# IHI J_,u 838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SCPP. PHATAP SINGH A1"'D ANOTHER v. GlJRBAKSH SINGH - **Citation:** [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 838 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1962 - **Bench:** S. K. DAs, K. St:BBA RAo, RAGHt:BAR DAYAL - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ihi-j-u-838-supreme-court-reports-1962-scpp-phatap-singh-a1-d-another-v-2349 - **Pages:** 27 ## Headnote Conl"11pt of Court-Circular letter prohibiting Governmtnl ,.,..,nt from aeehng d.ciaion of Court bPfore exhausting official remediea-Proceeding on 1uch circular letter pending suit-If co...tilulta conkn.pl of Court-Contempt of r,•ourl.8 .. fol, 1952 (32 urse of judicial proceedin~ It cannot amount to contempt of Court. Whether the depart· mental action would tempt the respondent to withdraw the suit or deter other Government servants from filing similar suin would be considerations outside the scope of a contempt proceeding and, therefore, irretevant. In re tlie South ShielM (Thames Street) Ckaranc. Order, 1931, ( 1932) 172 L.TJ. 76, referred to. In re William 1'homaa Shipping Co. ll.W. Dillon & Sons ltd. v. The Company, In re Sir Robert Tlwmaa, ( 1930) 2 Ch. D. 368, distinguished. In the instant case the departmental enquiry against the respondent did not constitute a pa1allel enquiry and tend to interfere with the course of the litigation pending in Court and therefore, no contempt of court had been committed. Saib'nior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar, a court subordinate to the High Court. Thll High Court issued notice to the appellants and after hearing the parties came to the conclu. sion that though the appellants were elea.rly guilty of an olfc11ce punishable under s. 3 of the Coutempt of Courts Act, 1952, they were merely endeavouring to comply with the instructions of the Government, the legality or propriety of which they had no reason to doubt. In that view of the matter, the High Court t>xpresscd the view that the ends of ju,;tico would be amply met if the two appellants wt·re directed to ab1ndon tho depiirtmcntal proceed. ingd "hich had been taken against the respondent and furthermore, if they were warned against complying with the instructions contained in tho circular letter id8ued by tho State Government. On behalf of the appellants three points have been urged iu support of the cont~ntion that they were nut guilty of the offence of contempt of court. Firstly, it has been argued that the petition da.te [1962] SUPP. which gave rise to case no. 20 of 1957, a grievance wa.e made of interference with the coul'tle of justioe in the High Court in respect of the writ petition which waa dismissed by the High Court on May 20, 1957. But in the second petition filed on the same day, which gave rise to case no. 27 of 1957, the respondent clearly stated as follows in para. 9 of hie petition : "Previously the petitioner filed a petition under Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act in this Hon'ble Court in respect of this very charge-sheet on the ground that this chargesheet related to the writ petition that had bet>n filed by the petitioner (Civil Writ no. 528 of 1956). Now. however, the respondents are taking up the plea that the eharge·sheet ( annexure 'A') is not in respect of the writ petition filed in the High Court but concerns the suit which has been filed by the petitioner and which is awaiting decision in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Amritsar." It is clear, therefore, that the High Court had before it two petitions against the appellants, in one of which a grievance 'll as made of interference with the course of justice in resvect of the writ petition and in the other a grievance was made of interference with the course of justice in respect of the snit which waa awaiting decision in the court of the Senior Subordinete Judge, Amritsar. The respondent further stated that "by forcing and coercing him to withdraw hie snit or otherwise not to pl'l!B8 it" the appellants were obstructing the course of justice ann had, therefore, committed contempt of court punishable under e. 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. In view of ~heee allegations in the eecond petition filed on September 14, 1957, the first point urged on behalf oft.lie appellants must be overruled. We now come to the second point which is of a more substantial nature. We have already quoted 2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 847 the terms of the circular letter dated January 25, 1953. There was some argument before us as to whether the said circular letter contained executive instructions only or laid down a rule as to a condition of service. Our attention was dra'm to some institutions or departments of Government, where a rule in similar terms la\d down as one of the conditions of service that it is improper for a Government servant to take recourse to a court of law before he has exhausted the normal official channels of redress. Learned Advocates for the parties were, however, agreed that no rule laying down the couditions of service of Government servants serving in the department to which the respondent belonged imposed an obligation similar to that imposed by the circular letter. We have, therefore, proceeded in this case on the footing that the circular letter contained executive instructions only and did not embody a rule governing the conditions of service. Therefore we have not thought it necessary to consider what the position would be if such a rule were made a condition of employment for certain Government servants. Other considerations would then arise such as, the authority of the rule-making power to make such & rule, and we must make it clear that we are expressing no opinion on thoae other con.