# Haz•ri Lol v. Slall of Bihar

- **Citation:** [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 419
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963
- **Bench:** jAFER IMAM, N. Rajagopala Ayyanoar, J. R. Mudholkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/haz-ri-lol-v-slall-of-bihar-2718
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Criminal Trial-Criminal force--Use of, to deter public
8ervant from dischaming duty-1'ax O.f/icer in8Jiecti11y account
books-Snatc/ied by amwd-lf offencr- made out-Act constituting offence under i.'iale8 'l'ax lf!:U' also-Prosecution undrt
Penal Code, whether, colourable-Bilwr Sales Tax Act,
1114~
(Bihar XIX of lf/47), ss 17, 26 (1) (h)-lndian l'nrnl Coile,
1860 (Act XLV of 1860), '"· 349, .150, 35-1.
The Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes paid a
surprise visit to the shop of the appellant where he found two
sets of account books.
He took them up and started looking
into them. The appellant snatched away both the books.
An
attempt by the orderly peon of the Assistant Superintendent to
recover the books was foiled by the appellant. The appellant
was tried and convicted for an offence under s. 353 of the
Penal Code for using criminal force to deter a public servant
from discharging his duty.
Held, that the appellant was properly convicted under
s. 353 Penal Code. The snatching of the books amounted to
use of force; the snatching necessarily caused a jerk to the hands
of the officer which caused motion to his hands wit bin the
meaning ofs. 349 of the Penal Code. The Officer was entitled
under the Bihar Si'les Tax Act, and the Rules to pay a surprise
visit to the shop of the appellant without giving him any notice
and the appellant was bound to show him his account books.
The officer was lawfully in possession of the account books and
the appellant had no justification to snatch them away. The
officer was naturally annoyed at this and accordingly the act of
the appellant amounted to use of criminal force.
A seizure of the books under s. 17 of the Sales· Tax ,\ct
would be valid only if the reasons for the seizure were recorded
by the officer. But the present case was not one of seizure.
Merely holding books found lying in a shop for perusing the"'
does not amount to their seizure.
Prahlad Ram '"Staff, (Patna Hi"h Court, unreported).
distiniruished.
1962
1961
Haz•ri Lol
v.
Slall of Bihar
Mud/,.lkar, J.
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963JSUPP.
The act of the appellant amounted to an ofl'ence under
s. 26 (I) (h) of the Sales Tax Act also and for his prosecution
under that section sanction of the Commissioner would have
been necessary. His act was an offence both under that section
· and under s. 353 of the Code. He could be prosecuted for
either or both these offences. The offence under s. 353 of the
Penal Code was a graver offence than the one under s. 26 (I) (h)
and in choosing to pro,ecute the appellant under s. 353 the
prosecution could not be charged with acting colourably to
obviate the necessity of obtaining the sanction.
Sonelal Seth v. State, (Patna High Court, unreported),
disapproved,

## Text

I S.C.R.
SUPRE!vlE COlTRT REPORTS
41!1
HAZARl LAL
'V.
STATE OF BIHAR
(jAFER IMAM, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANOAR and J. R.
MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Criminal Trial-Criminal force--Use of, to deter public
8ervant from dischaming duty-1'ax O.f/icer in8Jiecti11y account
books-Snatc/ied by amwd-lf offencr- made out-Act constituting offence under i.'iale8 'l'ax lf!:U' also-Prosecution undrt
Penal Code, whether, colourable-Bilwr Sales Tax Act,
1114~
(Bihar XIX of lf/47), ss 17, 26 (1) (h)-lndian l'nrnl Coile,
1860 (Act XLV of 1860), '"· 349, .150, 35-1.
The Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes paid a
surprise visit to the shop of the appellant where he found two
sets of account books.
He took them up and started looking
into them. The appellant snatched away both the books.
An
attempt by the orderly peon of the Assistant Superintendent to
recover the books was foiled by the appellant. The appellant
was tried and convicted for an offence under s. 353 of the
Penal Code for using criminal force to deter a public servant
from discharging his duty.
Held, that the appellant was properly convicted under
s. 353 Penal Code. The snatching of the books amounted to
use of force; the snatching necessarily caused a jerk to the hands
of the officer which caused motion to his hands wit bin the
meaning ofs. 349 of the Penal Code. The Officer was entitled
under the Bihar Si'les Tax Act, and the Rules to pay a surprise
visit to the shop of the appellant without giving him any notice
and the appellant was bound to show him his account books.
The officer was lawfully in possession of the account books and
the appellant had no justification to snatch them away. The
officer was naturally annoyed at this and accordingly the act of
the appellant amounted to use of criminal force.
