# i. THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS ------------ ----- ---·---- M/8. KASTURI AND SONS (PRIVATE) LTD v. SHRI N. SAL1VATEE8WARAN AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1959] 1 S.C.R. 1
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1956-10-18
- **Bench:** Bhagwati, B. P. Sinha, Jafer Imam, J. L. Kapur, Gajendragadkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/i-the-supreme-court-reports-m-8-kasturi-and-sons-private-ltd-v-shri-n-1584
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Workfog journalist-Claim against employer for recovery of
dues-Referrncc by State Got•emment to specified aut/1ority-Jf
a11t/1oril)' also empowered to determine amount duc-Jl'orking ]oumalists (Conditio•n of Service) and Misceltaneo11s Prot·isions Act, 1955
(45 of z955): s. z7.
The respandent No. l was a journalist supplying news to the
petitioner's newspaper on payment of a fixed monthly honorarium.
Contrary to the petitioner's instructions the respondent No. l left
India and thereupan the petitioner terminated the arrangement.
Upan his retur~ to ~ndia the respondent No .. r requested the peti ..
tioner to reconsider its decision but the petitioner declmed to do
so. The respandent No. x applied to the State Government under
s. 17 of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Sen·ice) and
Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 claiming a large sum of money
from the petitioner. The State Government nominated respondent No. 2 as the authority under s. 17 of the Act and referred
the claim to him. The petitioner disputed the whole claim and
contended that the respondent No. 2 had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upan the merits of the disputed claim:
Held, that the authority specified under s. 17 of the Act had
no jurisdiction to determine the amount due as the section merely
provided !or a procedure to recovc,r an amount from the etnployer
which had previously been <letennmeJ by a competent authority
or court. II the legislature ha<l intended that the enquiry under
s. 17 should include the examination of the merits of the claim
and a decision thereon, it would have made appropriate provisions
conferring upan the State Government or the specified authority
the relevant powers essential for the purpose of effectively hold·
ing such an enquiry; but no such powers ha<\ been conferred.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition Xo. 240 of 1036.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for
the enforcement of Ji'undamental Rightti.
R. Ratnatnurthi Aiyar and B. K. B. Kaidu, for the
petitioners.
Purshotta·m Tricumdas, P. Ran_U181l'amy, Adrocate,
Mwrch 19.
2
SUPREME <'OL'H,T HEl'OHTS
(1959]
i95s
Bombay High Court, with special prm1is8ion and J. N.
--
Shroff, for the respondent No. 1.
M/s. I<ast11ri aiid
..
.
sens (Private) Ltd,
Y. K urruir, for the mterveners.
v,
C. K. Daphtanf, Solicitor-Gmeml of India and
Shri N, Sulivatm- B. Sen, for the Attornev-C:eneral of India (Tu assist
waran and Another th C
)
•
, e ourt .
1958. March 19.
The following Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
Gajendragadkar J,
GAJENDRAOADKAR J.--This is an application under
Art. 32 of the Constitution. The petitioner is a private
limited company having its registered office at Nu.
201, Mount Road, Madras.
The company is thr
proprietor of a daily newspaper called "The Hindu.,
which is published at Madras and has a large circulation in India and abroad. The shareholders of the
C'Ompany are all citizens of India. The first respondent, Shri N. Salivateeswaran, is a journalist of Bombay and he has been supplying news to various newspapers and journals one of which was the Hindu.
The supply of news by the first respondent tu the
Hindu was under an agreement under which he was
being paid a fixed monthly honorarium. Contrary
to the advice and instructions of the petitioner, the
first respondent left India for Zurich on May l, 1956.
The petitioner thereupon relieved him of his duties
and terminated with effect from March l, 1956, the
arrangement under which he was supplying news to
the Hindu. He returned to India in July 1956, and
requested the petitioner to reconsider its decision;
but the petitioner did not think that any case for
reconsideration had been made out. Thereupon the
first respondent made an application to the Labour
Minister of the State of Bombay under s. l 7 of the
Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and
Misrellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (Act 45 of 1955),
hereinafter referred to as the act. On receiving this
application the State of Bombay nominated Shri
M. R. Mehe

## Text

.i.
THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS
------------ ----- ---·----
M/8. KASTURI AND SONS (PRIVATE) LTD.
v.
