# I S.C.R. 242 STATE OF HARYANA v. EROS CITY DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD. AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [2016] 1 S.C.R. 242
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2016-01-19
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 354 of 2016
- **Bench:** RANJAN GOGOi, Prafulla C. Pant
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/i-s-c-r-242-state-of-haryana-v-eros-city-developers-pvt-ltd-and-others-30909
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Land Acquisition Act, 1894: ss.4 and 6 -
Acquisition
Notification of land measuring 172 kanals 19 mar/as in village
Lakarpur, District F aridabad - Out of that 129 kanals 14 mar las
owned by respondent no.I - Purpose of acquisition was expansion
and systematic development of Surajkund Tourist Complex - High
Court quashed the Notification - High Court also applied the equity
doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation in
favour of respondent no. I - On State's appeal, held: The land in
question was under acquisition in 1992 but proceedings were
dropped after Supreme Court's order in M.C. Mehta's case - In
1993, respondent no.I purchased the said land - In 1998, the
authorities were directed to consider the plan of hotel project
submitted by respondent no. 1 -
Fresh acquisition proceedings
initiated by the State - High Court has erred in quashing the
acquisition of land in question by applying doctrine of promissory
estoppel and legitimate expectation in the facts of the present case
- The purpose i.e. for expansion and systematic development of
Surajkund Tourist Complex is a public purpose - It included
development of parking area adjacent to the Surajkund Tourist
Complex near annual Surajkund Fair - High Court was incorrect
in holding that the State has not acted bonafide after 1992
acquisition proceedings were dropped - Earlier proceedings were
dropped in the light of M.C. Mehta's case in 1996 restraining
construction in the area and after modification in the said order in
G
1998, the State took fresh decision to acquire the land for public
purpose and there was no illegality in the same.
H
Sooraram Pratap Reddy and Others v. District Collector,
Ranga Reddy District and others 2008 (13) SCR 126 :
(2008) 9 SCC 552; State of Haryana and Others vs.
Vinod Oil and General Mills and Another (2014) 15
242
STATE OF HARYANA v. EROS CITY DEVELOPERS P. LTD.
SCC 410; A.P. Pollution Control Board II v. M. V. Nayudu
(Retd.) and Others 2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 249 : (2001)
2 SCC 62; Monnet !spat and Energy Limited v. Union
of India and Others 2012 (7) SCR 644 ; (2012) 11 SCC
1; Hira Tikkoo v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and
Others 2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 65 : (2004) 6 SCC 765 -
relied on.
M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India & Ors. Supreme Court's
judgment passed in W.P. (C) No. 4677 of 1985 on
10.05.1993 by - referred to.
Case Law Reference
2008 (13} SCR 126
relied on.
para9
(2014) 15 sec 410
relied on.
para 11
2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 249
relied on.
para 12
2012 (7) SCR 644
relied on.
para 13
2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 65
relied on.
para 14

## Text

A
[2016] I S.C.R. 242
STATE OF HARYANA
v.
EROS CITY DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD. AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 354 of 2016 etc.)
B
JANUARY 19, 2016
c
D
E
F
(RANJAN GOGOi AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.)
Land Acquisition Act, 1894: ss.4 and 6 -
Acquisition
Notification of land measuring 172 kanals 19 mar/as in village
Lakarpur, District F aridabad - Out of that 129 kanals 14 mar las
owned by respondent no.I - Purpose of acquisition was expansion
and systematic development of Surajkund Tourist Complex - High
Court quashed the Notification - High Court also applied the equity
doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation in
favour of respondent no. I - On State's appeal, held: The land in
question was under acquisition in 1992 but proceedings were
dropped after Supreme Court's order in M.C. Mehta's case - In
1993, respondent no.I purchased the said land - In 1998, the
authorities were directed to consider the plan of hotel project
submitted by respondent no. 1 -
Fresh acquisition proceedings
initiated by the State - High Court has erred in quashing the
acquisition of land in question by applying doctrine of promissory
estoppel and legitimate expectation in the facts of the present case
- The purpose i.e. for expansion and systematic development of
Surajkund Tourist Complex is a public purpose - It included
development of parking area adjacent to the Surajkund Tourist
Complex near annual Surajkund Fair - High Court was incorrect
in holding that the State has not acted bonafide after 1992
acquisition proceedings were dropped - Earlier proceedings were
dropped in the light of M.C. Mehta's case in 1996 restraining
construction in the area and after modification in the said order in
G
1998, the State took fresh decision to acquire the land for public
purpose and there was no illegality in the same.
H
Sooraram Pratap Reddy and Others v. District Collector,
Ranga Reddy District and others 2008 (13) SCR 126 :
(2008) 9 SCC 552; State of Haryana and Others vs.
