# Hukma v. Stau of Raiasthan. Das Gupta, f

- **Citation:** [1964] 4 S.C.R. 718
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963-08-30
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. SuBBA RAo, K. N. W Anchoo, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. R. MuDHOLKAR
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/hukma-v-stau-of-raiasthan-das-gupta-f-3185
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

Civil Service-Disciplinary proceedings-Enquiry-proposal by
enquiry officer, if binding on the Government-Order of dismissal
based on no evidence-Governrnent acting bona fide--Jurisd£ction
of the High Court to inte1"fere-Constitution of India, Arts. 226
and 311(1) & (2)-Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules. t'. 55.
On a complaint the appellant decided to hold a departmental
enquiry against the respondent, suspended him and served a notice
calling upon him to show cause \Vhy disciplinary action should not
be taken on the follo\ving charges; (i) Meeting the Deputy Director,
Administration, C.P.W.D., at his residence without necessary per- rmission, (ii) Voluntarily expressing regret at his not having brought
sweets from Calcutta for the Deputy Director's Children,
(iii) Offering a currency note which from size and colour appeared to be
a hundred rupee note as bribe \Vith the intention of presuading
Deputy Director; Shri Rajagopalan to support his representation
regarding his seniority to the U.P.S.C., (iv) violation of Rule 3
of the C. C. B. (Conduct Rules).
The respondent tendered his
explanation and on enquiry, the charges were not found proved.
The appellant considered the enquiry report and provisionally ca1ne
to the conclusion that the respondent should be dismissed and accordingly issued a second notice against him. The respondent submitted his explanation to this notice.
At that stage, his case was
referred to the Union Public Service Commission. The Con1mission
advised the appellant that none of the penalties could be inflicteU
on the respondent. The afV'Cllant considered the matter afresh and
'r< ,,..;
remitted it back to the commission to reconsider it again. The Commission, on re-exan1ining the matter adhered to its earlier views
-
' '
4 S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
719
an<l conveyed them to the appellant. The appellant considered the
1963
\vhole case again and dismissed the respondent fron1 service. The
respondent then moved a writ petition in the High Court under
Union of India
Arts. 226 and 311 for quashing the said order of dismissal. The
v.
petition was dismissed by the learned single judge.
The responH. C. Goel.
dent then preferred Letters Patent
Appeal
before the Division
Bench of the High Court. The appeal was allowed and his dismissal \Vas set aside. In this Court two questions of law arose for
consideration, namely ( 1) whether Government is competent to differ from the findings of fact recorded by the enquiry officer who has
been entrusted with the work of holding a departmental enquiry against a delinquent Government servant under r. 55 of
the Civil Services Rules and (2) whether the High Court in
dealing with a writ petition filed by a Government Officer
who has been dismissed from service is entitled to hold that the
conclusion reached by the Government in regard to his misconduct
is not supported by any evidence at all.
The appellant mainly
contended that if it acted bona fide, the High Court would
not be justified in interfering with its conclusions though the High
Court may feel that the said conclusions are based on no evidence.
Held, that on principle, neither findings recorded by the enquiry officer, nor his recommendations are binding on the Governn1ent and therefore,
the
constitutional
safeguard
afforded
by
Art. 311(2) cannot be said to have been contravened by the
appellant.
The Secretary of State for India v. l. M. Lal, (1945] F.C.R.
103, High Commissioner for India and High Commissioner for
Pakistan v. l. M. Lal, 75 I.A. 225, Khem Chand v. Union of India,
[1958] S.C.R. 1080, State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit, [1964]
2. S.C.R. 1 and A. N. D'Silva v. Union of India, [1962] Supp.
I S.C.R. 968, referred to.
In dealing with writ petition filed by public servants who have
been ~isn1issed or otherwise dealt with so as to attract Art. 311(2),
the I-Iigh C:ourt under Art. 226 has jurisdiction to enquire whether
th.e ~on?us1011 of the Government on \Vhich the impugned order
ol- di

## Text

1963
Hukma
v.
Stau of
Raiasthan.
Das Gupta, f.
1963
August 30
718
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
is by the recovery of the gold from him.
