court under that section to
set aside the order of forfeiture if it is not satisfied that the
grounds on which the Government formed its opinion could
justify that opinion.
Where no grounds of its opinion are given
at all the High Court must set aside the order for it cannot then
be satisfied that the grounds given by the Government justified
the order.
Arun Ranjan Ghose v. State of West Bengal, (1955) 59 C.W.N.
495, approved.
Premi Khem Raj v. Chief Secretary, A.LR. (1951) Raj. rr3,
N. Veerabrahmam v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.LR. (1959) A. Pr.
572 and Baba Khalil Ahmed v. State of U. P., A.LR. (1960) All,
715, disapproved.
488
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962)
196r
Per Das Gupta, ].-The High Court had no power to set
aside the order on the ground of failure of the Government to
Harnam Das
set out the grounds of its opinion in the order. The duty cast on
v.
the High Court is not to see whether the grounds stated by the
State of
Government for forming its opinion are correct but to see wheUttar Pradesh ther the opinion formed is correct; this can only be done by
examining the books. Section 99B has limited the grounds on
which relief can be asked for to one and one only, viz., that the
books do not contain any objectionable matter. It was not
permissible for courts to add to that grounrl.
Sarkar].
Baijnath v. Emperor, A.LR. (1925) All. 195, Premi Khem Raj
v. Chief Secretary, A.LR. (1951) Raj. rr3, N:Veerabrahmam v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I. I<. 1959 A. J;'r. 572 and Baba Khalil
Ahmed v. State of U. P., A.LR. (1960) All. 715, approved.
Arun Ranjan Ghose v. The State of West Bengal, (1959) 59
C.W.N. 495, disapproved.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 74 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated May 7, 1957, of the Allahabad High Court
in Criminal Misc. No. 2006 of 1953.
Veda Vyas, S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, for the
appellant.
G. C. Mathur and 0. P. Lal, for the respondent.
1961. April 27. The Judgment of Gajendragadkar,
Sarkar, Wanchoo and Ayyangar, JJ., was delivered
by Sarkar, J. Das Gupta, J., delivered a separate
Judgment.
SARKAR, J.-The only question that was argued in
this appeal is substantially one of construction of
s. 99D of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The appellant was the author of two books in
Hindi c

## Text

2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
487
HARNAM DAS
v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS GUPTA
and N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)
High Court, Powers of-Forfeiture of seditious publicationsOrder passed by Government-Application to High Court to set aside
order-Grounds of opinion not stated in order- Order, if liable to
be set aside-Code of Criminal Procedure, r898 (Act V of r898),
SS. 99A, 99B, 99C, 99D.
The respondent passed an order under s. 99A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure forfeiting two books written by the appellant as in its opinion they contained matter the publication of
which was punishable under s. l53A and 295A of the Indian
Penal Code. The order did not state the grounds on which
the respondent had formed this opinion as was required by
s. 99A. The appellant applied to the High Court under s. 99B
of the Code to set aside the order. Section 99D of the Code provided that the High Court shall set aside the order of forfeiture
if it was not satisfied that the book contained seditious or other
matter of such a nature as was referred to in sub-s. (r) of s. 99A.
The High Court was of the view that it could not set aside the
order under s. 99D for the reason that the order did not set out
the grounds on which the. Government had formed its opinion
and that its duty was only to see whether the books in fact
came within the mischief of the offence charged. Upon examining the books for itself the High Court came to the conclusion
that their contents were obnoxious and highly objectionable and
dismissed the application.
Held (Per Gajendragadkar, Sarkar, Wanchoo and Ayyangar, JJ. Das Gupta, J. contra) that on the failure of the respondent to set out the grounds of its opinion as required bys. 99A
of the Code the High Court should have set aside the order under
s. 99D. It is the duty of the High Court under that section to
set aside the order of forfeiture if it is not satisfied that the
grounds on which the Government formed its opinion could
justify that opinion.
Where no grounds of its opinion are given
at all the High Court must set aside the order for it cannot then
be satisfied that the grounds given by the Government justified
the order.
Arun Ranjan Ghose v. State of West Bengal, (1955) 59 C.W.N.
495, approved.
Premi Khem Raj v. Chief Secretary, A.LR. (1951) Raj. rr3,
N. Veerabrahmam v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.LR. (1959) A. Pr.
572 and Baba Khalil Ahmed v. State of U. P., A.LR. (1960) All,
715, disapproved.