Vinod Oil and General Mills and Another (2014) 15
242
STATE OF HARYANA v. EROS CITY DEVELOPERS P. LTD.
SCC 410; A.P. Pollution Control Board II v. M. V. Nayudu
(Retd.) and Others 2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 249 : (2001)
2 SCC 62; Monnet !spat and Energy Limited v. Union
of India and Others 2012 (7) SCR 644 ; (2012) 11 SCC
1; Hira Tikkoo v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and
Others 2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 65 : (2004) 6 SCC 765 -
relied on.
M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India & Ors. Supreme Court's
judgment passed in W.P. (C) No. 4677 of 1985 on
10.05.1993 by - referred to.
Case Law Reference
2008 (13} SCR 126
relied on.
para9
(2014) 15 sec 410
relied on.
para 11
2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 249
relied on.
para 12
2012 (7) SCR 644
relied on.
para 13
2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 65
relied on.
para 14
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 354 of
2016.
243
A
B
c
D
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.01.2008 of the Division
E
Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP
No. 10611 of2004.
WITH
C. A. NO. 355 OF 2016
Arun Bhardwaj,AAG, Jai Wadhwa, Ronak Karanpuria, Dr. Monika
Gusain, U gra Shankar Prasad for the Appellant.
Shyam Divan, Akhil Sibal, Malini Sud, Vidhi Goel, Priya Deep,
Sagun, Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Naresh Bakshi for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
PRAFULLA C. PANT, J. I. Leave granted in both the special
leave petitions.
F
G
2. These appeals are directed against judgment and order dated
21.01.2008, passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Civil
Writ Petition No. 10611 of 2004 whereby said Court has quashed the
H
244
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2016) 1 S.C.R.
A
notifications dated 08.10.2003 and 07.05.2004 issued under Sections 4
and 6 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, respectively, by the State ofHaryana
regarding acquisition of land measuring 129 kanals 14 marlas in village
Lakarpur, District Faridabad. The High Court has further quashed the
Award dated 05.05.2006, passed by respondent No. 4 in respect of land
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
owned by respondent No. 1 Eros City Developers Pvt. Ltd., which was
acquired through the above mentioned notifications.
3. Succinctly stated total area of 172 kanals 19 marlas situated in
village Lakharpur Tehsil Ballabgarh in District Faridabad was proposed
to be acquired by the State of Haryana through notification dated
08.10.2003 issued under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 out of
which 129 kanals 14 marlas (for short subject land) belonged to respondent
no. I Mis. Eros City Developers Pvt. Ltd. The details of the persons
whose land is acquired is as under:
S.
Name of owner
Total Area
Status
I
No.
I.
Shri Sekher
6 kanal
Compensation
paid. 1
Slo
Shri
Rosh an
2 1/1 marla
Possession taken over.
'
Lal
i
2.
Shri Sissar Slo Shri 6 kanal
Compensation
paid.
1
Roshan Lal
2 I> maria
Possession taken over.
-
-
----
129.kanal --
·--------
-·'
3.
Mis.
Eros
City
Compensation deposited I
Developers
Pvt.
14 maria
before
the
Land ·
Ltd.( Respondent
Acquisition
Collector.
No.I herein)
Acquisition
quashed i
vide
impugned I
----
-- -
judgment.
____ ~
4.
Shri Vikram Bakshi
25 kanal
C.W.P. No.
1510 of.
SI o Shri D N Ba ks hi
2 maria
2005 pending before the
High Court. Status quo
with
regard
to
the I
possession of the land
ordered
during
the ·
pendency of the
writ I
petition vide order dated
1
22.5.2006.
I
Compensation deposited
before
the
Land
1
Acquisition Collector.
5.
Mis.
Faridabad
2 kanal
Compensation
paid. I
Compex
18 maria
Possession taken over.
I
I
STATE OF HARYANA v. EROS CITY DEVELOPERS P. LTD.
245
[PRAFULLA C. PANT, J.]
The subject land was stated to have been acquired for the purpose
A
of expansion and systematic development of Surajkund Tourist Complex
which included development of parking area adjacent to the Surajkund
Tourist Complex near annual Surajkund Fair.
4. Admittedly, earlier in 1992 an attempt was made to acquire the
B
same land but the acquisition proceedings were dropped after this court
passed order dated 10.05.1996 in WP (C) No. 4677 of 1985 i.e., M.C.
