# Ho iMZO' Cai Form v. Slot1 of Biliar Gajtndro1adkor J
- **Citation:** [1964] 2 S.C.R. 470
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Case number:** Criminal A peal No. 219of 1960
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ho-imzo-cai-form-v-slot1-of-biliar-gajtndro1adkor-j-2937
- **Pages:** 11
## Headnote
1963
Ho iMZO' Cai Form
v.
Slot1 of Biliar
Gajtndro1adkor J,
1963
March 21
.. '
470 SUPREME COURTREPORTS[l964] vot,
Court has consistently refrained from laying down
u~duly broad or catego~ical propositions in dealing
with the somewhat difficult disputes which the
definition contained in s. 2 (j) raises before industrial
a.djud.ica.tion. In the present case, the dispute raised
hes w11l11n a narrow compass and it is on that narrow
basis that we have decided it.
In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed
with costs.
Appeals dismis1ed.
G. S. BANSAL
v.
THE DELHI ADMINISTRATION
(K. SunBA RAO, RAOHUBAR DAYAL and J. R.
MUDHOLK.AR jj).
Criminal Trial-Forgery of 7 Indian Prnal Code for forging a
valuable security. The appellant contended that he was not
guilty of forgery a• he had received money which was due to
him as the sole heir of his father and that he had gained no
advantage to himself nor caused any iRjury to another.
'··
2 s.c.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 47i
Held, that the appellant was rightly convicted under
s. 467 Indian Penal Code.
By adopting the device he saved
himself the expense of obtaining a succession certificate and
gained an economic advantage.
Further, he relieved himself
of the trouble of satisfying the Rationing Authority and the
Post Ma1ter General that he was the sole heir of his father
and gained an un·economic advantage.
He had thus made
the false document both dishonestly and fraudulently.
Dr. Vimla v. The Delhi Administration, [1963] Supp.
2 S. C. R. 585 distinguished.
## Text
1963
Ho iMZO' Cai Form
v.
Slot1 of Biliar
Gajtndro1adkor J,
1963
March 21
.. '
470 SUPREME COURTREPORTS[l964] vot,
Court has consistently refrained from laying down
u~duly broad or catego~ical propositions in dealing
with the somewhat difficult disputes which the
definition contained in s. 2 (j) raises before industrial
a.djud.ica.tion. In the present case, the dispute raised
hes w11l11n a narrow compass and it is on that narrow
basis that we have decided it.
In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed
with costs.
Appeals dismis1ed.
G. S. BANSAL
v.
THE DELHI ADMINISTRATION
(K. SunBA RAO, RAOHUBAR DAYAL and J. R.
MUDHOLK.AR jj).
Criminal Trial-Forgery of 7 Indian Prnal Code for forging a
valuable security. The appellant contended that he was not
guilty of forgery a• he had received money which was due to
him as the sole heir of his father and that he had gained no
advantage to himself nor caused any iRjury to another.
'··
2 s.c.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 47i
Held, that the appellant was rightly convicted under
s. 467 Indian Penal Code.
By adopting the device he saved
himself the expense of obtaining a succession certificate and
gained an economic advantage.
Further, he relieved himself
of the trouble of satisfying the Rationing Authority and the
Post Ma1ter General that he was the sole heir of his father
and gained an un·economic advantage.
He had thus made
the false document both dishonestly and fraudulently.
Dr. Vimla v. The Delhi Administration, [1963] Supp.
2 S. C. R. 585 distinguished.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
A peal No. 219of 1960.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment
and order dated January 7, 1960, of the Punjab
High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi, in Criminal
Appeal No. 45-D ofl959.
A. 8. R. Chari, J.B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur
and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.
Frank Anthony and R. N, Bachthey, for the
respondent.
1963. March 21. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
SuBBA R.~o J.-This appeal by special leave is
against the judgment and order of the High Court of
Punjab, Circuit Bench, Delhi, confirming those of the
Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, convicting the
appellant under s. 467 of the Indian Penal Code and
sentencing him to imprisonment till the rising of the
Court and to a fine of Rs. 250/-.
The appellant is an Under Secretary, now
under suspension, in the Ministry of Home Affairs,
Government of India, New Delhi, and is the son of
Janki Pershad. Janki Pershad held a ration depot in
Delhi. In the year 1948 Janki Pershad purchased
196J
G. S, Bansi:l
v.
Delhi Adminz'stratio,.
Subba Rao J.
G, S. B1J1Sd
••
D1/4i A/,,.ilfistr4ti~n
Sul!o lfn J.
