# HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD v. ASHOK VISHNU KATE AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1995] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 702
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1995-09-15
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 8338 of 1995
- **Bench:** G.N. Ray, S.B. Majmudar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/hindustan-lever-ltd-v-ashok-vishnu-kate-and-ors-13280
- **Pages:** 37

## Headnote

Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions. and Prevention of Unfair
Labour Practices Act, 1971-Sections 28(1), 30(2)-Jwisdiction of Labour
Court~nf air Labour Practice-Complaints filed by workmen apprehending
discharge or dismissal even prior to actual passing of orderr-Whether maintainable before Labour Court-Held, Yes.
Interpretation of Statutes-Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions
and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971-Social welfare legi.slaD tion-lnterpretation of-Construction.should be placed on relevant provisions
which effectuates the purpose for which such legi.slation is enacted.
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The predecessor of the appellant - company served chargesheets on
Respondent Nos. 1 to 9 for certain alleged misconduct. Respondents
instituted complaint before the Labour Court alleging that the company
has engaged in commission of unfair labour practices referred to in Item
1 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and
Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 and that in pursuance of
the show-cause notices, i~quirywas being conducted and they apprehended
that their services would be terminated. The respondents also filed applications for interim relief u/s 30(2), seeking interim injunction restraining the e1!1ployer - company from continuing the unfair labour practices
complained of and from terminating the services of the respondents. The
Labour Court passed an ex-pmte injunction restraining the employer -
company from terminating the service of the respondents.
The employer company contended that complaints were not maintainable and were premature and the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to
proceed with such complaints as jurisdiction of the Labour Court could
not be invoked under Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act as long as the
proceedings commenced by the employer- company were not terminated by
H orders of discharge or dismissal of the respondents.
702
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. AV. KATE
703
The Labour Court upheld the preliminary objection of the employer A
- company and held that the complaints were not maintainable at that
stage. The respondent workmen filed Writ Petition which was summarily
dismissed by the High Court. On appeal, the High Court held that the
respondents' complaints were not premature and the Labour Court had
jurisdiction to entertain such complaints filed before the actual orders of B
dismissal or termination were passed by the employer. The order passed
by the Labour Court was set aside and proceedings were remitted back to
the Labour Court for disposal of the complaints on merits. This Special
Leave Petition had been filed challenging the decision of the Division of
Bench of the High Court. During the pendency of the appeal, appellantcompany was substituted in place of the petitioner as the original C
petitioner had merged with the appellant-company.
The appellant - company contended that the High Court was in error
in taking the view that the complaints filed by the respondent workmen
were maintainable even prior to the passing of the dismissal or discharge D
order ; that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction under the Ma~arashtra
Act to proceed with such premature complaints; that though the Act deals
with prevention of unfair labour practices nowhere in the Act the word
'prevention' was mentioned; that the High Court was in error in taking the
view that unfair labour practice is not a penal offence under the Act as
Section 48 of the Act made such unfair labour practice penal; that the E
Labour Court u/s 30(2) could pass appropriate interim order restraining
the employer from enforcing or calling upon the employer to withdraw
temporarily the alleged unfair labour practice of dismissal or discharge
of employee and it was not as if after discharge or dismissal, such appropriate relief could not be granted by the Labour Court; that even F
though a chargesheet was served by the employer on the concerned
employee, there was still a possibility that it might not actually

## Text

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HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD.
v.
ASHOK VISHNU KATE AND ORS.
SEPTEMBER 15, 1995
[G.N. RAY AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.)
Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions. and Prevention of Unfair
Labour Practices Act, 1971-Sections 28(1), 30(2)-Jwisdiction of Labour
Court~nf air Labour Practice-Complaints filed by workmen apprehending
discharge or dismissal even prior to actual passing of orderr-Whether maintainable before Labour Court-Held, Yes.
Interpretation of Statutes-Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions
and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971-Social welfare legi.slaD tion-lnterpretation of-Construction.should be placed on relevant provisions
which effectuates the purpose for which such legi.slation is enacted.
E
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The predecessor of the appellant - company served chargesheets on
Respondent Nos. 1 to 9 for certain alleged misconduct. Respondents
instituted complaint before the Labour Court alleging that the company
has engaged in commission of unfair labour practices referred to in Item
1 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and
Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 and that in pursuance of
the show-cause notices, i~quirywas being conducted and they apprehended
that their services would be terminated. The respondents also filed applications for interim relief u/s 30(2), seeking interim injunction restraining the e1!1ployer - company from continuing the unfair labour practices
complained of and from terminating the services of the respondents. The
Labour Court passed an ex-pmte injunction restraining the employer -
company from terminating the service of the respondents.
