# Hindustan Forest Company v. Lal Chand Sarkar]

- **Citation:** [1960] 1 S.C.R. 569
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1960
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 262of1955
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. W Anchoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/hindustan-forest-company-v-lal-chand-sarkar-1794
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Arbitration-Contract--Award passed pending legal proceedings
challenging the existence and validity of contract-Validity-Breach
of contract-Contract providing for penalty as liquidated damagesAward granting maximum-Legality--Indian Contract Act, r872
(9 of r872), ss. 73, 74-Arbitration (Protocol and Convention Act,
I937 (6 of r937) s. 7(e)-Arbitration Act, r940 (IO of I940),
SS. 33, 35·
The appellant company, incorporated in India, entered into
a contract on June 18, 1945, for the supply of five hundred bales
of jute, with the respondent company which was incorporated in
England and which had its registered office in London. The
contract, inter alia, provided that in the event of default of tender
or delivery, the seller shall pay to the buyer as and for liquidated
damages ms. per ton plus the excess (if any) of the market value
over the contract price, the market value being that of jute
contracted for on the day following the date of default. There
was a provision for arbitration, under which any claim or dispute
whatever arising out of, or in relation to this contract or its
construction or fulfilment shall be referred to arbitration in
London in accordance with the bye-laws of the London Jute
Association. Disputes having arisen regarding the performance
of the contract the respondent referred the matter to the arbitration of the London Jute Association, who appointed two of its
members as the arbitrators. The appellant dicl not reply to the
notice given by the arbitrators but filed an application on
1959
Hindustan Forest
Company
v.
Lal Chand
Sarkar].
1959
A11gust ZI.
570
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
I959
August IO, 1949· under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, in the
Calcutta High Court, praying, inter alia, (a) for a declaration that
Shiva]uteBaling the arbitration agreement was void on the ground of uncertainty,
Limited
and (b) for a declaration that there was in fact and in law no
v.
contract between the parties on account of mutual mistake of the
Hindley and
parties. Notice was given by the appellant to the respondent
Cqmpany Limited and the London Jute Association that further steps in the arbitration proceedings should not be taken pending disposal of the
application under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The
arbitrators, however, proceeded with the arbitration and gave
their award on October 17, 1949· On November 26, 1951, an
application was filed by the respondent in the Calcutta High
Court under s. 5 of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention)
Act, 1937. praying that judgment be pronounced in accordance
with the award. The appellant contended that the award was
invalid on the grounds, inter alia, (1) that the award was bad
under s. 35 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, as it was made after the ·
receipt of the notice of filing of the petition dated August IO,
1940, under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act, by the respondent and
the arbitrators and during the pendency of the said application,
and (2) that the liquidated damages provided under the award
included not only the difference between the contract price and
the market price on the date of default but also a further sum of
lOs. per ton, that the extra amount was against the provisions
of ss. 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and that,
therefore, the award was bad on the face of it and could not be
enforced in view .of the provisions of s. 7(e) of the Arbitration
(Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937, which Jays down that an
award cannot be enforced in India if it is contrary to the Law of
India.
Held: (1) that the subject-matter of the legal proceedings
under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which relates to the
existence and validity of the arbitration agreement, are not
matters within the competence of the arbitrators, and do not
therefore cover any part of the subject-matter of the reference.
Consequently, s. 35 of the Arbitration Act is inapplicable.
(2) The award does not violate the provisions of ss. 73 and
94 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872

## Text

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
569
drawn to this aspect of the matter, they would not
have permitted any question as to art. 115 being
raised, and the parties would have saved considerable
costs thereby.
We therefore come to the conclusion that the appeal
must be allowed. The judgment and order of the
learned Judges of the appellate bench of the High
Court are set aside and those of the learned Single
Judge of the High Court are restored. The appellant
will be entitled to the costs in this Court and of the
hearing of the appeal before the High Court.
Appeal allowed.
SHIV A JUTE BALING LIMITED
v.