All the points raised in the appeal on behalf of the
appellant fail, and the appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
UNION OF INDIA
"·
H.C. GOEL
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAo, K. N. W ANCHOO,
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MuDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Civil Service-Disciplinary proceedings-Enquiry-proposal by
enquiry officer, if binding on the Government-Order of dismissal
based on no evidence-Governrnent acting bona fide--Jurisd£ction
of the High Court to inte1"fere-Constitution of India, Arts. 226
and 311(1) & (2)-Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules. t'. 55.
On a complaint the appellant decided to hold a departmental
enquiry against the respondent, suspended him and served a notice
calling upon him to show cause \Vhy disciplinary action should not
be taken on the follo\ving charges; (i) Meeting the Deputy Director,
Administration, C.P.W.D., at his residence without necessary per- rmission, (ii) Voluntarily expressing regret at his not having brought
sweets from Calcutta for the Deputy Director's Children,
(iii) Offering a currency note which from size and colour appeared to be
a hundred rupee note as bribe \Vith the intention of presuading
Deputy Director; Shri Rajagopalan to support his representation
regarding his seniority to the U.P.S.C., (iv) violation of Rule 3
of the C. C. B. (Conduct Rules).
The respondent tendered his
explanation and on enquiry, the charges were not found proved.
The appellant considered the enquiry report and provisionally ca1ne
to the conclusion that the respondent should be dismissed and accordingly issued a second notice against him. The respondent submitted his explanation to this notice.
At that stage, his case was
referred to the Union Public Service Commission. The Con1mission
advised the appellant that none of the penalties could be inflicteU
on the respondent. The afV'Cllant considered the matter afresh and
'r< ,,..;
remitted it back to the commission to reconsider it again. The Commission, on re-exan1ining the matter adhered to its earlier views
-
' '
4 S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
719
an<l conveyed them to the appellant. The appellant considered the
1963
\vhole case again and dismissed the respondent fron1 service. The
respondent then moved a writ petition in the High Court under
Union of India
Arts. 226 and 311 for quashing the said order of dismissal. The
v.
petition was dismissed by the learned single judge.
The responH. C. Goel.
dent then preferred Letters Patent
Appeal
before the Division
Bench of the High Court. The appeal was allowed and his dismissal \Vas set aside. In this Court two questions of law arose for
consideration, namely ( 1) whether Government is competent to differ from the findings of fact recorded by the enquiry officer who has
been entrusted with the work of holding a departmental enquiry against a delinquent Government servant under r. 55 of
the Civil Services Rules and (2) whether the High Court in
dealing with a writ petition filed by a Government Officer
who has been dismissed from service is entitled to hold that the
conclusion reached by the Government in regard to his misconduct
is not supported by any evidence at all.
The appellant mainly
contended that if it acted bona fide, the High Court would
not be justified in interfering with its conclusions though the High
Court may feel that the said conclusions are based on no evidence.
Held, that on principle, neither findings recorded by the enquiry officer, nor his recommendations are binding on the Governn1ent and therefore,
the
constitutional
safeguard
afforded
by
Art. 311(2) cannot be said to have been contravened by the
appellant.
The Secretary of State for India v. l. M. Lal, (1945] F.C.R.
103, High Commissioner for India and High Commissioner for
Pakistan v. l. M. Lal, 75 I.A. 225, Khem Chand v. Union of India,
[1958] S.C.R. 1080, State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit, [1964]
2. S.C.R. 1 and A. N. D'Silva v. Union of India, [1962] Supp.
I S.C.R. 968, referred to.
In dealing with writ petition filed by public servants who have
been ~isn1issed or otherwise dealt with so as to attract Art. 311(2),
the I-Iigh C:ourt under Art. 226 has jurisdiction to enquire whether
th.e ~on?us1011 of the Government on \Vhich the impugned order
ol- dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all.
It cannot be held, that if mala fides are not alleged and bona
ft.des .are assumed in favour of the appellant, its conclusion on a
ques~1on of fact ca~not be
successfully challenged eYen if it is.
manifest that there 1s no evidence to support it.
In the present case, there is no evidence on the record to sustain the finding of the appellant that charge no. 3 has been proved
against the respondent.
