# Ii.Ji. the Maharana Sahib Shri Bhagwat Singh Bahadur of Udaijmr v. The State of Rajas than

- **Citation:** [1964] 5 S.C.R. 1
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962-03-28
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 528 of 1963
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ii-ji-the-maharana-sahib-shri-bhagwat-singh-bahadur-of-udaijmr-v-the-state-of-2971
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

t
i
.I
I
•
THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS
H.H. THE MAHARANA SAHIB SHRI BHAGWAT
SINGH BAHADUR OF UDAIPUR
v.
THE. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS
(P.B.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.
SUBBA
RAO, K.N.
\VANCHOO, J.C. SHAH AND RAGHlJBAR DAYAL JJ.)
Industrial Dispute.• Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), s. ID-Reference
by State Gorernment-Liability of .Maharajah to pay staff on retrenchment-Reference whether competent without sanction of
the Union Gorernment under s. 87 B of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908). ss. 86, 87BProtection of ruler from being sued-Whether applies to proceedings for adjudication of Industrial Dispute.
. .
. · ·
Constitution of India, Art. 362-Rights, privileges iindlmmuniries of Rulers, nature of.
·
A dispute arose between. the appellant and his employees in
the "Motor Garage department" in respect of the claim made by
the employees for retrenchment and other compensation and leave
facilities. The Government of the State of Rajasthan, ·on December .
18, 1957, referred under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
the above-mentioned dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan.
Two preliminary objections were raised before the Industrial
Tribunal by the appellant against the maintainability of the
reference:
(I) That without the sanction of the Union Government under.
s. 87B of the Code of Civil Procedure, the reference to the Industrial
Tribunal was incompetent.
(2) That on the date when the reference was made no Industrial
Tribunal was constituted under s. 7A of the Industrial Disputes·
Act, 1947 as amended by Act 36 of 1956, and on reconstitution
of the Tribunal, the reference became incompetent.
The Tribunal rejected both the objections. The High Court
also dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant challenging
the validity of the order of the Tribunal. Hence this appeal.
Ileld,' (i) Section 86 read with s. 87 of the Code of Civil
Procedure in terms protects a Ruler from being "sued" and not
against the institution of any other proceeding which is not in the
nature of a suit. A proceeding which does not commence with
a plaint or petition in the nature of a plaint, or where the claim
is not in respect of a dispute ordinarily triable in a civil court, .
would prima facie not be regarded as falling within s. 86 Code of
Civil Procedure. Section 86 of the Code excludes the jurisdiction
of the civil courts and must be strictly construed. It docs not
debar the commencement of proceedings for adjudication of an
'
I/SCI New Delhi/64-1
1963
October J.
1963
Ii.Ji. the
Maharana Sahib
Shri Bhagwat
Singh Bahadur
of Udaijmr
v.
The State of
Rajas than
Shah J.
2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
industrial dispute for two reasons: neither party to the proceeding
is sded by the initiation of the p1'oceeding and the Tribunal is not
a court.
(ii) Article 362 of the Constitution declares that in the exercise
of legislative and executive power by the Union and the State due
regard shall be had to the guarantee or dssurance given under any
covenant or agreement with respect to the personal rights, privileges
and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State. These rights, privileges and dignities which are, for historical reasons, recommended
to be respected, avail the Rulers of Indian States in their status
as Indian citizens and not in recognition of any sovereign authority
continuing to remain vested in them.
In the present case, the
appellant has also, since the Constitution, been a citizen of India,
and his recognition as Ruler under Art. 366(22.l of the Constitution has not altered that status, but as a citizen he is assured a
privileged position.
(iii) By sub-s.
(2)
of the Rajasthan Industrial Tribunal
(Constitution and Proceedings) Validating Act, 1959, the Tribunal
originally constituted under s. 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, before the Act was amended by Act 36 of 1956, is to be deemed
to have been duly constituted under s. 7 A, and the reference made
on December 18, 1957 is to be deemed to hav

## Text

t
i
.I
I
•
THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS
H.H. THE MAHARANA SAHIB SHRI BHAGWAT
SINGH BAHADUR OF UDAIPUR
v.
