# I S.C.R. 158 ABHIRAM SINGH v. C.D. COMMACHEN (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS - **Citation:** [2017] 1 S.C.R. 158 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 2017-01-02 - **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 37of1992 - **Bench:** T. S. Thakur, Madan B. Lokur, S. A. Bobde, Adarsh Kumar Goel, Uday Umesh Lalit, Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, L. Nageswara Rao - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/i-s-c-r-158-abhiram-singh-v-c-d-commachen-dead-by-lrs-ors-31741 - **Pages:** 103 ## Headnote Representation of the People Act, 1951: s. 123 (3) (as amended in 1961) - Interpretation of - Held: Majority View: The Act being a statute that enables to cherish and strengthen democratic ideals should be interpreted in a manner that assists the elector or 1he electorate and not that assists the candidates - Keeping in view the social context in which sub-section (3) of s.123 was enacted and today's social and technological context, ii is absolutely necesswy to give a broad and purposive interpretation rather than a literal or strict interpretation - The provisions under sub-section (3) are required to be read and appreciated in the context of simultaneous and contemporaneous amendmellls inserting sub-section (3Aj in s. 12 3 and inserting s. 153A in !PC - Therefore sub-section (3) of s. 123 is to be interpreted in such a way so as to bring within sweep of 'corrupt practice', any appeal on the ground of the religion, race, caste, community or language of (i) any candidate or (ii) his agent, or (iii) any other person making appeal with the consent of the candidate, or (iv) the elector - The bar uls. 123 (3) to making an appeal on the ground of religion must not be confined to the religion of the candidale or that of his rival candidates - The word 'his' occurring in the Section refers not only lo the candidate or his agent, but is also intended to refer to the vol er or elector - Determination of the facts whether an appeal, at all, has been made to the elector and whether appeal made, is in violation of s. 123(3), would be a matter of evidence - Minority view: Election petitions alleging corrupt practices have a quasi-criminal character wherein standard of proof is close to that which guides a criminal trial - Therefore, s.123(3) must be interpreted in literal sense - The expression 'his' ins. 123(3) 158 ABHIRAM SINGH v. C.D. COMMACHEN (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. used in conjunction with religion, race, caste, co111111unity or language is in reference to the religion, race, caste, community or language of the candidate (in whose favour the appeal to caste a vote is made) or tho( of a rival candidate (when an appeal is made to refrain from voting for another) - Sub-section (3) cannot be construed as referring to the religion, race, caste, commu/1ity or language of the voter, even if the provision is given a purposive interpretation - Discussion, debate or dialogue, of matters relating to religion, race, caste, community or language of the voters is not an appeal on those grounds, and the sa111e is protected being an intrinsic part of freedom of speech. s.123(3) - Long-standing interpretation of given by the courts - Unsettling of - Permissibility - Held: Per Madan B. Lokur, J.: The interpretation given to s.123(3) was not well recognized ani there was uncertainty about correct interpretatio11 thereof. the court can unsettle the long-standing interpretation - Per: Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.: A change in the legal position, 11'hich has held the field through judicial precedent over a length of time can be considered only in exceptional and compelling circumstances - In the preselll cases no case has been made out to take a viell' at variance with the settled legal position that the expression 'his' in s. · 123 (3) must mean the religion, race, community or language of the candidate - Precedent. Interpretation of Statutes: [,iteral interpretation vis-a-vis purposive interpretation - Per Madan B. Lokur, J.: While imerpreting a statute or a provision in a statute, not only the text of the law; but also the co11text in which it was enacted and the social context, should be considered - However, in statutes having penal consequence, affecting liberty of an individual or imposing financial burden on a person, the rule of literal interpretation would still hold good - Per T.S. Thakur, C.J.I.: While interpreting an enactment, the courts should remain cognizant of constitutional goals and the purpose of the Act and interpret the provisions acco ## Text _Characters 0–39,895 of 248,267. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39895 for what follows._ A B c D E F G H [2017] I S.C.R. 158 ABHIRAM SINGH v. C.D. COMMACHEN (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 37of1992) JANUARY 02, 2017 [T. S. THAKUR, C.J.l., MADAN B. LOKUR, S. A. BOBDE, ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, UDAY UMESH LALIT, DR. