# 'I RAMESHWAR LAL PATWARI v. STATE OF BIHAR

- **Citation:** [1968] 2 S.C.R. 505
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1967-12-01
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 183 of 1967
- **Bench:** M. Hidayatullah, C. A. Vaidialingam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/i-rameshwar-lal-patwari-v-state-of-bihar-4226
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

505
Preventive Det.ent'ion Act, 1950-0rd2r of detention by Governor under
s. 3(1) (a)(iii)-<Jrouudr of detention supplied to detenu-·-Must not he
vague-Circumspettion on the part of detaining authority req11ired-Blackmarketing a sufficient ground for· detention \vlzen proved.
The· appellant was detained und·:r an order of the Governor of Bibar
State unde·r s. 3(1)(a)(iii) of the Preventive Detention Acr, 1950.
The
gromids of detention supplied to him mentioned that he \Vas engaged in
the black~marketing of food-grains.
He mad~ a representation before tlic
Advisory Board but his release was not recommended.
In a writ petition
before the High Court he urged that the grounds of detention supplied to
him were either vague or non-existent. The petition having been dismissed
by the High Court the oppellant by special leave, cam.e to this Court.
HELD·: (i) The formation of the opinion about detention rests with
the Government or the officer authorised.
Their satisfaction is all that
the Jaw speaks of nnd the courts are not constituted an appellate authority.
Thus the sufficiency of the grounds cannot be agitated before the court.
How.-:!vcr, the dclention of r. person v.·ithout a trial, mere1y on the subjective
!:ttisfaction of an authority however high, is a serious matter.
It must
require the closest scrutiny of the m·aterial on which the decision is formed.
leaving no room for errors or at lea~: avoidable errors.
Since the detenu
is not placed before· a Magistrate and -has only a right of being supplied
the grounds of ·detention with a vie\\-' to his making a representation to the
Advi~ory Board, the grounds must not be vague or indefinite and must
afford a real opportunity to make a representation against the detention.
It a vital ground is shown to be non.existing so that it could not have and
ought not to have played a part in the material for consideration. the court
may attach some importance. to this fact. [509 D-G]
Shibban Lal Saksena v. U.P. [1954] S.C.R. 418 and Knhm' Ta/pade
The King Emperor, [1943] F.C.R. 88 referred IQ.
(il) Black·marketing is a sufficient ground for detention because it
has a definite tendency to- disrupt supplies when scarcity exists or scarcity
is created artificially by hoarding to attain i1legitimate profits.
Indulging
in black~marketing is conduct which is prejudicial -10 the maintenance of
supplies. It is hardly necessary to read supplie<> conjunctively with s1..-rvices.
although cases may exist \Vhere supplies and services may both be affected.
The word 'and' is not used conjunctively but disjunctively.
If sweepers
strike, no· question of disrupting supplies arises but services essential to
the life of the community will certainly be disrup:ed. [510 BJ
Ehim Sen v. State of Punjab, fl952] S.C.R. 19, referred to.
(iii.) The grounds of detention supplied to the appellant \Vere cithef
non--existent or vague or other\visc deficient and did not justify the deteation of the appeJlant.
It \'.'as a matter of great regret that powers of
detention \\tithout a trial y,·hich should be eJoliercised with the greatest care
a.nd attention had been exercised in this case \Vith disregard for truth and
accuracy. [514 B-D]
506
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 2 S.C.R.

## Text

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'I
RAMESHWAR LAL PATWARI
v.
STATE OF BIHAR
December 1, 1967
[M. HIDAYATULLAH AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.]
505
Preventive Det.ent'ion Act, 1950-0rd2r of detention by Governor under
s. 3(1) (a)(iii)-<Jrouudr of detention supplied to detenu-·-Must not he
vague-Circumspettion on the part of detaining authority req11ired-Blackmarketing a sufficient ground for· detention \vlzen proved.
The· appellant was detained und·:r an order of the Governor of Bibar
State unde·r s. 3(1)(a)(iii) of the Preventive Detention Acr, 1950.
The
gromids of detention supplied to him mentioned that he \Vas engaged in
the black~marketing of food-grains.
He mad~ a representation before tlic
Advisory Board but his release was not recommended.
