# IDOL OF THAKURJI SURI GOVIND DEOJI MAHARAJ v. BOARD OF REVENUE, RAJASTHAN, AJMER & OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1965] 1 S.C.R. 96
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964-08-24
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 326 of 1962
- **Bench:** P. R. Ci4JENDRAUADKAR, J. c. SHAH, N. Rajagop, Ala Ayyangar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/idol-of-thakurji-suri-govind-deoji-maharaj-v-board-of-revenue-rajasthan-ajmer-3285
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

The Jaipur Matmi Rules, 1945, rr. 4 and 5-"State grant"" in favour of
idol-Liability for "Matmi dues"-Practict-Wri1 Pt1ition-Main1ainabiliry by affected party.
The appellant, an Idol, is the grantee of certain lands. They are "State
grants" under r. 4 of the Jaipllr Matmi Rule.<, 1945, having been made or
recognised by the Ruler of the State. All State grants are subject to
Matml dues under the Rules, that is, to the amount payable to the State by
the successor of a deceased grantee, oo bis recognition as such. There
bad been changes in the person of the Shebait of the idol twice, the previ"-'s
incumbent dying and his son being recognised as the successor. The reapondent therefore passed an order demanding Matmi dues from the present
Shebait. The appellant by a Writ Petition disputed the validity of the
order, but the petition was dismissed.
On appeal,
HELD: (i) The gran:s in question being grants made in favour of the
idol and not in favour of the Shebaits, no question of the death of the
grantc.c or his successor could arise and ctinsequcntly, the respondent could
not claim any Marmi dues from the appellant.
[IOOF-H].
(ii) Though the order for payment of Matmi dues had been nominally
passed against the Shebait, as they were intended to be enforced a~aiost the
properties belonging to the appellant, the appellant"• Writ Petition was
marntainable. [102E-G[.

## Text

IDOL OF THAKURJI SURI GOVIND DEOJI MAHARAJ
v.
BOARD OF REVENUE, RAJASTHAN, AJMER & OTHERS
August 24, 1964
(P. R. Ci4JENDRAUADKAR, C.J., J. c. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOP,ALA
AYYANGAR JJ.)
The Jaipur Matmi Rules, 1945, rr. 4 and 5-"State grant"" in favour of
idol-Liability for "Matmi dues"-Practict-Wri1 Pt1ition-Main1ainabiliry by affected party.
The appellant, an Idol, is the grantee of certain lands. They are "State
grants" under r. 4 of the Jaipllr Matmi Rule.<, 1945, having been made or
recognised by the Ruler of the State. All State grants are subject to
Matml dues under the Rules, that is, to the amount payable to the State by
the successor of a deceased grantee, oo bis recognition as such. There
bad been changes in the person of the Shebait of the idol twice, the previ"-'s
incumbent dying and his son being recognised as the successor. The reapondent therefore passed an order demanding Matmi dues from the present
Shebait. The appellant by a Writ Petition disputed the validity of the
order, but the petition was dismissed.
On appeal,
HELD: (i) The gran:s in question being grants made in favour of the
idol and not in favour of the Shebaits, no question of the death of the
grantc.c or his successor could arise and ctinsequcntly, the respondent could
not claim any Marmi dues from the appellant.
[IOOF-H].
(ii) Though the order for payment of Matmi dues had been nominally
passed against the Shebait, as they were intended to be enforced a~aiost the
properties belonging to the appellant, the appellant"• Writ Petition was
marntainable. [102E-G[.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 326 of
1962.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated September JO,
1959 of the Rajasthan High Court in D. B. Civil Writ Petition
No. 10 of 1957.
B. K. Bhattacharya and S. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant.
G. C. Kas/iwa/, Advocate-Genera/ for the State of Rajasthan.
K. K. Jain and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents.
A
B
c
D
E
F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
Gajendragadkar C. J.
The short
point
of law
which
arises in this appeal is whether under- rule 5 of the Jaipur Matmi
••
Rules, 1945, the appellant, the Idol of Thakurji Shri Govind
~. '
Deoji Maharaj, is liable to pay the Mcrtmi amount in question.
It appears that respondent No. 1, the Board of Revenue, had
passed an order on November 6, 1956, directing that the Matalaba H
MaJmi amounting to Rs. 15,404/14/6 be recovered from the
Shebait of the appellant. temple.
The appellant disputed the
'
THAKUR.Ji v. J.U!VBNUB BOARD (Gajendragadkar. C./.)
97
A validity of this order and filed a Writ Petition (No. 10 of 1957)
in the High Court of Ra jasthan contending that the said amoUJlt
• 1
was not recoverable from the appellant.