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD AND L. NAGESWARA RAO, JJ.) Representation of the People Act, 1951: s. 123 (3) (as amended in 1961) - Interpretation of - Held: Majority View: The Act being a statute that enables to cherish and strengthen democratic ideals should be interpreted in a manner that assists the elector or 1he electorate and not that assists the candidates - Keeping in view the social context in which sub-section (3) of s.123 was enacted and today's social and technological context, ii is absolutely necesswy to give a broad and purposive interpretation rather than a literal or strict interpretation - The provisions under sub-section (3) are required to be read and appreciated in the context of simultaneous and contemporaneous amendmellls inserting sub-section (3Aj in s. 12 3 and inserting s. 153A in !PC - Therefore sub-section (3) of s. 123 is to be interpreted in such a way so as to bring within sweep of 'corrupt practice', any appeal on the ground of the religion, race, caste, community or language of (i) any candidate or (ii) his agent, or (iii) any other person making appeal with the consent of the candidate, or (iv) the elector - The bar uls. 123 (3) to making an appeal on the ground of religion must not be confined to the religion of the candidale or that of his rival candidates - The word 'his' occurring in the Section refers not only lo the candidate or his agent, but is also intended to refer to the vol er or elector - Determination of the facts whether an appeal, at all, has been made to the elector and whether appeal made, is in violation of s. 123(3), would be a matter of evidence - Minority view: Election petitions alleging corrupt practices have a quasi-criminal character wherein standard of proof is close to that which guides a criminal trial - Therefore, s.123(3) must be interpreted in literal sense - The expression 'his' ins. 123(3) 158 ABHIRAM SINGH v. C.D. COMMACHEN (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. used in conjunction with religion, race, caste, co111111unity or language is in reference to the religion, race, caste, community or language of the candidate (in whose favour the appeal to caste a vote is made) or tho( of a rival candidate (when an appeal is made to refrain from voting for another) - Sub-section (3) cannot be construed as referring to the religion, race, caste, commu/1ity or language of the voter, even if the provision is given a purposive interpretation - Discussion, debate or dialogue, of matters relating to religion, race, caste, community or language of the voters is not an appeal on those grounds, and the sa111e is protected being an intrinsic part of freedom of speech. s.123(3) - Long-standing interpretation of given by the courts - Unsettling of - Permissibility - Held: Per Madan B. Lokur, J.: The interpretation given to s.123(3) was not well recognized ani there was uncertainty about correct interpretatio11 thereof. the court can unsettle the long-standing interpretation - Per: Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.: A change in the legal position, 11'hich has held the field through judicial precedent over a length of time can be considered only in exceptional and compelling circumstances - In the preselll cases no case has been made out to take a viell' at variance with the settled legal position that the expression 'his' in s. · 123 (3) must mean the religion, race, community or language of the candidate - Precedent. Interpretation of Statutes: [,iteral interpretation vis-a-vis purposive interpretation - Per Madan B. Lokur, J.: While imerpreting a statute or a provision in a statute, not only the text of the law; but also the co11text in which it was enacted and the social context, should be considered - However, in statutes having penal consequence, affecting liberty of an individual or imposing financial burden on a person, the rule of literal interpretation would still hold good - Per T.S. Thakur, C.J.I.: While interpreting an enactment, the courts should remain cognizant of constitutional goals and the purpose of the Act and interpret the provisions accordingly - Per S.A. Bobde, J.: A literal interpretation does not exclude a purposive interpretation - While construing a statute both the rules of interpretatio11 ca11 be applied whether it be penal statute or taxing statute - Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.: Where a statut01y provision implicates penal 159 A B c D E F G H 160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] I S.C.R. A consequences or consequences of a quasi-criminal character, a strict construction of the words used by the legislature must be adopted. Rule of Interpretation - Per T. S. Thakur, C.J.I.: An interpretation which has the effect of eroding or diluting the constitutional objective of keeping the State and its activities free B from religious considerations, must be avoided - The interpretations that are in tune with constitutional provisions and ethos ought to be preferred over others. Rule of interpretation-Per S.A. Bobde, J.: While interpreting statutes, wherever the language is clear, the intention of the c legislature must be gathered from the language used, and the support from extraneous sources should be avoided. Statutory interpretation - Use of legislative history as an aid to statutory interpretation - Permissibility - Held: Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.: Legislative history is a significant element in the