# HASAN NURA!"I MALAK v. ASSISTANT CHARITY COMMISSIONER, NAGPUR & ORS

- **Citation:** [1967] 1 S.C.R. 110
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1966-08-22
- **Case number:** Special Civil Application No. 380 of 1962
- **Bench:** K. Subba Rao
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/hasan-nura-i-malak-v-assistant-charity-commissioner-nagpur-ors-3899
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

A1'D J. M. SHELAT, J.]
Madhya Pradesh Public Tru.is Act (30 of 1951), ss. 5, 6, 7 and 8
-Scope of -Registrar after enquiry recording finding a trust 1101 u publ":
tnLS't-W hether required to make entry of ntgative (u1ding ;,, reRhtcr of
p11blic trusrs---Effect on right to file :ruir under •· 8 to set a<ide findingRepea/ of Act 30 of 1951 in application ro Vidhurbha area by am...,dtd
Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, s. 86--Sal'ing clauses in s. 86(3)-
EOect o/-Ji'hetl1er freslr enquiry to de1ern1i11e if
trurt a public
tru.tt
comp~tent.
Jn October 1953 upon an applicati<>n made under>. 5 of the Madhya
Pradesh Public Trus.i. Act, 30 of 1951, the Registrar
!>old an enquiry
on the question Wliether particular trust founded in 1891 in Nagpur in
the Vidharbha area of .the State, of which the properties were in
the
possession of and managed by the appellant, wa., a public trust.
On thll
conclusion of the inquiry, in accordance v.·ith s. 6 of the Act, he rec.:>rded
a finding in November 1955 that the trust in question was not a public
trust.
Howe\'er, the Registrar did not, as required by s. 7 of the Act,
came an entry of this finding to be made in the register maintained by him
under the Act.
On No>'<'mbcr I, 1956, as a result of the reorganisation of States, the
Vidbarbha area was merged in the then Bombay State.
The Bombay
Lqislature thereafter paMed the Bombay Public Trusts (Unillcation Biid
Amendment) Act, 1959 (6 of 1960) and bv a notification dated Febru·
ary I, 1961, pas<ed thereunder, the Bombay
Public Trust Act.
1950.
was extended to the Vidharbha area.
By •· 86 sub-ss. (I) and (2) of
the Bombay Act of 1950 inducted into that Act by Bombay Act 6
of 1960, ·the M.P. Act wa< repealed and the sa\ing provi•ions C"'1tained
in els. (a), (b) and (c) in s. 86(3) pro!ected. in!tr a/la,
anything
done, any rights etc. accn1ell <ind any Jeg:i1 procced.!ngs pending under
the repealed Act.
On March 2, 1962. Respondents 2 to 5 filed an
application under s. 19 of the Bombay Act before the Assistant Charitv
CommissioneT for an enquiry as to whethe' the said trust waa a public
trust.
Tho appellant contended that since the trust wu already declared
not to be a 11uhlic trust under the M.P. Act, the Assistanl Chanty Com·
missioner was precluded from holding the enquiry under the Bombay
Act.
The Assistant Charity Com.missioner ho\\·ever rejected this contention on September 6, 1962 and thereupon the appellant filed a writ
petition in the High Court challenging this decisio.n.
Two contentions were raised by the appellant in support of hi< peti·
lion.
Firstly, that the Registrar under the M.P. Acl having found tbal
the trust was not a public trust and six months having expired from
the date» of his finding, that finding became final under s. 8; that a
right within the moaning of cl. (b) of s. 86(3) of the Bombay
Act
vested in the appellant and therefore the Assistant Charity Commi<sioner
was not competent to reopen that finding and stan an inquiry abro~at
ing his said right; and secondly, that it was obligatory on the Registrar
tD make an entry in the register of public trusts mainlained \>Y him
Ito
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HASAN NURANI v. CHARITY COMMR. (She/at, J.)
111
under the Act and that since he had not made such an entry the enquiry
held by him was not completed; that being so the enquiry was a pending
proceeding saved by s. 86(3) and therefore the only remedy which respondents 2 to 5 had was to proceed in that proceeding by calling upon
the Registrar to make and notify such enuy and if necessary to file a
suit under s. 8 of the M.P. Act challenging that finding.