SHRI N. SAL1VATEE8WARAN AND ANOTHER
(BHAGWATI, B. P. SINHA, JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR
and GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)
Workfog journalist-Claim against employer for recovery of
dues-Referrncc by State Got•emment to specified aut/1ority-Jf
a11t/1oril)' also empowered to determine amount duc-Jl'orking ]oumalists (Conditio•n of Service) and Misceltaneo11s Prot·isions Act, 1955
(45 of z955): s. z7.
The respandent No. l was a journalist supplying news to the
petitioner's newspaper on payment of a fixed monthly honorarium.
Contrary to the petitioner's instructions the respondent No. l left
India and thereupan the petitioner terminated the arrangement.
Upan his retur~ to ~ndia the respondent No .. r requested the peti ..
tioner to reconsider its decision but the petitioner declmed to do
so. The respandent No. x applied to the State Government under
s. 17 of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Sen·ice) and
Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 claiming a large sum of money
from the petitioner. The State Government nominated respondent No. 2 as the authority under s. 17 of the Act and referred
the claim to him. The petitioner disputed the whole claim and
contended that the respondent No. 2 had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upan the merits of the disputed claim:
Held, that the authority specified under s. 17 of the Act had
no jurisdiction to determine the amount due as the section merely
provided !or a procedure to recovc,r an amount from the etnployer
which had previously been <letennmeJ by a competent authority
or court. II the legislature ha<l intended that the enquiry under
s. 17 should include the examination of the merits of the claim
and a decision thereon, it would have made appropriate provisions
conferring upan the State Government or the specified authority
the relevant powers essential for the purpose of effectively hold·
ing such an enquiry; but no such powers ha<\ been conferred.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition Xo. 240 of 1036.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for
the enforcement of Ji'undamental Rightti.
R. Ratnatnurthi Aiyar and B. K. B. Kaidu, for the
petitioners.
Purshotta·m Tricumdas, P. Ran_U181l'amy, Adrocate,
Mwrch 19.
2
SUPREME <'OL'H,T HEl'OHTS
(1959]
i95s
Bombay High Court, with special prm1is8ion and J. N.
--
Shroff, for the respondent No. 1.
M/s. I<ast11ri aiid
..
.
sens (Private) Ltd,
Y. K urruir, for the mterveners.
v,
C. K. Daphtanf, Solicitor-Gmeml of India and
Shri N, Sulivatm- B. Sen, for the Attornev-C:eneral of India (Tu assist
waran and Another th C
)
•
, e ourt .
1958. March 19.
The following Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
Gajendragadkar J,
GAJENDRAOADKAR J.--This is an application under
Art. 32 of the Constitution. The petitioner is a private
limited company having its registered office at Nu.
201, Mount Road, Madras.
The company is thr
proprietor of a daily newspaper called "The Hindu.,
which is published at Madras and has a large circulation in India and abroad. The shareholders of the
C'Ompany are all citizens of India. The first respondent, Shri N. Salivateeswaran, is a journalist of Bombay and he has been supplying news to various newspapers and journals one of which was the Hindu.
The supply of news by the first respondent tu the
Hindu was under an agreement under which he was
being paid a fixed monthly honorarium. Contrary
to the advice and instructions of the petitioner, the
first respondent left India for Zurich on May l, 1956.
The petitioner thereupon relieved him of his duties
and terminated with effect from March l, 1956, the
arrangement under which he was supplying news to
the Hindu. He returned to India in July 1956, and
requested the petitioner to reconsider its decision;
but the petitioner did not think that any case for
reconsideration had been made out. Thereupon the
first respondent made an application to the Labour
Minister of the State of Bombay under s. l 7 of the
Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and
Misrellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (Act 45 of 1955),
hereinafter referred to as the act. On receiving this
application the State of Bombay nominated Shri
M. R. Meher, I. C. S. (Retired), second respondent, as
the authority under s. 17 of the act for the purpose
of enquiry into the first respondent's application and
requested him to examine the claim made by the first
•
' /
8.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
3
respondent and, in case he was satisfied that any
r958
money was due, to issue a certificate for that amount
/ K-
.
d
h C II
f
.
M s,
asturi an
to t e
o ector o Bombay for further act10n as sons (Private) Ltd.
provided under s. 17. A copy of the application was
v.
served on the petitioner by order of the second Shri N. Salivateesreapondent; and a covering letter addressed to the waran and Anoth<r
petitioner called upon him to file his written state-
--
.