The employer company contended that complaints were not maintainable and were premature and the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to
proceed with such complaints as jurisdiction of the Labour Court could
not be invoked under Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act as long as the
proceedings commenced by the employer- company were not terminated by
H orders of discharge or dismissal of the respondents.
702
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. AV. KATE
703
The Labour Court upheld the preliminary objection of the employer A
- company and held that the complaints were not maintainable at that
stage. The respondent workmen filed Writ Petition which was summarily
dismissed by the High Court. On appeal, the High Court held that the
respondents' complaints were not premature and the Labour Court had
jurisdiction to entertain such complaints filed before the actual orders of B
dismissal or termination were passed by the employer. The order passed
by the Labour Court was set aside and proceedings were remitted back to
the Labour Court for disposal of the complaints on merits. This Special
Leave Petition had been filed challenging the decision of the Division of
Bench of the High Court. During the pendency of the appeal, appellantcompany was substituted in place of the petitioner as the original C
petitioner had merged with the appellant-company.
The appellant - company contended that the High Court was in error
in taking the view that the complaints filed by the respondent workmen
were maintainable even prior to the passing of the dismissal or discharge D
order ; that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction under the Ma~arashtra
Act to proceed with such premature complaints; that though the Act deals
with prevention of unfair labour practices nowhere in the Act the word
'prevention' was mentioned; that the High Court was in error in taking the
view that unfair labour practice is not a penal offence under the Act as
Section 48 of the Act made such unfair labour practice penal; that the E
Labour Court u/s 30(2) could pass appropriate interim order restraining
the employer from enforcing or calling upon the employer to withdraw
temporarily the alleged unfair labour practice of dismissal or discharge
of employee and it was not as if after discharge or dismissal, such appropriate relief could not be granted by the Labour Court; that even F
though a chargesheet was served by the employer on the concerned
employee, there was still a possibility that it might not actually culminate
into any discharge or dismissal and, therefore, complaint against
proposed dismissal or dismissal would be premature.
The respondent employees submitted that the Maharashtra Act G
itself was enacted for prevention of unfair labour practices, as enumerated
in the Schedules and such labour practices on the part of the employers
or the trade unions of employees could be prevented in appropriate cases
by the concerned courts functioning under the Act, which would mean that
such complainants could be filed prior to the actual commission of the H
704
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A
final act of the unfair labour practice complained of; that it was social
legislation; hence a liberal interpretation should be placed on the scheme
of the Act, with a view to subserve the purpose for which Maharashtra Act
was enacted; that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act fell short
of the achievement of goal of prevention of unfair labour practices and this
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was sought to be achieved by the Maharashtra Legislature.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court
HELD : 1.1. A conjoint reading of Section 28(1) and Section 30(1) of
the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair
Labour Practices Act, 1971 clearly shows that complaint can be filed for
the alleged unfair labour practice as contemplated in Item 1 of Schedule
IV on any of the grounds mentioned therein, both at the stage where such
final orders of discharge or dismissal are passed on the concerned alleged
grounds and also at the stages prior to such final orders, __ once the
employer is shown to have taken a firm step in that direction by initiating
departmental enquiries with a view to· ultimately discharge or dismiss the
employee on any of the alleged grounds and such enquiries are presently
in progress or are presently in offing. Then the employer can be said to be
presently engaging in any such unfair labour practice. It becomes obvious
that the twin phrases 'has engaged' and 'is engaging in' indicate not only
the finished, complete or continuous action but also an incomplete continuous action. [722-A-C]
Therefore, if an employer is alleged to be engaged in discharging any
employee then even before the actual order of discharge is passed he can
be said to be engaged in such discharge if it is shown that an attempt is
F
made towards such a discharge with an intention to ultimately discharge
the employee. [722-G]
1.2. Item 1 of Schedule IV would cover in the sweep of general unfair
labour practice on the part of the employer even the initiation of proceedings or taking any other firm step like suspension, towards discharge or
G
dismissal of the employee concerned, which can be challenged on the
grounds mentioned in Item 1 of Schedule IV. Sucli initiation of proceed-
. ings or firm steps themselves would be the occurrence of the alleged unfair
labour practices and would give a cause of action to the complaint to file
the complaint under section 28(1) within the period of limitation as laid
H down therein. [723-D-E]