The High Court rejected both these contentions and held
that
the
M.P. Act did not confer any finality on the Registrar's finding and that
under that Act finality attached to an entry made by the Registrar in the
register of public trusts; as the only register that the Registrar was enjoined
upon to maintain under the Act and the rtdes made thereunder was the
register of public

## Text

HASAN NURA!"I MALAK
v.
ASSISTANT CHARITY COMMISSIONER, NAGPUR & ORS.
· August 22, 1966
(K. SUBBA RAO, C. J.
A1'D J. M. SHELAT, J.]
Madhya Pradesh Public Tru.is Act (30 of 1951), ss. 5, 6, 7 and 8
-Scope of -Registrar after enquiry recording finding a trust 1101 u publ":
tnLS't-W hether required to make entry of ntgative (u1ding ;,, reRhtcr of
p11blic trusrs---Effect on right to file :ruir under •· 8 to set a<ide findingRepea/ of Act 30 of 1951 in application ro Vidhurbha area by am...,dtd
Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, s. 86--Sal'ing clauses in s. 86(3)-
EOect o/-Ji'hetl1er freslr enquiry to de1ern1i11e if
trurt a public
tru.tt
comp~tent.
Jn October 1953 upon an applicati<>n made under>. 5 of the Madhya
Pradesh Public Trus.i. Act, 30 of 1951, the Registrar
!>old an enquiry
on the question Wliether particular trust founded in 1891 in Nagpur in
the Vidharbha area of .the State, of which the properties were in
the
possession of and managed by the appellant, wa., a public trust.
On thll
conclusion of the inquiry, in accordance v.·ith s. 6 of the Act, he rec.:>rded
a finding in November 1955 that the trust in question was not a public
trust.
Howe\'er, the Registrar did not, as required by s. 7 of the Act,
came an entry of this finding to be made in the register maintained by him
under the Act.
On No>'<'mbcr I, 1956, as a result of the reorganisation of States, the
Vidbarbha area was merged in the then Bombay State.
The Bombay
Lqislature thereafter paMed the Bombay Public Trusts (Unillcation Biid
Amendment) Act, 1959 (6 of 1960) and bv a notification dated Febru·
ary I, 1961, pas<ed thereunder, the Bombay
Public Trust Act.
1950.
was extended to the Vidharbha area.
By •· 86 sub-ss. (I) and (2) of
the Bombay Act of 1950 inducted into that Act by Bombay Act 6
of 1960, ·the M.P. Act wa< repealed and the sa\ing provi•ions C"'1tained
in els. (a), (b) and (c) in s. 86(3) pro!ected. in!tr a/la,
anything
done, any rights etc. accn1ell <ind any Jeg:i1 procced.!ngs pending under
the repealed Act.
On March 2, 1962. Respondents 2 to 5 filed an
application under s. 19 of the Bombay Act before the Assistant Charitv
CommissioneT for an enquiry as to whethe' the said trust waa a public
trust.
Tho appellant contended that since the trust wu already declared
not to be a 11uhlic trust under the M.P. Act, the Assistanl Chanty Com·
missioner was precluded from holding the enquiry under the Bombay
Act.
The Assistant Charity Com.missioner ho\\·ever rejected this contention on September 6, 1962 and thereupon the appellant filed a writ
petition in the High Court challenging this decisio.n.
Two contentions were raised by the appellant in support of hi< peti·
lion.
Firstly, that the Registrar under the M.P. Acl having found tbal
the trust was not a public trust and six months having expired from
the date» of his finding, that finding became final under s. 8; that a
right within the moaning of cl. (b) of s. 86(3) of the Bombay
Act
vested in the appellant and therefore the Assistant Charity Commi<sioner
was not competent to reopen that finding and stan an inquiry abro~at
ing his said right; and secondly, that it was obligatory on the Registrar
tD make an entry in the register of public trusts mainlained \>Y him
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HASAN NURANI v. CHARITY COMMR. (She/at, J.)
111
under the Act and that since he had not made such an entry the enquiry
held by him was not completed; that being so the enquiry was a pending
proceeding saved by s. 86(3) and therefore the only remedy which respondents 2 to 5 had was to proceed in that proceeding by calling upon
the Registrar to make and notify such enuy and if necessary to file a
suit under s. 8 of the M.P. Act challenging that finding.