C1v1L APPELLATE JuRisnrcT10N : Civil Appeal No. 645
of 1962.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated August 2, 1960, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit
Bench) at Delhi in Letters Patent Appeal No. 27-D of 1959.
1963
Union of faiiiz
v.
H. C. G.et.
720
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General for India and R. H.
Dhebar, for the appellant.
N. C. Chatterjee, A. N. Sinha and K. K. Sinha, for
the respondent.
August 30, 1963. The Judgment of the court was delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-Two short questions of law arise
for our decision in the present appeal. The first question
is whether Government is competent to differ from the
findings of fact recorded by the enquiry officer who has
been entrusted with the work of holding a departmental
enquiry against a delinquent government servant under
Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules ; and the other question is whether the
High Court in dealing with a writ petition field by
a
Government Officer who has been dismissed from
Government service is entitled to hold that the conclusion
reached by the Government in regard to his misconduct
is not supported by any evidence at all. As our judgment
will show, we arc inclined to answer both the questions
in the affirmative. Thus, the appellant, the Union of
Union of India. succeeds on the first point, but fails on the
second.
At the hearing
of
this appeal, the learned
Attorney-General told us that the appellant was fighting this appeal as a test case not so much to sustain
the order of dismissal passed against the respondent
:is to obtain a decision from this Court on the two
points of law raised by it in the present appeal.
The -above two points arise in this way.
The respondent, H. C. Goel, joined the Central Public Works
Department on the 26th November, 1941, and in due course,
he was selected for appointment in Class I post in or about
1945-46. In January, 1956, be was posted as Surveyor of
Works at Calcutta. It appears that he felt that his seniority
had not been proper! y fixed and so, he had made a representation in that behalf to the Union Public Service Commission.
He happened to go to Delhi about the middle of January,
1956. Then, he called on Mr. R. Rajagopalan, who was
the Deputy Director of Administration, at his residence
on the 19th January, 1956. His idea in seeing Mr. RajaGopalan was to acquaint him with the merits of his case.
-·
4 S.C.R.
SUPREj\tE COURT REPORTS
721
In the course of hi~ conversation with Mr. Rajagopalan
it is alleged that be apologised for not having brought
'r:isagullas' for the children of Mr. Rajagopalan. Thereupon, Mr. Rajagopalan frowned and expressed his displeasure at the implied suggestion. A little later, during
the course of the interview, it is alleged that the respondent
took out from his pocket a wallet and from it produced
what appeared to Mr. Rajagopalan to be a folded hundred
rupee note. Mr. Rajagopalan showed his stern disapproval
of this conduct, whereupon the respondent said 'No' and
put the wallet with the note in his pocket. After a few
minutes the interview ended and the respondent left
Mr. Rajagopalan's place.
Soon thereafter Mr. Rajagopalan reported the incident
to Mr. Ananthakrishnan, Director of Administration, C.P.
W.D., and at his suggestion be submitted a complaint in
writing. In this complaint. Mr. Rajagopalan narrated the
incidents as they had occurred and added that at the end
of the interview, the respondent asked him whether he
could meet Mr. Rajagopalan again the next day to konw
about the result of his representation, and Mr. Rajagopalan
told him that he might make the enquiry when he happened to visit Delhi next.
On receiving this complaint from Mr. Rajagopalan, the
appellant decided to hold a departmental enquiry against
the respondent, suspended him and served a notice on him
on the 9th February, 1956, setting forth the charges against
hin_i and calling upon him to show cause why disciplinary
actJon should not be taken against him. This notice contained four charges which read thus:-
(i) Meeting the Deputy Director, Administration,
C.P.W.D., at his residence without necessary permission.
(ii) Voluntarily expressing regret at his not having
brought sweets from Calcutta for the Deputy
Director's children.
(iii) Offering a currency note which from size and
colour appeared to be a hundred rupee note as
bribe with the intention of persuading Deputy
Director, Sri Rajagopalan to support his representation regarding his seniority to the U.P.S.C.
(h) Violation of Rule 3 of the C.C. S. (Conduct Rules).
1963
Union of India
v.
H. C. Goel.
· Ga;endragadkor J.