HINDLEY AND COMPANY LIMITED
(B. P. SINHA, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and
K. N. W ANCHOO, JJ.)
Arbitration-Contract--Award passed pending legal proceedings
challenging the existence and validity of contract-Validity-Breach
of contract-Contract providing for penalty as liquidated damagesAward granting maximum-Legality--Indian Contract Act, r872
(9 of r872), ss. 73, 74-Arbitration (Protocol and Convention Act,
I937 (6 of r937) s. 7(e)-Arbitration Act, r940 (IO of I940),
SS. 33, 35·
The appellant company, incorporated in India, entered into
a contract on June 18, 1945, for the supply of five hundred bales
of jute, with the respondent company which was incorporated in
England and which had its registered office in London. The
contract, inter alia, provided that in the event of default of tender
or delivery, the seller shall pay to the buyer as and for liquidated
damages ms. per ton plus the excess (if any) of the market value
over the contract price, the market value being that of jute
contracted for on the day following the date of default. There
was a provision for arbitration, under which any claim or dispute
whatever arising out of, or in relation to this contract or its
construction or fulfilment shall be referred to arbitration in
London in accordance with the bye-laws of the London Jute
Association. Disputes having arisen regarding the performance
of the contract the respondent referred the matter to the arbitration of the London Jute Association, who appointed two of its
members as the arbitrators. The appellant dicl not reply to the
notice given by the arbitrators but filed an application on
1959
Hindustan Forest
Company
v.
Lal Chand
Sarkar].
1959
A11gust ZI.
570
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960(1)]
I959
August IO, 1949· under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, in the
Calcutta High Court, praying, inter alia, (a) for a declaration that
Shiva]uteBaling the arbitration agreement was void on the ground of uncertainty,
Limited
and (b) for a declaration that there was in fact and in law no
v.
contract between the parties on account of mutual mistake of the
Hindley and
parties. Notice was given by the appellant to the respondent
Cqmpany Limited and the London Jute Association that further steps in the arbitration proceedings should not be taken pending disposal of the
application under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The
arbitrators, however, proceeded with the arbitration and gave
their award on October 17, 1949· On November 26, 1951, an
application was filed by the respondent in the Calcutta High
Court under s. 5 of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention)
Act, 1937. praying that judgment be pronounced in accordance
with the award. The appellant contended that the award was
invalid on the grounds, inter alia, (1) that the award was bad
under s. 35 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, as it was made after the ·
receipt of the notice of filing of the petition dated August IO,
1940, under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act, by the respondent and
the arbitrators and during the pendency of the said application,
and (2) that the liquidated damages provided under the award
included not only the difference between the contract price and
the market price on the date of default but also a further sum of
lOs. per ton, that the extra amount was against the provisions
of ss. 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and that,
therefore, the award was bad on the face of it and could not be
enforced in view .of the provisions of s. 7(e) of the Arbitration
(Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937, which Jays down that an
award cannot be enforced in India if it is contrary to the Law of
India.
Held: (1) that the subject-matter of the legal proceedings
under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which relates to the
existence and validity of the arbitration agreement, are not
matters within the competence of the arbitrators, and do not
therefore cover any part of the subject-matter of the reference.
Consequently, s. 35 of the Arbitration Act is inapplicable.
(2) The award does not violate the provisions of ss. 73 and
94 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, as the arbitrators have only
awarded the maximum amount named in the contract.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
262of1955.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
decree dated :February 4, 1953, of the Calcutta High
Court, in Appeal from original decree No. 68of1952,
arising out of the judgment and decree dated
January 14, 1952, of the said High Court, in Special
Suit No. 2 of 1951.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
571
N. 0. Chatterjee, 0. B. Agarwala and Sukumar Ghose,
z9s9
for the appellants.
Shiva Jute Baling
B. Sen, S. N. Mukherjee, S. N. Andley, J.B. DadaLimited
chanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the respondents.