488
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962)
196r
Per Das Gupta, ].-The High Court had no power to set
aside the order on the ground of failure of the Government to
Harnam Das
set out the grounds of its opinion in the order. The duty cast on
v.
the High Court is not to see whether the grounds stated by the
State of
Government for forming its opinion are correct but to see wheUttar Pradesh ther the opinion formed is correct; this can only be done by
examining the books. Section 99B has limited the grounds on
which relief can be asked for to one and one only, viz., that the
books do not contain any objectionable matter. It was not
permissible for courts to add to that grounrl.
Sarkar].
Baijnath v. Emperor, A.LR. (1925) All. 195, Premi Khem Raj
v. Chief Secretary, A.LR. (1951) Raj. rr3, N:Veerabrahmam v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I. I<. 1959 A. J;'r. 572 and Baba Khalil
Ahmed v. State of U. P., A.LR. (1960) All. 715, approved.
Arun Ranjan Ghose v. The State of West Bengal, (1959) 59
C.W.N. 495, disapproved.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 74 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated May 7, 1957, of the Allahabad High Court
in Criminal Misc. No. 2006 of 1953.
Veda Vyas, S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, for the
appellant.
G. C. Mathur and 0. P. Lal, for the respondent.
1961. April 27. The Judgment of Gajendragadkar,
Sarkar, Wanchoo and Ayyangar, JJ., was delivered
by Sarkar, J. Das Gupta, J., delivered a separate
Judgment.
SARKAR, J.-The only question that was argued in
this appeal is substantially one of construction of
s. 99D of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The appellant was the author of two books in
Hindi called Sikh Mat Khandan Part 1 and Bhoomika
Nazam Sikh Mat Khandan which he had published
in April 1953. On July 30, 1953, the Government of
Uttar Pradesh, the respondent in this appeal, made
an order under s. 99A of that Code forfeiting these
books which were thereupon seized and taken away.
That order, so far as material, was in the following
terms: "In exercise of its powers conferred by sectiori
99A of the Code of Criminal Procedure ......... the
2 s.c.R. SUPHEME COURT l'tEPORTt:>
489
Government is pleased to declare the books ......... forfeited to Government on the ground that the said
books contain matter, the publicatfon of which is
punishable under section 153-A and 295-A of the
Indian Penal Code." It is the validity of this order
that is challenged in the present appeal.
Section 99A under which the order was made, so
far as relevant, is in these terms:
"Where any newspaper, or book ...... or any document ......... appears to the State Government to
contain any seditious matter or any matter which
promotes or is intended to promote feelings of
enmity or hatred between different classes of the
citizens of India or which is deliberately i.nd
maliciously intended to outrage the religious feelings of any such class by insulting the religion or
the religious belief of that class, that is to say, any
matter the publication of which is punishable under
section 124A or section 153A or section 295A of the
Indian Penal Code, the State Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette stating the
grounds of its opinion, declare ......... every copy of
such book ...... to be forfeited to Government.. .... "
Two things appear clearly from the terms of this
section. The first thing is that an order under it can
be made only when the Government forms a certain
opinion. That opinion is that the document concerning which the order is proposed to be made, contains
"any matter the publication of which is punishable
under section 124A or section 153A or section 295A
of the Penal Code." Section 124A deals with seditious
matters, s. ! 53A with matters promoting enmity between different classes of Indian citizens and s. 295A
with matters insulting the religion or religious beliefs
of any class of such citizens. The other thing that
appears from the section is that the Government has
to state the grounds of its opinion. The order made
in this case, no doubt, stated that in the Government's
opiniori the books contained matters the publication
of which was punishable under ss. 153A and 295A of
the Penal Code. It did not, however, state, as it
should have, the grounds of that opinion. So it is
Harna111 Das
v
State of
U ttar J-lradesh
sa~kar 1.
Harnani Das
v.
State of
UJtar. Pradesh
Sarkar ].
490
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
not. known which communities were alienated from
each other or whose religious beliefs had been wounded according to the Government, nor why the Government thought that such alienation or offence to religion
had been caused.
Now s. 99B gives the person interested in the
books, or documents forfeited, a right to apply to the
High Court to set aside the order made under s. 99A,
and s. 99D specifies the High Court's duty on such an
application being made to it. These two sections will
have to be especially considered in this case and so
they along with s. 99C, are set out below.