In a writ petition
before the High Court he urged that the grounds of detention supplied to
him were either vague or non-existent. The petition having been dismissed
by the High Court the oppellant by special leave, cam.e to this Court.
HELD·: (i) The formation of the opinion about detention rests with
the Government or the officer authorised.
Their satisfaction is all that
the Jaw speaks of nnd the courts are not constituted an appellate authority.
Thus the sufficiency of the grounds cannot be agitated before the court.
How.-:!vcr, the dclention of r. person v.·ithout a trial, mere1y on the subjective
!:ttisfaction of an authority however high, is a serious matter.
It must
require the closest scrutiny of the m·aterial on which the decision is formed.
leaving no room for errors or at lea~: avoidable errors.
Since the detenu
is not placed before· a Magistrate and -has only a right of being supplied
the grounds of ·detention with a vie\\-' to his making a representation to the
Advi~ory Board, the grounds must not be vague or indefinite and must
afford a real opportunity to make a representation against the detention.
It a vital ground is shown to be non.existing so that it could not have and
ought not to have played a part in the material for consideration. the court
may attach some importance. to this fact. [509 D-G]
Shibban Lal Saksena v. U.P. [1954] S.C.R. 418 and Knhm' Ta/pade
The King Emperor, [1943] F.C.R. 88 referred IQ.
(il) Black·marketing is a sufficient ground for detention because it
has a definite tendency to- disrupt supplies when scarcity exists or scarcity
is created artificially by hoarding to attain i1legitimate profits.
Indulging
in black~marketing is conduct which is prejudicial -10 the maintenance of
supplies. It is hardly necessary to read supplie<> conjunctively with s1..-rvices.
although cases may exist \Vhere supplies and services may both be affected.
The word 'and' is not used conjunctively but disjunctively.
If sweepers
strike, no· question of disrupting supplies arises but services essential to
the life of the community will certainly be disrup:ed. [510 BJ
Ehim Sen v. State of Punjab, fl952] S.C.R. 19, referred to.
(iii.) The grounds of detention supplied to the appellant \Vere cithef
non--existent or vague or other\visc deficient and did not justify the deteation of the appeJlant.
It \'.'as a matter of great regret that powers of
detention \\tithout a trial y,·hich should be eJoliercised with the greatest care
a.nd attention had been exercised in this case \Vith disregard for truth and
accuracy. [514 B-D]
506
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 2 S.C.R.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
183 of 1967.
Appeal by special kave from the judgment and order dated
August 9, 1967 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 31 of 1967.
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M. C. Seta/vad. R. L. Kohli and J. C. Ta/war, for the appellant.
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B. P. Iha, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
llidayatullah, J,
The appellant (Rameshwar Lal Patwari)
applied under Art. 226 of the Constitution and s. 491 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure for a writ or order in the nature of habeM
corpus for his release from detention in Bhagalpur Central Jail in
pursuance of an order of detention pa5scd by the Governor of
Bihar on July 4, 1967 under s. 3( I )(a)(i;i) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. He was arrested under the order on July 11,
I 967 and was served on July 13, 1967 with a copy of the ground~
on which his detention was based to enable him to make a representation.
He made a representation but his release was net recommended. His application in the High Court was also dismissed.
He no\" appeals by special leave.
The order of the Governor recites that it is ncccssa•; to make
an order for his detention to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of 5upplics and services essential to the community. The grounds which were furnished to him
were as follows :-
(!) He is a prominent b.usinessman of Dumka and
with the association of Sarvashri Mulchand Choudhury,
Kanhaiaya Choudhury, Fulchand Modi, Pir Mohammad
CBengaria P.S.) Shikaripara and others he indulges in
black-marketing of foodgrains.
He has four trucks.
one jeep and a car which have been registered in the
names of his relatives Truck No. BRL 1331 which is registered in the name of his brother-in-Jaw (sala).
Sri
Harichandra Agarwala was caught on 29th December,
1966 at Ranibahal near Ma 0 hanjor while carryin_g 95
bags o[ peddy. for illc!!al trade.
In this connection a
case under the Essential Commodities Act ha.s been
instituted. lie is on bail in this case.
(2) His trucks
always take to wicked
routes to
Saithia (We,t Bengal) and he himself pilots them.