A seizure of the books under s. 17 of the Sales· Tax ,\ct
would be valid only if the reasons for the seizure were recorded
by the officer. But the present case was not one of seizure.
Merely holding books found lying in a shop for perusing the"'
does not amount to their seizure.
Prahlad Ram '"Staff, (Patna Hi"h Court, unreported).
distiniruished.
1962
1961
Haz•ri Lol
v.
Slall of Bihar
Mud/,.lkar, J.
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963JSUPP.
The act of the appellant amounted to an ofl'ence under
s. 26 (I) (h) of the Sales Tax Act also and for his prosecution
under that section sanction of the Commissioner would have
been necessary. His act was an offence both under that section
· and under s. 353 of the Code. He could be prosecuted for
either or both these offences. The offence under s. 353 of the
Penal Code was a graver offence than the one under s. 26 (I) (h)
and in choosing to pro,ecute the appellant under s. 353 the
prosecution could not be charged with acting colourably to
obviate the necessity of obtaining the sanction.
Sonelal Seth v. State, (Patna High Court, unreported),
disapproved,
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeals Nos. 35 and 36 ofl961.
Appeals by special leave from the judgments
and orders dated November 1 and September 1960 of
the Patna High Court in Cr. Revisions Nos. 812 of
1960 and 76 of 1959 respectively.
Sarjoo Pra,sad and K. K. Sinha, for the appel·
!ants.
S. P. Varma, for the respondents.
1962. September 27.
The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
MUDHOLKAR, .J.--This is an appeal by special
leave from the judgment of the High Court of Patna
upholding the appellant's conviction under s. 353,
Indian Penal Code and the sentence passed against
him.
The facts which are not in dispute are as
follows:
On
the evening of October
29,
1957,
Mr. Bhupendra Narain Singh, Assistant Superintendent
of Commercial Taxes, Patna Sadar circle, paid a
surprise visit to the shop of Hazari Lall & Co., in
Bara.h town in order to inspect the books of accounts
I s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
421
maintained by the shop. At that time the appellant
Hazari Lall was in the shop.
Mr. Singh found that
two sets cf account books were kept in the shop. He
took them up and started looking into them. The
appellant snatched away both the books from him,
passed them on to one of his servants who made them
over to another servant who was on the upper floor.
Mr. Singh directed his orderly peon to recover the
books.
The peon was, however, prevented by the
appellant from going to the place where the account
books had been taken and in the scuffle which ensued
between the two, the orderly's shirt was torn. Thereafter Mr. Singh went to the police station to lodge
a complaint. The appellant who was brought there
by the Sub-Inspector, tendered an apology in writing
and so Mr. Singh did not lodge a complaint. He,
however, submitted a report in writing to the Superintendent of Commercial Taxes. The Superintendent
thereupon reported the incident to the Deputy
Superintendent of Police and eventually lodged a first
information report on November 1.
It is urged before us by Mr. Sarjoo Prasad,
who appears for the appellant, that mere snatching
away of books does not amount to using force as
contemplated bys. 349, I. P. C. and at any rate it
does not amount to use of criminal force as contemplated by s. 350, Indian Penal Code. If, therefore,
the act of the appellant did not constitute the use of
criminal force, his conviction under s. 353, I. P. C.
cannot be sustained.
His contention is that no force
was used against the person of Mr. Singh and
therefore, the requirements of s. 349, I. P. C, we~
not satisfied. Section 349, I. P. C. reads thus :
"Force.-A person is said to use force to another
if he causes motion, change of motion or
cessation of motion to that other, or iC he
causes to any substance such motion, or change
of motion, or cessation of motion as brings that
1961
H=ri l.ol
v:
Stat• of lfilw
Mut/WJ;ar, J.
1962
Hiz:ari Lal
v.
State of Bihar
Mudho/kar, /.
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l963]SUPP.
substance into contact with any part of that
other's body, or with anything which that other
is wearing or carrying, or with anything so
situated that such contact affects that other's
sense of feeling :
Provided that the person causing the
motion, or change of motion, or cessation of
motion, causes that motion, change of motion,
or cessation of motion in one of the three ways
hereinafter described :
First.-By his own bodily power.
Secondly.-By disposing any substance in such
a manner that the motion or change or cessation
of motion takes place without any further act
on his part, or on the part of any other person.
Thirdly.-·By inducing any animal to move, to
change its motion, or to cease to move."
It would be clear from a bare perusal of the section
that one person can be said to have used force against
another if he causes motion, change of motion, or
cessation of motion to that illher.