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>
J ·
Gajendragadkar J.
ment m rep y to t e rst respon ent s c aim.
By his application the first respondent had claimed
a sum of Rs. 1,57,172-8-0 from the petitioner. In his
written statement, the petitioner disputed the whole of
the claim made by the first respondent and traversed
all the material allegations made by him in support of
his claim.
The petitioner also contended that the
second respondent had no jurisdiction to go into the
matters arising· from the first respondent's application.
It was also urged by the petitioner alternatively that,
even if the second respondent had jurisdiction to deal
with the matter, he had the discretion to decline to
consider the matter and leave it to be tried in the
ordinary courts. The petitioner requested the second
respondent to exercise his discretion and direct the
first respondent to establish his claim in the appropriate civil court. The petitioner's written statement
was filed on October 18, 1956.
The second respondent decided to deal with the
question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue.
He
heard both the parties on this preliminary issue and,
by his order dated November 12, 1956, he recorded
his conclusion that he had jurisdiction to deal with
the matter and that it was unnecessary to direct the
first respondent to establish his claim in the ordinary
civil ·court. Accordingly the matter was adjourned to
December 1, 1956, for hearing on the merits. It is
this order which is challenged by the petitioner before
us by his present petition under Art. 32 of the
Constitution.
The petitioner's case is that s. 17 of the act provides only for a mode of recovery of any money due
to a working journalist. lt does not empower the
State Government or the authority specified by the
State Government to act as a forum for adjudicating
4
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
z958
upon the merits of the disputed claim. That being
.
so, the second respondent has no jurisdiction to deal
M;s.Kastunand
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·
f.th fi t
d t' 1'
· t
sons (Private) Ltd. wit t e merits o
e rs respon. en s c aim a.g~ms
v.
the petitioner.
In the alternative, the petit10ner
Shri N. Salivatees- contends that, if s. 17 confers jurisdiction on the
waran and Another State Government or the authority specified by the
State Government to adjudicate upon disputed claims
Gafrndragadka> J. mentioned in the said section, the said section would
be ·ultra vires and void. On these alternative pleas,
two alternative reliefs are claimed by the petitioner.
The first relief claimed is that a writ in the nature of
the writ of prohibition or other suitable writ or direction be issued restraining the second respondent from
exercising any powers under s. 17 of the act and
proceeding with the enquiry into the application filed
by the first respondent and forwarded to him by the
State Government and issue him a certificate. The
other relief JJlaimed is that this court should be pleased
to order and direct that s. 17 of the act is ultra vires
and void on the grounds set out in the petition.
It would be necessary and convenient to construe
s. 17 of the act first and determine its true scope and
effect. The larger question about the vires of this
act and the validity of the decision of the Wage
Board set up by the Central Government under s. 8 of
the act have been considered by us in the several
petitions filed by several employers in that behalf
before this Court. We have held in those petitions
that, with the exception of s. 5 (1) (a) (iii) which deals
with the payment of gratuity to employees who
voluntarily resign from service, the rest of the act is
valid. That is why the question about the vires of
s. 17 need not be considered in the present petition
over again. The main point which remains to be
considered, however, is : Does s. 17 constitute the
State Government or the authority specified by the
State Government into a forum for adjudicating upon
the merits of the claim made by newspaper employee
against his employer under any of the provisions of
this act ? Section 17 provides :
"Where any money is due to a newspaper employee from an employer under any of the provisions
...
4
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT HEPORTS
5
:•
of this Act, whether by way of compensation,
z958
gratuity or wages, the newspaper employee may,
.
without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make. M/s.(P[(a.stu1
r1J •Lndd
.
.
,,ons
riva e
t
an apphcat.10n to the State Government for the recov.
•
very of the money d.ue to him, and if the State Shri N. SalivateesGovernment or such authority as the State Govern- waran and Another
ment may specify in this behalf is satisfied that any
. --
money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for (hat GaJelld.-agadkar J.
amount to the collector and the collector shall proceed
to recover that amount in the same manner as an
arrear of land revenue. "
It is clear that the employee's claim against his employer which can form the subject matter of an
enquiry under s. 17 must relate to compensation
awardable under s. 4 of the act, gratuity awardable
under s. 5 of the act, or wages claimable under the
decision of the Wage Board. If the employee wishes
to make any other claim against his employer, that
would not be covered by s. 17. As the marginal note
shows, the section deals with the recovery of money
due from an employer.