- siderations. Assuming that the circular letter contained certain exeautive instructions what then ls the position? It should perhaps be made clear at the very outset that the question before us is not so m"Qch the validity of the circular letter in the abstract, but the propriety of the action taken against the respondent on the basis of the circular letter at a time when his suit was awaiting decision in the court of the Senior Subordinate Judge at Amritsar. It must not, however, be assumed that we are holding the circular letter to be valid in the sense that compliance with it will, in no circumstances, amount to contempt of court. We do n.:>t come to any such 1962 Pralap Singh v. Gurbaksh Sing\ DasJ. 1962 Pratop Singh v. G11tba/c1h Sing% DasJ. 848 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. conclusion. The a.rgument before us is that the circula.r letter did not impose a.n a.bsolutc ba.n on a. Government serva.nt seeking rcdrese of his grieva.nccs a.rising out of his employment or service conditions in a. court of law ; it is au bmitted that all that it did was to ask Government serva.nts to exhaust first the normal Official channels of redress before vroceeding t0 a court of law. The emphasis, it is stated, is on propriety and discipline in the conduct of a Government servant ; and it has been submitted that judged from that point of view the circular letter cannot be said to constitute an interference with the course of justice in a.ny court of law. Theo· retica.lly and in the abstract, this ma.y be true; and if the circular letter merely 111oys down that Ordinarily a Government servant should exhaust his dcpa.rtmental remedies before going to a court of law, no objection can be taken to it. Speaking generally, a Government servant does not ordinarily go to court unless a"ld until he fails to get what he considers to be justice from the departmental authoritifJ8. But we have to considllr in this ca.sea somewhat diffc. rent problem, namely, the action taken against the respondent during a pending litigation, as though going to a court of law before exhausting depart. mental remedies rn'USt in all cases be visited with punishment. What, after all, is contempt of court? "To speak generally, contempt of court may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and adruinistra.tion of the law into dis· respect or disregard, or to interfere with or prejudice pa.rtiee litiga.nt or their witnessea during the litigation." (Oswald's Contempt of Court, 3rd Edition, page 6.) We are concemcrl in the pref!{lnt case with the s~cond part, namely, "to interfere with or prej11dice pa.rties litigant during the litigation". In the case under our consideration the respondent had instituted a suit in the court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar, 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 849 in respect of his grievance that a certain sum of money was being illegally deducted from his salary. On behalf of the respondent it was alleged that he had no further departmental remedies to exhaust, inasmuch as the order by which a part of his sal&ry was being deducted was a final order made by the Punjab Government after considering the respondent's explanation. On behalf of the appellants it has been contended that the respondent had still a further remedy by way of an appe&l to the Governor. That is a matter with which we are not really concerned, as it relates to the question whether the respondent had or had not violated the terms of the circular letter. We are concerned with the action that was taken against the respondent on the footing, right or wrong, that he had violated the instructions of the circular letter. His suit was pending in the court of thfl Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar. When the summons in the suit was served on the Government, the Under Secretary to Government, drew the attention of one of the appellants to the circular letter and asked the latter to intimate to Government what action he proposed to take against the reepondent. Appellant Prat&p Singh then forwarded the memor&ndum of the Under Secretary to the Conservator of Forests, South Circle, &lid in hill forwarding endorsement Prat&p Singh directed. that the respondent Should he proceeded with in accordance · with the instructions in the cironl&r letter and that a oopy of the proceedings recorded and orders passed should be forwarded . to him. It appears, there- :t:ore, that appellant Part&p Singh w.as 11ot merely content with forwarding the memorandum· of the Under Secretarv. He directed his 8Ubordinate officer to take a~tion airainst the respondent. In accordance with that direction a proceeding was drawn up against the respondent and the appellant Bachan Singh was asked to enquire into it. The appellant Bachan Singh then drew up a 196$ i'Nt.;Sinth v. a.,.,., .. sin th DoJ. 1962 Pru.pSU.fh v. GurW.Ji Sinth Do1J. 850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. charge-ehi>et and in that charge-sheet it was stated that the respondent had gone to a court of law before exhausting all his departmental remedies. What would be the effect of these proceedings on the suit which wa.s pending in the court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amrit· sar ? From the practical point of view, the insti· tution of the proceedings at a. timo when the suit in the court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amrit:aar, was pending could only be to put pre88Ure on the respondent to withdraw his suit, or faoe the consequenoeR of disciplinary action. This, in our opinion, undoubtedly amounted to contempt of court. There are many ways of obstructing the Court and "any conduct by which the course of justice is perverted, either by a party or a atranger, is a contempt; thus the use of threats, by letter or otherwise, to a party· while his suit is pending; or abusing a party in letters to persons likely to be witnesRes in the cause, have been held to be con· tempts". (Oawald'a Contempt of Court, 3rd Edition, page 87). The question is not whether the action in fact interfered, but whether it had a tendency to interfere with the due course of justioe. The action taken in 'this e&11e against the respondent by way of a proceeding againat him ean, in our opinion, have only one tendency, namely, the tendency to coerce the respondent and force him to withdraw his suit or otherwise not press it. If that be the clear and unmistakable tendency of the prooeedings taken against the respondent, then there can be no doubt that in law the appellants have been guilty of contempt of court, even though they were merely carrying out th1> instruetions contained in ·the