o formation of an informed interpretation. E F G H Answering the reference, the Court HELD: MAJORITY VIEW: Per Madan B. Lokur, J. (For himself and for L. Nageswara Rao, J.): 1.1 The conflict between giving a literal interpretation or a purposive interpretation to a statute or a provision in a statute is perennial. It can be settled only if the draftsman gives a longwinded explanation in drafting the law but this would result in an awkward draft that might well turn out to be unintelligible. The interpreter has, therefore, to consider not only the text of the law but the context in which the law was enacted and _the social context in which the law should be interpreted. [Para 36] [197-D] R. v. Secretary of State ji;r Health ex parle Quintavalle [2003] UKHL 13 - referred to. Bennion on Statutory Interpretation Sixth Edition (lndian Reprint) page 847 - referred to. 1.2 Ordinarily, if a statute is well-drafted and debated in Parliament there is little or no need to adopt any interpretation other than a literal interpretation of. the statute. However, in a welfare State, what is intended for the benefit of the people is not ABHIRAM SINGH v. C.D. COMMACHEN (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. fully reflected in the text of a statute. [n such legislations, a pragmatic view is required to be taken and the law interpreted purposefully and realistically so that the benefit reaches the masses. Of course, in statutes that have a penal consequence and affectthe liberty of an individual or a statute that could im1JOsc a financial burden on a person, the rule of literal interpretation would still hold good. [Para 38] [200-B-D] l .3 The Representation of the People Act, 1951 is a statute that enables to cherish and strengthen democratic ideals. To interpret it in a manner that assists candidates to an election rather than tl\e elector or the electorate in a vast democracy like that ofltldi~ would really be going against public interest. [Para 39) (200-D-E) 1.4 The purpose of enacting sub-section (3) of Section 123 of the Act and amending it more than once during .the course of the first 10 years of its enactment indicates the seriousness with whicl1 Parliament grappled 'yith the necessity of curbing communalism, separatist and fissiparous tendencies during an ·election campaign (and even otherwise in view of the amendment of Section 153A of the IPC). It is during electioneering that a candidate goes virtually all out to seek votes from ·the electorate and Parliament (elt it necessary to put some fetters on the language that might be used so that the democratic process is not derailed but strengthened. Taking all this into consideration, Parliament felt. the need to place·a strong check on corrupt practices based on an appeal on grounds of religion during election campaigns (and even otherwise). (Para 41] [200-H; 201-A-B] 1.5 The concerns which formed the ground for amending Section 123(3) of the Act have increased with the tremendous reach already available to a candidate through the print and electronic media, and now with access to millions,throngh the internet and social media as well as mobile phone technology, none of which were seriously contemplated till about fifteen years ·ago. Therefore now, more than ever it is necessary to ensure that the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 123 of the Act are not exploited by a candidate or anyone on his or her behalf by making an appeal on the ground of religion with a' possibility of disturbing the even tempo of life. [Para 42] (201-C-DI 161 A B c D E F G H 162 A B c D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I S.C.R. 1.6 Keeping in view the social context in which sub-section (3) of Section 123 of the Act was enacted and today's social and technological context, it is absolutely necessary to give a purposive interpretation to the provision rather than a literal or strict interpretation i.e. limited only to the candidate's religion or that of his rival candidates. [Para 46) (203-G-H] Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. [1989] 3 SCR 316 : (1989) 2 SCC 754; Magan/al Chhaganla/ (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Grea/P" Tfombay (1975] 1 SCR 1 : (1974) 2 SCC 402; Badshah" Urmila Badshah Godse [2013] 10 SCR 259 : (2014) 1 SCC 188 - relied on. 1. 7 The provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 are required to be read and appreciated in the context of simultaneous and contemporaneous amendments inserting sub-section (3A) iu Section 123 of the Act and inserting Section 153A in the Penal Code. [Para 49] [205-C] 1.8 So read together, and for maintaining the purity of the electoral process and not vitiating it, sub-section (3) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 must be given a broad and purposive interpretation thereby bringing within the sweep of a corrupt practice any appeal made to an elector by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent to vote or refrain from voting for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of that candidate or for prejudicially affecting the election of any candidate on the ground of the religion, race, caste, community or language of (i) any candidate or (ii) his agent or (iii) any other