# Indian Iron&: Steel Co., Ltd v. Their Worknien

- **Citation:** [1958] 1 S.C.R. 667
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1956-06-29
- **Bench:** Bhagwati, S. K. DAs, J. L. Kapur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/indian-iron-steel-co-ltd-v-their-worknien-1416
- **Pages:** 22

## Headnote

Industrial dispute-lllegal strike-Lock-out-Notice lifting
lock-out and asking workmen to resume work-Workmen's right to be
taken back without condition-Workmen taken in custody by policeRefusal of leave-Discretion of the employer-Dismissal of workmen
-Powers of the Industrial Tribunal to interfere.
On account of the continued illegal stoppage of work, 'slow
down' tactics, and strikes indulged in by the workmen despite
the advice of their Union, the appellant company issued a notice
dated August '23, 1953, that " .......... in consequence of the
illegal strike .......... the Management has no option but to declare
a lock-out of the entire works except the special shifts .... with
effect from
August 24, 1953 ...... The services of all other
workers shall be deemed to be discharged with effect from
August 24, 1953". Subsequently the company lifted the lock-out
and gave notice on September 17, 1953
to the effect that " ..... .
all employees on the works r9lls of the Company on August 23,
1953, and who wish to report for duty, must resume work .... on September 18, 1953 .... " A third notice gave extension of time to the
workmen to resume work. The question was whether the notice
dated August 23, 1953, terminated the services of the respondent
by discharging them with effect from August 24, 1953, and the
notice dated September 17, 1953, merely gave him an opportunity of re-employment at the pleasure of the company on fulfilment of certain conditions.
Held, that, on a construction of the notices, the expression
_.
.. shall be deemed to be discharged" had to be read in the contest of
the declaration of a lock-out, ar.d the intention of the company
was that the employees whose employment
had been
refused
during the period of lock-out were to be permitted to resume
work without any conditions if they reported for duty by a particular date, and on fulfilment of a condition if they reported for
duty after that date.
Where some of the workmen who were taken in custody by
the police applied for leave when in custody but were refused
leave by the company acting under Standing Order No. 9, and
the Labour Appellate Tribi:nal took the view that as the workmen were in custody the company was not justified in refusing
leave, held, that whether in such circumstances leave should be
granted or itot must be left to the discretion of the employer, unless, it was proved, that it was a case of colurafile br mti/a fide
exercise of power under the Standing Order.
1957
October 15.
1957
Indian Iron&:
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Their Worknien
668
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
Burn and Co., Calcutta v. Their Employees, [1956] S.C.R. 781,
followed.
The powers of an Industrial Tribunal to interfere in cases
of dismissal of workmen by the company, are not unlimited and
the Tribunal does not act as a court of appeal and substitute its
own judgment of that of the management.
It will
interfere
(I) when there is want of good faith, (2) when there is victimisation or unfair labour practice, (3) when, the management has
been guilty of a basic error or violation of a principle of natural
justice, or (4) when on the materials the finding is completely
baseless or perverse.

## Text

_Characters 0–39,731 of 47,400. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39731 for what follows._