The High Court rejected both these contentions and held
that
the
M.P. Act did not confer any finality on the Registrar's finding and that
under that Act finality attached to an entry made by the Registrar in the
register of public trusts; as the only register that the Registrar was enjoined
upon to maintain under the Act and the rtdes made thereunder was the
register of public trusts it was not incumbent on him to make an entry in
such register when his finding was a negative one.
No such entry having
been made, no right under s. 86( 3) vested in the appellant which would
bar a fresh inquiry under the Bombay Act. The High Court further held
that there being no obligation. on the Registrar to make such a negative
e.ntry, it could not be said that the proceedings ·before him amounted to
a pending .proceeding saved under s. 86(3). It was also held that the
suit contemplated under s. 8 of the M.P. Act was a suit for the purpose
of correcting an entry. made by the Registrar and as no such entry was
made, respondents 2 to 5 could not have filed a suit undet that section.
On appeal to this Court,
HELD : A ·fresh inquiry under the Bombay. Act was not competent
and the Assistant Chari~ · Commissioner was precluded from entertaining it. [119 BJ
Reading S&. S, 6, · 7 and 8 of the M.P. Act it was clear thJlt the
R<:gistrar is enjoined upon to make an entry in the register of public
trusts irrespective of whether his finding is in the affirmative or in. the
negative. For the entry he ha• to make i& the entry "in accordance with
his finding" whatever that finding is. [117 BJ
The inquiry held by the Registrar under the M.P.' Act was indisputably "a thing duly done" under that Act.
The inquiry and its result
having been saved by s. 86(3), cl. (a), they ·contin.ued to be governed by the M.P. Act in spite of its ceasing to apply in Vidharbba. It could
not be said that the inquiry was completed because the Registrar had
yet· to make the entry of his finding which he was bound to make under
s. 7 of the M.P. Act; it was therefore a pending proceeding under that
Act. [118 G; 119 A-BJ
Universal Import Agency v. Chief ·Can/roller. [196JJ I S.C.R. 305,
referred to.
Rama/al v. Charity Commissioner, 63 Born. L.R. 418, distinguisb.-
ed
The cause of action for a suit under s. 8 of the M.P. Act i.\ !Ibo
firu:ling and not the entry. which is merely consequential.
It is therefore no\ right to say that a suit cannot be filed unless the Registrar baA
made the entry. The legislature could not have left the right to file. a
suit to the me·rcy of the
Registrar
who may or
may not
n;iake
the
entry. [114 B; 117 A-BJ
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 498
cl 1964.
112
SUPllllNB COU1T UPOl.TS
[1967] 1 s.c.1t.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 9
A
12, 1963, of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) at Nagpur in
Special Civil Application No. 380 of 1962.
S. T. Desai, G. L. Sanghi, S. C. Ghate, A. s. Babde and O. C.
Mathur, for the appellant.
B. R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for respondent No. I.
N. C. Chatterjee, Shankar Anand, Asghar Ali and Ganpat Rai,
for respondents Nos. 2 to 5.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Sbelat, J. This is an appeal by special leave against the Judgment and order of the High Court of Maharashtra dismissing the
appellant's petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The
question arising in the appeal is whether the Assistant Charity Commissioner appointed under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950
as extended to the area of Vidharbha has jurisdiction to hold an
inquiry under section 19 of that Act in spite of a previous finding by
the Registrar under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 30
of 1951 that the trust in question was not a public trust within the
meaning of the latter Act. The facts leading to the writ petition
may briefly be set out.
