# INDIA ELECTRIC WORKS LTD v. JAMES MANTQSH & ANR

- **Citation:** [1971] 2 S.C.R. 397
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1970-09-15
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals No. 1646 of 1966
- **Bench:** C. Shah, K. S. Hegde, A. N. Grover
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/india-electric-works-ltd-v-james-mantqsh-anr-5329
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Indian Limitation Act (9 ~ 1908), s. 14 'Othe~ cause of a like nature,'
scope of.
The plaintiff filed a money suit claiming rent in respect <if certain
structures, for the -period upto the date of suit and for future
rent as
damages. It was decreed by the trial court in its entirety, but the High
Court negatived the claim for future damages on the . sole ground that in
a pure money suit, no decree could be granted for recovery of compensation after the date of suit or after the date of decree ,The plaintilfs
then filed a suit claiming damages for the period upto the
date
of
the second suit which included the period for which the claim·
was di!allowed in the frrst suit.
As the total period was more than
3 years, protection from limitation 'for the period beyond 3 years
was ·.
claimed under ;, 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, by deducting the time
during which the earlier suit was prosecuted, and also on general principles,
The cause of action for the two suits was the saine and it was found .
that the previous suit 'had been prosecuted in good faith and with due
deligence.
HELD : The plaintiff was entitled to deduct the time during which
the ea·rJier suit was pending.
(Per Shah and Gro\er, JJ.) : The tondition for the applicability of
s. 14(1) to the present case is that the court in which the previous suit
was filed should have been unable to entertain ·the claim
relating to
future mesne profits, 'from defect of jurisdiction or 'other cause of a
like nature'. The words 'other cause of a like nature' must be construed
liberally and two constructions have been placed upon the words. (a)
In Nrityamoni Dassi v. Lakhan Chandra, I.L.R. [1916) 43 Cal. 660 (P.C.)
it, was held that if there was an effective decree by a competent court
capable of being enforced until it was set aside, the period of litigation
of that suit was deductible from the period of limitation for a second
suit filed for that same relief; and (b) in Jaikishan Singh v. People• Bank,
I.L.R. [1944) Lah. 451(F.B.j it was held that the defect must have been
of such a character as to make it impossible for the court to ·entertain
the suit or application in its inception, or at any rate, prevent it from
deciding the matter on merits. [400 G-H; 401 C; 402 B, F-G]
In the present case, either of the tests is applicable, because, {a) In
the earlier money suit the trial court had passed a decree for recovery
of future mesne profits, which was effective till the High Court lie! it
aside; or
(b) It could not he said that the previous money·suit was altogether
111isconceived, and therefore, the defect in it was of such a nature that
it had to be decided before the claim could be disposed of on merits.
[403 I'!]
Makhan Lal Matlak v. Girish Chandra 66 C.W.N. 692, referred to.
The general principle deduced in Narayan Jiwiji Patil v. Khandappagauda Patil. I.L.R. [1939'] Born. 173, fr<?m various p~onounce.ments of
the Privy Council
that
where
a
claim
was
satisfied
either
by
398
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1971] 2 S.C.R.
agreement of parties or by a decree of court, and. if t)le satisfaction or
the decree was set aside subsequently in a judicial proceeding a fresh
cause O'f action would accrue in favour of the claimant, was not relied
upon because, s. 14(1) was applicable to the present case. [404 A-B, CJ
(Per Hcgde, J.) : Section 14'(1) in terms does not apply, but in
Mst. Ranee Sumo Moyee v. Shooshee M~khee, 12 M.I.A. 244 it was
held by the Judicial Committee that a daim which is satisfied, an expression held to include even getting a decree on a claim, if reopened because
of the decree of the appellate court or otherwise, a new cause of action
accrues to the plaintiff on the date the earlier satisfaction is taken away.
This view has held the field for a long time and it is
not in public
interest to disturb it. · Applying the mle to the facts of $e present case,
a new cause df action 111ust be deemed to have accrued to the plaintiff
in respect of the mesne profits under dispute on the da

## Text

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397
INDIA ELECTRIC WORKS LTD.
v.