Mehta's case restraining the constructions in the area. Meanwhile in
1993 contesting respondent appears to have purchased the land indicated
above. It is in 1998, the order dated 10.05.1996 said to have been
modified, and Municipal Corporation Faridabad and the State Government
C
were directed to consider the plan of hotel project submitted by the
respondent No. l.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant State submitted that annual
Surajkund Mela, is held every year in February in Faridabad District,
and has become a regular feature of international fame. As such, there
D
was need to develop Surajkund Tourist Complex by acquiring land adjoining
to Surajkund Mela ground in Faridabad. It is also pointed out that
significance of Surajkund fair was noticed by this Court in W.P. (C) No.
4677of1985 (M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India and ors.) wherein effective
directions were issued in the year 1996 to protect and maintain the sanctity
of the area. The acquisition of subject-land is thus not only in public
E
interest but also to maintain the integral development of the Surajkund
Complex in a unified and planned manner. It is contended that while
quashing the notifications mentioned above, the High Court has erred in
not considering the public interest and public purpose over private interest
of the respondent/writ petitioner, a private colonizer. The impugned order
F
passed by the High Court has been assailed by the appellant, also on the
ground that the equity doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate
expectation were wrongly applied by the High Court in favour of
respondent No. 1. It is stated that before issuance of notification under
Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short "the Act") objections
filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 under Section 5A of the Act were
G
duly considered by the authority concerned, and there was no illegality
in the acquisition.
6. On the other hand, on behalf of respondent No. 1, Shri Shyam
Divan Senior Counsel contended that Government of Haryana which
earlier attempted to acquire the same land in the year 1992, itself dropped
H
246
A
B
c
D
E
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[20161 1 S.C.R.
the acquisition proceedings as such it cannot be said that the land in
question is genuinely required for any public purpose. The contesting
respondent has pleaded that the land in question was purchased by it in
the year 1993 with the object to construct a hotel complex of international
standard. In the counter affidavit, it is stated that the answering respondent
got the permission for change of land use and submitted the plan for
sanction from the Municipal Corporation. It also obtained permission
from Public Works Department for construction of approach road to the
land. Even the Director, Tourism, Government of Haryana, had accorded
approval for the hotel project of respondent No. 1. However, the
answering respondent was prevented from raising construction due to
the restraint order dated 10.5.1996, passed by this Court in M.C. Mehta 's
case (in W.P. (C} No. 4677 of 1985). Said order was modified on
13.05.1998. On application filed by the answering respondent, vide order
dated 12.10.1998, this Court directed the Municipal Corporation,
Faridabad, and State Government to accept option plan A with regard to
hotel project (ground plus four floors), submitted by it. It is submitted
that there was malice on the part of the State Government in acquiring
the land in question through the notification dated 08. l 0.2003 issued under
Section 4 of the Act. It is also pleaded that there were overwhelming
circumstances in favour of the answering respondent to invoke doctrine
of promissory estoppel, and that of legitimate expectation. In this
connection, it is pointed out that pennission of change of land use was
also granted in favour of the answering respondent. Lastly, it is submitted
that the High Court has rightly quashed the notifications issued by the
State Government for acquisition of the land owned by the answering
respondent.
p
7. In reply to this, on behalf of the State of Haryana, it is submitted
that since the construction did not start within six months as required
under the terms of order by which permission for change of land use
was granted as such merely for the reason that permission to change of
land use granted, the acquisition cannot be questioned. It is further
submitted that the acquisition proceedings have been upheld by the High
G
Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 1510 of 2005 filed by Vikram Bakshi,
who was owner of another piece of land acquired by same notification
dated 08.10.2003 issued under Section 4 of the Act read with
consequential notification issued under Section 6 of the Act.
8. We have also gone through the copy of order dated 07.07.2010
H
passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in Civil Writ Petition
STATE OF HARYANA v. EROS CITY DEVELOPERS P. LTD.
247
[PRAFULLA C. PANT, J.]
No. 1510 of 2005 filed by Vikram Bakshi, said writ petition was filed
A
challenging the notification dated 08.10.2003 issued under Section 4 of
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the consequential notification issued
under Section 6 of the Act. The land for which acquisition sought to be
quashed by Vikram Bakshi relates to 32 kanal of land comprising of
rectangle no. 40 khasra Nos. 14, 17/1, 17/2, 18/1, 23/l, and 24/1 of B
Village Lakharpur Tehsil Ballabhgarh District Faridabad. In said petition
also, public purpose i.e. expansion and systematic development of
Surajkund Tourist Complex was questioned, and issue relating to
consideration of objections filed under Section 5-A was raised. The
High Court after considering the rival submissions and going through the
record opined that there was no illegality in the acquisition and dismissed
C
the Writ Petition No. 1510 of2005 on 07.07.2010.
