# HINSAVIRODHAK SANGH v. MIRZAPUR MOTi

- **Citation:** [2008] 4 S.C.R. 1020
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2008-03-14
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 5469 of 2005
- **Bench:** H.K. Sema, Markandey Kat Ju
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/hinsavirodhak-sangh-v-mirzapur-moti-24761
- **Pages:** 31

## Headnote

...l_
Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 14, 19(1)(g) & 21:
•
c
. Right to practice trade/business - Closure of slaughter
house during festival - Reasonable restriction . vis-a-vis
religious tolerance - Held: Resolution passed by Municipal
Corporation closing municipal slaughter house during
PARYUSHAN festival observed by Jain community not in
D
violation of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) or 21 of Constitution as there
is no clear violation of any constitl!tional provision by such
-j..
resolutions - Since closure of the slaughter house was for a
.,
short period of nine days, resolutions not putting excessive
restriction· on the right of butcher community to practice their
profession - Restriction for a limited period cannot be termed
E as unreasonable restriction -
During restriction, nonvegetarian could become vegetarian out of respect for religious
feeling of other community - The policy of tolerance alone
could keep the co.untry together despite so much diversity -
Hence nothing unreasonable found in the impugned
F resolutions as violative of fundamental rights of respondent
)'
as granted u!Articles 14, 19(1 )(g) and 21 - Bombay Provincial
Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 - Resolutions dated 14181
1999 and 291811999 issued thereunder.
G
Delegated legislation - Nature of - Held: Statutory in
character provided it does not violate provisions of parent
statutes.
Delegated legislation - Constitutional validity of - Held :
APresumption is in favour of Constitutionality thereof - It is only
H
1020
•
HINSAVIRODHAK SANGH v. MIRZAPUR MOTi
1021
KURESH JAMAT & ORS.
in the limited case of clear violation of provision: beyond a A
reasonable doubt that the Court should declar:e it to be
unconstitutional - Judicial restraint - Exercise of
Respondent No. 1, a registered public charitable trust
safeguarding the interests of the persons engaged in the
business of slaughter and sale of livestock; Respondent. 8
No. 2, an association of persons, engaged in the sale of
mutton in the city of Ahmedabad; and Respondent No.3,
an individual, who was doing the business of selling .
mutton in the city of Ahmedabad filed Writ Petitions before
the High Court alleging that with a view to appease the C
Jain community the State Government and th·e.
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation have passed
resolutions dated 14-8-1998 and 29-81999 for closure of
the municipal slaughter houses in the city of Ahmedab~d
during the period of the Paryushan festival, an important D
Jain festival. It is alleged that the closure of the municipal
slaughter houses directly results in violation of their .
fundamental rights to do trade and business as
guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and
closure of the slaughter house cannot be said to be a E
reasonable restriction merely because a particular
community or a section of the society feels that there
should be closure of the municipal slaughter houses for
a particular period will be in consonance with the Jain
ideology of Ahinsa (non-violence). The Division Bench of F
the High Court held that the impugned resolutions of the
Municipal Corporation were constitutionally invalid; that
the people eat vegetarian food or non-vegetarian food is
their private affair and the Court cannot make any
pronouncement about it; that people living in different G
parts of the country have different eating habits. Even in
a particular locality, village or town, there are some
persons who are vegetarian and others who are nonvegetarian and that no restriction can be placed on the
slaughtering or eating of meat merely because it may hurt
H
1022
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008) 4 S.C.R.
A the sentiments or the religious feelings of a particular
\
community or a society. Hence, the present appeal.
~
~ · Allowing the appeals, the Court
•. ...
·· · ~ELD: 1.1 The impugned resolutions passed by
B Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad are valid, as there
is 110 violation of Articles 14, 19(1 )(g) or 21 of the
Constitution. ·(Para - 25) [1036-F]
~
_.
State of Guj

## Text

_Characters 0–39,807 of 60,424. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39807 for what follows._

[2008] 4 S.C.R. 1020
A
HINSA VIRODHAK SANGH
{
II.
MIRZAPUR MOTi KURESH JAMAT & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 5469 of 2005)
B
MARCH 14, 2008
(H.K. SEMA AND MARKANDEY KAT JU., JJ.)
...l_
Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 14, 19(1)(g) & 21:
•
c
. Right to practice trade/business - Closure of slaughter
house during festival - Reasonable restriction . vis-a-vis
religious tolerance - Held: Resolution passed by Municipal
Corporation closing municipal slaughter house during
PARYUSHAN festival observed by Jain community not in
D
violation of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) or 21 of Constitution as there
is no clear violation of any constitl!tional provision by such
-j..
resolutions - Since closure of the slaughter house was for a
.,
short period of nine days, resolutions not putting excessive
restriction· on the right of butcher community to practice their
profession - Restriction for a limited period cannot be termed
E as unreasonable restriction -
During restriction, nonvegetarian could become vegetarian out of respect for religious
feeling of other community - The policy of tolerance alone
could keep the co.untry together despite so much diversity -
Hence nothing unreasonable found in the impugned
F resolutions as violative of fundamental rights of respondent
)'
as granted u!Articles 14, 19(1 )(g) and 21 - Bombay Provincial
Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 - Resolutions dated 14181
1999 and 291811999 issued thereunder.