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HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. AV. KATE
705
1.3. Once the Labour Court is given the powers in appropriate cases A
of passing interim relief of restraining orders as per Section 30 (2) it would
clear~y indicate the legislative intention that complaints regarding the
proposed dismissal or discharge on any of the grounds mentioned in Item
1 of Schedule IV could be filed before the Labour Court. In such complaints the Labour Court in appropriate cases, in exercise of its powers
under Section 30(2) can issue interim orders with a view to preventing such
alleged unfair practices from getting fructified. Thus Section 30(2) also
highlights the legislative intent of providing an effective machinery to
prevent the finalisation of the alleged unfair practices which are required
to be nipped in the bud. [725-D-E]
1.4. Prevention of commission of unfair labour practice is the very
purpose of the Act. Prevention of unfair labour practice, as per the Act, is
aimed not only against the employers, but also against the employees and
their trade unions, if they are alleged to engage themselves in any of the
unfair labour practice mentioned in Schedule III. [727-E, H, 728-A]
1.5. Maharashtra Act is a social welfare legislation and in interpreting such a welfare legislation, such a construction should be placed on the
relevant provisions which effectuates the purpose for which such legislation is enacted and does not efface its very purpose of prevention of unfair
~abour practice. [728-E]
If a wider interpretation is placed on the relevant provisions of Item
1 of Schedule IV, apart from not straining the language which even may
become permissible on the rule of purposive construction, the said construction would fructify the very purpose for which the Maharashtra Act
was enacted. [730-E]
Workmen of Anwican Express International Banking C01poration v.
Management of Amelican Express International Bankin~ C01poration, [1985]
4 sec 71, relied on.
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Chanan Singh v. Registrar Cooperative Societ es, Punjub & Ors., [1976] G
3 SCR 685, distinguished.
Franchis Bennion, Statutory Interpretati 11 (Sec< nd Edition), referred
to.
2. A mere threat to discharge or dismiss an employee if he joins a H
706
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A
union by itself may be an unfair labour practice as per Item l(a) of
Schedule II thought the threat might not have been translated into any
attempt in the direction of discharge or dismissal. For the purpose of
attracting Item 1 of Schedule IV, apart from mere threat, some concrete
step like starting departmental enquiry has to be taken by the employer
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before such an action can be brought in challenge by the concerned
employee on any of the grounds mentioned in Item I of Schedule IV.
Consequently, merely because the legislature has not repeated the terminology of mere threat while enacting Items of Schedule IV it would not
mean that before the final order of discharge or dismissal is passed on
any of the grounds contemplated by Item I of schedule IV, and only first
step is taken in that direction, the unfair labour practice to discharge or
dismiss such employee on any of these grounds mentioned in Item I of
Schedule IV cannot be said to have taken place, or on that basis the
complaint would be premature. [731-F, 732-C-D]
3. When a contemplated action on the part of the employer to dismiss
or discharge an employee on any of the grounds mentioned in that item is
firmly taken, the employee can as well show that this type of action on the
part of the employer is a habitual action or by way of a general practice.
But even apart from such a general practice, it can be alleged and
demonstrated that the employer is following such a practice at least for
the complaint. It is not as if a practice which is not repetitive in character
can never amount to an unfair labour practice as contemplated by
Schedule IV, Item 1. [736-A-B]
Bharat Iron Works v. B.B. Patel, [1976) 2 SCR 280, distinguished.
F
4. Employers have a right to take disciplinary actions and to hold
domestic enquiries against their erring employees. But for doing so, the
standing orders governing the field have to be followed by such employers.
These standing orders give sufficient protection to the concerned employees
against whom such departmental enquiries are proceeded with. If such
G departmental proceedings initiated by serving of.chargesheets are brought
in challenge at different stages of such proceedings by the concerned
employees invoking the relevant clauses of item I of Schedule IV before the
final orders of discharge or dismissal are passed, the Labour Court dealing
with such complaint should not lightly interfere with such pending domestic enquiries against the concerned complainants. The Labour Court conH
cerned should meticulously scan the allegations in the complaint and it
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. AV. KATE [MATMUDAR, J.]
707·-
necessary, get the necessary investigation made in the light of such comA
plaint and only when a very strong prim a f acie case is made out by the
complainant appropriate interim orders intercepting such domestic enquiries in exercise of powers u~der Section 30 (2) can be passed by the
Labour Courts. Such orders should not be passed for mere askance ~y the
Labour Court. Otherwise, the very purpose of holding domestic enquiries B
as per the standing orders would get frustrated. (737-G-H, 738-A-C]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8338 of
1995.