S. 99B. Any person having any interest in any
newspa.per, book or other document, in respect of
which an order of forfeiture has been made under
section 99A, may, within two months from the
date of such order, apply to the High Court to set
aside such order on the ground that the issue of the
newspaper, or the book or other document, in
respect of which the order was made, did not contain any seditious or other matter of such a nature
as is referred to in sub-section (1) of section 99A.
S. 990. Every such application shall be heard
and determined by a Special Bench of the High
Court composed of three Judges.
S. 99D. (1) On receipt of the application, the
Special Bench shall, if it is not satisfied that the
issue of the newspaper, or the book or other document, in respect of which the application has been
made, contained seditious or other matter of such a
nature as is referred to in sub-section (1) of section
99A, set aside the order of forfeiture.
We think it fairly clear from these sections that the
ground on which an application can be made under
s. 99B is the ground which, if established, would
require the High Court to set aside the order under
s. 99D.
The appellant had moved the High Court at
Allahabad under s. 99B to set aside the order of forfeiture of his books. It seems to have been contended
in the High Court that the order of forfeiture should
be set aside on the ground that the grounds of the
l-
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
491
Government's opinion had not been stated. With
regard to this contention, the High Court observed,
"The requirement to state the ground is mandatory.
A mere citation of words of the section will not do.
But as has been held by a Special Bench of this Court
in Baijnath v. Emperor (A.LR. 1925 All. 195), with
which we respectfully agree, the High Court in view of
the provisions of s. 99D of the Code of Criminal Procedure is precluded from considering any other point
than the question whether in fact the document comes
within the mischief of the offence charged." In this
view of the matter the High Court refused to set aside
the order on account of the omission to state the
grounds of the opinion. The High Court then proceeded to examine the books for itself and found that
their contents were "obnoxious and highly objectionable" and dismissed the application observing that the
appellant had "entirely failed to show that the books
did not contain matters which promoted feelings of
enmity and hatred between different classes, or which
did not (sic) insult or attempt to insult the religion or
religious beliefs of the Sikhs''. The present appeal
arises out of this order of the High Court.
The High Court was of the view that its duty under
s. 99D was only to see "whether in fact the document
comes within the mischief of the offence charged''. It
thought that a document would be within the mischief
of the offence charged if, in its own opinion, it contained matters the publication of which would be
punishable under either s. 124A, or s. 153A or s. 295A
of the Penal Code as mentioned in the order of forfeiture, irrespective of the Government's opinion on the
matter. Otherwise, it seems to us, the High Court
could not uphold the order for the reason that in its
view the books offended the Sikhs and the Sikh religion in spite of the fact that there is nothing to show
that the Government thought that the books had that
effect. The same view appears to have been taken in
certain other cases, namely, Premi Khem Raj v. Chief
Secretary('), N. Veerabrahmam v. State of Andhra
Pradesh(') and Baba Khalil Ahmed v. State of U.P. (').
(1) A.I.R. (1951) Raj. 113.
(2) A.l.R. (1959) A,P. 572.
(3) A.I.R. (196o) AU. 71~.
Harnani Das
v.
State of
U !tar Pradesh
Sarkar j.
r96r
lfar11an1 J)as
v.
State of
Uttar Pradesh
Sar/air J.
492
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
Apparently, it was thought in these CP.ses that the
words "if it is not satisfied that ......... the book ........ .
contained seditious or other matter of such a nature
as is referred to in sub-section (I) of section 99A" in
s. 99D meant, not so satisfied for any reason whatsoever irrespective of the reasons on which the Government formed its opinion about it.
We arc unable to
accept this constrnction of s. 99D.
The question is what do the words "matter of such
a nature as is referred to in sub-section (I) of section 99A" appearing in s. 99D mean'/ Do they mean
any matter of that nature as the High Court thought?
Or do they mean only those on which the order of forfeiture was based, that is, those which for the reasons
stated by it, the Government thought were punishable
under one or more of sections 124A, 153A and 295A
of the Penal Code mentioned by it? It seems to us
that the latter is the correct view and follows inevitably if ss. 99A, 99l3 and 99D are read together, as
they must.
Now s. 99D is concerned with setting aside an order.
That order is one made under s. 99A. An order under
that section can be made only when certain things
have appeared to the Government and the Government has formed a certain opinion. The section further requires the Government to state the grounds of
its opinion. It is this order, that is, the order based
on the grounds stated, which the party affected has
been given by s. 99B the right to move the High Court
to set aside. It would follow that all that s. 99B can
require the party to do is to show thrit that order was
improper.