G
Delegated legislation - Nature of - Held: Statutory in
character provided it does not violate provisions of parent
statutes.
Delegated legislation - Constitutional validity of - Held :
APresumption is in favour of Constitutionality thereof - It is only
H
1020
•
HINSAVIRODHAK SANGH v. MIRZAPUR MOTi
1021
KURESH JAMAT & ORS.
in the limited case of clear violation of provision: beyond a A
reasonable doubt that the Court should declar:e it to be
unconstitutional - Judicial restraint - Exercise of
Respondent No. 1, a registered public charitable trust
safeguarding the interests of the persons engaged in the
business of slaughter and sale of livestock; Respondent. 8
No. 2, an association of persons, engaged in the sale of
mutton in the city of Ahmedabad; and Respondent No.3,
an individual, who was doing the business of selling .
mutton in the city of Ahmedabad filed Writ Petitions before
the High Court alleging that with a view to appease the C
Jain community the State Government and th·e.
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation have passed
resolutions dated 14-8-1998 and 29-81999 for closure of
the municipal slaughter houses in the city of Ahmedab~d
during the period of the Paryushan festival, an important D
Jain festival. It is alleged that the closure of the municipal
slaughter houses directly results in violation of their .
fundamental rights to do trade and business as
guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and
closure of the slaughter house cannot be said to be a E
reasonable restriction merely because a particular
community or a section of the society feels that there
should be closure of the municipal slaughter houses for
a particular period will be in consonance with the Jain
ideology of Ahinsa (non-violence). The Division Bench of F
the High Court held that the impugned resolutions of the
Municipal Corporation were constitutionally invalid; that
the people eat vegetarian food or non-vegetarian food is
their private affair and the Court cannot make any
pronouncement about it; that people living in different G
parts of the country have different eating habits. Even in
a particular locality, village or town, there are some
persons who are vegetarian and others who are nonvegetarian and that no restriction can be placed on the
slaughtering or eating of meat merely because it may hurt
H
1022
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008) 4 S.C.R.
A the sentiments or the religious feelings of a particular
\
community or a society. Hence, the present appeal.
~
~ · Allowing the appeals, the Court
•. ...
·· · ~ELD: 1.1 The impugned resolutions passed by
B Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad are valid, as there
is 110 violation of Articles 14, 19(1 )(g) or 21 of the
Constitution. ·(Para - 25) [1036-F]
~
_.
State of Gujarat vs. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat
& Ors. 2005(8) SCC 534; Mohd. Faruk vs. State of Madhya
c Pradesh AIR 1970 SC 93; Mohd. Hanif Quareshi vs. State of
Bihar AIR 1958 SC 731 and Abdul Hakim Quarishi vs. State
of Bihar AIR 1961 SC 448 - referred to.
1.2 Had the impugned resolutions ordered closure
D of municipal slaughter houses for a considerable period
of time, the impugned resolutions would have been held
..,
to be invalid being an excessive restriction on the rights
·"'t'
of the butchers who practice their profession of selling of
meat. After all, butchers are practicing a trade and it is their
E fundamental right under Article 19(1 )(g) of the Constitution
which is guaranteed to all citizens of India. Moreover, it is
not a matter of the proprietor of the butchery shop alone.
There may be also several workmen therein who may
become unemployed if the slaughter houses are closed
F
for a considerable period of time, because one of the
conditions of the licence given to the shop-owners is to
...
supply meat regularly in the city and this supply comes
from the municipal slaughter houses of the city. Also, a
~
large number of people are non-vegetarian and they
cannot be compelled to become vegetarian for a long
G period. What one eats is one's personal affair and it is a
part of his right to privacy which is included in Article 21
of the Constitution. (Para 26) [1036-G, H; 1·037-A, 8, C]
~
R. Rajagopal vs. State of Tamilnadu AIR 1995 SC 264 -
·H · relied on.
HINSA VIRODHAK SANGH v. MIRZAPUR MOTi
1023
KURESH JAMAT & ORS .
.A
1.3 Almost all meat eaters get their meat from the local
A
,.
butcher shop in the city, usually from a shop which is
close to their residence. Hence, closure of the slaughter
house, in substance, means compelling the nonvegetarians to become vegetarians for 9 days. However,
the restriction is only a partial restriction for a limited B
period, and it is not disproportionate. A period of 9 days
)..
is a very short time and surely the non-vegetarians can
•
become vegetarians during those 9 days out of respect
for the feeling of the Jain community. Also, the dealers in
meat can do their business for 356 days in a year, and
they have to abstain from it for only 9 days in a year. c
Hence, this is not an excessive restriction, particularly
since such closure has been observed for many years.