(3) A businessman of Barahiya disclosed
that he
(Rameshwar Lal Patwari) visited Barahaiya -on several
occasions and purchased gram, gramdal under various
nantes and smuggled them to West Bengal.
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(4) 01\ the night of 2-2-66, Sri R. S. Singh, 1st
Class Magistrate
along with Sub-Divisiooal Officer
Sadar, other Magistrate and police officers, raided the
house of Sri Rameshwar Lal Patwari and found all
kinds of foodgrains in huge quantity.
His stock register was maintained in irregular way.
He cou~d not
produce the sale register .and took the ple1 that it was
produced before the.Income Tax Officer. It was found
that he has been dealing in foodgrains
without any
licence. A case has been instituted in this connection in
which he is on bail.
(5) Shri Babu Ram Bikaneria, owner of a .Rice
Mill at Saitha District Birbhum (West Bengal) visited
Dumka on 26-11-66 and told him (Sri Rameshwar Lal
Patwari) to supply gram and gramdal. He (Sri Rameshwar Lal Patwari) promised to supply gram and gramdal.
On 7 /8-12-66 -Sri Mulchand Choudhury of Rameshwar, who is his agent sent his truck No. BRJ 2029 loaded with gram and gramdal to Saitha through Mahesh
Kola Check post. . His truck No. BRL 1366 and van
BRL 2005 were found at Rameshwar on 7-12-1966
wherefrom he smuggles foodgrains to West Bengal. He
purchases gram and gramdal through Gopal Manda! of
Lakhisarai (District Monghyr) and smuggles them to
West Bengal.
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In the circumstances, the State Government are satisfied that if Shree Rameshwar Lal Patwari is allowed to
remain at large, he will indulge in activities prejudicial to
the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the
community.
For prevention of such activities,
the
State Government consider his detention necessary.
Shri Rameshwar Lal Patwari is informed that he may
make a representation in writing against the order under
which he is detained. His representation, if any, may be
addressed to the Under Secretary to Government, Political (Special) Department, Bihar, Patna and forwarded
through
the Superintendent of the Jail as soon as
possible.
By order of the Governor of Bihar."
These . ground~ were challenged by the appellant in the High
Court. According to him some of them did not exist in fact and
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others were vague or irrelevant.
The High Court scrutinised
them and came to the conclusion that his complaint had no substance.
In this appeal he urges the same contentions and submits that .the High Court was in error in its conclusion.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1968] 2 S.C.R.
Before we consider these grounds in the light of arguments
(1cfore us, we may say a few words about the Preventive Detention Act and the extent to which the exercise of powers under that
Act can be questioned before courts.
Article 22(1) and (2) of
the Constitution lay down that no person who is arrested shall be
detained in Clhtody without being informed of the grounds for
'uch arrest, nor shall he be denied the right to consult and to he
defended hy, a legal practitioner of his choice and further that the
person arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before
the nearest Magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours and
no person shall be detained beyond that period (excluding the
tim~ necessary for the journey to the court of the Magistrate)
without the authority of the Magistrate.
To this there is an exceptio~ in sub-cl. (b) of cl. (3) of the article. It says that these
provisions shall not apply to any person who is arrested or detained under any Jaw providing for preventive detention.
There
are, however, other safeguards.
Clause (4) of the article provides
that no law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the
detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless an Advisory Board has reported before the expiration of that
period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause
for such detention.
There are other provisions prescribing other
checks with which we arc not presently concerned.
In pursuance of this power Parliament has enacted the Preventive Detention Act, 1950.
The Preventive Detention Act by its
third section enables the Central Government or the State Government, if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to
preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, to
make ;1.n order that such person be detained.
There arc
other
grounds on which the power to detain may also be exercised but
they do not apply here.
This power is also conferred on some
officers named in the section.
When an officer makes an order
he has to report to the State Government together with the grounds
on which the order is based and in the like manner the State Government has to report to the Central Government.
Section I 1
then provides that where an Advisory Board reports sufficient
cause for the detention of a person, Government may confirm the
detention and continue it for such period as it thinks fit. If the
Advisory Board reports that there is no sufficient cause Government must revoke the order and release the detenu.
Section 11-A
now prescribes the maximum period of detention.