The High Court has
dismissed this writ petition and the appellant has come to this
court with a certificate granted by the High Court. ·
B
In its petition, the case for the appellant was that several
lands had been granted to the appellant from time ·to time and
that these grants were made in the name of the Idol, and that the
Seva Pooja of the Idol and the management of its properties was
entrusted to the Goswami ever since the Idol of Thakurji Shri
Govind Deoji Maharaj was taken to Jaipur: from Brindaban.
On
C
the death of the ninth Shebait, Goswami Shri Krishna Chandra
succeeded to the Shebaitslrip in 1888 arid continued to be in
management as such Shebait until 1935.
On his death,
his
eldest son Goswami Bhola Nath succ.eeded and Seva Pooja was
looked after· by him , during his lifetime.
On the death of
Goswami Bhola Nath in 1945, his. eldest son . Goswami
D
Pradumna
Kumar
succeeded
to
the
Sl!ebaitship
and
has been carrying on the management of .the properties of the·
temple and looking after the Seva Pooja of the lido!. It ·was
during the management of Pradumna Kumar that the impugned
order has been passed by respondent No. 1.
Accordihg to this
order, Matmi has been sanctioned "in favour of Goswami Bhola
E
Naih on the death of ·Krishna Chandra Deo and in favour of
Pradumna Kumar beo on the death of Bhola Nath" and the total
amount directed in that behalf is Rs. 15,404/ 14/6. The appellant's petition specifically averred that the property in question had
been granted to the Idol itself and that the Shebaits have been
F
performing the sCva Pooja of the Idol and managing the properties
of the temple as such Shebaits.
On these allegations, the appel-
~· ·
Iant prayed that an appropriate writ, order or direction should be
issued prohibiting respondent No. l and the Collector, Sawai
Madhopur, respondent No. 2, and their nominees or agents Crom
recovering or Crom taking any step for the recovery of any MataG Iaba· Matmi under the impugned order of respondent No. 1 ·from
the petitioner's estate.
The appellant 'also claimed that .au appropriate order or direction or writ should be issued quashing. the said
-
..-1
impugned order as well as the prior otd~ dated April 21'.l, 1954
on which the latter order was based.
8
Respondents 1; 2 and the State Qf Rajasthan ·which was joined
as respo11d11nt No. 3 disputed the appQ)lant's claim· and made
several pleas.
Tu: regard to the allegation of the a~t
that
tfie properties in question had been granted to the Id<if, the
98
SUPIUIM! con.T IU!l'()RT5
[ IP65) I S.C.R.
respoodents' reply merely stated that, 1bat allegation was n«
A
admiued as 1ht documcnu regarding the original grants wc:ce DOI
traceable.
The respondents urged that the Matalaba
Matmi
had been properly leYied by respondent No. 1 against 1he Shebaits and that the appellant's grievance that its properties were
not liable to pay the said amount was not well-founded.
The IDgh Court has proceeded to deal with this dispute on
the b~ that the appella.ut, the Idol of Tluikurji Shri GoviDd
Deoji Maharaj was die owner of lhl'. properties.
It, however,
took the view that since the Shebaits were managing the properB
ties and perfonning the Seva Pooja of the appellant Idol, Shebaitship it54lf being property the relevant Rules applied, because the
C
beneficial interest which the Sbcbaits llel.d oould be said
to
amount to a 'State grant' within the meaning of r.4 (I ) . On
this view, the High Court came to the oonclusion 1hat what is
coniemplated in the Matmi Rules is the succession to a Shebait.
In that connection, the High Court referred to the fact that the
predecessors of the present Shebait had applied for .Mat.tni and
D
the present Shebait himself had silnilarly filed an application in
that behalf.
According to the High Court, the plain meaning of
the definition of 'Mauni' is that it is payable at the time ol-tlle
recognition of the succeeding Shebait.
In this connection the
High Court has also observed that the writ petition had been filed
by the Idol and though the Shebait appeared as the agent of the
E
Idol, it was not a petition filed by the Shebait as such, and since the
impugned order had been passed against the Shebait, the grievance made by the Idol was technically not justified.
Even so,
since the High Court was inclined to take the view that by virtue
of the beneficial interest which the Shebaiu have in the property
F
of the temple the impugned order had been properly pas.sed, the
High Court considered the merits of the writ petitiOll filed by the
appellant and clismis.5ed it with costs.
The main judgment has
been delivered by Bhandari J. Modi. J. has agreed with the conclusions of Bhandari J. and in a brief order he has indicated the
principal grounds on which his conclusions rested.
Modi 1. also G
held that it was not possible for the Court to help the appellant in
view of the Rules as they stand.
He thought that the only relief
which the appellant can secure is by moving respondent No. 3 to
exercise its discretion under clause (xvii) of r.20 and get eitemption from the payment of the amount in question.
It is against
this decision that the appellant hAs oome to this Court.
The Jaipur Matmi Rules came into force in 1945 and some
of the relevant provisions of these Rules must now be considered
H
....
lo.. •
THAKURJI v. REVENUE BOAltD (Ga;endragadkar, C.J.)