(Paras -· 30, 31 & 34) [1038-A, B, C; 1039-D, E]
State of Madras vs. VG Row (1952) SCR 597 and Om
D
)-
Prakash and others vs. State of UP and others (2004) 3 SCC
~
402 - relied on
2.1 The impugned resolutions which have been made
under Section 466(1 )(D)(b)of the Bombay Provincial E
Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 amount to a piece of
delegated legislation. A piece of delegated legislation is
also statutory in character and the only limitation on it is
that it should not violate the provisions of the parent
statute or of the Constitution. The impugned resolutions
.,.
of the Corporation do not violate the parent statute or any
F
constitutional provisions. (Para - 38) [1040-D, E]
2.2 This Court recently held that the Court should
exercise judicial restraint while judging the constitutional
validity of statutes. The same principle also applies when G
judging the constitutional validity of delegated legislation
and here also there should be judicial restraint. There is a
_.._
presumption in favour of the constitutionality of statutes
as well as delegated legislation, and it is only when there
is a clear violation of a constitutional provision or of the
H
1024
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 4 S.C.R.
A . parent statute, in the case of delegated legislation beyond
reasonable doubt that the. Court should declare it to be
unconstitutional. (Para 39) [1040-F, G, H; 1041-A]
B
-Govt. of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. vs. Smt. P Laxmi Devi,
· JT 2008(2) 8 SC 639 - relied on.
3.1 It is the Constitution of India which is keeping the
people together despite all tremendous diversity, because
the Constitution gives equai re$pect to all communities,
sects, lingual and ethnic groups, etc. in the country. -
· c (Para - 46) [1042-F]
3.2 Emperor Akbar was a propagato.r of Su/eh.~i-Ku/
(universal toleration) at a time when Europeans ,were
indulging in religious massacres. He was far ahead of
even the Europeans of his. times, the Emperor himself
D abstained from eating meat on Fridays ·and Sundays and
on some- other days, as has been mentioned in the Ain-1Akbari by Abul Fazl. It was beca.use of the wise policy of
toleration of the Great Emperor Akbar that-the Mughal
empire lasted for so long, and hence the-saril~ wise policy
E -- of toleraticm alone can keep the cou(:ltry tOgether despite
so· much diversity. '(Paras...,. 56, 57 &:58) [1045~C, F, G]
4.1 Article 1 (1) of the Constitution states "India i.e
Bharat is a Union of States" during the Constituent
Assembly debates some members of the Constituent
F Assembly were of the view that India should be described
as a Federation. However, instead of the word
"Federation" the word "Union" was deliberately selected
by the Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly
to indicate two things, viz., (a) that the Indian Union is not
G the result of an agreement by the States, and (b) that the
component States have no freedom to secede from it.
(Paras - 61 & 62) [1046-E, F, G]
4.2 In a multi cultural country like ours with such
H diversity, one should not be over sensitive and over
)... ..
). ..
HINSA VIRQDHAKSANGH v. MIRZAPUR MOTi
1025
KURESH JAMAT & ORS.
touchy about a short restriction when it is being done out /\
of respect for the sentiments of a particular section of
society that the great Emperor Akbar himself used to
remain a vegetarian for a few days every week out of
respect for the vegetarian section of the Indian society
and out of respect for his Hindu wife. The people of this B
country should have similar respect for the sentiments
for others, even if they are a minority sect. (Para 72)
[1049-G; 1 050-A, B]
4.3 In the present case, it is seen that for a long period
slaughter houses have been closed in Gujarat for a few C
days out of respect for the sentiments of the Jain
community, which has a sizable population in Gujarat and
Rajasthan .. Nothing unreasonable is seen in this
restriction .. Hence, the impugned judgment is set aside
and the impugned resolutions of the Municipal D
Corporation of Ahmedabad are held to be valid. (Paras -
71 & 73) [1049-E, F; 1050-8, C]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
5469 of 2005.
Fram the final Judgment dated 22/6/2005 of the High Court
of Gujarat atAhmedabad in S.C.A. No. 6239of1998.
WITH
E
Civil Appeal Nos. 5470/2005, 5472/2005, 5474/2005,
F
5476-5478/2005 & 5479-5481/2005.
Soli J. Sorabjee, P.H. Parekh, U.N. Bhachawat, T.R.
Andhyarujina, Suresh Shelat, E.R. Kumar, Ashok Jain,
Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad, Ajay Jha, Arjun Garg,
Shubhranshu Padhi, Somnadri Gaud (for M/s. Parekh & Co.), G
Anip Sachthey, Mohit Paul, Alok Bhachawat, Madhavi Divan,
~.
Hemantika Wahi, Pinky, Jasal, Prashant G. Desai, Tejas Patel,
S.C. Patel and Subhashish BhowmicfortheAppellant.
M.N. Rao, Fakhruddin, W:A. Nomani,Abdul KarimAnsari,
H
1026
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 4 S.C.R.
).._
A
AftabAli Khan, Abdul Qadir, Raj Kishore Chaudhary,A. Ramesh,
.,.