By snatching
away the books which Mr. Singh was holding the
appellant necessarily caused a jerk to the hand or
hands of Mr. Singh in which he was holding the
books.
His act, therefore, mav be said to have
caused motion to .Mr. Singh's hand or hands.
Further, the natural effect of snatching the books from
the hand or hands of Mr. Singh would be to affect
the sense of feeling of the hand or hands of Mr. Singh.
We have, therefore, no
doubt that the action
of the appellant amounts to use of force as contemplated bys. 349, I. P. C.
Mere use of force, however, is not enough to
bring au act within the terms of s. :35a, I.P.C. It has
further to be shown that force was used intentionally
to any person without that p!Crson's consent in ordrr
•
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
423
to commit an offence or with the intention or with
the knowledge that the use of force will cause injury,
fear or annoyance to the person against whom the
force is used.
The contention of Mr. Sarjoo Prasad
is that the appellant did not intend t-o commit any
offence but only wanted to retrieve his own property
of which Mr. Singh had taken possession without his
permission.
He also contended that the appellant's
act has admittedly caused no injury or fear to
Mr. Singh nor can it be said to have caused any
justifiable annoyance to him. We cannot accel?t
Mr. Sarjoo Prasad's contention that the appellant did
not cause annoyance to Mr. Singh by snatching away
the books from his hands nor do we accept his contention that the action of the appellant does not amount
to an offence.
The contention of Mr. Sarjoo Prasad that
Mr. Singh could not inspect the account books without the permission of the appellant ignores the provi,
sions of s. 17 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Bihar
XIX of 1947) and r. 50 of the Rules framed
under the Act. Sub-section (2) of.s. 17 of the Act
provides that all accounts, registers and documents
relating to stocks of goods or purchases, sales and deli.
veries of goods by any dealer and all goods kept in any
place of business of any dealer shall at all reasonable
times be open to inspection by the Commissioner. It
is common ground that the Commissioner is authorised
by law to delegate his power to his subordinates and
it is not cii;iputed that ~uch power has been delegated
to the Ass!Stant Supermtendent of Commercial Taxes
S~b-_section ( 4) of s. 17 further empowers the Com:
m1SSJoner to enter and search any place of business of
any dealer. Under his delegated power the Assistant
Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, therefore, has
the right to enter a place of business.
Rule 50 deals
'!Ith ~pei;tio?S. !hat rule empowers the CommisSIO~ m his d!scretion to pay a surprise visit to the
busmess premises of a dealer for inspection of the
1962
H...,ilAI
v.
Stat.of BU....
MuJMlkar, J.
1962
Hizari Lal
. v.
State of Bihar
Alud'1olkar, J.
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1U63] SUPP.
accounts, registers, documents, stocks and goods of
such dealer though the normal procedure is that he
should give reasonable notice in writing to the dealer
of his intention to make an inspection. Therefore,
though Mr. Singit had not given any notice of his
intention to visit the shop of the appellant, he was
entitled to pay a surprise visit.
Mr. Singh paid
such a surprise visit evidently because he suspected
that the appellant was maintaining a double set of
account books.
In view of the fact that the law
confers a power upon the Sales Tax authorities to
inspect account books of a dealer and for that pur·
pose even pay surprise visits to the shop of the dealer
it would follow that there is an obligation on the
dealer to allow the authorities to insoect his books of
account.
No permission from him, 'express or tacit,
for that purpose is necessary.
Mr. Singh was, therefore, lawfully in possession of the account books when
he took them up in the shop and started perusing
them.
The appellant had no justification in law to
snatch the books of accounts. To feel annoyed at
this action of the appellant would be the natural reaction of Mr. Singh and.. therefore, the appellant's
act must be held to amount to use of criminal force.
We are further clear that the appellant's act in 5nat·
ching away the books amounts to obstruction of an
officer making an inspection, which act is made
punishable by s. 26(1 )(h) of the Act.
Mr. Sarjoo Prasad then referred to the prosecution allegation that Mr. Singh, after being deprived
of the possession of account books, directed his
peon to retrieve them and said that the real object
of .Mr. Singh was to seize the account books under
s. 17.
He added that this is made further clear from
the following passage in the report
made
by
Mr. Singh to his superior.
"From the statement given above, it is clear
that Sri Hazari Lall, proprietor of M/s. Hazari
Lall & Co., has deliberately obstructed me from
1 s.c:.k. SUPREME COUR.'1' R.ltPoR.ts
'1:[5
seizing the douqle sets of accounts which were
found in his business premises.