1963
Union of India
v.
H. C. Goel.
Gaj•ndragadkar J.
722
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(196'1]
The respondent tendered his explanation and the matter
was enquired into under Rule 55 of the Civil Services Rules
by Mr. Kapoor. The Enquiry Officer examined Mr. Raj1gopalan · and the respondent, considered the evidence produced before him, and came to the conclusion that the
charges framed against the respondent had not been satisfactorily proved. This report was made by the enquiry
officer on the 10th April, 1956.
The appellant considered the report submitted to it
by Mr. Kapoor and. provisionally came to the conclusion
that the respondent should be dismissed from service, and
accordingly issued a, second notice against the respondent
on the 14th June, 1956. The respondent submitted his
·explanation in response to this notice.
At that stage, the respondent's case was referred to the
Union Public Service Commission. By its report made on
the 30th October, 1956, the Commission took the view that
the first charge should be dropped; the second charge was
hardly a matter justifying framing of a charge against the
officer; the third charge had not been proved on the basis
of the available evidence; and in view of the said conclusion, the Commission thought that . the fourth charge
failed automatically. The Commission accordingly advised
the appellant that none of the penalties provided for in
Rule 49 of the Civil Rules need be inflicted on the r=spondent.
The appellant considered the matter afresh in the light
of the report receiv·ed from the U.P.S.C., but since it adh=red to the conclusion which it had provisionally reached
before issuing the s;econd notice against the respondent, it
requested the Commission to reconsider the matter and remitted the said matter to it on the 8th December, 1956.
The Commission, on re-examining the matter, adhered to
its earlier views and conveyed the same to the appellant
on the 15th January, 1957. The appellant considered the
whole case again and came to the conclusion that a case
had been established against the respondent for his dismissal, and so, by its order passed on the 13th March, 1957,
dismissed him from service.
The respondent then moved the Punjab High Court
by his writ petition No. 201-D of 1957 for quashing the
said order of dismissal, under Articles 226 and 311 of the
--
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4 S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
723
Constitution. A learned Single Judge of the said High
Court heard the matter and came to the conclusion that
the respondent had not made out a case for quashing the
order of dismissal passed against him. The respondent then
preferred an appeal under the
Letters Patent
and a
Division Bench of the said High Court which heard
the Letters Patent Appeal has allowed the respondent's
appeal.
It has held that in view of the fact that the
Enquiry Officer had made a report in favour of the
respondent, it was not open to the appellant to differ
from his findings and inasmuch as the impugned order of
dismissal was passed by the appellant as a result of its conclusion that the findings of the enquiry officer were erroneous, the said order contravened the provisions of Art. 311
of the Constitution. That is how the writ petition filed
by the respondent was allowed and his dismissal set aside.
The appellant then applied for a certificate to the High
Court but the said application was rejected. The appellant
then moved this Court for special leave and it is with the
special leave granted by this Court that it has brought the
present appeal before us.
The first question which calls
for our decision is
whether it was competent to the appellant to take a different view on the evidence adduced against the respondent
and proceed on the basis that the conclusions of fact recorded by the enquiry officer were unsound and erroneous. If
it is held that the appellant was precluded from differing
from the conclusions of the enquiry officer, then, of course,
the subsequent steps taken by the appellant would be inconsistant with Art. 311 of the Constitution. On the other
hand, if the competence of the appellant to differ from the
conclusions of the enquiry officer cannot be seriously questioned, then the argument that the appellant contravened
Art. 311 when it issued the second notice against the respondent cannot succeed.
Article 311 consists of two sub-articles and their effect
is no longer in doub~. The question about the safeguards
provided to the public servants in the matter of their dismissal, removal or reduction in rank by the Constitutional
provision contained in Art. 311, has been examined by this
court on several occasions. It is now well-settled that a
public servant who is entitled to the protection of Art. 311
1%3
Union of India
v.
H. C. Goel.
·Gajendragadkar T.
1963
Union of l#tli~
v.
H. C. Goel.
Gaiendragadkar /.