M.Z. Chaudhary, N.K. Neeraj, lmtiazAhmed and Naghma lmtiaz
(for Mis. Equity Lex Associates) for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
MARKANDEY KAT JU, J. Civil Appeal No. 5469/2005
1. This appeal by special leave has been filed against the
-4
impugned judgment dated 22.6.2005 of the Division Bench of
..
the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No. 6329 of
1998 ...
c
2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
3. Respondent No. 1 claims to be a registered public
charitable trust working for safeguarding the interests of the
D persons engaged in the business of slaughter and sale of
,
livestock, mutton etc. It is alleged that it is functioning in the city
"'
of Ahmedabad in Gujarat since 1962 and has about 3000
members. Respondent No. 2 All Ahmedabad (Chhoti Jamat)
Mutton Merchant Association is an association of persons who
E are engaged in the sale of mutton in the city of Ahmedabad.
Respondent No.3 is an individual who is doing the business of
selling mutton in the city of Ahmedabad.
4. The common grievance of the respondents herein (the
~·
F
writ petitioners before the High Court), is that with a view to
~ ~
appease the Jain community the State Government and the
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (in short 'the Corporation')
have, from time to time, taken decisions/passed resolutions for
closure of the municipal slaughter houses in Ahmedabad during
G
the period of the Paryushan festival (which is an important Jain
festival) resulting in serious violation of their fundamental right
to trade and do business in meat etc. They have alleged that in
the year 1993, the State Government accepted the demand of
>-
some organizations belonging to the Jain community for closure
of the municipal slaughter houses during the period of Paryushan
H and issued directions to the Corporation to take appropriate
HINSA VIRODHAK SANGH v. MIRZAPUR MOTi
.. 1027
KURESH JAMAT & ORS. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]
action accordingly. In subsequent years, the Corporation passed A
J...
resolutions for closure of the municipal slaughter houses for
,
different period ranging from 8 to 18 days during the Paryushan
festival.
5. They have alleged that the closure of the municipal
B
slaughter houses directly results in violation of their fundamental
rights to do trade and business as guaranteed by Article 19(1 )(g)
of the Constitution and it cannot be said to be a reasonable
}.
restriction merely because a particular community or a section
~
of the society feels that for a particular period there should be
closure of the municipal slaughter houses as that will be in c
consonance with the Jain ideology of Ahinsa (non-violence).
6. There were two resolutions impugned in the writ petition
passed by the Standing Committee of the Municipal Corporation
for closure of the municipal slaughter houses in Ahmedabad D
during the Paryushan festival. These resolutions read as follows:
)-
"Resolution dated 14.8.1998:
.I
Resolved that during the current year from 19.8.1998, Mhah
Paryushan Parv of Jain Religion begins. Every year during
E
Paryushan Parv, the slaughter houses of this Municipality
are closes. Accordingly, having regard to the sentiments
of the citizens of Jain Religion, during the current year
also, on account of Paryushan Parv from 19.8.1998 to
26.8.1998, and as per the discussion in the Committee,
sanction should be obtained from the Municipal
F
'Y
Corporation, to close Municipal slaughter houses every
year, for eight days, during Paryushan Parv.
Resolution dated 29.8.1999:
Resolved that as demanded by Shree Arihant Seva Samaj G
and All Gujarat Digambar Jain Samaj, Ahmedabad, in
anticipation of the sanction of the Municipal Corporation,
sanction is granted to close the Municipal slaughter house
for the period 27.8.1998 to 5.9.1998 of Digambar Jain
Society Paryushan Parv from 27.8.1998 to 5.9.1998; and H
102a·
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 4 S.C.R.
as per the discussion in the Committee, hereafter every
year, to close the municipal slaughter houses, for ten days
of Digambar Jain Samaj Paryusi)an Parv."
7. Thus it appears that the closure of slaughter houses in
Ahmedabad was ordered by the Corporation for a period of 18
B days, first from 19.8.1998 to 26;8.1998 in connection with the
festival of the Shvetamber sect of the Jain community and the
other from 27.8.1998 to 5.9.1998 during which the Digambar
sect of the Jain community celebrates Paryushan festival.
However, during the course of the arguments, learned senior
C · counsels for the appellants Mr. Soli Sorabjee and Mr. T.R.
. Andhyarujina stated that the closure is only for 9 days and not
for 18 days which is evident from paragraphs 20 & 23 of the
affidavit filed on behalf of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation
· in the connected Civil Appeals (C.A. Nos. 5479-81/2005). ,
D
8. The impugned resolutions dated 14.8.1998 and
29.8.1999 were passed under Section 466(1 )(D)(b) of the
Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949~ The said
provision reads as follows:
E
'The ·commissioner may make standing orders consistent
with the provisions of this Act and the rules and by-laws in
respect of the following matters, namely:-
F
G
H
(A) ......... .
(B) ...... ~ .. .
(C) ......... .
(0) ......... .