Hind~~ and
1959. August 21.
The Judgment of the Court was Company Limited
delivered by
WANCHOO J.-This is an appeal by special leave
Wanckoo J.
against the judgment of the Calcutta High Court. The
appellant is a company, incorporated in India, with
its registered office in Calcutta dealing in jute. It
entered into a contract on June 18, 1945, with the
respondent-company, which is incorporated in England and has its registered office in London. The
contract was for the supply of five hundred bales of
jute of crop 1945-46 to be shipped from Calcutta or
Chittagong to Rio de Janeiro, when freight became
available. The contract provides that in tpe event of
default of tender or delivery, the seller shall pay to
the buyer as and for liquidated damages 10s. per ton
plus the excess (if any) of the market value over the
contract price, the market value being that of jute
contracted for on the day following the date of default.
This date was to be the date in London on declaration
of default by telegram or without such declaration if
default was eventually made by lapse of time on the
21st day after expiry of the extended period. There
is also a provision for arbitration, which lays down
that any claim or dispute whatever arising out of, or
in relation to this contract or its construction or fulfilment shall be referred to arbitration in London in
accordance with the bye-laws of the London Jute
Association, and it was open to either party to claim
arbitration whenever and as often as disputes arose.
The contract also provides for an appeal by any party
dissenting from an arbitration award to the London
Jute Association in accordance with the regulations in
force for the time being. Lastly, it is provided that
the contract would be construed according to the laws
of England whatever the residence and nationality of
the parties might be or become and would be deemed
to be performed there. The courts of England or
572
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
'959
arbitrators, as the case might be, would have exclusive
Sh • 18
.
jurisdiction over all disputes which might arise under
iva ute
aling h
fi
f
.
.
Limited
t e contract, except or the purpose o enforcmg m the
v.
Colonies or abroad any arbitration award made under
Hindley and
this contract,
Company Limited
On June 23, 1947, thirty-nine bales of jute were
wanchoo 1.
consigned by the appellant to Rio de Janeiro in part
performance of the contract and information of this
was given to the respondent by letter on July 17, 1947.
It was said in this letter that difficulty had arisen
because of the non-availability of quota and it was
hoped that the balance remaining under the contract
would be shipped as soon as quota was available. The
respondent sent a reply to this letter on July 25, 1947,
and the appellant wrote a further letter on August 1,
1947, in which it was said that the remaining amount
of jute under the contract would be shipped as soon
as the quota was available.
We do not know what happened thereafter till we
come to August 1948. It seems that the respondent
received a cable on August 12, 1948, from the appellant stating that the contract stood cancelled long ago.
The respondent by its letter dated August 12, 1948,
refused to accept this position. Thereafter there were
disputes and differences between the parties and eventually the respondent claimed .default on or about
June 1949 in terms of the contract. On or about July
14, 1949, the respondent referred the matter to the
arbitration of the London Jute Association, which
appointed two of its member as arbitrators. The respondent filed its claim before the arbitrators on July 23,
1949. On July 27, 1949, the arbitrators gave notice to
the appellant to file its answer by August 19, 1949. The
appellant, however, filed no answer before the arbitrators. What the appellant did in reply was to file an
application under s. 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act,
1940 (hereinafter called the Arbitration Act), on ~he
original side of the Calcutta High Court, in which it
made three prayers, namely-
(a) declaration that the arbitration agreement, if
any, between the parties was void ab initio on the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
573
ground of uncertainty and was not binding on the
z959
appellant;
Shiva Jute Bali11g
(b) declaration that there was in fact and in law
Limited
no contract between the parties on account of
v.
mutual mistake of the parties · and
Hindley and
•
'
.
•
Company Limited
(c) that the court might be pleased to adJtld1cate
_
on the existence and/or validity of the alleged arbiwanchoo J.
tration agreement and the effect of the same.
This application. was moved on August 12, 1949. It
appears that on August 13, 1949, the appellant sent a.
cable to the respondent and the London Jute Association informing them that an application had been
made in the Calcutta High Court challenging' the submissions contained in the contract and that the arbitrators had become functus officio pending disposal of the
application, which was fixed for August 29.