It will thus he seen that the report of the Advisory Board plays
:in important part.
In the present case the report of the Advisory
Board has been produced. It reads :
"fn our opinion, the grounds of detention served on
the detenu also ~ire fairly particular and generally well
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RAMESHWAR LAL I'. BIHAR (Hidayatultah, J.)
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founded.
It cannot, therefore, be said that there is no
material for his detention in the way in which he had
-- been indulging in the transport of foodgrains
from
Bihar to West Bengal frequently.
It cannot be held
that the order of detention passed upon him is unreasonable.
The order in his case also cannot be disturbed.
Sd/- S. C. Mishra 25-8-67.
Sd/L R. K. Choudhury.
Sd/- U. N. Sinha."
The appellant contends that the Advisory
Board has failed to
notice also that the grounds furnished to him were vague and irreleva.ll! and some· of them did not exist in law.
Now the law on the subject of Preventive Detention has been
stated over and over again and it is not necessary to refer to all
that has been decided by this Court on numerous occasions. We
shall refer to what concerns this case. The formation of the opinion
about detention rests with the Government or the officer authorised.
Thei~ satisfaction is all that the law speaks of and the courts
are not constituted an appellate authority. Thus the sufficiency of
the grounds cannot be agitated before the court.
However, the
detention of a person without a trial, merely on the subjective satisfaction of an authority however high, is a serious matter. It must
require the closest scrutiny of the material on which the decision
is formed, leaving no room for errors or at least avoidable errors.
The very reason that the courts do not consider the reasonableness
of the opinion formed or the sufficiency of the material on which
it is based, indicates the need for the greatest circumspection on
the part of those who wield this power over others. Since the detenu
is not placed before a Magistrate and has only a right of being
supplied the grounds of detention with a view to his making a
representation to the Advisory Board, the grounds must not be
vague or indefinite and must afford a real opportunity to·make a
representation against the detention.
Similarly, if a vital ground
is shown to be non-existing so that it could not have and ought
not to have played a part in the material for consideration, the
court may attach some importance to this fact.
Thus it was in
Shibhan Lal Saksena v. U.P. (1 ) that when Governmen't itself confirmed the order on one ground rejecting the other, the order
was held unsustainable.
This Court applied the case of the
Federal Court in Keshav Ta/pade v. The King Emperor( 2 ) and
held that the detention oq the ground which survived could not be
allowed to stand. The following observations may be quoted :
" .... The detaining-authority gave here two grounds
for detaining the petitioner. We can neither decide whether thes<! grounds are good or bad, nor can we attempt
O,l [1954] S,C.R. 418.
(2) [1943] F.C.R. 8~.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 2 S.C.R.
to assess in what manner•and to what extent each.of these
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grounds op-.:rated on the mind of the appropriate authority and contributoo to the creation of the satisfaction on
the basis of which the detention order was made. To say
that the other ground, which still remains, is quite sufficient to sustain the order, would be to substitute an objective judicial test for the subjective decision of the cxecuB
tive auth9rity which is against the legislative policy under'
lying the statute. In such cases, we think, the position
would be the same as if one of these two grounds was
irrelevant for the purpose of the Act or was wholly illusory and this would vitiate the 'detention order as
a whole."
This case is strongly relied upon by Mr. Sctalvad for reasons which
will soon appear. Tue other side relies upon observati0ns in Bliim
Sen v. State of Punjab( 1 ) where blackmarketing was considered a
sufficient ground for detention.
No doubt blackmarketing has
at its base a shortenin& of supplies because blackmarket flourishes
best when the availability of commodities is rendered difficult. It
has a definite tendency to disrupt supplies when scarcity exists or
scarcity is created. artificially by hoarding to attain illegitimate
profits. Indulging in 'blackmarketing is conduct which is prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies. It is hardly necessary to read
supplies conjunctively with services
as was contended although
cases may exist where supplies and services may both be affected.
The word 'and' is not used conjunctively but disjunctively.
If
sweepers strike, no question of disrupting supplies arises but services essential
to the life of the community will certainly be
disrupted.
Looked at from this angle, can we say that the dct~nu was
supplied grounds which were not vague or indefinite or irrelevant
or non-existing ? Tue grounds are five in number. Putting aside
the first and fifth grounds for the time, we may refer to the second,
third and fourth grounds first.