person making the appeal with the consent of the candidate or (iv) the elector. [Para 49] [205-D-Fj 1.9 It is a matter of evidence for determining whether an appeal has at all been made to an elector and whether the appeal if made is in violation of the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. [Para 49) (205-F-GJ 2. There was some uncertainty about the correct ABHIRAM SINGH v. C.D. COMMACHEN (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. interpretation of sub-section (3) of Section 123 of the Act. It is not as if the interpretation was well-recognized and settled. That being the position, the court can unsettle the long-standing interpretation given to s. 123(3) of the Act. [Para 48] [205-A]. Ku/tar Singh v. Mukhtiar Singh AIR 1965 SC 141 : [1964] SCR 790 - followed. Jagdev Singh Sidhanti v. Pratap Singh Dau/ta [1964] 6 SCR 750; Kanti Prasad Jayshanker Yagnik v. Purshottamdas Ranchhoddas Patel. [19691 3 SCR 400 : (1969) 1 SCC 455; Dr Ramesh Yeshwa11t Prabhoo v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 371: (1996) 1 sec 130 - held not correct law. · Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen [1996] 1 Suppl. SCR 340 : (1996) 3 SCC 665; Narayan Singh v. Sunder/al Fatwa (2003) 9 SCC 300; Mohd. Aslam v. Union of India [1996] 3 SCR 782 : (1996) 2 SCC 749; S. R. "Bommai v. Union qf India [1994] 2 SCR 644 : (1994) 3 SCC 1; Ziyauddi11 Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdass Mehra [1975] Suppl. SCR 281 : (1976) 2 SCC 17; S. Hareharan Singh v. S. Sajjan Singh [1985] 2 SCR 159 : (1985) 1 SCC 370; Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya v. Lachhi Ram [1955] 1 SCR 608 - referred to. Per T.S. Thakur, C.J.I. (Concurring) 1. It cannot be said that the amendment in 1961, in one sense served to widen the scope of corrupt practice n/s. 123(3) of Representation of People Act, 1951, but in another sense restrict the scope of corrupt practice. The unamended provision made any appeal in the name of religion, race, caste, community or language a corrupt practice, regardless of whose religion, race, caste, community or language was involved for such an appeal. The only o.ther requirement was that such an appeal was made in a systematic manner for the furtherance of the prospects of a candidate. If that was the legal position before the amendment and if the Parliament intended to enlarge the scope of the corrupt practice, the question of the scope being widened and restricted at the same time did not arise. There is nothing to suggest either in the statement of objects and reasons or contemporaneous record of proceedings, including notes accompanying the bill to 163 A B c D E F G H 164 A B c D E SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] l S.C.R. show that the amendment was contrary to the earlier position intended to permit appeals in the name of religion, race, caste, community or language to be made except those made in the name of the religion, race, caste, community or language of the candidate for the furtherance of whose prospects such appeals were made. Any such interpretation will not only do violence to the provisions of Section 123(3) but also go against the avowed purpose of the amendment. Any such interpretation will artificially restrict the scope of corrupt practice for it will make permissible what was clearly impermissible under the unamended provision. The correct approach, is to ask whether appeals in the name of religion, race, caste, community or language which were forbidden under the unamended law were actually meant to be made permissible subject only to the condition that any such appeal was not founded on the religion, race, caste, comm unity or language of the candidate for whose benefit the same was made. The answer to that question has to be in the negative. The law as it stood before the amendment did not permit au appeal iu the name of religion, race, caste community or language, uo matter whose religion, race, community or language was invoked. The amendment did not intend to relax or remove that restriction. On .the contrary it intended to widen the scope of the corrupt practice by making even a 'single such appeal' a corrupt practice which was not so under the unamended provision. Seen both textually and contextually the argument that the term "llis religion" appearing in the amended provision must be interpreted so as to confine the same to appeals in the name of "religion of the F . candidate" concerned alone does npt stand closer scrutiny and must be rejected. [Paras 8 and 9) [209-C-H; 210-A-C] G H Z..1 Under the constitutional scheme mixing religion with State power is not permissible w'hile freedom to practice, profess and propagate religion of one's choice is guaranteed. The State being secular in character will not identify itself with any one of the religions or religious denominations. This necessarily implies that religion will not play any role in the governance of the c·ountry which must at all times be secular in nature. The elections to the State legislature or to the Parliament or for that matter or any other body in the State is a secular exercise just as the functions of the elected representatives must be secular in both outlook ABHIRAM SINGH v. C.D. COMMACHEN (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. and practice. The Constitutional ethos forbids mixing of religions or religious considerations with the secular functions of the State. This necessarily implies that interpretation of any statute must nut offend the fundamental mandate under the Constitution. An interpretation which has the effect of eroding or diluting the constitutional objective of keeping the State and its activities free from religious considerations, therefore, must be avoided. While interpr,eting an enactment, the Courts should remain cognizant of the Constitutional goals and the purpose of the Act and interpret the provisions accordingly. [Para 23] [215-D-G] 2.2 While interpreting a legislative provision, the Courts must remain alive to the constitutional provisions and ethos and that interpretations that are in tune with such provisions and ethos ought to be preferred over others. Applying that principle to the present case, an interpretation that will have the effect of removing the religion or-religious considerations from the secular character of the State or state activity ought to be preferred over an interpretation which may allow such considerations to enter, effect or influence such activities. Electoral processes are doubtless secular activities of the State. Religion can have no place in such activities for religion is a matter personal to the individual with which neither the- State nor any other individual has anything to do. The State is under an obligation to allow complete freedom for practicing, professing and propagating religious faith to which a citizen belongs in terms of Article 25 of the Constitution of India but the freedom so guaranteed has nothing-to do with secular activities which the State undertakes. The State can and indeed has in terms of Section 123(3) forbidden interference of religions and religious beliefs with secular activity of elections to legislative bodies. [Para 28) [217-C-G] Saifi1ddin Saheb 1' Slate of Bombay AIR 1962 SC 853: [1962] Suppl. SCR 496; Ahmedabad St. Xavier s College Society and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Am'. [1975] 1 SCR 173: (1974) 1 SCC 717; flldira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain [1976] SCR 347 : (1975)' Suppl. SCC 1; S.R. Bommai v. Union of India [1994) 2 SCR 644 : 1994 (3) SCC l; M.P. Gopa/akrislman Nair and Anr. 1' State of Kera/a and Ors. [2005] 3 SCR 712: (2005) 11 SCC 45; Dr. Vimal (Mrs.) v. Bhagzlji & Ors. 165 A B c D E F G H 166 A B c D E SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I S.C.R. [1995] 1 Suppl. SCR 392: (1996) 9 SCC 351; Ambika Sharan Singh v. 1"1aha11t Mahadeva and Giri and Others (1969) 3 SCC 492; Kedar Nath v. State art speaks of the basis of tb,e appeal. The appeal is to vote or refrain from voting for any person on the ground of his religion, race, caste, community or language. In the latter part of Section 123(3), the corrupt practices consist in the use of or appeal to religious symbols or national symbols such as the national flag or emblem for (i) the furtherance of the prospects of the election of that candidate or (ii) prejudicially affecting the election of any ca.ndidate. [Paras 13 and 14) (231-A-E) 169 A B c D E F G H 170 A B c D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I S.C.R. 2.2 Section 123(3) evinces a Parliamentary intent to bring within the corrupt practice an appeal by a candidate or his agent (or by any person with the consent of the candidate or his election agent) to either vote or refrain from voting for any person. The positive element is embodied in the expression "to vote". What it means is that there is an appeal to vote in favour of a particular candidate. Negatively, an appeal not to vote for a rival candidate is also within the text of the provision. An appeal to vote for a candidate is made to enhance the prospects of the candidate at the election. An appeal to refrain from voting for a candidate has a detrimental effect on the election prospects of a rival candidate. Hence, in the first instance, there is an appeal by a candidate (or his agent or by another person with the consent of the election agent). The appeal is for soliciting votes in favour of the candidate or to refrain from voting for a rival candidate. The expression 'his' means belonging to or associated with a person previously mentioned. The expression "his" nsed in conjunction with religion, race, caste, community or language is in reference to the religion, race, caste, community or language of the candidate (in whose favour the appeal to cast a vote is made) or that of a rival candidate (when an appeal is made to refrain from voting for another). It is impossible to construe sub-section (3) as referring to the religion, race, caste, community or language of the voter. The provision, adverts to "a candidate" or "his agent", or "by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent". This is a reference to the person making the appeal. The next part of the provision contains a reference to the appeal being made "to vote or refrain from voting for any person". The vote is solicited for a candidate or there is an appeal not to vote for a candidate. Each of these expressions is in the singular. They are followed by expression "on the ground of his religion ... ". The expression "his religion ... " must necessarily qualify what precedes; namely, the religion of the candidate in whose favour a vote is sought or that of another candidate against whom there is an appeal to refrain from voting. 