The employee contends that the process of recovery
...
begins with the making of an application setting out
the claim and ends with the actual recovery of the
amount found due. On this construction, the dispute
between the employee and his employer in regard to
any claim which the employee may make against his
employer would fall to be determined on the merits
right up from the start to the issue of the certificate
under this section. In other wordR, if a claim is made
by the employee and denied by the employer, the
merit:S of the claim together with tlw other issues that
may arise between the parties have to/be considered
under this section. On this argument s. 17
proviuP~
a self-contained procedure for the enforcement of tlw
claims covered by it.
On the other hand, the case for the petitioner i~
that the section provides for a procedure to recover
the amount due from an employer, not for the deter.
mination of the question as to what amount is due.
The condition precedent for the application of s. 17 is
a prior determination by a competent authority or the
6
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1959]
I958
court of the amount due to the employee from his
-
employer. It is only if and after the amount due to
M/s.(PKastutr)i •Lntdd the employee has been duly determined that the stage
sons
rwa e
. .
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v.
1s reac e
to recover t a·t amount an
1t 1s at t 1s
Shri N. Salivatees-stage that the employee is given the additional advanw•ran and Another tage provided by s. 17 without prejudice to any other
G .
--
mode of recovery available to him. According to
a;endragadkar .f. this view, the State Government or the authority specified by the State Government has to hold a summary
enquiry on a very narrow and limited point : Is the
amount which is found due to the employee still due
when the employee makes an application under s. 17,
or, has any amount been paid, and, if yes, how much
still remains to be paid? It is only a limited enquiry
of this type which is contemplated by s. 17/ Within
the scope of the enquiry permitted by this section are
not included the examination and decision ·of the
merits of tl\e claim made by the employee. When
the section refers to the application made by the employee for the recovery of the money due to him, it
really contemplates the stage of execution which
follows the passing of the decree or the making of an
award or order by an appropriate court or authority.
In our opinion, the construction suggested by the
petitioner should be accepted because we feel that
this construction is more reasonable and more consistent with the scheme of the act.
It is significant that the/State Government or the
specific authority mentioned in s. 17 has not been
clothed with the normal powers of a court or a tribunal to hold a formal enquiry.
It is true that s. 3,
sub-s. (1) of the Act provides for the application of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to or in relation to
working journalists subject to sub-s. (2); but this provision is in substance intended to make working
journalists workmen within the meaning of the main
Industrial Disputes Act. This section cannot be read
as conferring on the State Government or the specified
authority mentioned under s. 17 power to enforce
attendance of witnesses, examine them on oath, issue
commission or pass orders in respect of discovery and
inspection such as can be passed by the boards, courts
S.C.lt.
RVPRE.ME COUHT ltEPORTi-l
7
or trilrnnals under the Ind1rntrial Disputes Act.
Lt is
1 058
obvious that t,he relevant provisions of s. 11 of the 11
f'
.
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A
1947
h' I
c
h
· l ' ,s. 'astun an
n US(rm
18pUtes
ct,
. , \\' IC l eon1er t e 81LIC sons (Private) Ltd.
powers on the conciliation officers, boards, eourts and
v.
tribunals <'amwt he made i1pplicable to the State Sh11 .v. salivat"s-
(iovcrnnwnt or the specified authority mentioned wara 11 • 11d A11other
urnler s. 17 m!'l'elY bv virtue of s. 3(1) of the act.
G . d
,.
.
•.
•
.
tJ)Cn ragaW"ar J.