THE. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS
(P.B.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.
SUBBA
RAO, K.N.
\VANCHOO, J.C. SHAH AND RAGHlJBAR DAYAL JJ.)
Industrial Dispute.• Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), s. ID-Reference
by State Gorernment-Liability of .Maharajah to pay staff on retrenchment-Reference whether competent without sanction of
the Union Gorernment under s. 87 B of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908). ss. 86, 87BProtection of ruler from being sued-Whether applies to proceedings for adjudication of Industrial Dispute.
. .
. · ·
Constitution of India, Art. 362-Rights, privileges iindlmmuniries of Rulers, nature of.
·
A dispute arose between. the appellant and his employees in
the "Motor Garage department" in respect of the claim made by
the employees for retrenchment and other compensation and leave
facilities. The Government of the State of Rajasthan, ·on December .
18, 1957, referred under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
the above-mentioned dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan.
Two preliminary objections were raised before the Industrial
Tribunal by the appellant against the maintainability of the
reference:
(I) That without the sanction of the Union Government under.
s. 87B of the Code of Civil Procedure, the reference to the Industrial
Tribunal was incompetent.
(2) That on the date when the reference was made no Industrial
Tribunal was constituted under s. 7A of the Industrial Disputes·
Act, 1947 as amended by Act 36 of 1956, and on reconstitution
of the Tribunal, the reference became incompetent.
The Tribunal rejected both the objections. The High Court
also dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant challenging
the validity of the order of the Tribunal. Hence this appeal.
Ileld,' (i) Section 86 read with s. 87 of the Code of Civil
Procedure in terms protects a Ruler from being "sued" and not
against the institution of any other proceeding which is not in the
nature of a suit. A proceeding which does not commence with
a plaint or petition in the nature of a plaint, or where the claim
is not in respect of a dispute ordinarily triable in a civil court, .
would prima facie not be regarded as falling within s. 86 Code of
Civil Procedure. Section 86 of the Code excludes the jurisdiction
of the civil courts and must be strictly construed. It docs not
debar the commencement of proceedings for adjudication of an
'
I/SCI New Delhi/64-1
1963
October J.
1963
Ii.Ji. the
Maharana Sahib
Shri Bhagwat
Singh Bahadur
of Udaijmr
v.
The State of
Rajas than
Shah J.
2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
industrial dispute for two reasons: neither party to the proceeding
is sded by the initiation of the p1'oceeding and the Tribunal is not
a court.
(ii) Article 362 of the Constitution declares that in the exercise
of legislative and executive power by the Union and the State due
regard shall be had to the guarantee or dssurance given under any
covenant or agreement with respect to the personal rights, privileges
and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State. These rights, privileges and dignities which are, for historical reasons, recommended
to be respected, avail the Rulers of Indian States in their status
as Indian citizens and not in recognition of any sovereign authority
continuing to remain vested in them.
In the present case, the
appellant has also, since the Constitution, been a citizen of India,
and his recognition as Ruler under Art. 366(22.l of the Constitution has not altered that status, but as a citizen he is assured a
privileged position.
(iii) By sub-s.
(2)
of the Rajasthan Industrial Tribunal
(Constitution and Proceedings) Validating Act, 1959, the Tribunal
originally constituted under s. 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, before the Act was amended by Act 36 of 1956, is to be deemed
to have been duly constituted under s. 7 A, and the reference made
on December 18, 1957 is to be deemed to have been made as if
the Tribunal were constituted under s. 7 A of the amended Act.
The Validating Act is, because of Item 22 List Ill of the Seventh
Schedule lo the Constitution, within the competence of the State
Legislature.
As the Act was reserved for the consideration of
the President and has received his assent, by virtue of Art. 254(2)
it must prevail in the State of Rajasthan.
Mundra Metal Works Pril'ate Ltd. v. St~tc of Rajasthan,
W.P.No. 107/58, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
528 of 1963.