The
appellant received a. reply to its cable in which it was
asserted that no such application as the appellant bad'
made to the Calcutta. High Court could be made th~re
and that the arbitrators would proceed with the adjudication on August 27 as already fixed. On August 17,
1949, the appellant sent a. letter to the London Jute
Association in which it referred to its cable and the
reply of the Association to that and reiterated its
stand that any further steps taken in the arbitration
proceedings pending disposal of 'the ~pplication under
s. 33 would be invalid under the Arl1itration Act. The
arbitrators, however, proceeded with the arbit.ration
and gave their a.ward on October 17, 1949.
No proceedings thereafter were ta.ken by the appellant in London, nor does.it appear that any steps were
taken by it to have its application under s. 33 decided,
till we come to November 26, 1951.
On that date, an
application was filed by the respondent in the Calcutta.
High Court under s. 5 of the Arbitration (Protocol and
Convention) Act, 1937, (hereinafter called the Protocol
Act). Along with this application it filed the a.ward
dated October 17, 1949, and prayed that judgment be
pronounced in accordance with the a.ward and decree
be passed accordingly. Notice of this was issued to
the appellant, which filed i~ reply on January 14,
7~
574
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1960(1)]
t959
1952, We do not think it necessary to set out the
Sh .
-
.
petition of the respondent under s. 5 of the Protocol
wajute Baling A
d h
II
,
I
h
.
.
Limited
ct an t e appe ant s rep y t ereto m detail, because
v.
when the matter came to be heard in court only two
Hindley and
points were urged on behalf of the appellant, namelyCompany Limited
(1) that the award was made after the notice of
Wanchoo ].
filing of the petition dated August 10, 1949, under
s. 33 of the Arbitration Act had been given to the
respondent and the arbitrators, and consequently
the award made after the receipt of the said notice
and during the pendency of the said application was
bad under s. 35 of the Arbitration Act; and
(2) that the award was bad on the face of it and
could not therefore be enforced in view of the provisions of s. 7(e) of the Protocol Act, which lays down
that an award cannot be enforced in India if it is
contrary to the law of India. It was contended that
the award was contrary to the law of India and this
appeared on the face of it inasmuch as the arbitrators had purported to award such damages as could
not be done under the provisions of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872.
Both' these contentions were negatived by the learned
Single Judge and he ordered the award to be filed
in court and passed a decree in terms thereof.
The appellant then went up in appeal, which was
heard by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court.
The grounds of appeal show that the same two points,
which were urged before the learned Single Judge,
were reiterated therein. When the matter came to be
heard before the Division Bench, the same two points
were raised on behalf of the appellant there also. The
Division Bench negatived the two contentions raised
before it on behalf of the appellant and confirmed the
judgment of the learned Single Judge.
It is curious,
however, to notice that though all these proceedings
were being taken on the application under s. 5 of the
Protocol Act the appellant apparently took no steps to
have its application under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act,
which seems to have been adjourned sine die, decided
along with the respondent's application under s, 5 of
the Protocol Act,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
575
This was followed by an application for a certificate
z959
to appeal to this Court, which was refused. Then the 5,,. 1-;-B 1.
11
1. d
h' C
£
. 1 1
wa u,e a ing
appe ant app ie to t is
ourt or spec1a
eave to
Limited
appeal, which was granted. In the special leave
v.
petition also the appellant raised the same to points,
Hindley ~ml_
namely, (i) the construction of ss. 33 and 35' of the Company Limited
Arbitration Act and the application of these provisions
Wanchoo J.
to the facts of this case, and (ii) the construction of
s. 7 of the Protocol Act and the Indian Contract Act
with respect to the damages awarded by the award.
In the statement of case also after narrating the
facts and circumstances, the same two points were
mentioned as the principal questions which a.rose for
determination in the appeal, namely, (i) the effect of
ss. 33 and 35 of the Arbitration Act on the facts and
circumstances of this case, and (ii) the interpretation
of s. 7 of the Protocol Act in the light of ss. 73 and 74
of the Indian Contract Act and their bearing on tlie
damages a.warded by the arbitrators and its effect on
the validity of the award.