From the Judgment and Order dated 6.3.92 of the Bombay High
Court in A. No. 952/89 in W.P. No. 2286 of 1989.
G.B. Pai, O.C. Mathur, Ritin Rai, Mrs. Meera Mathur for JBD. &
Co. for the Appellant.
c
N.B. Shtye, O.C. Mathur, Mrs. Meera Mathur, for J.B.D. & Co. Ritin D
Rai for the Intervenor.
Ms. Indra Jai Singh, S.J. Deshmukh and Bharat Sangal for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MAJMUDAR, J. Leave granted.
By consent of learned advocates of the parties, the appeal is finally
heard and is being disposed of by this judgment.
The short question involved in this appeal centres round the Jurisdiction of the Labour Court functioning under the Maharashtra RecogniE
F
tion of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short) regarding entertaining of
complaints filed under Section 28(1) of the Maharashtra Act .in connection G
with contemplated discharge or dismissal of the employees alleged to be
resorted to by the employer by way of unfair labour practice, as mentioned
in Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Act. The Labour Court in
which the complaints were filed took the view that such complaints were
not maintainable as the actual orders of discharge or dismissal were yet
not passed by the employer. The learned Single Judge of the Bombay High H
708
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A
Court confirmed that view, but the appellate Bench of the High Court
allowed the writ appeal filed by the respondent-workmen and took a
contrary view. That is how the employer is before us in this appeal.
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BACKGROUND FACTS
A few relevant facts are required to be noted at the outset. The
predecessor of the present appellant-company, Hindustan Lever Limited,
the Tata Oil Mills Company Limited served chargesheets on Respondent
Nos. 1 to 9 for certain alleged misconduct. Respondent Nos. 1 to 9
instituted Complaint (ULP) Nos. 90 to 98 of 1989 before the Presiding
Officer, First Labour Court, Bombay, alleging therein, inter alia, that the
appellant's predecessor company had engaged in commission of unfair
labour practices referred to in Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra
Act. It was the case of the respondents in the said complaints that in
pursuance of the show-cause notices, inquiry was being conducted and they
apprehended that their services would be terminated. The respondents also
filed applications for interim relief under Section 30(2) of the Maharashtra
act seeking interim injunction restraining the employer-company from
continuing the unfair labour practices complained of and from terminating
the services of the respondents. The Labour Court passed an ex-parte
injunction restraining the employer-company from terminating the services
of the respondents.
The employer-company filed its written statements in these complaints and among others it was ontended that complaints themselves were
not maintainable and were premature and the Labour Court had no
jurisdiction to proceed with such complaints as jurisdiction of the Labour
Court could not be· invoked under Item 1 of Schedule IV of the
Maharashtra Act as long as the proceedings commenced by the employercompany were not terminated by orders of discharge or dismissal of the
concerned respondents. The employer-company also resisted the complaints on merits.
The Labour Court by its order dated August 10, 1989, upheld the
preliminary objection of the employer-company and held that the complaints were not maintainable at that stage. The Labour Court followed the
decision of the learned Single Judge of the High Court sitting at Nagpur
in the case of Divisional Commissione1; M.S.R. T. C. v. Presiding Office1;
H Industfial Cowt of Maharashtra, Nagpur & Anr., (1989) Mah. L.J. 798, which
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. AV. KATE [MATMUDAR,J.]
709
had taken a similar view.
The respondent-workmen filed Writ Petition No. 2286 of 1989 under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India . The learned Single Judge of the
High Court summarily dismissed the same on August 21, 1989.
The respondents carried the matter before the Division bench of the
High Court in appeal, being Appeal No. 952 of 1989. The Division Bench
consisting of M.C. Pendse and S.N. Kapadia, JJ. allowed the said appeal
by its decision dated March 6, 1992, wherein Pendse, J. speaking for the
Division Bench, took the view that the respondents' complaints were not
premature and the Labour Court had jurisdiction to entertain such complaints filed before the actual orders of dismissal or termination were
passed by the employer. The order dated August 10, 1989, passed by the
Presiding Officer, First Labour Court, Bombay, was get aside and the
proceedings were remitted back to the First Labour Court. Bombay for
disposal of the complaints on merits.