Appeal from the judgment and
order dated
March 28, 1962 of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B.
Civil Writ Petition No. 164 of 1961.
G.S. Pathak, K. Jinder, B. Dutta, J.B. Dadachanji,
O.C. Mathur and Ral'inder Narain, for the appellant.
G.S. Kasliwa/, Advocate-General for the State of
Rajasthan, S.K. Kapur and B.R.G.K. Achar, for the
respondents.
October 3, 1963. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
SHAH J.-By order of the President of India,
H.H. the Maharana Sahib Shri Bhagwat Singh Bahadur
-hereinafter called 'the appellant'-was recognised
·-
-
,
)
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5 S.C.R.
-~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
3
as the Ruler of Udaipur with effect from July 4,
1955 in succession to his father the late Maharana
Bhupal Singh.
1963
H.H. the
Maharww Sahib
A dispute arose between the appellant and his Shri Bhagwat
employees in the "Motor Garage Department" about Singh Bahadur
the conditions of employment and representations
01 Udaipur
were made by the latter to the Government of Rajasthan
v.
through the Motor Workers Mazdoor Union, UdaiThe State of
pur.
The Government of the State of Rajasthan,
Raiasthan
Shah J.
on December 18, 1957 referred under s. 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), the following
I
dispute to the Jndustrial Tribunal, Rajasthan:
"Whether the Maharana Sahib Bahadur of Udaipur is liable to pay to the staff working with him
in the Palace Power House and Motor Garage,
consequent to their retrenchment, the arrears
of claims or the due salary, leave wages, overtime wages and weekly holidays as per schedule
appended hereto and if so, to what extent. If
not, to what relief the staff is entitled to under
the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,
as the question of payment of these claims has
arisen with the termination of their services
due to retrenchment effected by the employers."
-
Two preliminary objections were raised before
the lndustrial Tribunal by the appellant against
the maintainability of the reference:
(1) That the reference to the Industrial Tribunal
for adjudication of the dispute was not maintainable without the previous sanction of the
Central Government to the making of the
reference.
(2) That on the date when the reference was
made no Industrial Tribunal was constituted under s. 7 A of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, as amended by Act 36 of 1956,
and on reconstitution of the Tribunal, the
reference became incompetent.
The Tribunal rejected both the objections and
a writ petition filed by the appellant challenging the
4
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
-
).- --/
validity of the order of the Tribunal was dismissed
by the High Court of Rajasthan. The appellant
,1 hlf.H. th5e 1 .b has appealed to this Court, with certificate granted by
" a arana
a 11
h
. h
.
h
Shri Bhagwat t e H1g Court of RaJaSt an.
1963
Sinr;h Bahadur
The appellant contends in the first instance tha't
of Udaipur
without the sanction of the Union Government
v.
under s. 87B of the Code of Civil Procedure, the referThe State of ence to the Industrial Tribunal was incompetent.
Rajasthan
But the dispute between the parties relates to the
Shah J.
claim made by the employees for retrenchment and
other compensation and leave facilities:
the dispute
is raised before the Industrial Tribunal in a reference
under the Industrial Disputes Act, and not before \
a civil court in
a suit. The appellant is therefore
not "sued" in a court.
Section 86 Code of Civil
Procedure on which reliance is placed by the first
sub-section provides that:
"No Ruler of a foreign State may be sued in any
Court otherwise competent to try the suit except
with the consent of the Central Government
certified in writing by a Secretary to that Government:"
and by s. 87B the provisions of s. 86 apply in relation
to the Ruler of any former Indian State as they apply
in relation to the Ruler of a foreign State.
.,
The appellant is recognised under Art. 366(22)
of the Constitution as a Ruler of an Indian State.
buts. 86 in terms protects a Ruler from being "sued"
and not against the institution of any other proceeding
which is not in the nature of a suit.