Learned counsel for appellant, however, wanted to
raise before us other points arising out of s. 7 of the
Protocol Act. We do not think that the appellant
should be permitted to raise at this late stage any
new point in addition to the two points which were
urged before the learned Single Judge and which only
have all along been raised in the appeal to the High
Court and in the appeal before this Court. We shall
therefore confine the appellant to these two points
only and proceed on the assumption in the same manner as has been done by the High Court, namely, that
an application under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act
would lie in the circumstances of this case and therefore the provisions of s. 35 of the Arbitration Act
would be attracted.
Re. (1).
The pa.rt of s. 33 of the Arbitration Act, relevant
for our purpose, lays down that any party to an arbitration agreement desiring to challenge the existence
or validity of an arbitration agreement or to have its
effect determined shall apply to the court and the court
shall decide the question. It will thus be clear that
576
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
'959
s. 33 contemplates a.n application for three purposes,
Sh . -B 1.
namely, (i) when it is desired to challenge the exist-
'"" jute • ing
f
b"t t"
t ("") h
"t · d · d
Limited
ence o an ar 1 ra 10n agreemen , n w en 1 is es1re
v.
to challenge its validity, and (iii) when it is desired
Hiudley and
to have its effect determined. An arbitration agreeCompany Limited ment may come into existence in one of two ways; it
-
may either arise out of an agreement which contains
Wanehoo J.
nothing else besides the arbitration agreement, or it
may arise out of a. term contained in a. contract which
deals with various other matters relating to the contra.ct, which is the present case.
Where one is dealing
with an arbitration agreement of the second kind, s. 33
is concerned only with the term relating to arbitration
in the contract and not with the other terms of the
·contra.ct which do not a.rise for consideration on a.n
application under that section.
Then we come to s. 35. It provides that no reference
or award shall be rendered invalid by reason only of
the commencement of legal proceedings upon the
subject-matter of the reference, but when legal proceedings upon the whole of the subject-matter of the
reference has been commenced between all the parties
to the reference and a notice thereof has been given to
the arbitrators or umpire, all further proceedings in a.
pending reference s,hall, m.iless a stay of proceedings
is granted under s. 34, be invalid.
It will be seen,
therefore, that s. 35 makes proceedings before the
arbitrators invalid in the absence of an order under s. 34
staying the legal proceedings, where whole of the
subject-matter of the reference is covered by any legal
proceedings taken with respect to
i~.
In other
words, an arbitrator can continue the proceedings and
proceed to make the award on the reference, unless the
whole of the subject-matter of the reference is covered
by the legal proceedings whjch have been instituted.
Assuming that the proceedings taken under s. 33 are
" legal proceedings ", mentioned in s. 35, the question
which immediately a.rises on the facts of the present
case is whether the whole of the subject-matter of
the reference in this case was covered by the legal proceedings taken by the appellant by its application under
s. 33 of the Arbitration Act.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR.TS
577
In dealing with this aspect of the case, learned
z959
counsel for the appellant raised the questien of frustration of the contract and the powers of the court Shiva f.«
1~ ~aling
and the arbitrator in that behalf. It is true that the
•:'. e
words "frustration of contract" have been used in
Hindley and
paragraph 8 of the application. But the prayers do Company Limited
not show that any relief was claimed on that ground,
-
relief (c) being merely a repetition of the words of
Wanchoo f.
s. 33 of the Arbitration Act. Lea!rned counsel relied
on Heymen v. Darwins Ltd. (1) in this connection.
We do not think we should permit the appellant to
raise this contention at this late stage and would
content ourselves by pointing out incidentally that
even if the dictum in Heymen' s case (1) is accepted, it
will not help the appellant, for on that dictum the
question of frustration would be for the arbitrators to
decide on the basis of the terms used in this contract
which are of the widest amplitude and would not be
a. matter for consideration of the court. On this
basis th.ere would be no identity of subject-matter
between what can be raised in an application under
s. 33 on the facts of this case and what can be decided
by the arbitrators. However, we do not propose to
pursue this matter any further and to decide it.