724
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
must get two opportunities to defend himself. He must
have a clear notice of the charge which he is called upon
to meet before the departmental enquiry commences, and
after he gets such notice and is given the opportunity to
offer his explanation, the enquiry must be conducted according to the rules and consistently with the requirements
of natural justice. At the end of the enquiry, the enquiry
officer appreciates the evidence, records his conclusions and
submits his report to the Government concerned. That
i• the first stage of the enquiry, and this stage can validly
begin only after charge has been served on the delinquent
public servant.
After the report is received by the Government, the
Government is entitled to consider the report and the evidence led against the delinquent public servant. The Government may agree with the report or may differ, either
wholly or partially, from the conclusions recorded in the
report. If the report makes findings in favour of the public
.ervant, and the Government agrees with the said findings,
nothing more remains to be done, and the public servant
who may have been suspended is entitlted to reinstatement
~nd consequential rdids. If the report makes findings in
favour of the public s'~rvant and the Government disagree
with the said findings and holds that the charges framed
~gainst the public servant are prima facie proved, the Government should decide provisionally what punishment
~hould be imposed on the public servant and proceed to
issue a second notice against him in that behalf. If the
enquiry officer makes findings, some of which are in favour
of the public servant and some against him, the Government is entitled to consider the whole matter and if it holds
that some or all the charges framed against tl;e public servant are, in its opinion, prima facie established against him,
then also the Government has to decide provisionally what
punishment should be imposed on the public servant and
give him notice accordingly. It would thus be seen that the
object of the sceond notice is to enable the public servant
to satisfy the Government on both the counts, one that he
is innoc"ent of the charges framed against him and the
other that even if the charges are held proved against him,
the punishment proposed to be inflicted upon him is unduly severe. This pmition under Art. 311 of the Con-
' -
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
725
stitution is substantially similar to the position which
governed the public servants under s. 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935.
The scope and effect of
the provisions of s. 240 of the Government of India
Act, 1935, as well as the scope and effect of Art. 311
of the Constitution have been considered by judicial decisions on several occasions and it is unnecessary to deal with
this point in detail, vi<le The Secretary of State for India
v. I. M. La/(1), High Commissioner for India and High
Commissioner for Pakistan v. I. M. Lal(2) ; and Khem
Chand v. Union of India & Ors.(').
These reported decisions would show that it has never
been suggested that the findings recorded by the enquiry
officer conclude the matter and that the Government which
appoints the enquiry officers and directs the enquiry is
bound by the said findings and must act on the basis that
the said findings are final and cannot be reopened. The
High Court has, however, held that there are certain observations made by the Federal Court in the case of I. M.
Lal('), and by this Court in the case of Khem Chand('}
which support the respondent's contention that the appellant was bound by the findings recorded by the enquiry
officer in his favour in the present enquiry proceeding!.
Before referring to these observations, it is relevant to
examine this contention on principle. It is obvious that
the enquiry officer holds the enquiry against the respondent as a delegate of the appellant. That indeed
i1
the character which the enquiry officer inevitably occupies when he holds a departmental enquiry at the
instance of the Government.
The object of the enquiry
is plain. It is to enable the Government to hold an investigation into the charges framed against .a delinquent
public servant, so that the Government can, in due
course, consider the evidence adduced and decide whether
the said charges are proved or not. The interposition of
the enquiry which is held by a duly appointed enquiry
officer does not alter the true legal position that the charges
are framed by the Government and it is the Government
which is empowered to impose punishment on the delinquent public servant. Therefore, on principle, it is difli-
(tf (!945]-F~C.R:-!o3.
(2 ) 75 I.A. 225.
( 3 ) fl958 J S.C.R. 1080.
1963
u~ion of India
v.
H. C. Goel.
G•jendragadkar /.
1963
Union of India
v.
H. C. God.
Gajendragadkar J.
726
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
cult to see how the respondent is justified in contending
that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer bind the
appellant in the present case.
If the contention :raised by the respondent were to be
upheld, it would lead to illogical and almost fantastic
results. If the enquiry officer makes findings against the
public servant, on the respondent's contention the Government can never re-examine the matter, so that even if the
Government were satisfied that the findings against the
public servant were erroneous, it must proceed on the basis
that the public servant is guilty and impose some punishment on him. It is obvious that this proposition is entirely
inconsi.stant with the Constitutional rights of the appellant
which is the appointing authority and which has the power
to impose the punishment on the respondent.