A proceeding
which does not commence with a plaint or petition
in the nature of a plaint or where the claim is not in
respect of a dispute ordinarily triable in a civil court,
would prima facie not be regarded as falling within
s. 86 Code of Civil Procedure. The proceecjing for ·
adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act is
founded in a reference made by the local Government
under s. I 0 and the allied sections under the Industrial
Disputes Act and is not commenced by a plaint or
petition. An Industrial Tribunal is again not a court
within the meaning of s. 86: it is a Tribunal consli-
••
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5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
5
tuted for adjudicating industrial disputes. Section
86 of the Code excludes the jurisdiction of the civil
1963
courts and must be strictly construed. It does not
H.H. the .
debar the commencement of proceedings for adjudica- Maharana Sahib
·
f
· d
· 1 d.
f
· h
Sit1·1 Bhagwat
t10n o an m ustna
tspute or two reasons: nett er Singh Bahadt1r
party to the proceeding is sued by the initiation of the
of Udaipur
proceeding, and the Tribunal is not a court.
v.
It was urged however that by Art. 362 of tht>
Tlte State of
1 .
Rajasthmt
Constitution the
persona
rights, privileges and
dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State guaranteed
or
assured
under
any agreement or covenant
made
prior to the Constitution are preserved,
and a fetter is placed upon the exercise of power,
legislative and executive, of the Union and the States,
against infringement of the guarantee or assurance
given under the covenant or agreements entered into
by a Ruler of an Indian State.
Consequently, it is
submitted, as a Ruler of an Indian State the appellant
is entitled to the same privileges which a sovereign
Shalt J.
enjoy" under rules of fnternational Law against
;
foreign jurisdiction, and the same immunity from being
proceeded against either in the ordinary or extraordinary civil or criminal tribunals, and from payment of all taxes, and being subjected to police or other
administrative regulations.
• J.
-
The position of the former Rulers of fndian
States has, since the year 1947, been fundamentally
altered.
Prior to 1947 the Indian princes were,
notwithstanding the varying degree of suzerainty
exercised over them by the British Crown, rec0gnised
as having a degree of sovereignty and were in an
international sense regarded qua British India as
foreign sovereigns, and entitled to certain rights,
privileges and immunities.
On the enactment of the
Indian Independence Act, the suzerainty which the
British Crown had over the Indian States lapsed and
with it all the treaties and agreements in force at the
date of the passing of the Act between His Majesty
and the Rulers of the Indian States, all functions
exercisable by His Majesty at that date with respect
to Indian States, all obligations of His Majesty exist-
6
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
ing at that date towards Indian States or the Rulers
thereof, and all powers, rights, authority or jurisdicH.H. the . tion exercisable by His Majesty at that date in or
Maha;ana Sahib in relation to Indian States by treaty grant usage
Shri Bhagwat
-
.
'
'
.
1
Singh Bahadur sufferance or otherwise also came to an end.
Like
of' Udaipur
other States the State of Udaipur executed an agreev.
ment of accession and thereby in matters of defence,
The State of external affairs and communications concerning the
Raiasthan
State, the Government of India assumed sole responsibility. This accession was followed by a process
Shah.!.
of integration of the Indian States in Rajasthan which
culminated in the formation of the United State of
Rajasthan. The Rulers of the Indian States in the
Rajasthan area including the Ruler of Udaipur formed
•
the United State of Rajasthan, under a covenant the
provisions whereof were guaranteed by the Government of India. This covenant was modified by an
agreement which became effective from May 15,
1949.
On the enactment of the Constitution on
January 26, 1950 the Union of Rajasthan became one
of the Part 'B' States, and by the Constitution (Seventh
Amendment) Act, 1956, the Part 'B' State of Rajasthan "
was recognised as one of the States in India.
As a result of the constitutional developments
leading to the promulgation of the Constitution the
father of the appellant who was at one time recognised
as a sovereign of an independent State acquired the
status of a citizen of India. The appellant has also,
since the Constitution, been a citizen of India, and
his recognition as Ruler under Art.
366(22) of the
Constitution has not altered his status, but as a citizen
he is undoubtedly assured a privileged position.
The covenant of the United State of Rajasthan
to which the appellant's father as the Ruler of Udaipur
was a party consists of 20 articles.
