# I- • SARWAN SINGH & ORS ETC v. STATE OF PUNJAB

- **Citation:** [1979] 1 S.C.R. 383
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1978-08-30
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal Nos. 59 and 60 of 1972
- **Bench:** Jaswant Singh, P. S. Kailasam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/i-sarwan-singh-ors-etc-v-state-of-punjab-7586
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Penal Code, (Act 45), 1860 Section 300 rjw 149-Scope of.
383
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 Section 357(3) (=s. 54 of 1898 Code) object
~t order, to pay compensation to the victim or niembers of the family explained.
The deceased Mewa Singh is the brother of the two accused Sarwan Singh
and Bachan Singh and the paternal uncle of two other accused Karnail Singh
.-and Zora Singh sons of Sarwan Singh, Malkait Singh the other accused is the
·son-in-law of ·Sarwan Singh. They are thus close relatives and there was a
dispute over a common khal of the land and pahi. The deceased had put an
application before the Revenue Authority a·gairist the accused and the matter
was pending when the occurrence took place on 8-9-1969.
The deceased was
attacked by the accuse~ with deadly weapons resulting in as many as 27 injuries
of which injuries 2 and 3 were grievous. The deceased died thei nex~ day in the
civil hospital. The cause of <lea.th was shock and haemorrhage and the injiiries
were ante-mortem and sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
The trial court found all the five accused guilty under s. 302 read with s. 149
I.P.C.
and
punished
them
tl.loking
the
view
that once the
existence
of injuries sufficient· to cause death is proved, the intintion to cause death
Will be· presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances 'varrant an opposite
conclusion. The High Court in appeal found that the common object was clearly
to kill the deceased and that the offence fell under s. 300. Thirdly read with
'S. 34 IPC and_ accepted the trial court's Judgment.
Dismissing the appeals by special leave the Court,
A
B
c
D
E
HELD: (1) If a person causes an injury with the intention of causing bodily
injury to any person and when the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is
'Sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause d_eath, the offence would
F
faJI under clause (iii) of s. 300 and would be punishable under s. 302 '1.P.C.
""----' !387B]
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(2) In order to find the person guilty of offence under s. 300 read with
s. 149, the prosecution must establish that the offence was committed by any
member of a·n unlawful a•sembly in prosecution of the common object of the
assembly or such as the members of that assembly· knew it to be likely to be
committed in prosecution of the common object.
It is, therefore, necessary
for the pn;>secution to establish that the common object of the unlawful assembly
"\!r\1s to commit an offence under s. 300 or that the members of the assembly
knew it to be likely that an offence under s. 300 punishable under s. · 302 IPC
would be committed in prosecution of the common object.
[387B-D[
G
(3) If _the injuries that are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death are traced to a particular iccilsed, ho wD1 be gunty of an otfcnc~
H
under s. 300 punishable under s. 302 without) the aid of s. 149, when the injuries
caused are cumulatively sufficient to cause death, it is necessary before holding
384
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 1 S.C.R.
A
each of the accused guilty under s. 300 read with s. 149 to find that the
common object of the unlawful assembly was to cause death or that the members
of the unlawful assembly kne\v it to be likely that an offence punishable under
s. 302 IPC would be committed in prosecution of the common object. [387DFl
In the instant case, on an analysis of the injuries (a) it cMinot be said that
B
any of the persons that inflicted injuries intended to cause d·eath or touch
injury as is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. (b) T·he
circumstance that unexpected quarrel was between the members of the sa-me
family over a dispute as to water rights shows that no offence under s. 300
read with sec. 149 IPC punishable under s. 302 IPC has been made out.
(c) the common object of the asserrtbly was to cause bodily injury as is likely
to cause death. Though the doctor ha<S stated that the injuries were sufficient
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in the ordinary course of nature to cause death,

## Text

I-
•
SARWAN SINGH & ORS ETC.
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB
August 30, 1978
[JASWANT SINGH AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.J
Penal Code, (Act 45), 1860 Section 300 rjw 149-Scope of.
383
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 Section 357(3) (=s. 54 of 1898 Code) object
~t order, to pay compensation to the victim or niembers of the family explained.