Whether that order was proper or not
would, of comse, depend only on the merits of the
grounds on which it was based; whether another order
to the same effect could havo been made on other
grounds is irrelevant, for that would not show the
validity of the order actua.lly made; that order would
be bad if the grounds on which it is made do not support it. Two orde:rs, though both saying that a publication contains matter which offends the same section
of the Penal Code cannot be the same or an identical
order if the reasons why they are considered so to
' '
!--
,_
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
493
offend the section of the Penal Code concerned are
different. Nows. 99B says that a person affected by
the order may move the High Court to set it aside on
the ground that the book "did not contain any seditious or other matter of such a nature as is referred to
in sub-section (1) of section 99A". The matter mentioned here must, for the reasons stated, refer only to
such matter on which for the grounds stated by it, the
Government's opinion has been based.
We proceed now to s. 990. It is concerned with
the same order of forfeiture.
An order contemplated
bys. 99D is made on an application under s. 99B.
That order must therefore accept or reject the grounds
on which the application under s. 99B was made.
These grounds, as we have seen, are confined to challenging th" propriety of the grounds on which the
Government's opinion resulting in the order, was
based. The words which we have earlier quoted
from s. 99B occur substan·~,ally in the same form in
s. 99D.
The scope of the two sections is identical.
The common words occurring in them must, therefore,
have the same meaning in both. They must hence,
in s. 99D also mean such matters on which for the
grounds stated by it the Government's opinion was
based. They cannot mean, as the High Court thought,
any matter whatsoever, irrespective of the Government's reasons for making the order, which in the
High Court's opinion would have justified it.
This view of the matter also explains why s. 99A
requires the Government to state the grounds of its
opinion.
The reason was to enable the High Court
to set aside the order of forfeiture if it was not satisfied of the propriety of those grounds. If it were not
so, the grounds of the Government's opinion would
serve no purpose at all. This would specially be so
as s. 99G provides that an order of forfeiture cannot
be called in question except in accordance with the
provisions of s. 99B. If the order could be upheld,
as the High Court seems to have thought, on grounds
other than those on which the Government based its
opinion, there would have been no need to provide
63
Harnam Das
v.
State of
Uttar Pradesh
Sarkar ].
Ha1nGm Das
v.
State of
Uttar Pradesh
Sarkar ].
494
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
that the grounds of the Government's opinion should
be stated; such grounds would then have been wholly
irrelevant in judging the validity of the order.
The acceptance of the interpretation put by the
High Court would lead to a result which, in our view,
would be wholly anomalous. The order of forfeiture
with which s. 99D is concerned is indisputably an
order under s. 99A. Now, an order under that section is essentially an order of the Government and of
no one else. Take a case where the Government making the order states the grounds of its opinion on
which the order is based. Suppose the Government
says that the expression of view A in the book concerned offends the religious beliefs of community X.
Now assume that in an application made to set it
aside, the High Court was not satisfied that view A
could offend community X hut thought that another
expression of view in the same book which we will
call B, offended the religious beliefs of a. different community, say community Y. If in such a case the
High Court upheld the order, which, if the view of the
Court below is right, it could do, there would really
be an order of forfeiture made by the High Court and
not by the Government, because.the Government in
stating the grounds of its opinion had not, since it
did not say so, thought that view B could offend the
religious beliefs of community Y. We think it impossible that the sections concerned contemplated such
a result; the Code now here provides for an order of
forfeiture being made by the High Court. We are,
therefore, of opinion that under s. 99D it is the duty
of the High Court to set aside an order of forfeiture
if it is not satisfied that the grounds on which the
Government formed its opinion that the books contained matters the publication of which would be
punishable under any one or more of ss. 124A, l53A
or 295A of the Penal Code could justify that opinion.
It is not its duty to do more and to find for itself
whether the book contained any such matter whatsoever.
What then is to happen when the Government did
not state the grounds of its opinion? In such a case
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
495
if the High Court upheld the order, it may be that it
would have done so for reasons which the Government
did not have in contemplation at all. If the High
Court did that, it would really have made an order of
forfeiture itself and not upheld such an order made
by the Government. This, as already stated, the
High Court has no power to do under s. 99D. It
seems clear to us, therefore, that in such a case the
High Court must set aside the order under s. 99D, for
it cannot then be satisfied that the grounds given by
the Government justified the order. You cannot be
satisfied about a thing which you do not know. This
is the view that was taken in Arun Ranjan Ghose v.