'
472
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
three Post Office National Savings Certificates of the
face value of Rs. 250/·in the name of the Controller of
Rationing, Deihi, and depo~ited the same with him
as security. On February 21, 1952, .Janki Pershad
transferred the ration depot in favour of his grandson,
S. K. Bansal, the son of the appellant. Thereafter,
on April lli, 1952, Janki Pershad applied to the
rationing authority for the release of the said security
on the ground that he had transferred the concerned
ration depot in favour of his grandson who had given
a fresh cash security of his own. Before the said
security given by him was released, Janki Pershad
died on June l, 1952. On July 1, HJi'i2, the rationing authority wrote a letter to J anki Pershad, not
knowing that he had died, informing him that the
security deposited by him had been released and that
he should get the pledged certificates transferred in
his favour by filling in the prescribed form sent with
that letter and presenting the same along with the
certificates returned at the post office. The prosecution case is that, as J anki Pershad had by that time
died, the appellant filled in the said form for transfer,
affixed the signature purporting it to be that of his
father, attested the said signature, and affixed the
stamp of Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of
India, beneath his own signature of attestation, and
presented the said form and the certificates at the
Post Office. Though the clerk at the Post Office
had some doubts as to the genuineness of the signature
of Janki Pershad, on an
assurance given by the
appellant, he issued fresh certificates in the name of
Janki Pershad on July 12, 1952. On September 3,
1952, the appellant signed the three certificates on
their back as J anki l'ershad in token of their cancellation and placed his own attestation and stamp of
his office thereon.
He gave a letter of authority in
favour of Bhawani Shankar, a daftri attached to his
office, for cashing the same.
Bhawani Shankar
presented the certificates at the Post Office and
rc~.eivcd Rs. 275/- in payment thereof,
on his
-
2 S.d.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
473
furnishing the necessary receipt. The encashed
amount was paid to the appellant.
On September 8, 1956, the Magistrate, First
Class, Delhi, framed charges against the appellant
under s. 467 of the Indian Penal Code and committed
him
for
trial
before
the Court of Sessions.
On February 2, 1959, the Additional Sessions Judge,
Delhi, found him guitly under s. 467 of the Indian
Penal Code and sentenced him as aforesaid.
The
appeal filed to the High Court was dismissed on
January 7, 1960. Hence the present appeal.
The following were the charges framed against
the appellant :
"Firstly, that you between 9th July, 1952 and
3rd September, 1952 at Delhi dishonestly or
fraudulently attested the signatures of Janki
Persliad Bansal deceased which were forged by
you on the Lack of the application for transfer
of National Savings Certificates from one person
to another and thereby authorised the Post
Master, General Post Office, Delhi, to transfer
National Savings Certificates ....................... .
and that you thereby committed an offence
punishable under section 467 IPC and within
the cognizance of the Court of Sessions."
"Secondly, that you between 9th July, 1952 and
3rd September, 1952 at Delhi dishonestly or
fraudulently in order to obtain delivery of a
sum of Rs. 275/-attested the sigpatures of Janki
Pershad dece:J.sed on Nationa'l Savings Certificates ........................ which said signatures
were forged by you and forged a letter of authority purporting to have been written by the
deceased J anki Pershad Bansal and thereby
obtained
payment of Rs. 275/- from Post
Master, G. P. 0., Delhi, through Bhawani
Shankar on the basis of the above National
Savings Certificates fraudulently or dishonestly
19~
G. S. Bonsirl
v.
Delhi Administration
Subba Rao J.
196'.i
G. S. l1111iSru'
V,
) ',tfhi Ad111illi,1trati·m
Su~b1 Rafi .I.
474 SUPREME COURT REPOR ts [1964) vat.
discharged by you and that you thereby commitku
an
offence
punishable
under
section 467 IPC and within the cogni2ance of
the Court of Sessions, Delhi."
The appellant denied that he forged the signa·
ture of his father in the application, in the certificates or in the letter of authority. He also denied
to have gone to the Post Office and got the fresh
certificates, or to have deputed Bhawani Shanker for
encashment of the said certificates.
Further, he
disowned his own signature of attestation of the
alleged signature of Janki pershad and denied to have
affixed his office stamp on any of them.
In short,
his defence was a total denial of the pr~ecution
case.
The learned Additional Sessions Judge, after
considering the entire evidence placed before him,
held that both the charges had been substantiated
and therefore found the appellant guilty under s. 467
of the Indian Penal Code. On appeal, Chopra J.,
reviewed the entire evidence over again and came to
the conclusion that though it had not been established that the signature on the application form was
forged by the appellant, there was a clear and con·
vincing evidence that the appellant attested the same.
On the second charge, the learned Judge found that
the alleged signatures of Janki Pershad on the back
of the three certificates and the writting of the signature on the letter of authority were all forged by the
appellant.
On this finding, he dismissed the appeal.