'His' religion (and the same principle would apply to 'his' race, 'his' caste, 'his' community, or 'his' language) must hence refer to the religion of the person in whose favour votes are solicited or the person against whom there is an appeal for refraining from ABHIRAM SINGH v. C.D. COMMACHEN (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. casting a ballot. [Para 15] [231-F-H; 232-A-D] 2.3 Section 123(3) nses the expression "on the ground of his religion ... ". The expression 'the' is a definite article used especially before a noun with a specifying or particularizing effect. 'The' is used as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing forces of the indefinite article 'a' or 'an'. The expression 'ground' was substituted in Section 123(3) in place of 'grounds', following the amendment of 1961. Read together, the words "the ground of his religion •.. " indicate that what the legislature has proscribed is an appeal to vote for a candidate or to refrain from voting for another candidate exclusively on the basis of the religion (or race, caste, community or language) of the candidate or a rival candidate. 'The ground' means solely or exclusively on the basis of the identified feature or circumstance. [Para 16] [232-E-G] 2.4 There is a clear rationale and· logic underlying the provision u/s. 123(3). A person who contests an election for beiug elected as a representative of the people either to Parliament or the State legislatures seeks to represent the entire constituency. A person who is elected represents the whole of the constituency. The Constitution of India has rejected and consciously did not adopt separate electorates. Eveu where a constituency .is reserved for a particular category, the elected candidate represent~ the constituency as a whole and not merely persons who belong to the class or category for whom the seat is reserved. A representative of the people represents people at large and not a particular religion, caste or community. Consequently, as a matter of legislative policy Parliament lias mandated that the religion of a candidate cannot be utilized to solicit votes at the election. Similarly, the religion of a rival candidate cannot form the basis of an appeal to refrain from voting for that candidate. (Para 17] [232-H; 233-A-C] 2.5 There is also rationale for Section 123(3) not to advert to the religion, caste, community or language of the voter as a corrupt practice. The Constitution recognizes the broad diversity of India and, as a political document, seeks to foster a sense of inclnsion. It seeks to wield a nation where its citizens practice different religions, speak varieties of languages, belong to various castes and are of different communities into the 171 A R c D E F G H 172 A B c D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] l S.C.R. concept of one nationhood. Yet, the Constitution, in doing so, recognizes the position of religion, caste, language and gender in the social life of the nation. Individual histories both of citizens and collective groups in the society are associated through the ages with histories of discrimination and injustice on the basis of these defining characteristics. In numerous provisions, the Constitution has sought to preserve a delicate balance between individual liberty and the need to remedy these histories of injustice founded upon immutable characteristics such as of religion, race, caste and language. There is no wall of separation between the State on the one hand and religion, caste, language, race or community on the other. [Paras 18, 20) [233-D-F; 235-C) 2.6 The corrupt practice lies in an appeal being made to vote for a candidate on the ground of his religion, race, caste, community or language. The corrupt practice also lies in an appeal to refrain from voting for any candidate on the basis of the above characteristics of the candidate. · Electors however, may have and in fact do have ·a legitimate expectation that the discrimination and deprivation which they may have suffered in the past (and which many continue to suffer) on the basis of their religion, caste, or language should be remedied. Access to governance is a means of addressing social disparities. Social mobilisation is a powerful instrument of bringing marginalised groups into the mainstream. To hold that a person who seeks to contest an election is prohibited from speaking of the legitimate concerns of citizens that the injustices faced by them on the basis of traits having an origin in religion, race, caste, community or language would be remedied is to reduce democracy to an abstraction. Coupled with this fact is the constitutional protection of free speech and expression in Article 19(l)(a) of the Constitution. This fundamental right is subject to reasonable restrictions as provided in the .Constitution. Section 123(3) was not meant to and does not refer to the religion (or race, community, language or caste) of the