JAMES MANTQSH & ANR.
September 15, 1970
[J, C. SHAH, K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]
Indian Limitation Act (9 ~ 1908), s. 14 'Othe~ cause of a like nature,'
scope of.
The plaintiff filed a money suit claiming rent in respect <if certain
structures, for the -period upto the date of suit and for future
rent as
damages. It was decreed by the trial court in its entirety, but the High
Court negatived the claim for future damages on the . sole ground that in
a pure money suit, no decree could be granted for recovery of compensation after the date of suit or after the date of decree ,The plaintilfs
then filed a suit claiming damages for the period upto the
date
of
the second suit which included the period for which the claim·
was di!allowed in the frrst suit.
As the total period was more than
3 years, protection from limitation 'for the period beyond 3 years
was ·.
claimed under ;, 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, by deducting the time
during which the earlier suit was prosecuted, and also on general principles,
The cause of action for the two suits was the saine and it was found .
that the previous suit 'had been prosecuted in good faith and with due
deligence.
HELD : The plaintiff was entitled to deduct the time during which
the ea·rJier suit was pending.
(Per Shah and Gro\er, JJ.) : The tondition for the applicability of
s. 14(1) to the present case is that the court in which the previous suit
was filed should have been unable to entertain ·the claim
relating to
future mesne profits, 'from defect of jurisdiction or 'other cause of a
like nature'. The words 'other cause of a like nature' must be construed
liberally and two constructions have been placed upon the words. (a)
In Nrityamoni Dassi v. Lakhan Chandra, I.L.R. [1916) 43 Cal. 660 (P.C.)
it, was held that if there was an effective decree by a competent court
capable of being enforced until it was set aside, the period of litigation
of that suit was deductible from the period of limitation for a second
suit filed for that same relief; and (b) in Jaikishan Singh v. People• Bank,
I.L.R. [1944) Lah. 451(F.B.j it was held that the defect must have been
of such a character as to make it impossible for the court to ·entertain
the suit or application in its inception, or at any rate, prevent it from
deciding the matter on merits. [400 G-H; 401 C; 402 B, F-G]
In the present case, either of the tests is applicable, because, {a) In
the earlier money suit the trial court had passed a decree for recovery
of future mesne profits, which was effective till the High Court lie! it
aside; or
(b) It could not he said that the previous money·suit was altogether
111isconceived, and therefore, the defect in it was of such a nature that
it had to be decided before the claim could be disposed of on merits.
[403 I'!]
Makhan Lal Matlak v. Girish Chandra 66 C.W.N. 692, referred to.
The general principle deduced in Narayan Jiwiji Patil v. Khandappagauda Patil. I.L.R. [1939'] Born. 173, fr<?m various p~onounce.ments of
the Privy Council
that
where
a
claim
was
satisfied
either
by
398
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1971] 2 S.C.R.
agreement of parties or by a decree of court, and. if t)le satisfaction or
the decree was set aside subsequently in a judicial proceeding a fresh
cause O'f action would accrue in favour of the claimant, was not relied
upon because, s. 14(1) was applicable to the present case. [404 A-B, CJ
(Per Hcgde, J.) : Section 14'(1) in terms does not apply, but in
Mst. Ranee Sumo Moyee v. Shooshee M~khee, 12 M.I.A. 244 it was
held by the Judicial Committee that a daim which is satisfied, an expression held to include even getting a decree on a claim, if reopened because
of the decree of the appellate court or otherwise, a new cause of action
accrues to the plaintiff on the date the earlier satisfaction is taken away.
This view has held the field for a long time and it is
not in public
interest to disturb it. · Applying the mle to the facts of $e present case,
a new cause df action 111ust be deemed to have accrued to the plaintiff
in respect of the mesne profits under dispute on the date the decree
of the trial court was set aside by the High Court.
[ 404 D-G]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals No. 1646 of
1966.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated April 11, 1963
of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No.
306 of 1959.
G. L. Sanghi and D. N, Mishra, for the appellant.
P. K. Chatterjee and P. K. Ghosh, for the respondent.
The Judgment of J. c. SHAH and A. N. GROVER JJ. was
delivered by GROVER, J.