The second ground says that "his
trucks always take to wicked routes to Saithia (We-st Bengal) and
he himself pilots them." This ground is extremely vague. It does
not mention a single instance of a truck taking a particular route
so that the detenu co~ld prove to the satisfaction of the Advisory
Board that the statement was false.
In Bhim Sen's case the condw:t of the black-marketer was shown in an appendix.
Herc no
particulars arc furnished and beyond denying the allegation, the
detenu cannot make effective representation.
The details could
not be such as were required to be concealed in the public interest
under s. 7(2) of the Act. The third ground that "a businessman of
Rarahiya disclosed that he (Rameshwarlal Patwari) visited Barahiya
on several occasions and purchased gram, gramdal under various
(I) (1952] S.C.R. 19.
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names and smuggled them to West Bengal" is equally vague.
Learned counsel for the State admitted that some details were
necessary to give the detenu an opportunity. It is obvious that
without the names of shops, dates of purchase, etc. it is next to
impossible to controvert. such an allegation. The fourth ground
speaks of a pending case in which the appellant is said to be on
bail. The grounds were furnished in July 1967. The appellant
was tried for the offence and acquitted as far back as February
1967. This ground discloses carelessness which is extremely disturbing.
That the detaining authority does not know that the
appellant was. tried and acquitted months before,· and considers
the pendency of the case against him. as one of the grounds of
detention shows that due care and attention is not being paid to
such serious matters as detention without trial. If the appellant
was tried and acquitted, Government was required to study the
judgment of acquittal to discover whether all these aJlegations had
any basis in fact or not. One can understilnd the use of the case 'if
the acquittal was technical but not when the case was held to be
false. In any event, even if there was no need to consider the
result of tb.e case the case could not be referred to as a pending
case.
What is still more disquieting is the attempt to avoid admitting
frankly that there has. been a mistake in including this ground. In
the return this is what is said :
"That the facts stated in paragraph 4 of the ground of
detention are not non est. Those facts stated in paragraph 4 even existed after .icquittal. In regard to the
facts stated in paragraph 4 the prosecution failed to prove
the prosecution case and, therefore, he wae acquitted.
The detenu had full knowl3dge of the facts that he was
acquitted by the Court in regard to the facts stated in
paragraph 4 of the grounds of detention and, therefore,
he was not handicapped in making a representation to
the Advisory Board."
This means that anything wrong or even false may be stated in
the grounds leaving the detenu to deny it and prove his version.
The attempt to cover up the mistake is as futile
as
it is
disingenuous.
This leaves over the first and :(ifth grounds. The first charges
the appeJlant with blackmarketing of foodgrains in conjunction
with certain named persens. No facts are mentioned and this
part of the ground is ·equally vague. No" incident is cited except
one. The ground goes on to say that his trucks, jeep and car are
registered in the names of his relatives. One such truck is mentioned, namel~, truck .No. BRL i331. It is said to be registered
in the name of his brother-in-law and it is further stated that it Was
512
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968\ 2 S C.R.
caught on December 29, 1966 at Ranibahal (near Ma,hanjor)
while carrying 95 bags of paddy for 'illegal trade' and that in this
connection a case under the Essential Commodities Act has been
instituted against 'him-_ It is not clear who is meant the appellant
or his brother-in-law. In a notice from the District Supply Officer,
Dumka it was stated :
"It was learnt from your driver
that on 29-11-66
(sic) at 3.50 a.m., ninety five bags of paddy (190 mds.)
was coming from Ranibahal to Dumka in your truck
BRL 13 31 belonged to you .... "
The appellant has denied that the paddy belonged to him.
He
pointed out that in the notice it was admitted that the paddy was
being taken to Dumk~ in Bihar, while in the grounds it was stated
that it was on its way to West Bengal and that carrying of goods
from Ranibahal to Dumka (both in Bihaf) was no offence. In his
replY, to the District Supply Officer the appellant had stated :
"I. I am a retail dealer in food-grains holding foodgrain License No. 204 of 1966.
2. The truck bearing No. BRL 1331 does not belong
to me.