The employer-company filed Special Leave Petition (C) No. 9740 of
1992 in this Court challenging the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench
of the High Court. During the pendency of this special leave petition, by
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I.A. No. 4of1995, the present appellant-company i.e., the Hindustan Lever
Limited, applied to be substituted in place of the original petitioner, the E
Tata Oil Mills Company Limited, on the ground that the original petitioner
had merged with M/s Hindustan Lever Limited. The said I.A. was allowed
and that is how the present appellant-company has prosecuted this appeal
by special leave. The Employers' Federation of India accompanied by M/s
Blue Star Limited, also filed I.A. No. 3 of 1992 seeking permission of this
Court for intervention as they were interested in supporting the petitionerF
company in the special leave petition. That application for intervention was
also allowed. The intervenors have filed their written submission in support
of the this appeal. They have also appeared through their learned counsel
who was heard in this appeal.
RIVAL CONTENTIONS
G
Shri Pai, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the appellant- company and the learned counsel for the intervenors contended that the
Division Bench of the High Court was in error in taking the view that the
complaints filed by the respondent-workmen were maintainable even prior H
710
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A
to the passing of the dismissal or discharge orders, as the case may be, and
that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction under the Maharashtra Act to
proceed with such premature complaints. In this connection, the learned
counsel submitted that a mere look at Item 1 of Schedule IV shows that
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the complaints of unfair labour practice in connection with the activities
mentioned therein on the part of the employer necessarily contemplated
final discharge or dismissal orders. They submitted that Section 28(1) lays
down the period of limited for filing complaints before the Labour Court.
The said period has to run from the date of alleged occurrence and,
therefore, the alleged unfair labour practice must occur by way of dismissal
or discharge before such complaint can be filed. It was next contended that
though the Act deals with prevention of unfair labour practices, nowhere
in the body of the Act in any of the sections the word 'Prevention' is
mentioned. According to the learned counsel, the Division bench of the
High Court was in error in taking the view that unfair labour practice is
not a penal offence under the Act. Section 48 of the Maharashtra Act
D made such unfair labour practice penal. That the Labour Court under
Section 30(2) could pass appropriate interim order restraining the
employer from enforcing or calling upon the employer to withdraw temporarily the alleged unfair labour practice of dismissal or discharge of
employee and it was not as if after discharge or dismissal, such interim
relief could not be granted in an appropriate case by the Labour Court.
E ·Reliance was also placed on the decision of this Court in the case of
Chanan Singh v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies Punjab & Ors., [1976] 3
SCR 685 for submitted that even though a chargesheet is served by the
employer on the concerned employee, there is still a possibility that it may
not actually culminate into any discharge or dismissal and, therefore,
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complaint against proposed dismissal or discharge would be premature.
On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondentemployees vehemently submitted that the Maharashtra Act itself is enacted
for prevention of unfair labour practices, as enumerated in the Schedules
and such labour practices on the part of the employers or the trade unions
G of employees, as mentioned in Schedule II, III and IV, could be prevented
in appropriate cases by the concerned Courts functioning under the
Maharashtra Act, which would necessarily mean that such complaints
could be filed prior to the actual commission of the final act of the unfair
labour practice complained of. The submission of the appellant's counsel
H would make the very scheme of preventing unfair labour practice inopera-
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HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. AV. KATE [MAJMUDAR, J.]
711
tive and otios. That the relevant provisions of the Maharashtra Act clearly A
contemplate filing of complaints not only against the final act of discharge
of dismissal of employees by way of unfair labour practice, but even at
stages prior to the final stage where the employer completes such an
exercise. That such was the view taken years back by the Full Bench of the
Maharashtra Industrial Court and which was followed by all Courts in
Maharashtra Functioning under the Maharashtra Act. That the view taken
by the Division Bench of the High Court was in consonance with the
scheme of the Act and fructified the said scheme. That it is a social
legislation hence a liberal interpretation should be placed on the scheme
of the Act, with a view to s1,1bserve the purpose for which Maharashtra Act
B
was enacted. That the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act fell short C
of the achievement of goal of prevention of unfair labour practices. This
was sought to be achieved by the Maharashtra Legislature by enacting the
provisions of the Maharashtra Act and consequently the interpretation
placed by the Division Bench of the High Court on the relevant provisions
of the Act and the final conclusion to which it reached deserve to be D
upheld.
OUR CONCLUSIONS AND THE REASONS FOR THE SAME
Having given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions, we
have reached the conclusion that the decision of the Division Bench of the E
Bombay High Court taking the view that complaints could be filed by the
workmen apprehending discharge or dismissal by way of unfair labour
practice as contemplated by the relevant clauses of Item 1 of Schedule IV
of the Maharashtra Act, even prior to the actual passing of orders of
discharge or dismissal is well sustained on the scheme of the Act. We now p
proceed to elaborate our reasons for the aforesaid conclusion.