There are, therefore, concurrent findings of fact
that the appellant put the signature of his father on
the relevant documents, attested t!iem and got the
securities transferred in the name of his father and
received the money from the Post Office. The said
findings being findings of fact based upon relevant
evidence. following the usual practice of tnis Court,
we accept them.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
475
Even so, Mr. Chari, learned counsel for the
appellant, contends that on the said findings the
appellant is not guilty of forgery as defined under
s. 464 of the Indian .Penal Code, for, it is said, he received the money which was admittedly due to him as
a sole heir of his father and, therefore, he did not
either gain an advantage for himself or cause any
injury to another,
and that the said point was
directly and fully covered by a recent decision of
this Court in Dr. Vimla v. The Delhi Administration (').
Mr. Anthony, learned counsel appearing for the
State, does not accept either the factual or the legal
position advanced by the learned counsel for the
appellant. He contends that on the facts found, the
appellant, when he put the signatures of his father
on the relevant documents, !'.ad the clear intention to
secure an economic advantage to himself inasmuch
as he resorted to the device adopted by him in order
to save himself the trouble and expense of obtaining
a succession certificate.
The conflicting arguments on the application
of Dr, Vimla's case ('), to the facts of the present
case can be better appreciated if the facts of the
present case are clearly borne in mind. If a person
who has given postal certificates as security to a
department by taking them in the name of the said
department dies, his heir cau get the said amount
by following two procedures, namely, (l) after
obtaining a succession certificate, he can apply to the
department concerned to release the security and then
apply to the postal department for getting the certicates cashed, and ( 2) if the current value of the
certificates at the time of the death of the holder
does not exceed Rs. 5,000/- he can, after the expiry of
three months from the date of the death of the
holder, satisfy the Post Master General that he is the
sole heir of the holder and after making the relevant
(I) [UIGSJ Supp. 2 s.c.R. ~.
I9M
G. S. Bansal
v.
Delhi Adminfrtration
,~ubba Rao J.
1969
G. S. ll•f'llal
'·
Dtllci 4«'111rtiitr•tir11
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] V6t.
declaration recover the said money. In ouc case he
has to incur expenses for obtaining the succession
certificate and in the other he has to wait for three
months and thereafter produce evidence to the satis·
faction of the Post Master Gcnernl that he ;s the sole
heir of the deceased hokier of the certificates. In the
present case, the appellant attested tl1e signature of
Janki Pershad on the reverse of the application form
for the transfer of the Post Oflice ~ational Savings
Certificates in the name of his father, got fresh certi·
ficates iss11ed in the name of his father, signed the
name of Janki Pcrshad on the back of the three certi·
ficates in token of their cancellation, placed his own
attestation and stamp of his office thereon, gave a letter
of authority in favour of Bhawani Shanker as though
it was given by Janki Pershad and received the
money from the Post Office.
By this pruccss he got
not only the certificates which stood in the uame of
the Ration Department transferred in the name of
his deceased father but also received the money pay·
able to his father.
Two steps were inrnlvcd in the
process, one was tu get the certificates in the name of
the Ration Department to be transferred in the name
of his father and the second was to receive the money
payable to his deceased father.
As the father died
before the certificates were transferred in his name by
the Ration Depa1'tment, the appellant should have
taken steps by informing that fact to the said authority and getting an application from the said authority
to the Postal authority for transferring the said
certificates in his favour.
The rationing authority
might not have given such an . applica~ion to the
Postal authority unless a success10n certificate was
produced by him.
No ~ul:s have bc~n placed before
us which enable the rallonmg authority to agree for
the transfer of the security given to it to a person
claiming to be the heir of the o:vner thereof without
the production of any such ccrt1ficate.
In regard to
the second process, the appellant would not have been
able to get the money from the postal department
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
477
within three months without a succession certificate
and thereafter without producing necessary evidence
of his heirship to the satisfaction of the Post Master
General.
This process entails delay, for the appel·
!ant can only apply to the postal authority after the
expiry of three months and thereafter the payment
depends upon the satisfaction of the officer concerned,
which may entail further delay or even rejection.
Be it as it may, on the facts his intention at the time
when he made out the false documents was to shortcircuit the al(.&rnative procedure open to him and
rec~ive the money without going through the expense
and trouble in valved therein. Section 463 of the
Indian Penal Code reads :
"Whoever makes any false document or part of
a document with intent to cause damage or
injury, to the public or to any person, or to
support any claim or title, or to cause any
person to part with property, or to enter into
any express or implied contract, or with intent
to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery."