(b)fixing the days and the hours on and during which
any market, slaughter-house or stock-yard may be
held or kept open for use and prohibiting the owner
of any private market from keeping it closed without
lawful excuse on such days or during such hours".
9. It may be mentioned that the slaughter houses in
HINSA VIRODHAK SANGH v. MIRZAPUR MOTi
1029
KURESH JAMAT & ORS. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]
Ahmed a bad. are owl"!ed and managed by the Ahmedabad
A
.>._
Municipal Corporation, but the animals which are slaughtered
'(
there belong to private persons represented by the respondents
herein, who bring their animals to the slaughter house for
slaughtering.
10. The stand taken by the Municipal Corporation is
B
reflected in the affidavit of Dr. Anil, Asstt. Superintendent
(Slaughter Houses) filed in Special Civil Application No. 9031
).
of 2000 .. In paragraph 6 and 7 of his affidavit, Dr. Anil has stated
~·
·as under:
c
"6. In reply to para 5 of the petition I state and submit that ·
:it is no doubt true that the religions sentiments of the Jain ·
community are taken into consideration when imposing
this ban. I.submit that it is not a question of Jain community
. imposing its will upon rest of the people, but it is a question D
of one section of society who believes in ·kindness to
animals making a request that during thetr religious days
)'
their sentiments may be respected for these few days, if
'
not for all times. It is considering this religio·us sentiment
that for a ·few days ban is imposed.
E
. 7. In reply to para 7 ofthe petition, I state that the petitioner
is right in saying that the question which arises before this
Hon'ble Court is one of principle and· not of any specific
event Which happened during a particular year. I further
state and submit that the Corporation has stated earlier F
whatare the reasons which have led it to impose a ban for
.,.
a few days during the Jain religious days. In reply to the
principles raised as under:-
(i)
I respectfully state and submit that looking to the long
term interest of the city and harmony with which the G
citizens are expected to live, the Corporation is well
within its right for closing down the slaughter houses
for a limited period of time.
(ii)
I state and submit that such a closure is certainly
H
k1030
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2008] 4 S.C.R.
A
undisputable in public interest and the restriction
which it places temporarily for a few days on the
)._
"
slaughter of animals is in no way contrary to the
Constitution.
B
(iii) I state and submit that the action of the Corporation
is well within its power and not malafide and not
contrary to law and not violative of Article 19 of the
Constitution.
..(
(iv)
I state that the Corporation's action as stated above
·1
c
is taken not to discriminate between the communities
but to see that if communities respect each others'
feeling and that more tolerant society where people
of different religions can live together happily is
brought about. Such a desire of the Corporation can
D
by no means be violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. It is important to appreciate
that the Corporation is not deciding between the Jains
-(
and other communities. What the Corporation is_
\
attempting to do is to see that the religious beliefs of
E
all communities and classes of society are respected
placing as little restriction or curb on the other
community so that all can live harmoniously and
peacefully.
(v)
I state that there is no fundamental right to slaughter
F
animals. I state and submit that the impugned action
as stated above is absolutely in public interest and
as already stated above, it is not to satisfy religious
sentiments of a particular section but to see that the
community as a whole lives cordially respecting each
G
other's religious belief.
(vi)
I respectfully state and submit that Section
466(1 )(d)(b) is legal and just and I leave it to my
~
lawyer to raise relevant argument on this legal issue.
(vii) I state and submit that the action of the corporation
.>-
H
HINSA VIRODHAK SANGH v. MIRZAPUR MOTi
1031
KURESH JAMAT & ORS. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]
..)..
is legal and valid. It is an absolutely bonafide exercise
A
I '
of power. It is not for a collateral purpose viz. to
appease Jains. I am not going into length on the
same issue as the same has been referred to in
former paragraphs of the affidavit. I state and submit
that the power has been exercised to see that the
B
citizens of Ahmedabad can all live cordially together
).
respecting religious sentiments of each other".
~·
11. The State Government filed its reply in Special Civil
Application No. 9509 of 1993. In paragraph 4 of the affidavit
filed by Shri M.V. Khalasi, Under Secretary to the Government, c
Urban Development and urban Housing Department, reference
has been made to the incident involving murder of Smt. Gitaben
Shah (Activist of Hinsa Nivaran Samiti) and it has been averred
that keeping in view the representations made by the Jain
organizations and personal requests made by eminent citizens D
t
it was decided to close the slaughter houses during the
'"
Paryushan days. Shri Khalasi has referred to the judgment of
Supreme Court in Jan Mohammed's case and averred that
the petitioners cannot complain of the violation of their
fundamental rights of trade and business simply because the
E
Municipal slaughter houses are closed during the period of the
.Paryushan.