The deceased Mewa Singh is the brother of the two accused Sarwan Singh
and Bachan Singh and the paternal uncle of two other accused Karnail Singh
.-and Zora Singh sons of Sarwan Singh, Malkait Singh the other accused is the
·son-in-law of ·Sarwan Singh. They are thus close relatives and there was a
dispute over a common khal of the land and pahi. The deceased had put an
application before the Revenue Authority a·gairist the accused and the matter
was pending when the occurrence took place on 8-9-1969.
The deceased was
attacked by the accuse~ with deadly weapons resulting in as many as 27 injuries
of which injuries 2 and 3 were grievous. The deceased died thei nex~ day in the
civil hospital. The cause of <lea.th was shock and haemorrhage and the injiiries
were ante-mortem and sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
The trial court found all the five accused guilty under s. 302 read with s. 149
I.P.C.
and
punished
them
tl.loking
the
view
that once the
existence
of injuries sufficient· to cause death is proved, the intintion to cause death
Will be· presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances 'varrant an opposite
conclusion. The High Court in appeal found that the common object was clearly
to kill the deceased and that the offence fell under s. 300. Thirdly read with
'S. 34 IPC and_ accepted the trial court's Judgment.
Dismissing the appeals by special leave the Court,
A
B
c
D
E
HELD: (1) If a person causes an injury with the intention of causing bodily
injury to any person and when the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is
'Sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause d_eath, the offence would
F
faJI under clause (iii) of s. 300 and would be punishable under s. 302 '1.P.C.
""----' !387B]
-
(2) In order to find the person guilty of offence under s. 300 read with
s. 149, the prosecution must establish that the offence was committed by any
member of a·n unlawful a•sembly in prosecution of the common object of the
assembly or such as the members of that assembly· knew it to be likely to be
committed in prosecution of the common object.
It is, therefore, necessary
for the pn;>secution to establish that the common object of the unlawful assembly
"\!r\1s to commit an offence under s. 300 or that the members of the assembly
knew it to be likely that an offence under s. 300 punishable under s. · 302 IPC
would be committed in prosecution of the common object.
[387B-D[
G
(3) If _the injuries that are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death are traced to a particular iccilsed, ho wD1 be gunty of an otfcnc~
H
under s. 300 punishable under s. 302 without) the aid of s. 149, when the injuries
caused are cumulatively sufficient to cause death, it is necessary before holding
384
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 1 S.C.R.
A
each of the accused guilty under s. 300 read with s. 149 to find that the
common object of the unlawful assembly was to cause death or that the members
of the unlawful assembly kne\v it to be likely that an offence punishable under
s. 302 IPC would be committed in prosecution of the common object. [387DFl
In the instant case, on an analysis of the injuries (a) it cMinot be said that
B
any of the persons that inflicted injuries intended to cause d·eath or touch
injury as is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. (b) T·he
circumstance that unexpected quarrel was between the members of the sa-me
family over a dispute as to water rights shows that no offence under s. 300
read with sec. 149 IPC punishable under s. 302 IPC has been made out.
(c) the common object of the asserrtbly was to cause bodily injury as is likely
to cause death. Though the doctor ha<S stated that the injuries were sufficient
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in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, it is difficult to hold that the
injuries, cun1ulatively, were 'Sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death. The common object of the assembly in the circumst.ances can only be
said to cause injuries· v::hich are likely to cause dea•th \Vhich will be· an offence
punishable under section 304(1) of
the
Indian
Penal
Code.
[388E-H,
389A]
D
(4) (a) The object of s. 357(3) is to provide compensation payable to the
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persons who are entitled to recover damages from the person sentenced even
though fine does not form part of the sentence. Though s. 545 of 1898 COde
enabled the court only to pay coinpensation out of the fine that would be
imposed under the law, by s. 357 (3) when ai court imposes a sentence, of
which fine does not form a part, the Court may direct the accused to pay
compensation. [390D-E]
(b) In awarding compensation it is necessary for the court to decide whether
the case is a fit one in which compensation ha-s to be awarded. If it is found
that compensation should be paid, then the capacity of the accused to pay a
compensation has to be determined. In directing compensation, the object is to
co1Iect the fine and pay it tQ the person who has suffered the loss. The purpose
~'ill not be served if the accused is not able to pa·y the fine or compensatiOii:
for, imposing a default sentence for non-payment of fine would not achieve the
object. If the accused is in a position to pay the compensation to the injureU
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or his dependent to which they are entitled to, there could be no reason for· ~
the court not directing such compensation. When a person, who caused injury
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due to negligence or is made vicariously liable is bound to pay compensation
it is only appropriate to direct payment by the accused who is guilty of causing
an injury with the necessary mens rea to pay compensation for the person who
has suffered injury.