Similarly, if the enquiry officer makes findings in favour
of the public servant, on the respondent's case that is final
and however illogical, erroneous or unsound the said findings may be, the appellant is powerless and must act on
the basis that the public servant is innocent. That again
is a very anomalous position and it ignores the true Constitutional rights of the appellant and the character of the
enquiry officer and the scope of his enquiry.
Sometimes, ·several charges are framed and findings
are recorded by the enquiry officer in respect of them. In
such cases, Government may accept some findings and may
reject others, and it has natnrally to proceed to take the
next step in the light of its own conclusions. Such a case
arose before this Court in The State of Assam and Anr. v.
Bimal Kumar Pandit('). Dealing with the requirements
which the second notice must satisfy in such a case, this
Court has
held that the said notice must indicate to
the public servant clearly the grounds on which the Goverment provisionally
intends to act in imposing the
proposed punishment specified in the notice.
Besides, it would be apparent that if the respondent's
argument is valid, then the second notice would serve very
little purpose. If, at that stage, the Government is bound
to accept the findings of the enquiry officer, the opportunity
which is intended to be given to the public servant to show
cause not only against the proposed punishment but also
(1) [1964] 2 S.C.R. 1.
-
•
'
'I
--
,
•
4 S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
727
against the findings recorded against him, would be defeated, because on the respondent's case Government cannot
alter the said findings. In our opinion, the contention
raised by the respondent is patently unsound and must be
rejected.
In· this connection, we may add that unless the statutory rule or the specific order under which an officer is
appointed to hold an enquiry so requires, the enquiry officer need not make any recommendations as to the punishment which may be imposed on the delinquent officer in
case the charges framed against him are held proved at the
enquiry; if, however, the enquiry officer makes any recommendations, the said recommendations like his findings on
the merits are intended merely to supply appropriate material for the consideration of the Government. Neither the
findings, nor the recommendations are binding on the Government, vide A. N. D'Silva v. Union of India(').
Let us now briefly consider whether the observations
on which the respondent rests his case justify his contention. In The Secretary of State for India v. I. M. ta!(')
Spens C.J. examined the provisions of s. 240(3) of
the
Government of India Act, 1935, and observed that the
said sub-section involves in all cases "where there is an enquiry and as a result thereof some authority definitely proposes dismissal, or reduction in rank, that the person
concerned shall be told in full, or adequately summarised
form, the results of that enquiry and the findings of the
enquiring officer and be given an opportunity of showing cause with that information why he should not
suffer the proposed dismissal or reduction."
Mr. Chatterjee suggests that these observations indicate that it
is only on the basis of the findings recorded by the
enquiry officer that the second notice can be issued.
In
our opinion, this argument is completely misconceived. In
the case of I. M. Lal, the findings were against him and
it is by reference to the said findings that the observations
made by Spens C. J. must be considered. If the findings
are against the public servant, and the Government on considering the evidence, accepts the said findings provisionally, it would be right to say that on the said findings
the second notice is served on the public servant, and so,
{'i [1962] Supp. I S.C.R. 968.
---(2)[1945]F.cll.: 103.
1963
Union af India
v.
H. C. Gael.
Gajcndragadkar f.
1963
Unio•• of India
v.
H. C. God.
Gajendragadkar /.
728
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
he should be given a clear idea as to the nature of the said
findings. That, of course, does not mean that the findings
of the enquiry officer are binding and virtually conclude
the matter.
The same comment has to be made about the observations made by S. R. Das C.J. in the case of Khem
C h>:lnd (1).
Summarising his conclusions, the learned
Chief Justice observed, inter alia, that the second opportunity to which a public servant is entitled can be effective
only if "the competent authority after the enquiry is over
and after applying its mind to the gravity or otherwise of
the charges proved against the Government servant, tentatively proposes to inflict one of the three punishments and
communicates the same to the Government servant." It is
obvious that when the learned Chief Justice refers to the
charges proved against the Government servant, it is not
intended to be suggested that the finding! made by the
enquiry officer in that behalf are final.