K. S. HEGDE, J. gave a separate
Opinion.
Grover, J,
This is an appeal by certificate .from a judgment
of the Calcutta High Court in which the sole question for determination is whether the suit was barred by limitation.
The material facts may be stated.
The appellant befo1e us
was the defendaint in a suit for recovery of damages with interest
and costs.
The suit was decreed by the trial judge and that decree
has been upheld by the High Court.
The defendant was a tenant
under the predecessor of the plaintiffs in respect of the shed and
structures described in schedule A of the plaint. In or about the
year 1939 the predecessor-in-interest of the plainliffs fik:d a title
suit in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Alipore for ejectment
and damages.
A compromise took place between the parties but
the defendant did not vacate the premises in terms of the compromise and continued to remain in occupation of the same.
The
property was requisitioned under Rule 75-A of the Defence of
India Rules and Government took its possession on February 2,
1944. It was derequisitioned on November 21, 1945.
For the
period from February 2, 1944 to November 21, 1945 the plaintiffs
recevied monthly compensation from the Government at the rate
of Rs. 350/-. For the period of the defendant's alleged wrongful
occupation the plaintiffs filed two suits against the defendant. The
first was for and recovery of damages upto February 1, 1944 and
the second was for damages from November 22, 1945 upto November 21, 1948.
The plaintiffs also claimed future damages till
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INDIA ELECTRIC wons v • .JAMBS (Grover, J,)
319
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of possC11sion although the suit waa not. one for passession.
lbe suita were decreed by the learned Subordinate 1ua&e in Deoember 1951 at the rate of Ra. 300/ • per month for tho OD.tire
period Of claim. In other worda the claim for lutute me!IDO profits
waa also a&lowed. On appeal the High Court disallowed the claim
for future D10S11e profits and reduced the rate to Rs. 200/ • per
month. The judgment disposing of those appeals along with ccr·
taill other appeals which arose out of a suit filed by the dcfendani
with which we arc not concerned in the present appeal is reported
in India Electric Work.r Ltd. \I, Mrs. B. S, Maitiosh cl Ori,(1)
This is what was observed in that judgment with regard to the
decree relating to future mcsnc profits at page 1 SS :-
"The rest of the decree in Suit No. 28 of 1948 was
not according to law and cannot be maintained. The
suit was. a pure money suit and not a suit for recovery
of possession of immovable property 8llld for mesnc
profits under 0.20, R. 12., Civil P .C. In such a suit
a preliminary decree may be passed for possession and
for assessment, but in a pure suit for recovery of money,
no decree can be passed for recovery of compeinsation
after the date of the suit upto the date of the decree or
after the date of the decree until recovery of possession.
This pan of the decree should, therefore, be set aside."
The plaintiffs then filed a suit on November 5, 1956 for .recovery
of an am()\lllt of Rs. 28,650/- together with interest thcrooa as
damages at the rate of Rs. 300/ • per month from November 22,
1948 to November 5, 1956 i.e. a period of 7 years, 11 months and
15 days.
For the period beyond 3 years of the 811it ~n
from limitation was plaimed
· arily under s. 14 of the J:ndilin
Limitation Act 1908, here:J:11 Cllilled the "Act" and on ~rat
principles of suspension of limitation owing to the ~y
of the
earlier suits. The defendant oontested the suit pnncipally an the
ground that it was barred by limitation. The rate at which
damages were claimed was also disputed. The tdal court was of
the opinion that the plaintiffs were entitled to the benelit of s. 14
of the Act and that no pare of the claim was barred by limitation.
As re~ards the rate of compensation or damages the trial court
fixed 1t at Rs. 250/- per month and decreed the suit accordingly.
The defendant appealed to the High Court.
The High Court
considered the question of the applicability of s. 14 and held thllt
the plaintiff could take advantage of it. The rate of damages
which had been determined by the trial court was also upbcld.
The admitted and proved facts are that tho clalm made in the
present suit was included in the previous money suit No. 28 or
1948 and a decree had been! passed by the trial court in-favour of
(l) A.l.R. 1956 Cal. 148,
155.