[390E-G]
( c) The court should not first consider what
compensation sought to be
awarded to the heirs of the deceased and then impose a fine which is higher
than the compensation. It is the duty of the court to take into account the
nature of the crime, the injury suffered, the justness of the claim for compensa~
tion, the capacity of the accused to pay the other relevant circumstances in
fixing the amount of fine or compenslation.
[390G·H, 391A]
Palaniappa Gounder v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1977] 3 SCR 132 applied.
[The Court altered the conviction of offence punishable under s. 304(1) reacE
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...
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G. s. F. c. v. NATSON MANU. co. (Desai,!.)
385
with s. 149 ond sentenced to 5 years R-I and a fine of Rs. 3500/- ea.ch, the
A
fine to be paid as compensation to the widow of the deceased]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 59
and 60 of 1972.
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment a:nd Order dated
23-9-1971 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Cr!. A. 512
of 1970 .
R. L. Kohli and U. P. Singh for the Appellantll.
A. S. Sohal, Hardev Singh and R. S. Sodhi for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KAILASAM, J. The two crinrinal appeals Nos. 59 and 60 of 1972
are by special leave.
Criminal Appeal No. 59 of 1972 is preferred
by Sarwan Singh, Kamai! Singh, Zora Singh and Malkiat Singh, while
Criminal Appeal No. 60 of 1972 is by Bachan Singh against their conviction and sentence imposed on them by the trial court aind confirmed
by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 512
of 1970.
This Court granted special leave in both cases limited to
the qnestion as to whether the offence committed by the appellants
is one pnnishable under section 300 I.P.C. or nnder any part of section
304 I.P.C.
The facts necessary for determining what offence the accused were
guilty of may be stated.
Sant Singh is the father of Sarwan Singh,
Bachan Singh and Mewa Singh.
Sarwan Singh is the first appellant
in Criminal Appeal No. 59 of 1972 and Bachan Singh is the so~o
appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 60 of 1972. The deceased Mewa
Singh is their brother. Sarwan Singh had two sons, Zora Singh and
Kamai! Singh who are appellants Nos. 3 and 2 in Criminal Appeal
No. 59 of 1972.
Sarwan Singh's daughter was married to Malkiat
Singh who is the fourth appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 59 of 1972.
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----- Pending appeal, Sarwan Singh and Bachan Singh have died and their
..
appeals have abated. We are therefore concerned only with Kamai!
Singh, Zora Singh and Malkiat Singh who are appellants Nos. 2, 3 and
4 in Criminal Appeal No. 59 of 1972 .
The deceased is the brother of the two accused and paternal uncle
of the two other accused.
The dispute was over a commQ!l Kha! of
the land and a pahi.
The deceased Mewa Singh put an application
before the Revenue authority against the accused and the matter was
pending when the occurrence took place.
On the date of the occurrence, 8-9-1969, at about 3 P.M., PW .. 3,
Mohinder Singh, went to Amar Siiogh, P.W. 5, who is Lambardar of
his village in connection with the mutation of his land. Amar Singh
was grazing his cattle near the minor canal just opposite to the well
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
, [1979] 1 S.C.R.
of the accused and the deceased Mewa Si'ngh. When P.W. 3 was 20
Kadams away from the place where Amar Singh was grazing his cattle,
he heard a Raula coming from the side of tube well of Mewa Singh.
Hearing the noise, P. W. 3 ran towards the place of the occurrence.