9~
A Rule 4 contains definitions.
Rule 4(i) defines a 'State grant' as
meaning a grant of an interest in land made or recognised by
the Ruler of the Jaipur State and includes a jagir, muamla, suba,
istimrar, chakoti, badh, bhom, inam, tankha, udak, milak, aloofa, khangi, bhog or other charitable or religious grant, a site
granted free of premitlm for a residence or a garden, or other
B grant of a similar nature.
Rule 4 ( 2) defines a person holding a
State grant as a 'State Grantee'. Rule 4(3) r~fers to 'Matrni' and
defines it in these terms:
c
D
"MatJni" means mutation of the name of the succezsor
to a State grant on the death of the last holder, The
person in whose name matJni is sanctioned is called
the "maanidar" and the sum payable by him on his
recognition as such by the State is called "matalba
matmi".
Rule 4 ( 4) defines 'Nazarana' thus :
"Nazrana" is the sum payable, in addition to matalba
matJni, by an adopted son or by a successor other
than a direct. male lineal descendant
of the
last
holder".
It will thus be noticed that under r. 4(i) a State grant mei:n~.
inter alia, a grant of an interest in land made by the Ruler of
E the Jaipur State and it includes a charitable or religious grant.
The High Court has dealt with the present w}it petition on. the
basis that the grant has been made in favour of the Idol.
In
fact, th~ two grants to which our attention was invited
fully
support this view.
The copy of the Patta dated 21st Ramzan
F
G
H
St. 1123 (Annexure Exbt. 4) shows that the villages Debra and
Salampukh Balahadi in Pargana Hindaun Baseshu Prasad were
a.llotted for "Punya Bhog" of Thakurji Sriji.
Similarly,
the
~opy of the Patta dated Katik Badi 8 of Smt. 1808 ( Annexure
Exbt. 5) shows that the village Govindpur Bas Hathyod Tehsil
Qasaba Sawai Jaipur was allotted for the Bhog (food offerings)
of Thakurji Sriji.
Therefore, we feel no difficulty in dealing
with the present appeal on the same basis which the High Court has
adopted in its judgment.
The grants in question were grants
made in favour of the Idol and not in favour of the Shebaits.
It
is well-known that a religious grant can be made either in favour
of the Idol as such or may be made to a person burdening the
grantee with the obligation to render requisite services to the
temple.
ft is with the first category of grants that we are concerned in this appeal.
The grant is one to the Idol and if the
Shebait manages the properties granted to the Idol, it is by virtue
too
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965] I S.C.R.
of his Shebaitship and not because he is in any manner a grantee A
from the State as such.
Rule 5 provides that all Stale grants shall be subject to Matmi
with certain exceptions..
With these exceptions we are not
concerned.
Rule 6 provides for the submission of death reports
by persons claiming succession to a grant.' Rule 7 prescribes
B
the penalty for the successor's failure to make the report.
Rule
8 provides for attachment of State grants pending Matmi.
Rule
9 provides for the Bhograj expenses during attachment of a bhog
·grant.
Under Rule 12, a i:laim for' succession to a State grant,
if not made within a year of tho last holder's death, shall be
C
rejected as time-barred and the grant resumed.
Rule 13 deals
with the question of the persons entitled to succeed.
Rule 14
deals with the same problem in the absenre of a direct male
lineal descendant.
The proviso to rule 14 lays down, inter alia,
that in the case of a grant for the mainlenance of a temple, other
than a Jain temple, it shall be within the discretion of the Gov0
ernment to select as successor any one of the male lineal descendants of the original grantee, with due regard to his. suitability
for the performance of worship.
With the rest of the Rules we
are not concerned in the present appeal.
The question which arises is, can the grant made to the appelE
!ant be said to attract the operation of rule 5 ? Rule 5 pl'CICribca
fO£ the levy of Matmi in respect of State grants and if the said
rule applies, the appellant would have no case.
In deciding
the question as to whether the appellant's estate is liable to pay
Malmi under r. 5 it is necessary to examine the nature of this
Manni, and find out whether a claim in respect of it can be made
F
against the appellant
We have already noticed . that Malmi
means mutation of the name of the successor to a State grant oo
the death of the last holder.
It is obvious that in the case of a
grant to the Idol or temple· as such there would be no question
about the death of the grantee and, therefore, no question about
its successor.
An Idol which is a jnridical person is not subject
G
to death, because the Hindu C()ncept is that the Idol lives for
ever, and so, it is plainly impossible to predicate about the Idol
which is the grantee in the preseat case that it has died at a
·-
certain time and the claims of a stltcessor fall to be determined.
That being so, it seems difJicult to hold that any claim for Matmi
can be made against the appellant, and that must clearly lead to
H
the inference that no amount can be recovered from the properties belonging to the Idol on the ground that Matrni is claimable
THAXURJI v. :RBVBNUE BOARD ( Gajendragadkar C.J.)