In tins eo11ncd1011, 1t would he relevant to renwmber t hitt H. 11 of the act expressly eonforn the nrntcrial
powers on the Wage Board estahlish!'d under s. 8 of
the Act. Whatever may he the truP nature' or drnracter
of the Wage Board-whether it is a IPgio;lative or an
administrative body-thl' legislature has taken the
pl'ccaution to enact thr Pnabling provisions of s. 11 in
the matter of the said material powers. It is wellknown that, whenever the legislature wants to confer
upon any specified authority powers of a l'ivil court
in the matter of holding enquiries, spccitil' provision
is made in that ochalf. lf the legislature had intended that the enquiry authorised under s. 17 should
include within its compass the examination of the
merits of the employee's claim against his employer
'-
and a decision on it, the legislature/would undoubtedly
have made an appropriate provision conferring on the
St<ttl' Government or the specified authority the relevant powers l'sscntial for the purpose of effectively
holding sueh an enquiry. The fact that the legislature has enacted s. 11 in regard to the Wage Board
but has not made any corresponding provision in
regard to thl' State Government or the specified
authority under s. 17 lends strong eorrobora.tion to
the view that the enquiry contemplated by s. 17 is ii
summary enquiry of a very limited 1mture and its
scope is confined t-0 the investigation of thl' narrow
point as t-0 what amount is actually due to be paid to
the employee under the decree, award, or other valid
order obtained by the employee after establishing his
claim in that behalf. We are reluctant to accept the
view that the legislature intended that the speciticd
authority or the State Government should hold a
larger enquiry into the merits of the employee's claim
without conferring on the State Government or the
8
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
'958
H]Jecifiml authority the necessary ]JOWers in that
.UJs. Kasturi a11d behalf. In this connection,· it would be relevant to
sons (Private) Ltd. point out that in many cases some complicated
v. .
questions of fact may arise when working journalists
Shri N. Salwatees- make claims for wages against their employers. It is
'"'
0
" ·~
4
nother not unlikely that the status of the working journalist,
Gajendragadkar J. the nature of the office he holds and the class to
which he belongs may themselves be matters of dispute between the parties and the decision of such
disputed questions of fact may need thorough examination and a formal enquiry.
If that be so it is not
likely that the legislature could have intended that
such complicated questions of fact should be dealt
with in a summary enquiry indicated by s. 17.
Section 17 seems to correspond in substance to the
provisions of s. 20, sub-a. (1) of the Industrial Disputes
(Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, which has now been
repealer!. U •Hier this section, any money due from
an employer under any award or decision of an industriu,l tribunal may be recovered as arrears of land
revenue or as a public demand by the appropriate
U<Jvernment on an application made to it by the
person entitled to the money under that award or
decision. It is clear that the proceedings under s. 20,
suh-s. (1) could comm~nce only if and after the workman had ohtainrd an award or decision in his favour.
We arc inelined to think that the position under s. 17
is substantially Himilnr.
ln this l'Onm'dion we may also refer to the provisions of s. :l3l' of the Industrial Disputes Act
(14 of 1947). Hub-s. (1) of s. 33C has heen added by
Act 36 of 1956 u.nd is modelled on the provisions of
s. 17 of the present Act. :Section 33C, sub-s. (2), however, is more relevant for ou1· purpose.
Under s. 33C,
snh-s. (2), where any workman is entitled to receive
from his employer any benefit which is capable of
being computed in terms of money, the amount at
which such bcnclit ma.y be computed may, subject to
any rules made under this al'!, he determined by sud1
Lithour Court as may be 8Jll'l'itied in this behalf by
the appropriate Uovcrnment, and the amount so
determined should be recovered as provided for in
_,
S.C.R.
i-IUPREME COURT REPORT1'
!l
sub-s. (1).
Then follows suh-s. (3) which provides for
1958
an enquiry by thr Labour Court into the question of
. -
.
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M·s.Kasluriand
com11utmg ie monpy va tw o t c uene it m quest10n.
· (P . , ) Ltd
'-'
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SOHS
Ttva e
.
The Labour Comt is empowered under th~-' sub-secv.
t-ion to appoint a c·ommissioner who shall, aftertakingshri N. Saliv•teessuch evidence 11.s 11111.y he necessary, submit a reportwara
1n and A11oll1tr
to the L11.hour Court, and the Labour Cov.rt shall
-
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fGajendragadkar ].
etermme t e amount a ter cons1 ermg t e report o
tlw commissioner and othrr l'ircumstances of the case.
These provisions indiC'atc that, where an employee
makes 11 daim for some money hy virtue of the benefit to which he iH ent it.led, an enquiry into the claim
is contemplated hy the L11.hour Court, and it is only
af"tl·r the Lahonr Court h11.s decided the matter that
the deeision becomes enforc·eahiP under s. 33('(1) by a
summary procpdure.