Section 464 of the said Code reads :
"A person is said to make a false documentPfrst.-Who dishonestly or fraudulently makes,
signs, seals or executes a document or part of a
document, or makes any mark denoting the
execution of a document, with the intention of
causing it to be believed that such document or
part of a document was made, signed, sealed or
executed by or by the authority of a person by
whom or by whose authority he knows that it
was not made, signed, sealed or executed or at
a time at which he knows that it was not made,
signed, sealed or executed; or
8econdly.-Who, without lawful
authority,
dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or
1968
G. S. B•os•I
••
D1lhi Administration
Subba R"" /,
1963
G. f. Ban!al
v.
Dtl11i Administration
S11bbo Rao J.
478
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
otherwise, alters a document in any material
part thereof, after it has been made or executed
either by himself or by any other person,
whether such person be living or dead at the
time of such alternation; or ......... "
A person, therefore, will be guilty of forgery if he
dishonestly or fraudulently signs a document with the
intention mentioned in s. 464 of the Code. Under
s. 24 of the Code.
"Whoever docs anything with "1e intention of
causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongfu I loss to another person, is said to do that
thing 'dishonestly'."
And under s. 25 thereof,
"A person is said to do a thing fraudulently if
he docs that thing with intent to defraud but
not otherwise."
On the said facts we have no doubt that the appellant had made the false documents with an intention
to cause wrongful gain to himself, for by adopting
the aforesaid device he secured for himself a gain as
otherwise he would have had to incur some expense
for obtaining a s11ccession certificate.
Even on the
assumption that he would have received the money
after satisfying the rationing authority and the Post
Master General. he secured an advantage by resorting
to the said device, as he was relieved of the trouble
of satisfying the rationing authority and the postal
authority that he was the sole heir of his father and
avoided the risk of their refusal, which would have
entailed further delay.
In that event he had secured
an uneconomic advantage : in the former case he
had made the false documents dishonestly and in the
latter case fraudulently.
In either case he committed
forgerr within the meaning of s. 46:~ of the Indian
Penal Code.
..
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT :REPORTS
479
The decision of this Court in Dr. V imla 's
case ('), is clearly distinguishable from the present
case.
In Dr. Vimla's case (1), this Court, after considering the relevant decisions on the question, stated
the legal position thus :
' The expression
'defraud'
involves
two
elements, namely, deceit and injury to the
person deceived.
Injury is something other
than economic loss, that is,
deprivation of
property, whether movable or immovable, or of
money, and it will include any harm whatever
caused to any person in body, mind, reputation
or such others. In short, it is a non-economic
or non-pecuniary loss.
A benefit or advantage
to the deceiver will almost always cause loss or
detriment to the deceived. Even in those rare
cases where there is a benefit or advantage to
the deceiver, but no corresponding loss to the
deceived, the second condition is satisfied."
There, Dr. Vimla purchased a car in the name of her
minor daughter N alini, got the insurance policy
taken on the car transferred in the name of N alini
by signing the necessary documents as Nalini and,
when the car met with an accident, obtained the
compensation money by signing the name of Nalini
in the claim form and receipt; in short Dr. Vimla put
through the relevant transaction in the name of her
minor daughter for reasons best known to herself,
that is to say, the real owner of the car was
Dr. Vimla and she only used the name of her minor
daughter. Neither she got any economic or noneconomic advantage by making the said false documents nor the Insurance Company incurred any
economic or non-economic loss by her so doing.
Therefore, this Court held that she was not guilty of
forgery.
But in the present case, the appellant
clearly secured an economic advantage by making
the false documents by (i) saving the money which
\I) p963J Supp. 2 s.c.R. 56~.
1963
G. S, Bansal
v.
Delhi Administration
Subba Rao J.
J96J
r.. S. Bansal
v.
Dtlhi Administrolion
1963
March 21
..
480
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l 91l4] VOL.
he would have otherwise spt'nt in obtaining a succession certificate, and (ii) getting the money belonging
to his father as his heir.
Even otherwise he secured
a non-economic advantage as he got himself relieved
of the trouble of getting the certificate of proof to the
satisfaction of the rationing authority and the Post
:Master General of his credential to receive the
money.
He was, therefore, guilty of making the
false documents both dishonestly and fraudulently.
The High Court is right in coming to the conclusion
which it did.
Jn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
Appeal dismii8ed .
•
PHILIP .JOHN PLASKET THOMAS
r.
COMMISSIONER OF INC0:\1E
TAX CALCUTT A
(S. K.
DAS,
A. K. SARKAR and
:\L HIDAY.ATC:LLAH .JJ.)
Income Tax-Tran..~Jer of share.,. l1!f '' man to a 11Jomau
before marriay1:-l11conie /roni those $lvrre~'i not tu l1e inc.ludetl in
that of her h11•lm111l-11!ea11ing of 1cifc and /11,.l,a11d-h1terpre.
tatim• of •latute-lnlention of &.gislarure-lncli