It would be
fruitless for the purpose of this appeal to catalogue all
the articles dealing with the rights, privileges ar:d
dignities of the Ruler of Udaipur.
A few only
need be set out. By Art. Xl as Ruler of a covenanting
State he was entitled to receive annually from the
revenues of the United State of Rajasthan for his -
)
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•
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
7
privy purse the amounts specified against his State
1963
in Sch. I thereof.
By Art. Xll he remained entitled
to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private
H.H. the
.
properties (as distinct from State properties) belong-Mah~rana Sahib
·
h.
·
h'
k'
h
d · · '
·
f Shn Bhagwat
mg to
1m on
IS ma. mg over t e a m1111strat10n o
Singh Bahadur
that State to the Raj Pramukh.
By Art. XIII the
of Udaipur
Ruler of each covenanting State, as also the members
v.
of his family, were entitled to all the personal privileges,
The State oJ
dignities and titles enjoyed by them, whether within
Rafasrhan
or outside the territories of the State, immediately
before August 15,
1947, and by Art. XIV the
SlwhJ.
succession, according to law and customs, to the
gaddi of each covenanting State, and the personal
rights, privileges, dignities and titles of the Ruler were
guaranteed.
By Art. XV guarantee was given against
any action or proceeding in any court whether in
a personal capacity or otherwise, in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by him or under
his authority during the period of his administration
. of that covenanting State. The covenant is in general
terms, and does not purport to make a comprehensive
list of the personal rights, privileges and dignities
except those which have been specifically referred to.
The agreement which came into force on May 15. 1949
makes no departure from the articles of the covenant.
The covenant which was entered into by the
Rulers of the Indian States in Rajasthan and the
agreement of May I 5, I 949, had the concurrence of
the Government of India and the provisions thereof
were guaranteed by the Government of India. In
order to give constitutional recognition to the guarantees and assurances under the covenants and agreements Arts. 362, 363, 131 proviso and 291 were ~n
corporated in the Constitution.
A~ticle 362 with
which we are directly concerned provides:
"In the exercise of the power of Parliament or
of the Legislature of a State ~o make laws or
in the exercise of the executive power of the
Union or of a State, due regard shall be had to
the guarantee or assurance given under .any s1:1ch
covenant or agrr.ement as is referred to m article
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
291 with respect to the personal rights, privileges
and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State."
M (·"·th~ 1i·b The Article declares that in the exercise of legisla-
. ,;h~,~~~gi~at' tive and executive power by the Union and the State
Singh Bahadur due regard shall be had to the guarantee or assurance
ofVdaipur
given under any covenant or agreement with respect
v.
to the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the
The State of Ruler of an Indian State. It must be emphasized,
Raiasthan
that these rights, privileges and dignities which are,
for historical reasons, recommended to be respected,
Shah J.
avail the Rulers in their status as Indian citizens and
not in recognition of any sovereign authority continuing to remain vested in them. It is in that view unnecessary to enter upon a discussion as to what immunities and privileges; a foreign sovereign would
be entitled to in the Republic of India. The question
on which attention must be concentrated is: does
the reference of the industrial dispute by the Government of the State of Rajasthan which attracts the
application of the Industrial Disputes Act, trench
upon the guarantee or assurance under the covenant
executed by the appellant's father, with respect to
the personal rights privileges and dignities of the
Ruler of the State of Udaipur, and if it does so trench,
are the courts competent to grant relief ?
The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as originally
enacted applied to British India. But by the amendment made by the Industrial Disputes (Appellate
Tribunal) Act (48 of 1950), s. 34 and the Schedule
thereto, the Act was extended to the whole of India
except the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and since then
by the enactment of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 36 of 1956,
the Act extends to the whole of India. The Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, therefore, applied at the material
time to the territory of Rajasthan. The appellant
is a citizen of India, the Act extends to the territory
of Rajasthan and prima facie he is governed by the
provisions of the Act.