I 0 I
A against a person who claims tp be the successor of the Shebai\ .
of the · appellant.
B
c
The learned Advocate-General was unable to dispute· this
position.
He, ho.wever, attempted to argue that all grants pertaining to the properties of the appellant were not before the
Court, and so, it may not be proper to proceed on the basis that
all the properties of the appellant have been granted
to the
appellant in its own name.
We are not impressed by this argument.
We have already noticed that a specific avennent was
made by the appellant in paragrap)l 3 of its writ petition that
all the State grants made to the appellant from time to time were
in the name of the Idol, and though the respondents ·did not
specifically admit this averrnent, they pleaded that since the documents regarding . the original grants were not traceable, they
required the appellant
to prove its case in that behalf.
The
appellant produced two grants and ii appears from the judgment
of the High Court that the matter was proceeded with on the
D
basis that the Idol is the grantee of all the properties.
That
being so, we do not think it is open to the Advocate-General now
to contend that some of the properties may have been granted
t~ the Shebaits no doubt burdened with the obligation t:l perform
the services of the Idol.
E
F
The High Court appears to have taken the view that because
a Shebait has some kind of a beneficial interest in the property
of the temple, that beneficial interest itself could be treated as a
State grant and it is on this basis that the High Court held that
the impugned order passed by. respondent No. 1 was valid. In
the ·present case we are not concerned to enquire whether for
recognising a succeeding Shebait any Matmi can be recovered by
the resP<?ndents; but since the High Court has laid emphads on
the fact that the Shebait has a beneficial interest in the properties
granted to the appellant, it is necessary to point out that though
the Shebait by virtue of the special position attaching to Shebait
under the Hindu law can claim some beneficial interest, that
interest is derived not by virtue of the grant made by the State, but
G by virtue of the provisions of Hindu law, or custom, or usage of the
temple or locality where the temple is situated.
In Tilkayat Shri
G:ovindala/ji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (1) the
position of the Shebaits was incidentally considered,
and the
observations made by Mr. Justice Ameer Ali in Vidya Varuthi
H
Thirtha Swamigal v. Balusami Ayyar(') were cited with approval.
"In almost every case", said Mr. Justice Ameer Ali, "the
Mahant is given the right to a part of the usufruct. the mode of
(I} [1964] 1 S.CR. 561.
(2) 48 I.A. 302, 311.
102
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965] I S.C.R.
enjoyment and the a.mount of the usufruct depending again on
A
usage and custom.
In no case was the property conveyed to
or vested in him, nor is he a trustee in the English sense of the
term, though in view of the obligations and duties resting on him,
he is answerable as a trustee in the general sense for mal-administration." Therefore, it seems to us that the High Court was in
error in holding that the beneficial interest of the Sheba.its in the
properties granted to the appellant amounted to a State grant,
and so, the impugned order was perfectly valid.
The incidental
effect of the conclusions reached by the High Court may perhaps
be taken to be that the order passed by respondent No. I being
valid, the amount in question can be recovered from the proper1ics of the appellant.
That is why we thought it necessary to
clarify the position in law on this point.
B
c
In fact, by Civil Misc. Petition No. I 081 of 1964 it has been
brought to our notice by ~ appellant that it had made a compensation claim because lands granted to the appellant had been
resumed by the State of Rajasthan by notification No. _F. (388) I
D
REV I 1.A/53 dated Jan. I, 1959 and that an annual sum by way
of annuity to the Deity had been sanctioned by the State of
Rajasthan under its order dated April 24, 1962. This order has,
however, directed that the amount of Rs. 15,404/14/6 which has
been ordered by respondent No. 1 to be recovered by way of Matmi
,hould be deducted and that, it is urged before us by the appellant,
cannot be done.
This fact clearly shows that the appellant is
justified in apprehending that , though the order of Matmi dues
has been nominally passed against the present Shebait, it may be
enforced against the properties belonging to the appellant Since
E
we have held that the properties granted to the appellant constitute
State grants under r. 4(1 ), but do not become liable to pay
F
Matmi dues under r. 4(3), we must hold that the appellant's
writ petition was justified inasmuch as it asked for an appropriate
direction restraining the respondents and their nominees or agents
from recovering the said amount from the appellant's estate.
Therefore, prayer made by the appellant in paragraph 16(1) of
its writ petition must be allowed.
Since we are not concerned
with the validity of the order passed by respondent No. I agaimt
the present Sheba.it, we propose to express no opinion in regard
to the merits of the prayer contained in paragraph 16(2) of the
writ petition.
The result is, the appeal is allowed, the order passed by the
Hi~h Court is set aside
and the appellant's writ petition is
"'lowed with costs.
Appeal allowed.
G
H
•