12. During the pendency of the petitions, Hinsa Virodhak
Sangh, Satellite Murtipujak Jain Sangh, Shree Laxmi Vardak
Jain Sangh and Shree Shahibaug Girdhar Nagar Jain
F
....,.
mt,
Swetambar Murti Pujak Sangh got themselves impleaded as
parties to the writ petitions or were allowed to be impleaded as
party respondents. Thereafter, Dr. K.K. Shah, President of Hinsa
Virodhak Sangh filed affidavit dated 17 .8.1998 in Special Civil
Application No~ 6239 of 1998. He has referred to the Farman G
issued by Mughal Emperor Akbar in the 15th century, notifying
12 days of the month of Badharva including 8 days of the
'\
'"""'
Paryushan as the period of abstinence during which no living
creature would be slaughtered, and averred that the petitioners'
right to trade and business in livestock, meat etc. is not violated
H
•
1032
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 4 S.C.'R.
A
on account of closure of the slaughter houses during the period
_A_
of the P.aryushan. Shri Jayesh Manubhai Shah has also filed
..
affidavit 17.8.1998 on behalf of three Jain Sanghs. In paragraph
4 of his affidavit, Shri Jayesh Manubhai· Shah has averred as
under:-
B
"The Jain religion is a very old religion based mainly on
the principles of "Ahinsa" of the highest order. In the days
of Paryushan Parva all the Jains all over the world will ·
~
observe various religious activities such as fasting,
....
prayers, attending the lectures providing and observing
c
"Ahinsa". The Jains are believing in not killing or hurting
even a small insect, therefore, the killing or cutting of the
animals in the slaughter houses during these days of
Paryushan Parva aff~ct and hurt the religious feelings of
·;-
all Jains. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have been
D
respecting the religious feeling of Jains since last many
years and during the closure of the slaughter houses in
--f
Paryushan Parva days there are no complaints regarding
\
non-supply of meat or its products by consumers, traders
etc. thereof'.
E
13. It was submitted by learned counsel for the appellants
before the High Court that the closure of the municipal slaughter
houses during the period of Paryushan should be declared as
an unreasonable restriction on the rights of the writ petitioners
to carry on trade and business in livestock, mutton etc. It is
F alleged that the impugned resolutions were passed by the
/'
Corporation in view of the demand made by some organizations
"("
)-
belong to the Jain community and it has nothing to do with the
general public interest. It was further submitted that the
fundamental rights of those engaged in the trade and bus;ness
G of slaughtering animals and/or selling meat etc which is
guaranteed under Article 19{1 )(g) of the Constitution cannot be
put to peril or jeopardized with a view to assuage the feelings of
any particular community or a particular section of society, or
;>--
1
as a mark of religious sentiments of a particular community. It
H was submitted that a large number of people living in Ahmedabad
r
HINSA VIRODHAK SANGH v. MIRZAPUR MOTi
1033
KURESH JAMAT & ORS. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]
~
are non-vegetarians and their right to food of their choice is an A
I
integral part of the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution which cannot be violated at the whims and fancies
of the Jain community.
14. It was also submitted that the impugned resolutions of 8
the Corporation were totally arbitrary and discriminatory and
hence violative of Article 14 of the Constitution apart from
>-
violating Article 19(1 )(g) of the Constitution.
~·
15. In reply it was submitted before the High Court by
learned counsels for the Municipal Corporation and the State of c
Gujarat that the impugned resolutions were valid and there is
no violation of any constitutional provision. It was submitted that
non-vegetarians should respect the sentiments of the Jain
community and should not complaint against the closure of the
slaughter houses simply because it may adversely affect their D
business for a few days. A reference was made to the decision
_)-
of this Court in Haji Usmanbhai Qureshi vs. State of Gujarat
{
AIR 1986 SC 1213 in which a Constitution Bench of this Court
upheld the ban on slaughter of bulls and bullocks below the age
•
of 16 years. It was submitted that the right to eat non-vegetarian
food cannot be treated as a part of the right to life under Article
E
21 of the Constitution and the closure of Municipal slaughter
houses for a few days cannot be said to be arbitrary or violative
of Article 19(1)(g) or Article 14 of the Constitution.
16. Reference was also made to the decision otthis Court
F
in Municipal CorpQration vs. Jan Mohammed AIR 1986 SC
,,.
1205 where closure of the municipal corporation slaughter
houses by the Corporation for 7 days i.e. during Janmasthami,
Mahatma Gandhi's Birthday, 301h January, Mahavir Jayanti, Ram
Navami, etc. was held to be valid.
G
17. By the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the
High Court held that the impugned resolutions of the Municipal
Corporation were constitutionally invalid. The Division Bench
~
of the High Court held that the writ petitioners' right to freedom
to carry on the trade of slaughtering and selling meat cannot be
H
,.
....._.,
1034
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008) 4 S.C.R.
A curtailed or abridged merely at the asking of a particular section
)._
of society, or organizations belonging to a particular community
"
merely because the members of that particular community feel
that according to their religion people should not eat nonvegetarian food during a particular festival. The Division Bench
B was of the view that whether the people eat vegetarian food or
non-vegetarian food is their private affair and the Court cannot
make any pronouncement about it. People living in different parts
-{
of the country have different eating habits. Even in a particular
locality, village or town, there are some who are vegetarian and
~
c others who are non-vegetarian. The Division Bench held that
no restriction can be placed on the slaughtering or eating of
meat merely because it may hurt the sentiments or the religious
feelings of a particular community or a society.