Before we deal with the relevant provisions of the Maharashtra Act,
it would be necessary to note that in the State of Maharashtra, prior to the
passing of the Maharashtra Act, two Acts governing the relations between G
the employers and the employees in industries were already holding the
field. One Act was the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 ('B.l.R. Act'
for short) which applied to certain notified industries under the Act.
yarious protections were given under the B.I.R. Act to the workmen
covered by the said Act. But there was no provision regarding prevention
of unfair labour practices either on the part of the employers or on the H
712
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A
part of the unions of employees. There was also a Central Act. Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 ('I.D. Act' for short) applicable to industries which
were not covered by the B.l.R. Act. The Maharashtra Act was ·passed by
the legislature on February 1, 1972, being Maharashtra Act 1 of 1972. By
that time industries which were covered by the I.D. Act, which was a
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Central Act, also did not have the benefit of any provision regardin~
prevention of unfair labour practices. Under the I.D. Act provision was
made for reference by an appropriate Government of any industrial dispute
between the employers and the employees for adjudication of competent
Industrial or labour Court, as the case may be. The "Industrial Dispute" as
defined by Section 2(k) of the I.D. Act could be referred for adjudication
to the competent authority as per Section 10, if the persons applying for
reference represented majority of each party as laid down by Section 10(2).
"Industrial Dispute" as defined by Section 2(k) of the I.D. Act, 1947
provides as under :
'"Industrial Dispute' means any dispute or difference between
employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or
between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the
employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or
with the conditions of labour, of any person ;"
Only with effect from 1.12.1965, Section 2(A) was inserted in the I.D. Act
wherein even an individual workman could raise an industrial dispute in
connection with his discharge or dismissal or otherwise termination of
service. For all other types of industrial disputes, a majority of workmen
had to support the dispute before the appropriate Government could refer
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it for adjudication of competent Court. However, in either case, reference
of such industrial dispute had to be made by the appropriate Government
under Section 10 of the I.D. Act. There was no provision for reference of
any industrial dispute under the Central Act, for preventing any unfair
labour practice, by the time the Maharashtra Act saw the light of the day.
It is, of course, true that by an amendment to the Industrial Disputes Act
G Chapter V(c) was added w.e.f. August 2, 1984, which deals with unfair
labour practice. The :"unfair Labour Practice" as defined by the I.D. Act
in Section 2(ra) means 'any of the practices specified in the Fifth Schedule'.
When we turn to the Fifth Schedule to the I.D. Act, we find the cataloguing of unfair labour practices on the part of the employers, the trade
H unions of the employers and on the part of the wor~men and trade unions ,
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. AV.KATE[MAJMUDAR,J.]
713
of workmen, which are almost pari-mate1ia with lists of unfair labour A
practices on the part of the employers, on the part of the trade unions and
general unfair labour practices on the part of the employers as found in
Schedules II, III and IV of the Maharashtra Act. However, even the
aforesaid amended provisions of the I.D. Act concerning unfair labour
practice nowhere provide for any reference of industrial dispute in connecB
tion with such unfair labour practice on the part of the employers which
can entitle the workmen or a body of workmen to seek a reference for
adjudication or for its prevention by any competent Court under the I.D.
Act, and all that a workman can do is to wait till the order of discharge or
dismissal is passed and then he can raise a dispute under Section 2(A) in
connection with his dismissal or discharge and if such dispute is referred
by the appropriate Government for adjudication of the Labour Court
which is entitled to adjudicate upon such dispute as per the residuary Item
6 of Schedule II to the I.D. Act. then in such a dispute it can be shown by
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the workman that his actual dismissal or discharge was a result of unfair
labour practice as laid down by clause 5 of part 1 of the Fifth Schedule to D
the I.D. Act. However, there is no provision for preventing any proposed
discharge of dismissal by way of unfair labour practice on the part of the
employer as per the statutory scheme of the I.D. Act, even after the
insertion of Chapter V(c) in that Act. On the other hand, more than a
decade before the aforesaid amendment was brought in the I.D. Act, which
fell short of providing for prevention of u~fair labour practice, the
Maharashtra Legislature as early as in 1972 enacted the Maharashtra Act
providing for such prevention. Similarly as noticed earlier the B.LR. Act
also did not offer any remedy to the workmen to raise a dispute regarding
prevention of any unfair labour practice on the part of the employer who
had set in motion machinery for discharging or dismissing workmen by way
of alleged unfair labour practice. Thus, in the background of the then
existing lacuna both under the Central Act, i.e. the l.D. Act and the B.I.R.