Then we turn to prayers (a) and (b) of paragraph
9 of the application based on paragraphs 6 and 7
thereof. These prayers undoubtedly cannot be the
subject-matter of arbitration, for they go to the very
root of the contract and imply that there was no
contract between the parties at all and therefore no
arbitration agreement. These prayers can certainly
form the basis of an application under s. 33, for they
relate to the existence and validity of the arbitration
agreement contained in the contract; but not being
matters within the competence of the arbitrators,
there can be no identity of, the subject-matter under
reference to the arbitrators and. the subject-matter of
prayers (a) and (b). The conclusion, therefore, is that
prayers (a) and (b) can be the subject-matter of an
application under s. 3.3 but they cannot be the subjectma.tter of the reference to the arbitrators. Therefore,
(1) [1942] 2 A.C. 3S6.
578
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
z959
the subject-matter of the legal proceedings under s. 33
-
in this case cannot and does not cover any part of the
Shiva f«''., ~aling subject-matter of the reference. Section 35 in consequ-
·~:'
ence can have no applfoation and the award cannot
Hindley and
be assailed as invalid on the ground that it violates
Company Limited s. 35 of the Arbitration Act. The first contention,
therefore, must fail.
Wanc:hoo J.
Re. (2).
The argument under this head is that the liquidated
damages provided under cl. (12) of the contract include
not only the difference between the contract price and
the market price on the date of default but also a
further sum of 10s. per ton. Reference in this connection is made to ss. 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract
Act, and it is said that the extra amount of 10s. per
ton included in the sum of liquidated damages is
against the provision of these sections and therefore
the award being against the law of India is bad on the
face of it and should not be enforced in India. Section 73 provides for compensation for loss or i:lamage
caused by breach of contract. It lays down that when
a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by
such breach is entitled to receive from the party who
has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or
damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose
in the usual course of things from such breach, or
which the parties knew, when they made the contract,
to be likely to result from the breach of it. Section 74
provides for breach of contract where penalty is stipulated for or a sum is named and lays down that when
a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the
contract as the amount to be paid in case of such
breach, or if .the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the
breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or
loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive
from the party who has broken the contract reasonable
compensation not exceeding the amount so named or,
as the case may be, the penalty stipulated for.
What
cl. (12) of the contract provides in this case is the
measure of liquidated damages and that consists of
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
579
two things, namely, (i) the difference between the conz959
tract price and the market price .on the date of default,
· -
d (")
dd't'
f 10
t
b
h
Th
Shiva jute Baling
?'n
n .an a.
i 10n o
s. per on a ove t at.
ere
Limited
is nothmg m s. 73 ors. 74 of the Contract Act, which
v.
makes the award of such liquidated damages illegal.
Hindley and
Assuming that the case is covered by s. 74, it is provid- Company Limit1d
ed therein that reasonable compensation may be
awarded for breach of contract subject to the maximum
Wanchoo J.
amount named in the contract. What the arbitrators
have done is to award the maximum amount named
in the contract. If the appellant wanted to challenge
the reasonableness of that provision in cl. (12) it should
have appeared before the arbitrators and represented
its case. It cannot now be heard to say that simply
because cl. (12) provided for a further sum of 10s. per
ton over and above the difference between the contract
price and the market price on the date of the default,
this was per se unreasonable and was therefore bad
according to the law of India. as laid down in ss. 73
and 74 of the Contract Act. Both these sections
provide for reasonable compensation and s. 74 contemplates that the maximum reasonable compensation
may be the amount which may be named in the
contract. In this case the arbitrators have awarded
the maximum amount so named and nothing more.
Their award in the circumstances cannot be said to be
bad on the face of it, nor can it be said to be against
the law of India as contained in these sections of the
Contract Act. The second contention must also fail.
We, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs to the
respondent.
Appeal dismissed.