He also saw P.W. 5, Amar Singh and Mohinder Singh, son of Thakar
Singh, P.W. 4 also running towards the place of occurrence. The th!ee
witnesses and Ujagar Singh, P.W. 9 who are eye-witnesses spoke to
the actual incident as follows :-
"When they reached near the place of occurrence they
heard Zora Singh shouting to Mewa Singh. Zora Singh was
armed with a Gandasi, Karnail Singh was holding a Takwa,
Malkait Singh wa_s armed with a Gandasi and Sarwan Singh
and Bachan Singh were having a Lathi each. Zora Singh gave
a Gandasi blow to Mewa Singh who raised his hands to ward
off the blow and sustained injury.
Kar'nail Singh then gave
a Takwa blow to Mewa Singh which he warded off by rais;ng
his hands and got an injury on his hand.
Zora Singh and
Karnail Singh gave more injuries with their respective weapons.
Therefore, all th·~ accused started causing injuries to
Mewa Singh with their respective weapons while he was lying
on the ground."
On the evening at about 8.30 P.M., P.W. 14 saw Mewa Singh and
enquired from the doctor whether he. was in a fit condition to make
a statement. The doctor gave hi~ opinion that Mewa Singh was not
fit to make a statement.
Mewa Singh's condition was found to be
not satisfactory and therefore he was moved to Civil Hospital, Ludhiana.
He died at 5.40 p.m. on 9-9-1969. The doctor noted 27 injuries on
the per.mn of Mewa Singh.
According to the doctor, the cause of
death was shock and haemorrhage and the injuries were ante-mortem
and sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
Dr.
Jagjit Singh, P.W. 5, examined Mewa Singh on admission to the hospital at 6.45 p.m. on 8-9-1969 and found 27 injuries on Mewa Singh,
of which injuries 2 a'nd 3 were grievous. Injuries at 3, 5 to 9, 11 to
1 7 were caused by sharp-edged weapons,.
All the injuries, except 2
and 3 were simple in nature.
The trial court was of the view that the question for consideration
was whether the accused intended to inflict the injuries ln question and
if once the existence of injuries sufficient to cause death is proved,
the intention to cause death will be prei;umed unless the evidence or
the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusi~n. In this view, the
trial court found all the accused gnilty under section 302 read with
section 149 of the India'n Penal Code.
The High Court fou11d that
--
i
SARWAN v. PUNJAB (Kailasam, J.)
387
the common object was clearly to kill the deceased and the offence
A
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fall under section 300.
Thirdly, read with section 34, Indian Penal
Code.
The facts of the case disclose that five accused armed with various
weapons caused the injuries to the deceased which resulted in his
death.
If a person causes an injury with the intention of causing
bodily injury to any person and when the bodily lnjury intended to be
inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to canse death,
the offence would fall under clause (iii) of section 300 and would
be punishable under section 302 of the Lndian Penal Code.
The
five accused were convicted by the trial court for an offunce under
•ection 302 read with section 149 I.P.C.
In order to find the person
,guilty of offence u'nder section 302 read with section 149, the prosecution must establish that the offence was committed by any member
-0f an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of the
assembly or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely
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to be committed in prosecution of the common object. It is, therefore
necessary for the prosecution to establish that the common object of D
the unlawful ·assembly was to commit ah offenDo under section 300
or that· the members of the assembly knew it to be likely that an offence
under section 300 would be committed in prosecution of the common
-0bj•oct.
The cumulative effect of the injuries was no doubt found to
have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to. cause death.
If the injuries that are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death am traced to a particular accused, he will be guilty of
an offence punishable under section 302 without the aid of section·
149, when the injuries caused are cumulatively sufficient to cause death,
'it is rrocessary before holding each of the accused guilty under section
302 read with section 149 to find that the common object of the unJawful assembly was to cause death or that the members of the unlawful assembly knew it to be likely that an offence !punishable under
·section 302 I.P.C. would be committed in prosecution of the common
-Object In order to determine this question, it is neoossary to refer to
the injuries caused in some detail :
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Two grievous injuries are injuries 2 and 3 described in Ex. PD.
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Injury No. 2 is an incised wound 3/4" x 1/4" bone deep on the right
little finger at its middle and injury No. 3 is incised wound 1/3" distal
to injury No. 2 at the right little firiger cutting the bone underneath.
fhe grievous injury is the fracture and cutting of the right little finger
raused by a sharp-:edged weapon.