The plea raised by the appellant is that by virtue
of Art. 362 of the Constitution reference of an
. -
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5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
9
industrial dispute under the machinery provided under
1963
the Act for settlement of industrial disputes infringes
the guarantee or assurance in respect of his personal
H.H. the .
rights privileges and dignities assured to him by the Malw_rana Sa/uh
'
h" h f
d
h
U ·
f R ·
I
Shn Bhagwat
covenant w 1c
orme
t e
mon o
aJast rnn. Singh Bahadur
But the plea of immunity from the jurisdiction of the · of Udmj1ur
Industrial Tribunal, in the matter of adjudication of
v.
an industrial dispute, because it was a personal right The State of
or privilege, was never raised in the High Court,
Rajasthan
and no evidence has been led in that behalf.
As
observed in the White Paper on Jndian States, para
Shah J.
240 at p. 125, the rights enjoyed by the Rulers varied
from State to State and were exercisable both within
and without the States. They covered a variety of
matters ranging from the use of red plates on cars to
immunity from civil and criminal jurisdiction, and
exemption from customs duties etc.
In truth no
reliance at all was placed on Art. 362 of the Constitution in the High Court.
In the absence of evidence
directed to the question whether the appellant as
"Ruler of the Indian State of Udaipur" was entitled
by virtue of the covenant or agreement relied upon
by him to the privilege of not being proceeded against
in the Industrial Tribunal, we would not be justified
in entertaining his plea.
It may also be mentioned
that if exemption from the jurisdiction of the Industrial
Tribunal be claimed relying on the guarantee or assurance under the covenant being disputed, the questions
whether the courts have jurisdiction to deal with the
dispute if the covenant or the agreement was one
of the nature referred to in Art. 363,' or the dispute
relates to any right accruing under or liability or
obligation arising out of any provisions of the Constitution relating to such treaty, agreement etc., may
fall to be determined.
This Court in Sudhansu
Shekhar Singh Deo v. State of Orissa( 1 )
observed
at p. 786:
"If, despite the recommendation that due regard
shall be had to the guarantee or assurance given
under the covenant or agreement, the Parliament
or the Legislature of a State makes laws inconsis-
(l J [1961] l S.C~R. 779, 786.
1963
fl.fl. the
Maharana Sahih
Shri Bhaglt'af
Singh Bahadur
of Udaipur
IO
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
tent with the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State, the exercise of
the legislative authority cannot, relying upon the
agreement or covenant, be questioned in any court,
and that is so expressly provided by Art. 363 of
the Constitution."
v.
But whether the bar to the jurisdiction of a court
7
"rfr,%:,~~:m~f ·arising out of Art. 363 can be effectively pleaded has,
Shah J.
it must be observed, not been investigated before the
High Court. It was also not raised before us: it has
fallen to be mentioned by us because it arises out of
the plea raised for the first time before this Court
in which reliance is placed on Art. 362 by the appellant.
We therefore decline to express any opinion on the
questions whether by Art. 362 the appellant is privileged against a reference under the fndustrial Disputes
Act and also whether the courts have jurisdiction to
adjudicate upon the plea set up by the appellant.
The second contention was, in our judgment.
rightly negatived by the High Court. The Industrial
Disputes Act was applied to the territory of Rajasthan
by the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act
(48 of 1950), and an Industrial Tribunal was thereafter
constituted by notification dated June 2, 1953, under
s. 7 of that Act. The Industrial Disputes Act was,
however, amended by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (36 of 1956),
and s. 7 as originally enacted was deleted and in lieu
thereof ss. 7, 7 A. 78 and 7C were enacted.
The
power to appoint an Industrial Tribunal was, under
the amended act, conferred upon the appropriate
Government by s. 7 A.
But it appears that no fresh
notification appointing the Tribunal was issued under
s. 7 A, and the Tribunal originally constituted under
s. 7 functioned.
To that Tribunal reference of the
present dispute was made by order dated December
18, 1957. The High Court of Rajasthan in Writ
Petition No. 107 of 1958-lYiundra Metal Works
Private Ltd. v.