Act regarding any provision for prevention of unfair labour practice, we
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will have to examine the scheme of the Maharashtra Act which seeks to
provide a remedy for prevention of such unfair labour practices and to find
out how it supplies the lacuna and tries to achieve its goal.
G
SCHEME OF THE MAHARASHTRA ACT
The preamble of the Act lays down as under :
H
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c
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
"An Act to provide for the recognition of trade unions for
facilitating collective bargaining for certain undertakings; to state
their rights and obligations; to confer certain powers on unrecognised unions: to provide for declaring certain strikes and lock-outs
as illegal stricks and lock-outs; to define and provide for the
prevention of certain unfair labour practices; to constitute courts
(as independent machinery) for carrying out the purposes of according recognition to trade unions and for enforcing the
provisions relating to unfair practices; and to provide for matters
connected with the purposes aforesaid.
WHEREAS, by Government Resolution, Industries and
Labour Department, No. IDA. 1367-LAB-II, dated the 14th
February 1968, the Government of Maharashtra appointed a Committee Called "the Committee on Unfair Labour Practices" for
defining certain activities of employers and workers and their
organisations which should be treated as unfair labour practices
and for suggesting action which should be taken against employers
or workers, or their organisations, for engaging in such unfair
labour practices;
AND WHEREAS, after taking into consideration the report
of the Committee Government is of opinion that it is expedient to
provide for the recognition of trade unions for facilitating collective
bargaining for certain undertakings; to state their rights and obligations; to confer certain powers on unrecognised unions; to provide
for declaring certain strikes and lock-outs as illegal strikes and
lock-outs; to define and provide for the prevention of certain unfair
labour practices; to constitute cour~s (as independent machinery)
for carrying out the purposes or according recognition to trade
unions and for enforcing provisions relating to unfair practices;
and to provide for matters connected with the purposes aforesaid;
It is hereby enacted in the Twenty-~econd year of the Republic of
India as follows : ........ .''
The preamble of the Act clearly indicates that the Maharashtra Act
is brought on the statute book with the avowed purpose of regulating the
activities of trade unions and for preventing certain unfair labour practices
H both on the part of unions of employees as well as the employer. As laid
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. A.V.KATE[MATMUDAR,J.]
715
down by Section 2(3) of the Act, the Act has to apply to the industries to A
which B.l.R. Act, for the time being applies and also to any industry as
defined in clause G) of Section 2 of the l.D. Act and also to the State
Government which in relation to any industrial dispute concerning such
industry is the appropriate Government under that Act. Thus, the Act
sought to supplement and cover the field for which the concerned inB
dustries governed by the then I.D. Act and B.l.R. Act did not get any
coverage and that field was obviously amongst others the field pertaining
to prevention of unfair labour practices as defined by the Act.
"Unfair labour practices" as per Section 3(16) mean unfair labour
practices as defined in Section 26. When we turn to Section 26, we find
C
that it occurs in chapter VI dealing with unfair labour practices. It provides
that in this Act, unless the context requires otherwise, "unfair labour
practices" mean any of the practices listed in Schedules II, III and IV. That
takes us to the concerned Schedules.
Schedule II of the Act deals with unfair labour practices on the part D
of the employers. Schedule III of the Act deals with unfair labour practices
of trade unions of employees and then comes Schedule IV which deals with
general unfair labour practices on the part of the employers. As we are
directly concerned with Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act, it is necessary
to reproduce the said item with all its clauses at this stage.
E
"SCHEDULE IV
General Unfair Labour Practices on the Part of employers
1. To discharge or dismiss employees-
(a) by way of victimisation ;
(b) not in good faith, but m colourable exercise of the
employer's rights ;
(c) by falsely implicating an employee in a criminal case on.
false evidence or on concocted evidence;
( d) for patently false reasons ;
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( e) on untrue or trumped up allegations of absence without H
)
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
leave;
(t) in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice in the
conduct of domestic enquiry or with undue haste :
(a) for misconduct of a minor or technical character, without
having any regard to the nature of the particular misconduct or
the past record of service of the employee, so as to amount to a
shockingly disproportionate punishment."