He had further
assaulted my peon in liis business premises besides snatching away the double sets of accoilnts
as referred above.
He has thereby committ.ed
offence punishable-under law."
His first contention is that Mr. Singh' had in
fact seized the account books or had picked them with
the object of seizing and as he had not complied with
the requirement of sub-s. (3) of s. 17, that is, of recording his reasons in writing for making a seizure of
the books, his act was, illegal and the appellant was
justified in resisting the seizure. In support of his
contention he relied on the unreported decision of
Patna High Court in Pr(.lhlad Ram v. 8tate(1).
In
that case account books had been seized by A--Superinlcnden l of Commercial Taxes from the premises of a
dealer for the purpose of inspecting them and it was
held that the seizure was illegal because he had not
recorded in writil.lg his reasons for making the seizure
as required by
sub:~. (3)' of s. 17 of the Act.
The
dealer and some of ·his employees were ·convicted of
an offence under s. 353, I. P. C. The High Court
acquitted them on the ground that they were entitled
to use force as the search of the premises and the
seizure of the book~ was illegal. That case is distin.
guishable from the prdent one.
Mr. Sarjoo Prasad,
however, c~ntends that here ~Tso Mr. Singh had taken
possession of the account books and he must be deemed
to have seized them.
In our opinion merely holding
books found lying in the premises for perusing theni'
cannot properly be regarded as seizure because seizure
implies doing.~omething over and abO\'e holding at\
article in one~ hand.
According fo the Shorter Oxl'ord Dictionary, seizure, among other things, means
·· ...... confiscation or forcible taking possession (land
or goods); a sudden and forcible taking hold."
As
ali-eady stated, Mr. Singh merely pic~ed up the books
which were lying in the shop and did not snatch
(I) Cl'i, Rcvi,"<ion No, 324 of 1960 dccide1l on Octtlhf"t' G, 1960.
J .f
#
•,
1962
Hazari Lal
v.
State of Bihar
Mudho/kar 1 J,
1962
l:ltwJri Lal
v.
Sta,. of Bihar
M&.dh~1lr.or, J.
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
them away from anyone nor did he take them by
force. On the contrary they were taken away by force
by the appellant. If, indeed, he had retrieved them by
force it may have been possible to urge that that
latter act of his amounts to seizure. The case, therefore, does not help learned counsel.
He next contended that the only offence which
the appellant has committed was one under s. 26(1)
(h) of the Act and that as no previous ~anction of the
Commissioner had been obtained for launching the
prosecution the trying Magistrate was precluded by
the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 26 from taking cognizance of the alleged offence. Undoubtedly had the
appellant been prosecuted for obst.ructing Mr. Singh
from inspect:ng or seizing the account books, the trying Magistrate would have been incompetent to take
cognizance of the offence without the previous sanction of the Commissioner. The appellant is,
however, not being proceeded against for that offence but
only for the offence under s. 353, I. P. C. for which
no sanction is required. Learned counsel contends
that the whole object of the prosecution is to get
round the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 26 and that
that is why the prosecution was launched under s.353,
I. P, C.
The suggestion apparently is that the prosecution of the appellant for the offence under s. 353 is
merely colourable. Whether Mr. Singh was obstructed while making an inspection of the account books
or which he was intending to seize them, the Commissioner's sanction would certainly have been required
under sub-s. (2) if in fact the appellant was prosecu·
ted specifically for obstructing Mr. Singh. He could
have been prosecuted for these offences even without
proof of the fact that he had used criminal force.
From the fact5 found it would no doubt appear that
the appellant has committed an offence under s. 26
(I) (h) of the Act as also under s. 353, I. P. C. because
he has used criminal force.
He could be prosecuted
for either or both these offences at the discretion of
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
427
the prosecution. It may be that he was not prosecuted in respect of both the offences and the prosecution was restricted to the offence under s. 353,
I. P. C. only to obviate the necessity of obtaining the
Commissioner's sanction. Even so. the prosecution
cannot be said to have done something which is
unwarranted by law. An offence under s. 353, I. P. C.
is a graver offence thall' the one under 26 (1) (h)
of the Act because it is punishable with imprisonment
for a period up to two years or to payment of fine
without any limit, or both, whereas an offence under
s. 26(1) (h) is punishable with imprisonment which
may extend up to six months or with a fine not exceeding Rs. 1,000/-, or both. In choosing to prosecute
the appellant for a graver offence under the general
law the prosecution cannot be regarded as having
acted colourably.