1•--LJ08 Sup Clf71
400
SUPREME COUJlT .. )!,EPOllTS
(1971] 2 S.Clt
the _plaintiffs for ~e .entire'clafui iqclu~g the .claim for !~t.ure
damages.
The plamti1fs were oilly required to pay additional
eourt fee as provided by the' Indian Coun Fee Act for the .. claim
relating to future damages and the plaintiffs had in fact paid the
required amount of additional court fee.. The High Court, in the
judgment mentioned before and in the partion extracted therefrom,
had negatived the claim for future dam:ages on the sole ground
that no decree could be granted for recovery of compensation after
the date of the suit or after the date of the decree in a pure money
suit. . In other words it was held that under the Jaw the court was
not competent to decree such a suit.
Section 14 in so far as it is material for our purpose runs as
follows:-
S. 14(1) "In computing the period of limitation
prescribed for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another
civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or
in a Court of Appeal, against the defendant shall be
excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the
same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in
a Coun which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other
cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
(2) ....... ,, ........... .
Explanation I ........... .
Expfunation IL ......... .
Explanation m.-For the purpose of this section
misjoinder of parties or of causes oi action shall be
deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of
jurisdiction".
The High Court having found that the present clafui of the plaintiffs was also included in the previous suit the condition that the
previowi proceeding should be founded upon the same cause of
action must be held to· have been satisfied. The High Court has
further held that the previous suit had been prosecuted in good
faith and with due diligence. In order to attract the applicability
ofs. 14(1), therefore, an that has to be determined is whether the
rourt in which the previous suit was filed was unable to entertain
the claim relating to future mesne profits "from defect of jurisdiction" or "other cause of a like ·nature". It is common ground and
indeed cannot be ar~ued nor has any attempt been made to urge
such a contention before us that the court trying !he previous suit
was unable to entertain it from defect of jurisdiction.
The only
question for determination is whether the court was unable to
entertain the previous suit from "other cause ol a like nature". In
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JNOJ,\ ELECTRIC WORKS v. JAMES (Grover, J.)
401
Jaikishan Singh v. The Peoples Bank of Northern India( 1) it was
pointed out that s. 14 of the Act will have no application where
failure on the part of the petitioner or the plaintiff to get the reliefs
which he asked for was not attributable to anything connected
either with the jurisdiction of the court or with some other defect
which was like that of jurisdiction.
It was observed that the words
"or other cause of a like nature", however, liberally construed must
be read so as to ceinvey something ejusdem generis or analogous
to the preceding words relating to the defect of jurisdiction. If
these words were read along with the expression "is unable t<J
entertain", they would denote that the defect must' be of such
a character as to make it impossible for the court to entertain
the suit or application in its inception or at all <:vents as
to prevent it from deciding it on the merits. In other words,
if the defects were of such a nature that they had to be decided
before the case could be disposed of on merits or if they did
not necessitate an examination of the merits oi the case they would
be defects of a ''like nature".
The cases which were decided on
the principle that if a plaintiff or a petitioner failed to establish a
cause of action in himself no deduction of time could bt: allowed
under s. 14 were noticed and it was accepted that they proceeded
on a correct view.
Illustration of the facts .which would be
covered by the words "or other cause of a like nature" as given in
the decided cases were: (i) if a suit had failed because it was
brought without proper leave; (il) if it had Jailed because .no
notice under s. 80, Civil Procedure Code, had been given; (iii)
where it would fail for non-production of the Collector's certificate
required by s. 7 of the Pensions Act.
In each one of these cases
the court did ll.ot lack jurisdiction in its inception but the suit could
not be proceeded with and disposed of until the statutory conditions
laid down had be~ satisfied or fulfilled.
Mention m'ay be made. of two cases which are apposite out of
the numerous decisions relating to the point under consideration.
In Shrimati Nrityamoni Das;·i & Others v. Lakhan Chandra Sen(')
the plaintiffs were defendants fa a suit brought at a prior stage.
In
that suit they associated themselves with the plaintiffs and prayed
for adjudication
of their rights.