9. In Sooraram Pratap Reddy and Others vs. District Collector.
Ranga Reddy District and others (2008) 9 SCC 552, this Court has
held that the project for which land is acquired should be taken as a
whole and must be judged whether it is in the larger public interest. It D
cannot be split into different components and to consider whether each
and every component will serve public good. A holistic approach has to
be adopted in such matters. This Court further observed in said case
that development of infrastructure is legal and legitimate public purpose
for exercising power of eminent domain. In deciding whether acquisition
is for "public purpose" or not, prima facie, the Government is the best
judge. Although the decision of the Government is not beyond judicial
scrutiny, normally, in such matters a writ court should not interfere by
substituting its judgment for the judgment of the Government. In
Sooraram Pratap Reddy (supra), this Court has further explained that
the meaning of expression "public purpose" is wider than that of "public
necessity".
10. Clause (f) of Rule 26-D of the Punjab Scheduled Roads and
Controlled Areas Restriction of Unregulated Development Rules, 1965
(for short "1965 Rules") requires the applicant seeking change of land
E
F
use for construction to undertake to start construction on the land within
G
a period of six months and complete the construction within a period of
two years from the date of order permitting the change of land use. It
appears that no construction was done in terms of Clause (f) of Rule 26D of 1965 Rules on the land in qu·-stion, for which acquisition is quashed
by the impugned order.
H
248
A
B
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2016) 1 S.C.R.
11. In State of Haryana and Others vs. Vinod Oil and General
Mills and Another (2014) 15 SCC 410, this Court has held that pennission
for change of land use has no relevance while considering the validity of
acquisition. It is further observed in said case that there is no bar to the
subsequent acquisition of a land, after the land was released from earlier
acquisition.
12. In A.P. Pollution Control Board II vs. M.V. Nayudu (Retd.)
and Others (200 I) 2 SCC 62, this Court has observed in para 69 as
under:
"69. The learned Appellate Authority erred in thinking that because
c
of the approval of plan by the Panchayat, or conversion of land
use by the Collector or grant of letter of intent by the Central
Government, a case for applying principle of "promissory estoppel"
applied to the facts of this case. There could be no estoppel against
D
E
F
the statute ...... "
13. As far as the argument advanced on behalf of the respondent
relating to the promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation is
concerned, in Monnet Ispat and Energy Limited vs. Union of India
and Others (2012) 11 SCC 1, this Court while enumerating the principles
relating to doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation
has clearly held that the protection of legitimate expectation does not
require the fulfillment of the expectation where an overriding public
interest requires otherwise. In other words, personal benefit must give
way to public interest and the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot
be invoked which would block public interest for private benefit.
14. In Hira Tikkoo vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh and
Others (2004) 6 SCC 765, this Court explaining the scope of principle
of legitimate expectation has held that the doctrine cannot be pressed
into service where the public interest is likely to suffer as against the
personal interest of a party. In paragraph 22 this Court has observed as
under:
G
"22. In public law in certain situations, relief to the parties aggrieved by
action or promises of public authorities can be granted on the doctrine of
"legitimate expectation" but when grant of such relief is likely to harm
larger public interest, the doctrine cannot be allowed to be pressed into
service. We may usefully call in aid the legal maxim: "Salus Populi est
H
suprema lex: regard for the public welfare is the higher law." This
STATE OF HARYANA v. EROS CITY DEVELOPERS P. LTD.
249
[PRAFULLA C. PANT, J.]
principle is based on the implied agreement of every member of society
A
that his own individual welfare shall in cases of necessity yield to that of
community. His property, liberty and life shall under certain circumstances
be placed in jeopardy or even sacrificed for the public good."
15. In view of the principle of law laid down by this Court as
above, in our opinion the High Court has erred in quashing the acquisition
B
of land in question, by applying doctrine of promissory estoppel and
legitimate expectation, in the facts of the present case. We have no
hesitation in holding that the purpose i.e. for expansion and systematic
development of Surajkund Tourist Complex, is a public purpose. It included
development of parking area adjacent to Surajkund Tourist Complex
near annual Surajkund Fair. We are of the view that the High Court is
C
incorrect in holding that the State has not acted bonafide, after 1992
acquisition proceedings were dropped. It is apparent from the record
that earlier proceedings were dropped in the light of orders passed in
M.C. Mehta's Case in the year 1996, restraining construction in the
area, and after modification in the said order in the year 1998, the State
D
took fresh decision to acquire the land for public purpose and there is no
illegality in the same.
16. Accordingly, both the appeals are allowed and impugned
judgment and order dated 21.01.2008 passed by the High Court in CWP
No.10611of2004, is set aside. No order as to costs.
E
Devika Gujral
Appeals allowed.