In October 1953, one Jaferbhai claiming to be a beneficiary
applied under s. 5 of the M.P. Act to the Registrar that the trust
known as Mehdibaug founded in Nagpur in 1891 and its properties
which were and are admittedly in possession of and managed by the
appellant was a public trust. As required by section 5(2) of that
Act the Registrar directed that a proclamation in respect of the said
application should be published in the next issue of Madhya Pradesh
Ga7.ette. The inquiry held by the Registrar ended in an order dated
November II, 1955 whereby he held that the trust was not public
trust. Though the Registrar gave his aforesaid finding he did not
cause an entry thereof to be made in the register maintained by him
under the Act. On November 1, 1956 as a result of the reorganisation of States Vidharbha was merged in the then Bombay State. The
Bombay legislature thereafter passed the Bombay Public Trusts
(Unification Amendment) Act, 1959 and by a notification dated
February 1, 1961 passed thereunder the Bombay Public Trusts
Act 1950 was extended to the Vidharbha area. On March 2, 1962,
respondents 2 to 5 filed an application under section 19 of the
Bombay Act, 1950 before the Assistant Charity Commissioner for an
inquiry as to whether the said trust was a public trust. The appellant contended that since the trust was already declared not to be a
public trust under the M.P. Act the Assistant Charity Commissioner
was precluded from holding the inquiry under the Bombay Act.
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HASAN NURANI v. CHARITY COMMR. (She/at, J.)
113
On September 6, 1962, the Assistant Charity Commissioner rejected
that contention. Thereupon the appellant filed the aforesaid
petition in the High Court. The High Court as stated above
dismissed the petition holding that the Assistant Charity Commissioner had jurisdiction to hold the inquiry. It is this order which
is impugned in this appeal.
In view of the controversy between the parties as to the effect
of certain provisions of the Bombay Act 1950 and the M.P. Act of
1951 it becomes necessary to briefly notice some of the relevant
provisions of the two Acts. Section 2(4) of the M.P. Act defines
"public trust" as meaning an express or constructive trust for a
public, religious or charitable purpose and includes a temple etc. or
any other religious or charitable endowment and a society formed
for a religious or
charitable purpsose. Sub-section 5 of that
'section defines "register" as meaning a register maintained under
sub-section 2 of section 3 of the Act. Section 3(2) provides that the
Registrar should maintain a register of public trusts and such other
books and registers and .in such form as may be presc;ribed. Section
4 provides for the registration of public trusts and lays down that the
working trustee of every public trust should apply to the Registrar
for its registration by an application in which certain particulars
therein mentioned have to be set out. Section 5 provides that on
receipt of such an application or upon an application made by any
person having interc:St in a public trust or on his own motion, the
Registrar
shall make an inquiry in the prescribed manner for
ascertaining amongst other things whether th.e trust in question is a
public trust. Sub-section 2 of section 5 as aforesaid provides for
giving a public notice of the inquiry proposed to be made inviting
all persons interested in the public trust under inquiry to prefer
objections, if any, in respect of such trust. Under section 6 the
Registrar on. completion of the inquiry has to record his findings
with reasons therefor as to the matters set out in section 5(i) and
•nder section 7(1) he has to cause entries to be made in the register
in accordance with his findings and has to publish on the notice
board of his office the entries so made. Sub-section 2 of section 7
reads as under:
·
"The entries so made shall, subject to the provisions of
this Act and subject to any change recqrded under any
provision of this Act or a rule made thereunder, be final and
conclusive."
Sectio" .8
provides that' any working trustee or person having
interest in a public trust or arty property found to be trust property,
aggrieved by any finding of the ·Registrar under section 6 may,
within six months from the date of the publication of the: notice
under sub-section(!) of section 7, institute a suit in a civil.court
to have such finding set aside or modified. Sub-section 3 provides.
114
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967) I S.C.R.
that on the final decision of the suit, the Registrar shall, if necessary,
A
correct the entries made in the register in accordance with such
decision.
It is clear from the provisions of section 8 that though the
entries made by the Registrar are final and conclusive that finality
is subject to the decision of the court in a suit challenging the findings
of the Registrar. The cause of action for such a suit is thus the
finding of the Registrar and not the entry. It is manifest that
section 7 requires the making of the entry and its notification in
order that the findings given by the Registrar are recorded and
are given publicity so that an aggrieved party whether he is a
working trustee or a person interested in the trust may file a suit
within the prescribed time.
Under section 35 of the Act the
Sta•e Government framed rules prescribing inter alia for the
maintenance of certain
registers.
Under the Act and the said
Rules the Registrar had to maintain four registers, viz. (I) a register
of public trusts, (2) a register of the properties of public truslll,
(3) a register relating to immovable properties belonging to the
trusts and ( 4) a register of decisions of courts relating to public trusts.