It is trtw that, in the present case, the Government
of Bomlmy has spl'rified the n,uthorities under the
P11.yrnent of W,tges Act and the lndtrntrial Disputes
Act n,s s1weitied authoritil'S undPr s. 17 to cleal with
applic·Mions of JlPwsp;tper employees whose wages are
less than Hs. :WO per month or more respectively;
but there ean be no doubt that, when thP second
respondent entertained the first respondent's application, he w11.s acting as the specified authority under
s. 17 and not ;ts an industrin,l tribunal. It is clear
that, under s. 17, the State Government would be
entitled to specify any person it likes for the purpose
of holding an enquiry under the said st'ction. The
powers of the authority specified undPr s. 17 must be
found in the provisions of the act itself and they
cannot he inferred from the a.cl"idental circumstance
that th!.' specified authority otherwise is a member of
the industrial tribunal; since there is no provision in
the act which confers on the specified authority the
relevant and adequate powers to hold a formal
enquiry, it would be difficult to accept the position
that various questions whi~h may arise between the
working journn,lists and their employers were intended to be dealt with in a summary and 11.n informal
manner without uonferring adequate powers on the
a
10
~UPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959)
i958
specified authority in that behalf. The second respon-
.
dent himself was impressed by this argument but he
M,s. Kast"" "''d was inclined to hold that the necessary power could
sons (Private) I.Id. b
d b l · b ·
l' t'
\
h th
h
v
e assume
y nm y nnp wa 10n }ecause e
oug t
Skri N. Salivatees- that, in the absence of such implied power, his
waran and Another jurisdiction under s. 17 could not he effectively
exercised. In our opinion, this approach really begs
Ca)mdra;adkar .f. the question. If the legislature did not confer ad-
-equat«{powers on the specified authority under s. 17,
a more reasonable inference would be that the nature
and scope of the powers under s. 17 is very limited
and the legislature knew that, for holding such a
limited and narrow enquiry, it was unnecessary to
confer powers invariably associated with formal and
complicated enquiries of a judicial or <1uasi-judicial
character. We must accordingly hoi<I that tn<' second
respondent had no jurisdiction to entPrtain the first
respondent's application at this stage.
It appears from the order made hy the second
respondent that he took the view that, though he had
jurisdiction/to deal with the application, it would
have been open to him to refuse to exercise that
jurisdiction and to direet the first respondent to
establish his claim in the ordinary civil court.
He,
however, thought that he need not l'.Xcrc:isc that power
in the present case.
We are satisfied that the second
respondent wa~ in error in both these conclusions. If
he had jurisdiction to deal with this matter under s. 17,
it is difficult to appreciate how, in the absence of any
provision in that behalf, he could have directed the
first respondent to establish his claim in/th<· ordinary
civil court. Such an order would clearly have amounted to the second respondent's failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in him.
Besides, if s. 17 had really
given him discretion in this matter as assumed by the
second respondent, on the merits of this case it would
obviously have been a case which should have heen
referred t-0 the ordinary civil court. This, however, is
now a matter of purely academic intl>rest.
The question which still remains to be considered is:
Wh~t would be the proper order to make on the
present petition in view of our conclusion that the
S.C.R.
8UPREME COURT REPORTS
11
sc<,011d n•sponclcnt had no jurisdiction to ent()rtai!I the
r95B
first respondent's application. The present petition
-
.
purports to invoke our jurisdiction under Art. 32 of ,\Ifs. Kast•,, ""d
h C
.
.
d .
l' !
d
so"s (Private) lid·
t c .onstitutmn an
1t was a va H an
competent
v.
petition in so far <18 it challenged the vires of s. 17 Sliri N. salivatrcs·
itself; but, onces. 17 is held to be valid and in order, ... , ... • ,.d A•other
the l'Ompetence of the petition under Art. 32 is
-
naturally open to srrimrn jeopardy. No <1uestion aboutG•J• 11dr•g•dkar .1·
the fundamental rights of the petitioner is involved
and his griPv11nce against. the order passed by the
second rt>spondent cannot be ventilated by a petition/
under Art. 32. This position is fairly conceded by
the h1rned counsel for the petitioner.
He, however,
itrgucd thiit, if we construe s. 17 in his favour and
hold that the second respondent had no jurisdiction to
cnt.ertain the first wspondent's application, his purpose
would be pffcrtively served even though teehnically
his petition may ultimately be dismissed on the ground
that it is not. compl'tent undC'r Art. 32 of the Constitution. In our opinion, there is considerable force in
this contention. We would accordingly hold that t·he
second respondent has no jurisdi<'tion to entertain the
first respondent's application; but, since the petition
itself is not competent und<'r Art. 32, we would direct
that the petition fails on this technical ground and
must bt> dismissed.
There would be no order as to
costs.
Petition di.tmissed.