Section 26 (1) (h) of the Act deals only with one
kind of obstruction and no mqre. But there may be
an obstruction which may involve graver consequences to the officer obstructed such as grievous
hurt or even death. It would lead to startling results
if it were to be held that the prosecution acted colourably in not restrictiag the accusation to a minor
offence requiring sanction. For, if the prosecution
were to be so restricted, grave offences will go unpunished. Surely, that is not what the legislature could
ever have intended when it enacted s. 26 of the Act.
It makes little difference if the prosecution decided
to proceed with respect to a graver offence and ignore
one which is of a comparatively minor character.
Mr. Sarjoo Prasad relied upon an unreported
decision of the Patna High Court in support of his
aforesaid contention. That is the decision in Sandal
Seth v. The Swte (1).
There the question whi,;h
arose for consideration was whether an act of the
kind proved in the case before us falls under s. 353,
I.P.C., Das, J, who decided the case held that it does
not.
The reason given by him is that the definition
(!) Patna High Court, unrcprted.
1962
Hazari I.Al
v.
Stale of BiMr
Mudholkar, J.
1962
Hazari lAl
v.
State of Bikar
Mudholk.ar, J.
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
of criminal force contained in s. 353, I.P.C. shows
that what is contemplated by the section is the use of
criminal force to or against a person and not to an
inanimate object.
He then observed :
''It is true that in certain circumstances criminal
force used to an inanjmate object may result in
the use of criminal force to a person Jlso; that
is made clear by illustrations (a) and (b) to
section 350, Indian Penal Code. In the particular case before me, no force appears to have
been used to the Inspector of Sales Tax at all.
I doubt whether in the circumstances of this
case it c:in be said that criminal force was used
to the Inspector of Sales Tax. In my opinion,
it would be over-taxing ingenuity to bring the
act of the petitioner within the mischief of
criminal force, as defined in section 350 of the
Indian Penal Code."
The learned Judge went on to observe that a more
straightforward course would have been to prosecute
the accused under s. 26 of the Sales Tax Act. With
respect, we may point out that the learned Judge has
omitted to consider the words "change of motion or
cessation of motion to that other ...... " Had the learned
Judge borne these ingredients in mind he would no
doubt have considered the effect of snatching· away
the books from the hands of the officer in that case.
In the circumstances we find it difficult to agree with
the conclusion of the learned Judge. We also do not
agree with the suggestion implicit in the concluding
part of his judgment that where the facts disclose an
offence under s. 26 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act resort
should rather be had to the provisions of that section
than to the general law even if the act amounts to an
offence under the general law. We are, therefore,
unable to accept his view. We, therefore, dismiss the
appear.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.J:,!!l
Along with this appca I Crimin<:I Appeal N?.
;{5 of 1961 was also heard and this judgment will
govern the decision of that appeal also.
Th~re the
facts are slightly different only in one respect, m that
the account book which was snatched away from the
hands of the Assistant Superintendent of Commercial
Taxes was in the process torn, part of it remaining
in the hands of the Assistant Superintendent and a
part in the hands of the dealer who snatched it a'-1'.ay.
Apart from that, there is no difference and the pomts
which were urged before us were identical.
For the
reasons given by us we dismis' this appeal also.
Appenls dismissrd.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
·1·.
PEER MOHD. & ANOTHER.
(B. P. SINHA, c. ]., P. B. GA.JESDRAGADKAH, K. N.
WANf'HOo, K. C. DAS GFPTA and J.C. SHAH, JJ.)
Gitizenship-Foreigner-lrulian going
to ]Jakistan after
r1on8fitution-Return on Paki.>1f.ani JHf8Rport-If reas"'s to
be
ritizen of India-l
1on.'5titutinn of /11,rlirt, .4t!.
7-ffif1"zen~'fh1'.7;
Act, 1955 (-57 of 19•i•j).
The respondents who were citizens of India left India
for Pakistan sometime after January 26, 1950.
They returned
to India in 1956 on the strength of a Pakistani passport and
visa.
They continued to stay in Io.dia even after the period of
the visa had expired and were prosecuted under s. 14 Foreigners
Act, 1_946, read with cl. 7 Foreignei 's Order, 1948, for unauthonsed and illegal overstay in
India. The High Court
acquitted them holding that they had not become foreigners
on account of their leaving India after January 26, 1950, and
the question whether they had lo~t their Indian citizenship on
account of acquisition of Pakistani citizenship could not be
agitated before a court of law. The appellant contended that
in view of Art. 7 of the Constitution the respondents could
~962
Haz.ari Lal
v.
Stale of Bihat
Mudholkar, J.
1962
September, 29•