State of West Bengal(') and we are in complete agreement with it. The present is a case of this kind. We
think that it was the duty of the High Court under
s. 99D to set aside the order of forfeiture made in this
case.
We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the
Government's order of forfeiture dated July 30, 1953.
The appellant will be entitled to a return of all books,
documents and things seized under that order.
DAS GUPTA, J.-By a notification dated July 30,
1953 the Lttar Pradesh Government acting under
s. 99A of the Code of Criminal Procedure declared
the books "Sikh Mat Khandan, Part I" and "Bhoomika Nazam Sikh Mat Khandan" which had been
published by the appellant Harnam Das in April
1953, forfeited to government on the ground that
these books contained matters the publication of
which was punishable under s. 153A and 295A of the
Indian Penal Code.
The High Court held on an
examination of the books that they clearly came
within the mischief of s. 153A and s. 295A of the
Indian Penal Code. Accordingly it held that the order
of the State Government forfeiting the two books was
eminently just and proper and in that view dismissed
the application.
One argument appears to have been raised that the
order of forfeiture should be set aside as the notification by which the government made the declaration
<•> (1955> 59 c.w.N. 495.
Harnam Das
v.
State of
U ttar Pradesh
Sarkar ].
Das Gupta].
zy61
Ha:tnam Das
v.
State of
Uttar Pradesh
Das Gupta ].
496
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
of forfeiture did not state the grounds of the government's opinion as required by s. 99A. The High
Court rejected this argument being of opinion that in
view of the provisions of s. 99D of the Code of Criminal Procedure the High Court was "precluded from
consideration of any other point than the question
whether in fact the document comes within the mischief of the offence charged."
It is quite clear that the government notification
did not state the grounds of the opinion formed by
the government that these documents contained matters the publication of which was punishable under
s. 153A and s. 295A of the Indian Penal Code.
The
question raised before us is whether the High Court
was right in rejecting the argument that the order of
forfeiture should be set aside on the ground that
grounds of the government's opinion were not stated
in the government notification as required by s. 99A.
The view which prevailed with the learned judges in
respect of this question was in accord with what had
been held by the same High Court in an earlier case
of Baijnath v. Emperor(') and by the Rajasthan High
Court in Premi Khem Raj v. Chief Secretary('). The
same view has later on been taken by the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in N. Veerabrahmam v. State of
Andhra Pradesh(') and by the Allahabad High Court
in a later decision in Baba Khalil Ahmad v. State of
U. P. ('). A contrary view appears to have been
taken by the Calcutta High Court in Arun Ranjan
Ghose v. The State of West Bengal(').
The material portion of s. 99A is in these words:-
"Where any newspaper, or book ...... or any document ...... appears to the Government to contain any
seditious matter or any matter which promotes or
is intended to promote feelings of enmity or hatred
between different classes of the citizens of India or
which is deliberately and maliciously intended to
outrage the religious feelings of any such class by
insulting the religion or the religious belief of that .
(1) A.I.R. (r925) All. 195.
(2) A.I.R. (19<1) Raj. 113.
(3) A.I.R. (r959) An. Pr. 57'-
(4) A.J.R. (1960) AIL 715.
(5) (1955) 59 C.W.N. 495·
!•
i
\_
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
497
class, that is to say, any matter the publication of
which is punishable under section 124A or section
153A or section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, the
State Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette stating the grounds of its opinion, declare
...... every copy of such book ...... to be forfeited to
the government."
It is clear therefore that before any government
makes a declaration forfeiting a book under the provisions of this section it has first to be of opinion that
the book does contain a matter the publication of
which is punishable under s. 124A or s. 153A or
s. 295A of the Indian Penal Code. Once it forms such
an opinion the government has the power to declare
the book forfeited.
The section requires that this
must be done by a notification in the official gazette
and in that notification the government is required to
state the grounds on which it formed the opinion.
The legislature however did not make such an order
made by the government immune from any attack.
In s. 99B it has provided the means by which the
aggrieved person may obtain relief against the order
if in fact the government was wrong in its opinion and
the book did not contain a matter the publication of
which is punishable under s. 124A, or s. 153A or
s. 295A of the Indian Penal Code. Section 99B runs
thus:-
" Any person having any interest in any newspaper, book or other document, in respect of which
an order of forfeiture has been made under s. 99A,
may, within two months from the date of such
order, apply to tho High Court to set aside such
order on the ground that the issue of the newspaper, or the book or other document, in respect of
which the order was made, did not contain anv
seditious or other matter of such a nature as fo
referred to in sub-section (1) of s. 99A."