.
18. The Division Bench of the High Court strongly relied
D on the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Mohd.
Faruk vs. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1970 SC 93.
...,_
19. We have carefully considered the judgment of the
\
Constitution Bench in Md. Faruk's case (supra). In that judgment
'
E
reference was made to the decision of the earlier Constitution
Bench in Mohd. Hanif Quareshi vs. State of Bihar AIR 1958
SC 731 in which it was held - (i) that a total ban on the slaughter
of cows of all ages and calves of cows and. of she-buffaloes,
male and female, was reasonable and valid; (ii) that a total ban
F
on the slaughter of she-buffaloes or breeding bulls or working
bullocks (cattle as well as buffaloes), so long as they were
capable of being used as milch or draught cattle, was also
Y'
reasonable and valid; and (iii) that a total ban on the slaughter
of she-buffaloes, bulls and bullocks (cattle or buffalo) after they
ceased to be capable of yielding milk or of breeding or working
G as draught animals was not in the interest of the general public
i
and was invalid.
20. Reference was also made in Md. Faruk's case (supra)
to Abdul Hakim Quarishi vs. State of Bihar AIR 1961 SC
)-.
H 448 where it was held that the ban on the slaughter of-bulls,
(~
•
,
'·
HINSA VIRODHAK SANGH v. MIRZAPUR MOTi
1035
KU RESH JAMAT & ORS.- [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]
j__
bullocks and she-buffaloes below the age of 20 or 25 years
A
.,
was not a reasonable restriction in the interest of the general
public and was void. The Court observed that a bull, bullock or
buffalo did not remain useful after it was 15 years old, and
whatever little use it may then have was greatly offset by the
economic disadvantages of feeding and maintaining
B
unserviceable cattle. This Court also held that the additional
>-
condition that the animal must, apart from being above 20 or 25
•
years of age, be unfit was a further unreasonable restriction. On
"
that ground the relevant provisions in the Bihar, U.P. and Madhya
I
Pradesh Acts were declared invalid.
c
21. In paragraph 11 of Md. Faruk's case (supra), this Court
observed:
"The sentiments of a section of the people may be hurt by
permitting slaughter of bulls and bullocks in premises D
t
maintained by a local authority. But a prohibition imposed
I
on the exercise of a fundamental right to carry on an
occupation, trade or business will not be regarded as
reasonable, if it is imposed not in the interest of the general
public, but merely to respect the susceptibilities and
E
sentiments of a section of the people whose way of life,
belief or thought is not the same as that of the claimant"
22. It was on the basis of the observations made in the
aforesaid para 11 in Md. Faruk's case (supra) that the Division
Bench of the High Court struck down the impugned resolutions
F
of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation.
23. Before we proceed further it may be mentioned that a
Seven-Judge Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in State
of Gujarat vs. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat & Ors.
2005(8) sec 534 has partially overruled the decision of the G
Five-Judge Constitution Bench in Md. Hanif Qureshi's case
(supra). In the aforesaid decision the Seven-Judge Constitution
Bench has referred, inter alia, to the decision in the Five-Judge
Constitution Bench decision in Md. Faruk's case (supra) (in
para 29). In paragraph 67 of the Seven-Judge bench judgment H
~
1036
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 4 S.C.R.
A it has been observed: .
~ "
"The State and every citizen of India must have compassion
for living creatures. Compassion; according to the Oxford
Advanced Learner's Dictionary means "a strong feeling
B
of sympathy for those who are suffering and a desire to
help them". According to the Chambers 20th Century
Dictionary, compassion is fellow-feeling, or sorrow for the
,.,._
sufferings of another; pity"'. Compassion is suggestive of
sentiments, a soft feeling, emotions arising out of sympathy,
...
pm
pity and kindness. The concept of compassion for living
c
creatures enshrined in Article 51-A(g) is based on the
background of the rich cultural heritage of India the land of
Mahatma Gandhi, Vinobha, Mahaveer, Buddha, Nanak
and others. No religion or holy book in any part of the
world teaches or encourages cruelty. Indian society is a
D
pluralistic society. It has unity in diversity. The religious,
cultures and people may be diverse, yet all speak in one
--f
\
voice that cruelty to any living creature must be curbed
and ceased".
E
24. We have quoted paragraph 67 of the Seven-Judge
Bench decision of this Court because this observation will be
deemed to have impliedly overruled the observation in paragraph
11 of the judgment in Md. Faruk's case (supra) that sentiments
of a particular section of the people are irrelevant in imposing a
prohibition.
•
F
'f'
25. We are of the opinion that the impugned judgment of
the High Court cannot be sustained. In our opinion, the impugned
resolutions of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation are valid, and
there is no violation of Articles 14, 19(1 )(g) or 21 of the
G Constitution.