Henderson J, of the Calcutta
High Court who tried the suit decreed the claims of the plaintiffs
and made a similar decree in favour of the defendants.
The l{igli
Court in its appellate jurisdiction, while affirming the findings of
Henderson J .. held thdt the decree granted by him in favour cl the
defendants could not be maintained.
The decree
wa>
consequently varied and the defendants in that suit were releg-Jted to a
fresh suit for the relief to which they were clearly entitled. In
ii) I.LR. [1944] Lah. 451. IF 8.l
(2) I.LR. [1916]
~3 Cal. 660·
402
SUPREME COUJ.T IUIPOll.Tl'I.
[1971 J 2 S.C.lt.
the subsequent suiL the question of the bar of limitation arose.
This is what was observed by their Lordships with regard to the
claim that the prior period could be deducted for the purpose of
limitation :
"It was an effec.tive decree made by a competent
court and was capable of being enforced until set aside.
Admittedly if the period during which the plaintiffs were
litigating for their rights is deducted their present suit
is in time. Thehl Lordships are of opinion that the plea
of limitation was rightly overruled by the High Court".
In Sarojendra Kumar Dutt v. Pumachandra Sinha( 1) S. R. Das, J.
(as he then was) expressed the view that the principle ors. 14
was applicable not only to cases where the person brought his suit
in the wrong court but also applied where he brought his case in
the right court although he was prevented from getting a trial on
the merits by something which, though not a defect of jurisdiction,
was analogous to that defect There an attorney had made· an
application under Chapter 38, &ule 48, Origi·nal Side Rules of the
Calcutta High Court, for an order against his client for payment
of the sum allowed on taxation.
As discretion was conferred by
the Rule to either make an order for payment or to refer the
parties to a suit the matter was referred to a suit in view otl the
facts of the case. The learned judge held that the plaintiff's right
had not been investigated iin the Chamber Application because it
was considered that it was a proper case where the attorney should
be relegated to a suit. It was, therefore, by reason of an infirmity
or dofect of jurisdiction that the order for payment could not be
made. The defect of jurisdiction was in no way brought about
by the plaintiff or by any absence of diligence or good faith on his
part. He was found entitled to the benefit of s. 14 of the Act.
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It is well settled that although all questions of limitation must
be· decided by the provisions of the Ac.t and the courts cannot
travel" beyond them the words "or other cause of a like nature"
must be construed liberally.
Some clue is furnished with regard
to the intention of the legislature by the Explanation Ill in
s. 14(2). Before the enactment of the Act in 1908 there was a.
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conflict amongst the High Courts on the question whether misjoinder and non-joinder were detects which were covered by the
words "or other cause of a like nature". It was to set at rest this
Conruct that Explanation Ill .was added.
An extended meaning
was thu5 given to these words.
Strictly speaking misjoinder or
non-joinder of parties could hardly be regarded as a defect of
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jurisdiction or something similar or analogous to ii.
(!) A.IR. (1949] cat 24.
INDIA ELECTlllC WOllKS v. JAMES (Grover, J.)
403
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.In our judgmi:nt the present case is very similar to the one
decided by the Privy Council in Shrinuui N rityamoni Dassi & Ors.
v. Lakhan. Chandra Sen ( 1). There an effective decree had been
made by Henderson J., of t11e Calcutta High Court which enured
to the benefit of the defendants but the appellate court considered
that such a decree could not have been legitimately made and set
B it aside.
The period of the previous litigation was held to be
deductible apparently under the provisions of s. 14( 1) of the Act.
JD the case before us the trial court had passed a decree in the
money suit of 194.8 for recovery of future mesne profits. The
High c.ourt on appeal set aside that decree on the g1ound that no
suCh decree could have been passed in a pure suit for recovery of
money. The benefit of s. 14( 1), therefore, was rightly allowed
by the High Court in the judgment under appeal.
Even if the test
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propounded in the Lahore full bench decision in Jai Kisha11 Singh
v. The Peoples Bank of Northern India(') is to be applied there
can be no manner of doubt that the defect in the suit of 1948 was
of a nature which had to be decided before the claim could be
0
disposed of on the merits. The High Court there was called upon
to decide whether the claim was at all entertainable on the frame
of the suit and it came to the conclusion that the court was oot
COlllpetent to pass any decree for recovery of future damages or
mesne profits in the suit as laid.