These being the only registers prescribed either under the Act or the
said rules there was no obligation on the Registrar to maintain
any other register or book.
The Bombay Act, 1950 defines a public trust to mean an express
or constructive trust for either a public, religious or charitable
purpose or both and includes a temple, a math, a waqf, a dharmada
or any other
religious or charitable endowment and a society
formed either for a
religious or charitable purpose or for both
and registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Section
I 8 provides for registration of public trusts and is substantially
in the same terms as section 4 of the M.P. Act. Section 19 similarly
provides for an inquiry for ascertaining the matters set out therein
which are again in the same terms .as in section 5 of the M. P. Act.
Though the definition of the public trust in the Bombay Act is
not exactly in the same terms as that in the M.P. Act the contents
of both are substantially the same. In any event it is not the case
of the respondents that that which is not a public trust or a property
belonging to a public trust under the M. P. Act has been made
a public trust or a property belonging to such trust under the Bombay
Act.
The inquiry under both the Acts and its scope are
therefore the same. Section 86 of the Bombay Act inducted
in the Act
by Bombay Act
6 of
1960
contains
both
repeal and saving clauses.
Under sub-sections I and 2 read
with Bombay Act 6 of 1960 the M.P. Act of 1951 stands repealed.
Sub-section 3 which is a saving provision provides that the repeal
or cessation of the Acts under sub-sections I and 2 shall riot in
any way affect :
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HASAN NURANI v. CHARITY COMMR. (Shelat, J.)
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"(a) anything duly done or suffered under the laws hereby
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repealed or ceasing to apply before the said date ;
(b) any right, title, interest, obligation or liability already
acquired, accrued or incurred before the said date
under the laws hereby repealed or ceasing to apply ;
(c) any legal proceedings or remedy in respect of such
right, title, interest, obligation or liability."
Two contentions were raised by the appellant in the High
Court in support of his petition. First, that the Registrar under
the M.P. Act having found that the trust was not a public trust
and six months having expired from the date of his finding that
finding became final,. that a right within the meaning of cl. (b)
of section 86(3) of the Bombay Act vested in the appellant and
that therefore the Assistant Charity Commissioner was not competent to reopen that finding and start an inquiry abrogating his
said right and (2) that it was obligatory on the Registrar to make
an entry in the register of public trusts maintained by him and that
since he had not made such an entry the inquiry held by him
was not completed; that that being so the inquiry was a pending
proceeding saved by section 86(3) and therefore the only remedy
which respondents 2 to 5 had was to proceed in that proceeding
by calling upon the Registrar to make and notify such entry and if
necessary to file a suit under section 8 of the M.P. Act challenging
that finding.
The High Court, rejected both these contentions.
The High Court held that the M.P. Act did not confer any finality
to the Registrar's finding and that under that Act finality attached
to an entry made by the Registrar in the register of public trust.
It also held that when the Registrar's finding was a negative one it
was not incumbent on him to make any entry as the only register he
was enjoined upon to maintain was the one prescribed by the Act.
The rules made under the Act not having prescribed any other
register or book and the only register prescribed by the Act being
the register of public trusts it was not obligatory upon him to enter
a finding that the trust in question was not a public trust. No such
entry having been made no right under section 86(3) of the Bombay
Act vested in the appellant which would bar a fresh inquiry under
the Bombay Act. The High Court furthe( held that there being no
obligation on the Registrar to make such a negative entry it could
not be said that the proceedings before him was a pending proceeding
saved under section 86(3). No finality therefore was given to the
finding of the Registrar that the trust was not a public trust. As
regards the suit under section 8 of the M.P. Act, the High Court held
that on a true interpretation of sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of that Act the
suit contemplated was a suit for the purpose of correcting an entry
made by the Registrar and that no such entry having been made
116
SUPRBMB COURT UPORTS
(1967] I S.C.R.
no such suit lay and consequently respondents 2 to 5 could not have
filed a suit under that section.
As aforesaid the preamble of the M.P. Act shows that the Act
was enacted to regulate and to make better provision for the administration of public, religious and charitable trusts in the then State
of Madhya Pradesh. With that end in view section ,5 of that Act
provides for an inquiry to be held by the Registrar for ascertaining
among other things whether a trust under inquiry is a public trust or
not. A public notice of such an inquiry was provided for under
section 5(2) in order to enable persons interested in such trust to
participate therein. Sections 6 and 7 enjoin upon the Registrar to
record his finding.