The enquiry
report along with the evidence recorded constitute the
material on which the Government has ultimately to act.
That is the only purpose of the enquiry held by competent
officer and the report which he makes as a result of the
said enquiry. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding
that the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the appellant was not justified in differing
from the findings recorded by the enquiry .officer. As we
have just indicated, if it is held that the report of the
enquiry officer is not binding on the Government, then
the Constitutional safeguard afforded by Art. 311 (1) & (2)
cannot be .said to have been contravened by the appellant
and the grievance made by the respondent in that behalf
must fail.
This conclusion does not finally dispose of the appeal.
It still remains to be considered whether the respondent
is not right when he contends that in the circumstances
of this case, the conclusion of the Government is based on
no evidence whatever. It is a conclusion which is perverse
and. therefore, suffers from such an obvious and patent
error on the face of the record that the High Court would
be justified in quashing it. In dealing with writ petitions
filed by public servants who have been dismissed, or other-
(') [1958] S.C.R. 1080.
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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
729
wise dealt with so as to attract Art. 311(2), the High Court
under Art. 226 has jurisdiction to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the impugned order
of dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all.
It is true that the order of dismissal which may be passed
against a Government servant found guilty of misconduct,
can be described as an administrative order; nevertheless,
the proceedings held against such a public servant under
the statutory rules to determine whether he is guilty of
the charge framed against him are in the nature of quasijudicial proceedings and there can be little doubt that a
writ of certiorari, for instance, can be claimed by a public
servant if he is able to satisfy the High Court that the ultimate conclusion of the Government in the said proceedings which is the basis of his dismissal is based on no evidence. In fact, in fairness to the learned Attorney-General,
we ought to add that he did not seriously dispute this
position in law.
He, however, attempted to argue that if the appellant
acted bona fide, then the High Court would not be justified in interfering with its conclusion though the High
Court may feel that the said conclusion is based on no
evidence. His contention was that cases where conclusions.
are reached by the Government without any evidence, could
not, in law, be distinguished from cases of mala fides; and
so he suggested that perverse conclusions of fact may be
and can be attacked only on the ground that they are
mala {ides, and since mala fides were not alleged in the
present cas.e, it was not open to the respondent to contend
that the view taken by the appellant can be corrected in
writ proceedings.
We a'.e not prepared to accept this contention. Malafide exercise of po_wer can be attacked independently on
~he ground_ that it 1s mala fide. Such an exercise of power
~s ~!ways liable to be quashed on the main ground that
It is not a bona fide exercise of power. But we are not
prepared to hold t~at if mala fides are not alleged and bona
fides are a;sumed 111 favour of the appellant, its conclusion
?n. a 9uesuo~ of fact cannot be successfully challenged even
if it 1s m~rufest. '.hat there is no evidence to support it.
T~e two _mlirm1ues are separate and distinct though, conceivably, 111 some cases, both may be present. There rn:iv
47-2 S. C. India/64
·
1963
Union of India
'·
H. C. Goel.
Gajendra~
gadkar /.
1963
Union of India
V,
H. C. Goel.
Gajendragadkar f.
730
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
be cases of no evidence even where the Government is
acting bona fide; the said infirmity may also exist where
the Government is acting mala fide and in that case, the
conclusion of the Government not supported by any evidence may be the result of mala fides, but that does not
mean that if it is prqved that there is no· evidence to support the conclusion of the Government, a writ of certiorari will not issue without further proof of mala fides. That
is why we are not prepared to accept the learned AttorneyGeneral' s argument that since no mala fides are alleged
against the appellant in the present case, no writ of certiorari can be issued in favour of the respondent.
That takes us to the merits of the respondent's contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third
charge framed against the respondent had been proved,
is based on no evidence. The learned Attorney-General
has stressed before us that in dealing with this question,
we ought to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is
acting with the determination to root out corruption, and
so, if it is shown that the view taken by he appellant is a
reasonably possible view, this Court should not sit in
appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this
Court would have taken the same view or not. This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which
we can legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the
respondent's case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against the respondent that charge No. 3
was proved against him? In exercising its jurisdiction
under Art. 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot
consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of
evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a
matter which is within the competence of the authority
which dealt with the question; but the High Court can
and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in
support of the· impugned conclusion. In other words, if
the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted
as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent?