The defect was of a nature which
had to be decided before the merits of the claim could be adjudicated upon nor did any occasion or necessity arise of going into
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or eitamining the merits oi. the aforesaid claim.
It could hardly
be said that the previous money suit of 1948 was altogether misconceived.
As has been pointed out by the High Court, in a later
decision of the same court in Makhan Lal Madak v. Giljsh Chandra 1ana(8 ) the view taken was that a claim for mesne profits even
Without a suit for recovery of possession might weli be entertainable.
The plaintiffs' claim had not been investigated in that suit
because the High Court considered that the court was not competent to liccree such a suit. It was by reason of an infirmity or
defect of judsdiction that there could neither be adjudication of
the claim on the merits nor could it be decreed. The defect of
jurisdiction had in no way been brought about by the plaintiffs· ot
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by any absence of diligenc6 or good faith on their part. They
were thqs fully entitled to the benefit of s. 14(1) of the Act.
Another principle which has been enunciated in certain dcci11ions of the Privy Council and which is stated to be one of p,eaeral
application has been invoked on behalf of the plaintiff-respondenl~.
Rangnektr, J ., in delivering the judgment of the Divisi<in Bench
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in NarayaiJ Jivaji Patil & Another v. Curunsthgowla Khandappa-
(I) I.L.R. (19161 43 Cal. 660.
(3) 66 C.W.N. 692.
(2) I. L. R, [I~ Lah, 4$1 (P.B.)
404
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971] 2 S.C.R..
gouda Patil & Another( 1) disc.ussed at length the various proJiolincements of the :Privy Council and deduced the, principle that
whe~e a claim was ,satisfied either by agreement of parties or by
decree of the court !lilld it the satisfaction or decree was set aside.
subsequently in a judicial proceeding a. fresh cause of action would
accrue in favour of the claimant. In the present case it could be
said that the cause of action for future mesne profits was satisfied
by the decree which had · been granted by the trial court in the
!llOney suit of 1948. . The High Court, however, in the «ppeals
decided by it by means of the judgment in l/fdia Electric Works
Ltd. v .. Mrs. B. S. Mantosh &_ Ors.(2 ) delivered on June 30, 1955
had set aside that decree.
A new cause of action accrued in
favour oi the plaintiffs from the date of that judgment. It is, however, unnecessary to rest our decision on the principle relied upon
by Rangn.ekar J. in the Bombay case because we are .satisfied that
the plaintiffs were entitled to deduction of time under s. 14(1)
of the Act.
The appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.
Hegde, J.
Though on the plain language of s. 14(1) of the
Limitation Act, I would have had no hesitation in holding that the
plaintiff cannot avail himselt of the benefit of that provision, as a
misconceived suit, $Uch as the one he filed earlier claiming future
mesne profits in a money suit caunot be said to be a claim which
the .:ourt was unable to entertain from defect ol jurisdiction or
other cause of a like nature yet in view of the decisio·n of the
Judicfal Committee in Mst. Ranee Surno Moyee v.
Shooshee
Mokhee Burmon/a and Ors.("), which decision has been followed
in the later decisions of the Judicial Committee as well as in several decisions of High Courts, I am of the opinion that it is not in
public interest to disturb a question of law which has held the field
fur a long time.
The decision of the Judicial Committee referred
to earlier held that a claim which is satisfied, an expression held
to include even getting of a decree on a claim, if reopened because
of the decree of the appellate court or otherwise, a new cause of
action accrues to the plaintiff on the date the earlier satisfaction
is taken away. Applying that rule to, the facts of the present case
a new cause of action must be deemed to have accrued to the
appellant in respect of the mesne profits under dispute once the
decree of the trial court was set aside by the High Court. For
this reason I agree with the order proposed.
V.P.S.
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(!}I. L. R. [1939] Bom. 173.
(3) 12 Moore's I. A. 244.
(2) A. I. R. 1956 Cal. 148 Ftp. 155.
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