Such a finding may either be that the trust is ·a
public trust or it is not. Section 7( I) enjoins upon him to cause
entries to be made in the register "in accordance with the findings
recorded by him under section 6", and he is to publish the entries
when made in the register. The register prescribed no doubt is a
register of public trusts. If the finding of the Registrar is that a
particular trust is not a public trust, does he not have to make
an entry of his finding in the register or has he to make an entry in
that register only when his finding is a positive one that the· trust is
a public trust? It will be noticed that there is nothing in section 7( I)
to show that he is required to make an entry only if the finding is in
the
affirmative. On the other hand sub-section I of section 1
expressly provides that he shall cause entries to be made in accordance
with the findings recorded by him under section 6. Section 6
shows that he has to record his findings and the reasons therefor
whatever the findings are, whether in the affirmative or in the negative. Since entries under section 7(1) are to be made in accordance
with such findings, either positive or negative, it follows that entries
have to be made irrespective of whether the trust is found to be a
public trust or not. To say that he is
required to make an
entry of finding only if the finding is that the trust is a public
trust would be contrary to the express language of sections 6 and 7
and would unnecessarily curtail the language and the scope of the
two sections. This construction is also supported by section 8.
Under that section, though it is the entry made under s. 7 which
has been given finality a right of suit is conferred on both the
working trustee and all persons having interest in the trust or any
property belonging to it .and who is aggrieved 'by any finding'.
The section no doubt provides that such a suit has to be filed within
six months from the date of the publication of the entry. But that
provision is clearly one fixing limitation. That does not mean
that the suit is to set aside the entry. The section in so many terms
states that such a suit would be to set aside the finding given by the
Registrar and where such a finding is set aside the Registrar has to
correct the entry made in the register in accordance with his findings
The cause of section for such a suit thus is the finding and not
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HASAN NURANI v. CHARITY COMMR. (She/at,!.)
117
the entry which is merely consequential. It is therefore not right
to say that a suit cannot be filed unless the Registrar has made the
entry. The legislature, besides, could not have left the. right to file
a suit to the mercy of the Registrar who may or may not make the
entry. It is equally not correct to say that the Registrar has not to
make an entry if his finding is in the negative. Suppose the
Registrar in a given case gives his finding that the trust in question
is not a public trust and does not make an entry on the ground that
the register maintained by him is the register of public trusts and not
of trusts which are not public trusts. What is a person interested
in the trust or its properties to do if he is aggrieved by that finding?
Does it mean that he has no remedy by way of a suit? That surely
cannot be the meaning to be given to sections 7 and 8. If the
making of the entry is the condition precedent for such a suit such
a person would have no remedy of a suit under section 8. It is
precisely to avoid such a result that the section provides in explicit
language that any person, aggrieved by the finding and not the entry,
has a right to file a suit and to have such a finding set aside, whether
the finding is positive or negative. There is nothing in s. 8 which
restricts the right of a suit in cases where the finding is in the affirmative. If that was so, giving a right to sue to a person interested in the
trust would be superfluous as he would never be aggrieved by a
finding that the trust is a public trust. The High Court was, therefore, in error when it held that the Registrar was not obliged to
make the entry as his finding was in the negative. In .our view,
reading sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the M.P. Act it is clear that the
Registrar is enjoined upon to make an entry in the register of public
trusts irrespective of whether his finding is in the affirmative or in the
negative. For the entry he has to make is the entry "in accordance
with his finding" whatever that finding is.
As regards the second contention urged before it, the High
Court observed that if it was obligatory on the Registrar to cause
an entry to be made in the register even if the finding was negative,
the fact that he had not made such an entry would not deprive the
appellant of his right and in that event it would have helc! that the
proceeding before the Registrar was still pending and respondents
2 to 5 would in that cas·e have to have recourse to the M.P. Act.
But the High Court on the ground that there was no obligation on the
Registrar to make the entry rejected this contention. Let us see
whether there was justification in the contention that the inquiry
is still pending and that respondents 2 to 5 have to proceed under that
Act and not under s. 19 of the Bombay Act.