26. Had the impugned resolutions ordered closure of
municipal slaughter houses for a considerable period of time
we may have held the impugned resolutions to be invalid being
>-
an excessive restriction on the rights of the butchers of
H Ahmedabad who practise their profession of meat selling. After
,.
(
HINSA VIRODHAK SANGH v. MIRZAPUR MOTi
1037
KURESH JAMAT & ORS. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]
)._
all, butchers are practicing a trade and it is their fundamental A
'f
right under Article 19(1 )(g) of the Constitution which is
guaranteed to all citizens of India. Moreover, it is not a matter of
the proprietor of the butchery shop alone. There may be also
several workmen therein who may become unemployed if the
slaughter houses are closed for a considerable period of time,
B
because one of the conditions of the licence given to the shop-
).
owners is to supply meat regularly in the city of Ahmedabad
..
and this supply comes from the municipal slaughter houses of
Ahmedabad. Also, a large number of people are non-vegetarian
and they cannot be compelled to become vegetarian for a long c
period. What one eats is one's personal affair and it is a part of
his right to privacy which is included in Article 21 of our
Constitution as held by several decisions of this Court. In R.
Rajagopal vs. State of Tamilnadu AIR 1995 SC 264 (vide
para 28) this Court held that the right to privacy is implicit in the D
right to life and liberty guaranteed by Article 21. It is a 'right to
>-
be let alone'.
. +
27. However, in the present case, the closure of the
slaughter houses is only for 9 days and not for a considerable
period of time. We have, therefore, to take a balanced view of E
the matter.
28. In this connection it may be mentioned that there is a
large population of the Jain community in the States of Rajasthan
and Gujarat. The Jains have a religious festival called Paryushan
during which they do penance. Out of respect, for their F
sentiments surely the non-vegetarians can remain vegetarians
for 9 days in a year.
29. Mr. Soli Sorabjee, learned senior counsel for one the
appellants submitted that even non-vegetarians can get meat G
from other cities of Gujarat or from other States during these 9
days' period of Paryushan and they will not be compelled to
become vegetarians. Learned counsel submitted that it is only
the municipal slaughter houses which are closed for 9 days, but
there is no ban on eating meat during those 9 days which can
H
1038
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 4 S.C.R.
A easily be procured from outside. We do not agree.
30. We have to take a practical view of the matter. Most
people do not have the money to purchase meat from other
cities or otlJer States and bring it to Ahmedabad. Almost all meat
eaters get their meat from the local butcher shop in the city,
8
usually from a shop which is close to their residence. Hence,
closure of the slaughter house, in substance, means compelling
the non-vegetarians to become vegetarians for 9 days.
31. However, we agree with Mr. Sorabjee that the restriction
c is only a partial restriction for a li111ited period, and it is not
di~pr~portionate. Hence it is not an unreasonable restriction.
32. While it is true that the fundamental right of the writ
petitioners under Article 19(1 )(g) is affected by the impugned
resolutions of the municipal corporation, we have further to
D examine whether the resolutions are saved by Article 19(6) which
states that reasonable restrictions can be put on the right to
freedom of trade and occupation under Article 19(1 )(g) of the
Constitution.
33. In this connection, we may now refer to the well known
E Constitution Bench decision of this Court in State of Madras
vs. V.G. Row 1952 SCR 597, where this Court observed that
while determining the reasonable restriction, the Court should
consider not only the factors of the restriction such as the duration
and the extent but also the circumstances and the manner in
F which the imposition has been authorized. The Court further
G
H
observed:
"It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test
of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be
applied to each individual statute impugned, and no
abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness
can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of
the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying
purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and
urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the
.,
--{
HINSA VIRODHAK SANGH v. MIRZAPUR MOTi
1039
"'
KURESH JAMAT & ORS. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]
l
disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions A
at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. In
evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own
conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances
of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy
and the scale of values of the judges participating in the B
decision should play an important part, and the limit to
>
their interference with legislative judgment in such cases
can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and
f'
self-restraint and the sobering reflection that the
Constitution is meant not only for people of their way of c
thinking but for all, and that the majority of the elected
representatives of the people have, in authorizing the
imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be
reasonable".
34. The aforesaid observations have become locus D
>-
classicus. In the present case we have noticed that the closure
'
of the slaughter house is only for 9 days and not for a
considerable period of time. This decision indicates that the
restriction is reasonable. A period of 9 days is a very short time
and surely the non-vegetarians can become vegetarians during E
those 9 days out of respect for the feeling of the Jain community.
Also, the dealers in meat can do their business for 356 days in
a year, and they have to abstain from it for only 9 days in a year.
Surely this is not an excessive restriction, particularly since such
closure has been observed for many years.
F
..,
35. In the above observation in State of Madras vs. V.G.
Row (supra) mention has been made therein of the things to
be seen in judging whether the restriction is reasonable or not,
and one important consideration is whether the restriction is
.
.
.
disproportionate. In our opinion, there is no disproportionate G
restriction because the restriction is only for a short period of 9
days. Moreover, in the above observation in V.G.