Section 99D provides that if after hearing the
application tho High Court is not satisfied that the
issue of the document in question contains any seditious matter or any other matter referred to in s. 99A,
that is to say, any matter the publication of which is
11;6 r
Harnam Das
v.
Stale of
UJ!tn I'radesh
Das Gupta ].
r961
Harnam Das
v.
State of
U ttar }'radesh
Das Gupta].
498
SUPREME COURT liEPORTS
[1962]
punishable under s. 124A or s. 153A or s. 295A of the
Indian Penal Code the High Court shall set aside the
order of forfeiture. The necessary result of the provision also is that if the High Court is satisfied that
the book in question contains matter the publication
of which is punishable under s. 124A or s. 153A or
s. 295A of the Indian Penal Code, tL High Court will
refuse. to set aside the order of forfeiture.
It has to be noticed that s. 99B in providing for
relief to a person aggrieved by an order of forfeiture
has limited the grounds on which relief can be applied
for to one and one only, viz., that the issue of the
newspaper, or the book or other document, in respect
of which the order was made, does not contain any
seditious matter or other matter of such a nature as is
referred to in sub-section (1) of s. 99A.
The appellant's contention that the High Court
should also examine the notification to find out whether the government had stated the grounds of its
own opinion as required by s. 99A and set aside the
order of forfeiture if it finds that this requirement has
not been fulfilled seeks to add an additional ground on
which an application can be made under s. 99B and
relief can be given by the High Court under s. 99D.
The question is: Can that be donE>? It is well to recognise thaf just as a right of appeal is a creature of
statute the right to apply for setting aside an orderwhich is really in the nature of an appeal-is equally
a creature of statute and when the legislature creates
such a right by a statute it may at its option make the
right unlimited or may limit it in any manner it likes.
It is settled law that no Court can add to or enlarge
the grounds for appeal as laid down in the statute
creating the appeal.
The position is exactly the same when the statute creates a right to seek relief by way of application and no court can add to the grounds on which
relief can be sought if the statute creating the right
to obtain relief is limited to one or more specified
grounds. It is interesting to remember in this connection the right to apply for review granted by 0. 47
r. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. After specifying
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
499
some grounds on which a review can be applied for,
the legislature added a further ground in the words
"for any other sufficient reason". The proper interpretation of these words "for any other sufficient
reason" has engaged the anxious consideration of the
courts and in 1922 the Privy Council after a review of
the numerous cases laid down the rule that "for any
other sufficient reason" means a reason sufficient on
grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately previously. If the correct position had been
that the court might add to the ground for a review
whenever it thought fit., all the discussion as regards
the interpretation of "for any other sufficient reason"
would have been meaningless and unnecessary.
Indeed the position in law that the courts cannot
add to the grounds to which the legislature has limited
the right of relief is so very clear and unassailable
that the learned counsel for the appellant did not like
to suggest that a ground can be added. To overcome
this difficulty that the courts cannot add to the
grounds of relief specified in s. 99B and s. 99D, an ingenious argument has been put forward that in order
that the High Court can give proper relief on the very
ground mentioned in s. 99B and s. 99D it is essential
that the government's order should state the grounds
of its opinion. The steps of the argument may
shortly be stated thus:-The government has formed
an opinion.
The High Court has to see that that
opinion is correct. In order to do this the High Court
must know what weighed with the government in
coming to its opinion. Therefore, without the grounds
of the Government's opinion the High Court cannot
be satisfied within the meaning of s. 99D that the
issue of the newspaper contained the matter complained of.
The fallacy of this syllogistic process is in the unsoundness of the premises that in order to determine
whether the government's opinion is correct or not the
High Court must know what weighed with the government.
When the application is heard by the High
Court and it has to come to a conclusion whether it is
or it is not satisfied that the issue of the newspaper,
196I
T-iarnatn Das
v.
Slate of
Uttar Pradesh
Das Gupta ].
I96I
Harnam Das
v.
State of
l.Jttar Pradesh
Das Gupta ].