circular letter. We have been referred to a large number of decisions dealing with various aspects of contempt of court. We consider it unneoell8&1"y to refer to them all, because it is clear to us that any conduct which interferes with or prejudices partiea litigant 2S.C.R. SUPltEME COURT REPORTS during the litigation is undoubtedly contempt of court. There is, however, one decision which is very much in point and to whir.h we must refer. In Shanlcar Lal Sharma v. M. S. Bisht (1) in very similar circumstances it was held by the Allahabad High Court that if any kind of threat or any action which may amount to a threat is held out to a person who approached the Civil Courts for a redress of his grievances, with a view to induce him to forego the assistance of the Civil Courts, the action amounts to a contempt of eourt. In that case also an employee of the Public Works Department of Uttar Pradesh moved the High Court for the grant of a writ. While the writ petition was pending in the High Court the Chief Engineer, P.W.D., U. P., purporting to act in accordance with certain directions contained in a circular letter asked for an explanation from the emp· loyee as to why he has submitted a writ application to the High Court. The learned Judges c•xpressed the view that there was no doubt that the action taken by the Chief Engineer in accordance with the instructions contained in the circular letter amounted to a threat with a view to induce the employee to forego the assistance of the Civil Courts. An unqualified apology having been tendered in the case, no further action was taken. On behalf of the appellants reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in S. 8. Roy v. State of Orissa('). That was a case iri which a First Class Magistrate misconceiving his powers and exercising a jurisdiction not vested in him by law and without any justifying circumstances made an order under s. 144, Code of Criminal Procedure, by ~hich a Civil Court peon was restrained from executing a warrant of arrest issued by an Additional Munsif in connection with the execution of a money decree; the Magistrate was not influenced by any extraneous consideration or dishonest motive in making the (I) A.f.R. 1956 All. 160. (2) A.J.R. 1960 S.C. 190. 1962 Pratap SiaJh v. Gurba~sh Sir.gh Vas J. 1~2 Pr~ Si""h v. Gwb.Wh Singh DasJ. 852 SL"PREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. order and it was held tha.t the Magistrate was not iruilty of contempt of the Court of the Additional Munsif, because there wa.s nothing to suggest a.ny wilful culpability on his part. We are unable t-0 agree with the learned Advocate for the Appel· lants that the principle of that decision shonld apply to the present case. The appellants in the instant case were not judicial officers who mis· conceiTed their powers. They were no doubt carrying out executive instructions given by their employer, but they carried out those instructions at a time when a. ci\'il suit was pending and they carried out the instructions in such a manner as to exert pressure on the reRpondent to withdraw the mit. That is the finding at which the High Court arrived and on that finding the appellants were clearly guilty of contempt of court. The deciaion in W eb.~ter v. Bakewell Rural Di~trid Cryuncil ( 1) on which also learned Advocate for the appellants relied is not in point. That was a case in which the yearly tenant of a cottage and land, adjoining a highway and farming part of a settled eRtate issued a writ against the local authority for an injunction to restrain an alleged trespass on his land ; the solicitor of the tenant for life wrote to the local authority with a view t-0 arrange the matter and at the Mme time wrote to the tenant that the tenant for life required him to withdraw the writ, and that, if he did not comply, his tenancy would be determined. It was held that the solicitor had not committed a. contempt of court. The decisitln proceeded on the footing that the tenant for life had the rig;ht to turn out the yearly tenant and there was nothing to prevent the tenant ~or life, who was the landlord, from exercising his legal rights if he did so honestly to protect the rights he had in the property. "We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the appellants were guilty of contempt of the (I) (1916) I Cb. 300. 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 853 Court of the Senior Subordinate Judgo, Amritsar and in awarding the ·sentence the High Court correctly took into consideration the circumstance that the appt'llants were merely carrying out the instructions contained in tho circular letter. Thongh that circumstance does not afford a defence to the charge, it is undoubtedly a consideration relevant to the sentence. . As to the third point that appellant Pratap Singh took no action beyond endorsing the memorandum of the Under Secretary, we have already dealt with it and pointed out that he not merely endorsed the memorandum of the Under Secretary but directed the Conservator of Forests, South Circle, to institute a proceeding against the respondent for having contravened the instructions contained in the circular letter. This disposes of all the points urged on behalf of the appellants. In our opinion, there are no grounds for interference with the judgment and order of the High Court dated November 5, 1958. Tlie appeals are accordingly dismissed. RAGHUBAR DAYAL,J.-Ihave held the advantage of perusing the judgment of my learned brother, ::;. K. Das, J., but regret my inability to agree tha.t the appellants are guilty of contempt of Court. The facts leading to the conviction of the appellants in the two appeals, hu.ve been fully mentioned in the majority judgment and I need not repeat them here. For the purpose of these cases, I assume the validity of the 8ircular issued by the Government in 1953. That has nut been challenged by the opposite p'l.rty. If an employee acts against the directions contained in the Circular, it is just and proper that a~tion be taken. If action is taken and that be considered per se to amount to the commission of contempt of Court, the directions in the Circular oan be disobeyed with impugnity and 1962 /'Map SiJr&1' v. GUtbaksh Singh DasJ, 1962 PraJap S i•11' v. C111b