voter. If Parliament intended to do so, it was for the legislature to so provide in clear and unmistakable terms. There is no warrant for making an assumption that Parliament while enacting Section123(3) intended to sanitize the electoral process from the real histories of the people grounded in injustice, discrimination and suffering. ABHIRAM SINGH v. C.D. COMMACHEN (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. The purity of electoral process is sought to be maintained by proscribing an appeal to the religion of a candidate (or to his or her caste, race, community or language) or in a negative sense to these characteristics of a rival candidate. The "his" in Section .123(3) cannot validly refer to the religion, race, caste, community or language -of the voter. [Para 20] [235cE-H; 236-A-C] 2. 7 s. 123(3) does not prohibit discussipn, debate or dialogue during the course of an election campaign on issues pertaining to religion or on issues of caste, community, race or language. Discussion of matters relating to religion, caste, race, community or language which are of concern to the voters is not an appeal on those grounds. Caste, race, religion and language are matters of concern to voters especially where large segments of the population were deprived of basic human rights as a result of prejudice and discrimination which they llave suffered on the basis of caste and race. Discussion about these matters - within and outside the electoral context - is a constitutionally protected value and is an intrinsic part of the freedom of speech and expression. [Para 21] [236-E-H; 237-A-B] 2.8 Thus, Section 123(3) must be interpreted in a literal ' sense. However, even if the provision were to be given a purposive interpretation, that does not necessarily lead to the interpretation that Section 123(3) must refer to the caste, religion, race, com'!lunity or language of the voter. On the contrary, there are sound constitutional reasons, which militate against Section 123(3) being read to include a reference "to the religion (etc) of the voter. Hence, it is not proper for the court to choose a partil;ular theory based on purposive interpretation; when that principle of interpretation does not riecessarily lead to one inference or result alone. It must be left to the legislature to amend or re-draft the legislative provision, if it considers it necessary to do so. [Para 22] [237-D~F] 2.9 The traditional view of courts both in India and the UK was a rule of exclusion by which parliamentary history was not readily utilized in interpreting a law. Over a period of time, the narrow view favouring the exclusfon of legislative history has given way to a broader perspective. · Debates in the Constituent Assembly have been utilized as au aid to the interpretation of a 173 A B c D E F G H 174 A B c D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I S.C.R. constitutional provision. The modern trend is to permit the utilization of parliamentary material, particularly a speech by the Minister moving a Bill in construing the words of a statute. The use of parliamentary debates as an aid to statutory interpretation has been noticed in several decisions of this Court. There is need for a balance between the traditional view supporting the exclusion of the enacting history of a statute and the more realistic contemporary doctrine allowing its use as an aid to statutory interpretation. The modern trend is to enable the court to look at the enacting history of a legislation to foster a full understanding of the meaning behind words used by the legisfature, the mischief" which the law seeks to deal and in the process, to formulate an informed interpretation of the law. Enacting history is a significant element in the formation of an informed interpretation. [Paras 31, 32, 33 and 35 ] [243-B-C; 244-D-G; 246-C-D] Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India AIR 1951 · SC 41: [1950] SCR 869; Dr Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v. PK Kunte [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 371 : 1995 (7) SCALE 1 - relied on. Stale of Travancore Co. 1( Bombay Co. Ltd. AIR 1952 SC 366 : [1952] SCR 1112; State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1964] 1 SCR 371; . Indra Sawhney v. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 477 : (1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454; Novartis AG v. Union of India (2013) 6 SCC 1 : [2013] 13 SCR 148; State of Madhya Pradesh 1(Dadabhoy s New Chirimiri Ponri Hill Colliery Co. Pvt. Ltd. (1972) 1 SCC 298 : [1972] 2 SCR 609; Union of India v. Legal Stock Holders Syndicate AIR 1976 SC 879 : [1976] 3 SCR 504; KP Vergese 1( Income Tax Officer AIR 1981 SC 1922 : (1982] 1 SCR 629; Surana Steels Pvt. Ltd. v. Dy Commissioner of Income Tax [1999) 2 SCR 589 : (1999) 4 SCC 306 - referred to. 'Principles of Statutory l11terpretu!w11' by G.P. Singh XIVth Edn.P-253; Bennion on Statut01y lnlerpretalion, Indian Reprint Sixth Edition page 561 - referred to. 2.10 The legislative history of s. 123(3) indicates that Parliament, while omitting the requirement of a "systematic" appeal intended to widen the ambit of the provision. An 'appeal' ABHIRAM SINGH v. C.D. 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