500
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
or the book or other document does contain a matter
mentioned ins. 99A, the one and only way of coming
to a conclusion appears to me to be to read the newspaper, or the book or other document. Arguments of
counsel might be of assistance; if the government has
stated its grounds for coming to its opinion, that
would also help; but the ultimate responsibility of
deciding whether or not to be satisfied that the issue
of newspaper contains matters as mentioned in s. 99A
can only be discharged by the High Court by reading
the document in question.
It has been suggested that whens. 99B ands. 99D
uses the words "any seditious or other matter of
such a nature as is referred to in sub-s. (1) of s. 99A",
they mean only those matters on which the Government based the order of forfeiture; so it is urged, unless the Government stated the ground of its opinion,
it will be impossible for the Court to decide the question under s. 99D.
I confess I do not think it reasonably possible to
conceive of a case, where an order under section 99A
will not mention the particular matter referred to in
s. 99A. (1) The mention of the particular matter out
of the several matters referred to in section 99A
which in its opinion is contained in the document does
not however involve the statement of reasons for
forming the opinion. Suppose a Government states
that in its opinion the document contains seditious
matters. It does not cease to be a complete statement
on this point merely because the reason for forming
the opinion are not also stated. The formation of the
opinion that one or more of the matters referred to in
the section are contained in a document and the statement that such an opinion has been formed are quite
distinct from the statement of the reasons for forming
the opinion. It appears to me clear that where, as in
the present case the Government order contains a
statement of the particular matter or matters out of
the several matters, referred to in s. 99A, viz., any
seditious matter or any matter which promotes or is
intended to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of the citizens of India or
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
501
which is deliberately and maliciously intended to outrage the religious feelings of any such class by insulting the religion or the religious beliefs of that class,
that is to say, any matter the publication of which is
punishable under section 124A or section 153A or section 295A of the Indian Penal Code" which in its
opinion the document contains, no difficulty can
possibly arise from the fact that the Court has not got
before it Government's grounds for forming such
opinion.
But, asks the appellant, why was it necessary then
for the legislature to require in s. 99A that the
Government should state the grounds of its opinion
when notifying the order of forfeiture? The real
reason, it is urged, was to enable the High Court to
set aside the order of forfeiture if it was not satisfied
of the propriety of those grounds, and necessarily also
when no grounds were stated. If that were correct,
it was reasonable to expect the legislature to make the
necessary provision in s. 99B that an order could be
challenged on the ground that the grounds of the
opinion were not stated, and consequential provisions
in s. 99D.
I can see no justification for reading into
these sections-section 99A and section 99D-words
which are not there, in an attempt to understand
why s. 99A contains such a requirement for statement
of grounds of the opinion. There can be no doubt
that this is a very salutary provision that Government should record the grounds of its opinion. Such
a provision diminishes the risk of government making
an arbitrary order of forfeiture. It was therefore a
question of legislative policy for the legislature to
require that the government should state its opinion.
To say that there coud have been no reason for including such a requirement in s. 99A unless the legislature intended the High Court to interfere if grounds
of the opinion were not stated, is, in my opinion,
wholly unjustified.
It seems clear to me that the duty cast by section
99D on the judges of the High Court is not to see
whether in a particular case the grounds stated by
64
Harnam Das
v.
State of
Uttar Pradesh
Das Gupta J.
JI atna1n Das
v.
State of
U ttar Pradesh
Das Guptri ].
502
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
the government for forming its opinion are correct,
but to see whether the opinion formed was correct.
To perform this.duty the one and the only way is to
examine the document which in the. Government's
opinion contains thu matter complained of.
The lj.rgument that the High Court is not in a position to perform this duty under s' 99D satisfa"ctorily
in the abs~nce of a statement by the government of
the grounds of its opinion appears to me therefore
wholly unsound.
In this very case, the learned judges of the High
Court of Allahabad felt no difficulty in coming to a
conclusion on the question before them even though
the government had not stated the grounds of its
opinion. I fail to see any justification for imagining
difficulties where there are none.
I have therefore come to the conclusion that the
High Court was right in rejecting the argument that
the order of forfeiture should be set aside on the
ground that the notification did not state government's grounds for forming the opinion.
The appeal should therefore be dismissed.
BY COURT:-In view of the opinion of the majority,
this appeal will be allowed and the order of the High
Court, set aside. The appellant will be entitled to the
return of all the books, documents and other things
seized from him under the order now set aside.
He
will also be entitled to the refund of expenses and
costs that he had to pay under the order of the High
Court.