Mr. Desai for the appellant relied on sub-section 3 of section
86 and urged that all the three sub-clauses, (a), (b) and (c) apply to
the present case. He urged that the inquiry before the Registrar
was a thing duly done under the M.P. Act and was therefore saved,
that the Registrar's finding had become final on the expiry of six
118
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967) 1 S.C.R.
months from the date of that finding and its finality vested a right
in the appellant which is saved by the sub-section and lastly that
the legal proceeding, that is the enquiry, was still pending and
in spite of the cessation of the M.P. Act, was saved. He contended
that a fresh inquiry therefore could not be held as the proceeding
before the Registrar was still pending and the competent authority
to proceed with it was the Registrar and not the Assistant Charity
Commissioner. The Assistant Charity Commissioner was therefore precluded from holding the impugned inquiry.
Mr. Chatterjee,
on the other hand, argued that no right can be said to have accrued
to the appellant as no finality attached to the Registrar's finding, an
entry of that finding not having been made by the Registrar. There
was also no question of any legal proceeding being saved as the
proceeding saved is the. one in respect of a right. title or interest
vested in
a party. Therefore, sub-ds. (b) and (c) according to
him would not in any case apply. As regards sub-cl. (a) he argued
that the inquiry before the Registrar was over so soon as he gave his
finding and therefore that inquiry also cannot be said to have been
saved.
The words "anything duly done" in sub-cl. (a) arc very often
used by the legislature in saving clauses such as we have in section
86 (3).
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 also provides
that unless a different intention appears the repeal of an Act would
not affect anything duly done or suffered thereunder. The object
of such a saving clause is to save what has been previously done
under the statute repealed. The result of such a saving clause is
that the pre-existing law continues to govern the thing done before a
particular date from which the repeal of such a pre-existing law takes
effect. In Universal Imports Agency v. Chief Controller(') construing
the words "things done" used in para 6 of the French Establishments
(Application of Laws) Order, 1954. this Court held that on a proper
interpretation the expression "things done" was comprehensive
enough to take in not only the things done but also the effect of the
legal consequences flowing therefrom. The inquiry held by the
Registrar under the M.P. Act was indisputably "a thing duly done"
under that Act.
The inquiry and its result having been saved by
section 86 (3) (a) they continue to be governed by the M.P. Act
in spite of its ceasing to apply in Vidarbha.
As we have already
held it was obligatory on the Registrar to have made an entry of
his finding in the register of public trusts maintained by him under
that Act though the finding was that the trust was not a public trust.
If any one was aggrieved by that finding he could have made the
Registrar to cause an entry to be made and thereafter file a suit to
set aside the finding and have the entry corrected.
Respondents
2 to 5 would be such persons as they claim to be interested in the
trust and are therefore persons ag~ricvcd by that finding
and
(I) [l96tt I. S.C.R. 305.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
HASAN NURANI v. CHARITY COMMR. (She/at, J.)
119
interested in challenging it. The contention that that inquiry was
completed is not correct because the Registrar had yet to make the
entry of his finding which he was bound to make under section 7 of
that Act. That being the position, the inquiry is saved by sub-cl.
(a) of section 86(3) and it is still pending and is governed by
the M.P. Act. In the result a fresh inquiry under the Bombay
Act while the proceeding under the M.P. Act is still pending was not
competent and the Assistant Charity Commissioner was precluded
from entertaining it. In this view it is not necessary to consider
Mr. Desai's contention that clauses (b) and (c) also apply to the
present ·case. Mr. Chatterjee however drew our attention to a
decision of the High Court of Bombay in Rama/al v. Charity Commissioner('). That decision cannot assist the respondents as the
effect of a saving clause such as we have in section 86(3) or in the
Bombay General Clauses Act was not considered there and the
question of the proceeding being a pending one was neither raised
nor considered. For the reasons aforesaid it is not possible to sustain
the order passed by the High Court dismissing the petition.
We therefore set aside the order, allow the appeal and make the
petition absolute. The respondents will pay the costs of.the appellant
both here and in the High Court.
R.K.P.S.
A ppea/ allowed_
(1) 63 Born, L.R. 418.