All the other injuries are simple in
nature. The injnri~s Nos. 1 to 3, 5 to 9, 11 to 17 were caused by
Hsharp-edged weapon.
Injury No. 1 is incised wound H" x 1/6"
muscle deep on the ]eft palm in-between the left thmnb and index
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388
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
\ [1979] 1 S.C.R.
finger.
Injury No. 2 is incised wound t" x !" bone deep on the right
little finger at its middle.
Injury No. 3 is incised wound 1/3" distal
to Injury No. 2 at the right little finger cutting the bone underneath.
Injury No. 5 is incised wound 2:' x !" muscle deep on the left shin
at its middle areas.
Injury No. 6 is incised wound t" X le" on the
left shin.
Injury No. 7 is incised wound 1/3" x t" muscle deep on
the left shin.
Injury No. 8 is incised wound 1/3"X !" muscle deep
on the left shin.
Injury No. 9 is incised wound t" X l /3" muscle
deep on the left shin.
While Injury No. 1 is on the left palm in
between the left thumb and index finger, injuries Nos. 2 and 3 on the
right little finger at its middle, injuries Nos. 5 to 9 are in the area of
the left shin.
Most of the injuries are only t" deep while injury No.
9 is 1/3'' deep, and injury No. l is 1/6" in depth.
The other injuries
Nos. 11 to 17 are on the right shin and are incised wounds, most of
which are of the size of t" X t". The other injuries are contusions in
the chest area on the right and the left side, the width not exceeding
3/4 of an inch.
Injury No. 26 is on the head of the dimension of
H" X t" muscle deep on the left side of the head 3" above the
left ear.
All the injuries are described by the doctor as simple.
The
depth of the incised in juries is not more than t of an inch and the width
of the contusions is not more than 3/4".
The area of the injury cannot be said to be a vital part of the body.
The injury on the head is
only !" in depth and has not caused any damage.
On an analysi<i of
the in juries it cannot be said that any of the persons that inflicted
injuries intended to cause death or such injury as is sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death. If the common object of
the unlawful assembly was to commit murder and m prosecution
of
the common object of the urilawful assembly any m0mber caused an
injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death, the members of the assembly would be liable for an
offence
under section 302 I.P.C. read with 149 l.P.C. but on a consideration
of the injuries we are not satisfied that the common object of the unlawful assembly was to cause death.
Taking the circumstance that
the unexpected quarrel was between the members of the same family
over a dispute as ,to water rights, we are unable to hold that offence
under section 302 read with section 149 is made out.
On a consideration of the circumstances and the nature of the injuries, it is not possible to hold tliat the common object of the assembly was to came
bodily injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death.
It can be said that the common object of the assembly
H
was to cause bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
Though the
doctor has stated that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, we find it difficult to hoid that the
injuries, cumulatively, were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
'
SARWAN v. PUNJAB (Kai/asam, J.)
389
to cause death.
The common object of the assembly in the circumstances can only be said to cause injuries which are likely to cause death
which will be an offence' punishable under section 304(1) of the Indian
Penal Code.
In the circumstances we set aside the conviction under
section 300 read with section 34 LP .C. but find the appellants are
guilty of an offence punishable under section 304 ( 1) read with section
149 I.P:c. and sentence them to five years rigorous imprisonment and
a fine of Rs. 3,500/- each.
In this case, the death was caused by the brothers in a quarrel
regarding water rights.
From the records we are satisfied that the
accused are possessed with sufficient funds to compensate, at least to
some extent, the loss that has been suffered by the dependants of the
deceased.
The law which enables the Court to direct compen>ation to be paid
to the dependants is, found in section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act 2 of 1974). The corresponding provision in the 1898
Code was section 545.
Section 545 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898) was ainended by Act 18 of 1923 and by Act
26 of 1955.
The amendment which is relevant for the purpose of
our discussion is 545 ( 1) (bb) which, for the first time was inserted by
Act 26 of 1955.