A mere look at Item 1 of Schedule IV shows that it would be a
general unfair labour practice on the part of the employer to discharge or
dismiss employees on any of the grounds mentioned in, clause (a) to (g) of
this Item. On this aspect there is no dispute between the parties. The moot
question is whether the sweep of the item can cover any of the alleged
general unfair labour practices on the part of the employer, before the
employer concerned actually discharges or dismisses the employee on any
of the grounds enumerated in clauses (a) to (g). Let us take an illustration
to see how this item operates. If an employer discharges or dismisses an
employee by way of victimisation it would be a complete unfair labour
practice on his part as contemplated by clause (a) of Item 1 of Schedule
IV. As we have seen above, the Act is enacted with a view to prevent such
unfair labour practice. Therefore, the question squarely arises as to how
such an unfair labour practice of discharge or dismissal of an employee by
way of victimisation can be prevented. If it is to be prevented, it has to be
prevented from taking effect or getting completed. Therefore, the intervention of the Labour Court can be sought where the concerned general unfair
labour practice on the part of the employer to discharge or dismiss an
employee by way of victimisation has not resulted into its culmination but
it is in pipeline or process. Under the standing orders governing the
concerned industries, before an employee can be discharged or dismissed
on the ground of any misconduct, departmental enquiry has to be held.
G Consequently, taking the initial step towards the direction of discharging
or dismissing of any employee on the ground of any misconduct by issuing
a chargesheet can be said to be the first action taken by the employer
towards such ultimate discharge or dismissal of an employee. It can then
be said that the process of alleged unfair labour practice on the part of the
employer to discharge or dismiss an employee on ground (a) mentioned in
H Item 1 of Schedule IV is started or has got initiated or is triggered off by
HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. v. AV. KATE [MATMUDAR, J.]
717
the employer. If an employee can make out a strongplima facie case for A
interdiction of such a process, he can legitimately invoke the jurisdiction
of the Labour Court for preventing such an unfair labour practice from
getting fructified or completed. In this connection, it is necessary to note
that the general unfair labour practice on the part of the employers as
mentioned in Item 1 of Schedule IV pertains to different types of objectionable actions based on grounds which are indicative of unfair labour
practices and any action based on such grounds with a view to discharge
or dismiss an employee is considered by the Act to be an unfair labour
practice on the part of the employer.
B
The Division Bench of the High Court for coming to its conclusion C
has heavily relied upon the words "to discharge or dismiss employees" as
found in Item 1 of Schedule VI. We find that the term "to discharge or·
dismiss
11 does indicate even attempted action towards such discharge or
dismissal. In this connection, we may profitably refer to the meaning of the
term "to" as found in various dictionaries as the said term is not defined by
the Maharashtra Act.
D
In Concise Oxford Dictionary, New Seventh Edition, Oxford University Press, at page 1124, one of the meanings of the word "to" is mentioned
as under:
11ln the direction of (place, person, thing, condition, quality,
etc.; with or without implication of intention or of arrival."
In Collins English Dictionary, at page 1525, one of the meanings of
the word "to" is as under :
"used to indicate the destination of the subject or object of an
action: he climbed to the top
11
•
In Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume 41A, at page
418, one of the meanings of the word "to
11 is amplified as under :
"The word "to" means indicating anythi~g regarded as a ter~
minal point or limit in the direction of which there is movement
and at which there is arrival or in the direction of which there is
movement or tendency without arrival."
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In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 5th Edition, volume 5, at page 2646, H
A
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c
718
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
one of the meanings of the word "to" is mentioned as under :
"(3) "To" wills often mean "towards." The plaintiff effected a
marine policy, subject to rules one of which was that ships were
not to sail from any port on the east coast of Great Britain "to"
any port in the Belts between December 20 and February 15. The
plaintiffs vessel sailed on February 8 for a port in the Belts, and
was lost; held, that the rule in question was a warranty and not an
exception; and that the word "to" in the rule meant "towards" and
not "arriving at " (Colledge V. Harty 6 Ex. 205)
( 4) "To or towards": see R. v. M'Cmthy, [1903J 2 Ir. R. 156, cited
INTIMIDATE."
It becomes, therefore, obvious that general unfair labour practice on
the part of the employer to discharge or dismiss the employee on any of
the ground listed in clauses (a) to (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV would
D
include any step towards or in · the direction of ultimate discharge or
dismissal of the employee on that ground and even before such discharge
or dismissal is finally arrived at. It is not possible to accept the contention
of the learned counsel for the appellant that discharge or dismissal of any
employee would only mean the confirmed acf of discharge or dismissal on
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any of these grounds and not a penultimate step taken by the employer
concerned in that direction on that ground.