The State of Rajasthan and two
others---held that the reference made to the Tribunal
which was constituted under s. 7 of the fndustrial
-
•
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Jl
Disputes Act before it was amended by Act 36 of
1963
1956
was
incompetent.
The State
Government
then reconstituted the Tribunal under s. 7 A of the
lf.H. the
Act by notification dated April 16 1959 but no fresh Mah~rana Sahib
f h d.
.
h
'
'
d
Shrz Bhagwat
reference o t e 1spute rn t e present case was ma e Singh Bahadur
by the State Government to the reconstituted Tribunal.
of' Udaipur
Relying upon this development the appellant urged
v.
that the Tribunal reconstituted by notification dated
The State of
April 16, 1959 had no jurisdiction to entertain the
Rajasthan
reference originally made, and in the absence of a
fresh reference to the reconstituted
Tribunal the
Shah J.
proceeding was incompetent. He also urged that
the constitution and the appointment of the Tribunal
made after March 30, 1959 were invalid .
It is unnecessary however to consider the merits
of these contentions because the Legislature has
remedied the defects, if any, in the constitution of the
Tribunal, by enacting the Rajasthan Industrial Tribunal (Constitution and Proceedings) Validating Act,
1959, which wa~ reserved for the consideration of the
President of India and has received his assent.
By
s. 2( I) of that Act, notwithstanding any judgment,
decision or order of any court and notwithstanding
any defect or want of form or jurisdiction, the Industrial
Tribunal for Rajasthan, constituted under s. 7 of the
lndustrial Disputes Act, 1947, by Government notification dated the 2nd June, 1953, as amended by order
dated the 9th March, 1956, shall, as respects the period
commencing on the 10th day of March 1957 and ending
with the 15th day of April, 1959, be deemed to have
been duly constituted under s. 7 A of the said Act.
By sub-s. (2) it is provided that notwithstanding any
judgment, decision or order of any court all references
n)ade to and all proceedings taken and orders passed
by the Industrial Tribunal constituted in sub-s. (I)
between the period 10th March, 1957 and 15th April,
1959, shall be deemed respectively to have been made,
taken and passed as if the said Tribunal were constituted under s. 7 A of the Act. It is clear from the validating provisions that the Tribunal originally constituted
under s. 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, before
it was amended by Act 36 of 1956 is to be deemed to
1963
12
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
have been duly constituted under s.7 A, and the reference
made on December 18, 1957 is to be deemed to have
H.H. the
been made as if the Tribunal were constituted under
Maharana Sahibs. 7 A of the amended Act.
The Validating Act is
Sim Bhagwat
.
.
'
Singh Bahadur because of Item 22, List III of the Seventh Schedule
of Udaipur
to the Constitution, within the competence of the
v.
State Legislature, and it was reserved for the consideraThe State of tion of the President and has received his assent.
Raiasthan
It must by virtue of Art. 254(2) prevail in the State
Shah J.
1963
October 3
of Rajasthan.
The contentions raised in this appeal must therefore fail.
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
MOHAN SINGH
v.
BHANW ARLAL & OTHERS.
(P.B.
GAJENDRAGADKAR,
K. SUBBA RAO,
K.N.
WANCHOO, J.C. SHAH AND
RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.)
Election-Corrupt Practice-lngredients-Pub/ication of leaf'
lets-If and 1vhen
ronstilute corrupt practice-"Gratification"-
Meaning of-The Representation of the People Act, , 195 l (43 of
1951), SS. 82, 123(1) (B) and 123 (4).
The appellant was declared elected to the Madhya Pradesh
Legislative Assembly.
Another candidate Himmat Singh withdrew his candidature before the date of polling.
Respondent l
one of the defeated candidates, challenged the election by a petition
under the Representation of the People Act alleging that the
appellant had disqualified himself by committing corrupt practices.
lt was alleged that he had shortly before the polling of votes published two leaflets in Hindi containing statements of fact with regard
to the personal character or conduct of respondent 1 which were
false and which the appellant believed to be false or did not believe
to be true and that the statements were calcul.ited to prejudice the
prospects of respondent I at the election. The appellant denied
-