By this amendment the court is enabled to direct
the accused, who caused the death of another person, to pay compensation to the persons who are, under the Fatal Accidents Act, entitled
to recover damages from the persons sentenced, for the loss resulting
to them from such death. In introducing the amendment, the Joint
Select Committee stated "when death has been caused to a person, it
is but proper tbat his heirs and dependants should be compensated, in
suitable cases, for the loss resulting to them from such death, bJ the
·person who was responsible for it.
The Committee proceeded to state
that though section 545 of the Code as amended in 1923 was int~nded
to cover such cases, the intention was not however very clearly brought
out and therefore in ocder to focus the attention of the courts on this
aspect of the question, the Committee have amended section 545 and
it has been made clear that a fine may form a part of any sentence
including a sentence of death and it has also been provided that the
persons who are entitled under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, to
recover damages from the person sentenced may be compensated out
of the fine imposed. It also expressed its full agreement with the
suggestion that at the time of awarding judgment in a case where
death has resulted from homicide, the court should award compen•ation to the heirs of the deceased. The Committee felt that tl\is
will
result in settling the claim once for all by doing away with the need for
a further claim to a civil Court, and avoid needless worry ~nd expense
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1979] ] S.C.R.
to both sides.
The Committee further agreed that in cases where the
death is tl;e result of negligence of the offender, appropriate compensation should be awarded to the heirs.
By the introduction of clause
(bb) to section 545(1), the intention of the legblatur·~ was
made
clear that, in suitable cases, the heirs and dependents should be compensated for the loss that resulted to them froJll the death, from a person who was responsible· for it.
The view was also expressed that the
court should award compensation to the heir of the deceased so tliat
their claims would be settled finally.
This object is sought to be given
effect to by section 357 of the new Code (Act 2 of 1974 ).
Section
357 (3) provides that when a court imposes a sentence, of which fine
does not form a part, the Court may, when passing judgment, order
the accu;cd person to pay, by way of compensation, such amount, as
may be specified iμ the order, to the person who has suffered any loss
or injury by reason of the act for which the accused person has been
so sentenced.
The object of the section therefore, is to provide compensation payable to the persons who are entitled to recover damages
from the person sentenced even though fine does not form part of the
sentence.
Though section 545 of 1898 ·Code enabled t.hc court only
to pay compensation out of the fine that would be imposed under the
Jaw, by' section 357(3) when a Court imposes a senetnce, of whicl~ fine
does not form a part, the Court may direct the accused to pay compensation.
In awarding compensation it is necessary for the court to
decide whether the case is a fit one in which compensat;on has to be
awarded. If it is found that compensation should be paid, then the
capacity of the accused to pay a compensation has to be determined.
In directing compensation, the object is to collect the fine and pay it to
the person who has suffered the loss.
The purpose will not be served
if the accused is not able to pay the fine or compensation for, imposing
a default sentence for non-payment of fine would not achieve the object.
If the accused is in a position to pay the compensation to the injured
or his dependents to which they are entitled to, there could be no
reason for the Court not directing such compensation. When a person, who, caused injury due to negligence or is made vicariously liable
is bound to pay compensation it is only appropriate to direct payment
by the accused' who is guilty of causing an injury with the necessary
Mens Rea to pay compensation for th~ person who has suffered injury.
In a\vanJing compensation as cautioned by this C•Jnrt in a decision
reported in Palaniappa Gounder v. State of Tamil Nadu('), the Court
should not first consider what compensation ought to be awarded to the
heirs of the deceased and then impose a fine which is higher than the
compensation. It is the duty of the Court to take into account the
(l) [19771 3 S CR 132.
SARWAN v. PUNJAB (Kailasam, J.)
391
nature of the crime, the injury suffered, the justness Qf the claim for
compensation, the capacity of the accused to pay and order relevant
circumstances in fixing the amount of fine or compensation. After consideration of all the facts of the case, we feel that in addition to the
sentence of 5 years rigorous imprisonment, a fine of Rs. 3,500/- on each
of the accused under section 304(1) I.P.C. should be imposed.
The
fine will be paid as compensation to the widow of the deceased, Mewa
Singh.
Jn default of payment of fine, the accused will undergo further simple imprisonment for 6 months.
S.R.
Appeals dismissed.
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