This approach
will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence
as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence
legally the impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying
this test, we are inclined to hold that the respondent's
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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
731
grievance is well-founded because, in our opinion, the finding which is implicit in the appellant's order dismissing
the respondent that charge number 3 is _proved against him
is based on no evidence.
The facts relating to this narrow point are very few.
The respondent expressed his regret to Mr. Rajagopalan
that he had not brought rasagullas for his children. There
is some controversy as to whether this statement was made
by the respondent at the beginning of his interview with
Mr. Rajagopalan or at its end. The complaint made by
Mr. Rajagopalan shows that the interview began with the
respondent's expression of regret that he had not brought
sweets for Mr. Rajagopalan's children. Mr. Rajagopalan
in his evidence stated that this statement was made by the
respondent at the close of the interview. One fact is clear
that the respondent did express regret that he had not
taken sweets to Mr. Rajagopalan' s place. If the respondent's version that he said so at the beginning of the interview is believed, particularly when it is supported by the
complaint made by Mr. Rajagopalan, it may show that
the stern disapproval expressed by Mr. Rajagopalan on
hearing the said remark from the respondent must have
acted as a warning to him. That, however is another
matter.
Then, as to the hundred rupee note which according· to
Mr. Rajagopalan, was taken out by the respondent from
his wallet, Mr. Rajagopalan has admitted that the said
note was folded double. He says that he noticed that its
colour was blue and that its size was bigger than the usual
ten rupee or five rupee note. Mr. Rajagopalan who appears to be a straightforward officer gave his evidence in
a very honest way. He frankly told the enquiry officer
that it could not be said that the hundred rupee note which
he thought the respondent took out from his wallet had
been offered to him by the respondent, but he thought that
the whole thing had to be viewed in the context of the
matter. He also admitted that his eye-sight was not
perfect.
The respondent, on the other hand, suggested that in
reply to the questions which Mr. Rajagopalan put to him
he took out some papers from his pocket to find out the
letter of his appointment, and as soon as Mr. Rajagopalan
1963
Union of India
v.
fl. C. Goel.
Gajendragadkar f.
1963
Union of lizdia
v.
H. C. Goel.
Gajendrag•dk_ar /.
732
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%4].
appeared to discourage him, he put the said paper in his
pocket.
Now, in this state of the evidence, how can it be said
that respondent even attempted to offer a bribe to Mr. Rajagopalan. Mr. Rajagopalan makes a definite statement that
respondent did not offer him a bribe. He merely refers
to the fact that respondent took out a paper from his
wallet and the said paper appeared to him like a hunderd
rupee note duble folded.
Undoubtedly, Mr. Rajagopalan
suspected the respondent's conduct, and so, made a report
immediately. But the suspicion entertained by Mr. Rajagopalan cannot, in law, be treated as evidence against the
respondent even though there is no doubt that Mr. Rajagopalan is a straightforward and an honest officer. Though
we folly appreciate the anxiety of the appellant to root
out corruption from public service, we cannot ignore the
fact that in carrying out the said purpose, mere suspicion
should not be allowed to take the place of proof even in
domestic enquiries. It may be that the technical rules
which govern criminal trials in courts may not necessarily
apply to disciplinary proceedings, but nevertheless, the
principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care must
be taken to see that the innocent are. not punished, applies
as much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held under the statutory rules. We have very
carefully considered the evidence led in the present enquiry
and borne in mind the plea made by the learned AttorneyGeneral, but we are unable to hold that on the record,
there is any evidence which can sustain the finding of the
appellant that charge No. 3 has been proved against the
respondent. It is in this connection and only incidentally
that it may be relevant to add that the U.P.S.C. considered
the matter twice and came to the firm decision that the
main charge against the respondent had not been
established.
The result is, though the appellant succeeds on the
principle point of law raised in the appeal, the appeal fails,
because, on the merits, we hold that no case had been
made out for punishing the respondent.
The appellant to pay the costs of respondent.
Appeal dismissed.
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