3. The said 95 bags of paddy loaded on the said
truck No. BRL 1331 does not belong to me. The fact is
that the said 95 bags of paddy belong to Shri Prahlad
Rai Giluka of village Banskuli, P. S. Ranishwar who is
a cultivator which he had agreed to sell to me on condition that the delivery. of the said paddy will be made
to me at Dumka.
I. therefore, request that the cause shown ahove be
accepted and lhe
proceedings. if any,
may kindly be
dropped."
It appears that Prahlad Rai Giluka of Mouza .Banskuli, P. S.
Ranishwar confirmed this before the District Supply Officer by
stating as follows :-
" l. That your petitioner is a cultivator and owns
more than I 00 bighas of Dhani lands at Mouza Murgani Ranibahal and Kumirdaha and other villages which
arc contiguous villages.
2.
3. That the petitioners son Prabhudayal Giluka is
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of fund and the petitioner proposed to sell 95 bags of
paddy to one Rameshwar Lal Patwari of Dumka from
his Murg:ini and Ranibahal land.
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4. That it was agreed that the paddy will be delivered at Dumka where the price will be paid_
5. That the petitioner accordingly engaged the truck
of one Haris Chandar Agarwala, his BRL 1331 and
asked his Munshi Mahadev Pal to load
95 bags of
paddy in the truck.
6.
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7. That when the paddy in question was in the process of loading at .Ranibahal the paddy was seized by
the District Supply Officer on 29-12-66.
8.
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10. That the paddy in question is not involved in
any offence the same should be released forthwith."
When these documents· came to be filed, the return of the State
Government made the. following reply and avoided the issue :
"4. . .... It appears that the notice was issued on
the statement of the driver of the truck who stated that
he was bringing 9 5 bags of paddy from Ranibahal to
Dumka in the truck belonging to the appellant. The
statement of ·the driver clearly shows that· the truck
belonged to the appellant. The driver did not tell anything about the facts stated in annexure 'D' to special
leave paper book (Page .49 to 51)."
This shows that there was no inquiry at all.
The alleged statement of the driver was accepted and it was assumed that the
paddy was being taken to West Bengal. At least the explanation
of the persons concerned could have beyn obtained.
This is
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clearly a case of jumping to a· conclusion which is being lamely
justified, when it is questioned with written record.
In these
circumstances there is much reason to think that this ground probably did not exist although we are not in a position to say that
it is :tion-existing.
The :fifth ground mentions
that one Babu Ram Bikanaria
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wanted gram and gramdal at his Rice Mill at Saitha District
Birbhum (West Bengal) and visiting Dumka ·contacted the appellant. The latter promised to supply gram and gramdal. On 7 /8
December 1966 one Mulchand Choudhury sent truck No. BRJ
2029 loaded with gram and gramdal to Saitha through Mahesh
Kola checkpost. Further Mulchand's truck No. BRL 1366 and
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van BRL 2005 were found at Raneshwar on December 7, 1966
from where 'he' smuggles .foodgrains to West Bengal.
'He' purchases gram and gramdal through Gopal Manda! of Lakhisarai
(Dist. Monghyr) and smuggles them to West Bengal. It is again
L2Sup.Cl/68-2
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(1968] 2 S.C.R.
not clear who this 'he' is.
The appellant has denied that he does
business in gram and gramdal and has any connection with Gopal
Manda! of Lakhisarai or knows him.
He has denied all contact
with such persons. No reply to this was given in the return filed
m this Court.
It appears that there may be suspicion that the appellant may
be connected with some blackmarketing. We arc not concerned
with the sufficiency or the reasonableness of the grounds. In this
case at least two grounds are vague, one ground is found to be false
and of the remaining in one there is no explanation and in the
other there is a lame excuse that the driver of the truck did not
furnish the full information.
The case is thus covered by our
rulings that where some grounds are found to be non-existing or
are cancelled or given up, the detention cannot be justified.
It
is further covered by our decisions that if the grounds are not
sufficiently precise and do not furnish details for the purpose of
. making effective representation the detention can be questioned.
This case displays both these defects and it is a matter of great
regret that powers of detention without a trial, which should be
exercised with the greatest care and attention have been exercised
in this case with such disregard for truth and accuracy. We accordingly allow the appeal and hold the detention of the appellant
to be illegal and order his release.
G.C.
Appeal allowed.
A
B
c
D