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
667
INDIAN IRON & STEEL CO., LTD. & ANOTHER
'V.
THEIR WORKMEN
(and connected appeals)
(BHAGWATI, S. K. DAs and J. L. KAPUR, JJ.)
Industrial dispute-lllegal strike-Lock-out-Notice lifting
lock-out and asking workmen to resume work-Workmen's right to be
taken back without condition-Workmen taken in custody by policeRefusal of leave-Discretion of the employer-Dismissal of workmen
-Powers of the Industrial Tribunal to interfere.
On account of the continued illegal stoppage of work, 'slow
down' tactics, and strikes indulged in by the workmen despite
the advice of their Union, the appellant company issued a notice
dated August '23, 1953, that " .......... in consequence of the
illegal strike .......... the Management has no option but to declare
a lock-out of the entire works except the special shifts .... with
effect from
August 24, 1953 ...... The services of all other
workers shall be deemed to be discharged with effect from
August 24, 1953". Subsequently the company lifted the lock-out
and gave notice on September 17, 1953
to the effect that " ..... .
all employees on the works r9lls of the Company on August 23,
1953, and who wish to report for duty, must resume work .... on September 18, 1953 .... " A third notice gave extension of time to the
workmen to resume work. The question was whether the notice
dated August 23, 1953, terminated the services of the respondent
by discharging them with effect from August 24, 1953, and the
notice dated September 17, 1953, merely gave him an opportunity of re-employment at the pleasure of the company on fulfilment of certain conditions.
Held, that, on a construction of the notices, the expression
_.
.. shall be deemed to be discharged" had to be read in the contest of
the declaration of a lock-out, ar.d the intention of the company
was that the employees whose employment
had been
refused
during the period of lock-out were to be permitted to resume
work without any conditions if they reported for duty by a particular date, and on fulfilment of a condition if they reported for
duty after that date.
Where some of the workmen who were taken in custody by
the police applied for leave when in custody but were refused
leave by the company acting under Standing Order No. 9, and
the Labour Appellate Tribi:nal took the view that as the workmen were in custody the company was not justified in refusing
leave, held, that whether in such circumstances leave should be
granted or itot must be left to the discretion of the employer, unless, it was proved, that it was a case of colurafile br mti/a fide
exercise of power under the Standing Order.
1957
October 15.
1957
Indian Iron&:
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Their Worknien
668
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
Burn and Co., Calcutta v. Their Employees, [1956] S.C.R. 781,
followed.
The powers of an Industrial Tribunal to interfere in cases
of dismissal of workmen by the company, are not unlimited and
the Tribunal does not act as a court of appeal and substitute its
own judgment of that of the management.
It will
interfere
(I) when there is want of good faith, (2) when there is victimisation or unfair labour practice, (3) when, the management has
been guilty of a basic error or violation of a principle of natural
justice, or (4) when on the materials the finding is completely
baseless or perverse.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos .
•
44, 45, 336, and 337 of 1957.
"Appeals by special leave from the decisions dated
29th June, 1956, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of
India, Calcutta in Appeals Nos. Cal.-223, 226, 247 and
250 of 1955.
M. C. Seta!tiad, Attorney-General for India, Dipak
Datta Chaudhury and B. N. Ghosh, for the appellants
in C. A. No. 44 and respondents in C. A. No. 45.
M. C. Setaivad, Attornay~General for India, S. N.
Mukherji and B. N. Ghosh, for the appellants in C.A.
Nos. 336 and respondents in C. A. No. 337.
S. K. Acharya, A run Kumar Dutt, D. L. Sen Gupta
and Sukumar Ghosh, for the appellants in C.A. Nos.
45 & 337 and respondents in C. A. Nos. 44 & 336.
1957. October 15. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
s. K. Das, J.
S. K. DAs J.-These four appeals by special leave
arise out of certain labour disputes· between the employer, Messrs. Indian Iron and Steel Company
Limited and the Indian Standard Wagon Company
Limited, Burnpur, Asansol, (hereinafter compendiously referred to as the Company) on one side and some
of their employees on the other. Messrs. Martin Burn
Limited, 12, Mission Row, Calcutta, are the Managing
Agents of the Company. Originally, the case out of
which Civil Appeals 44 and 45 have arisen was known
as the cast! of 144 workmen, and the other case out of
which Civil Appeals 336 and 337 have arisen was
known as the case of 74 workmen. At present, the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
669
number of workmen involved in the four appeals is
much smaller. Civil Appeals 44 and 45 go together as
they arise out of the same decision, Civil Appeal 44
being on behalf of the Company in respect now of 104
respondent workmen, and Civil Appeal 45 on behalf
of 103 out of the said 104 workmen. Similarly, Civil
Appeals 336 and 337 go together and arise out of a
common decision, Civil Appeal 336 being on behalf of
the Company in respect of 10 workmen in three groups
and Civil Appeal No. 337 on behalf of 31 workmen.
The facts of these two sets of appeals are somewhat
different, and it will be conducive to convenience as
also to clarity of discussion of the issues involved, if
the two sets are dealt with separately.
Civil Appeals 44 and 45.
We take up first Civil Appeals 44 and 45. With
regard to these appeals the relevant facts are these.
In 1947 the Asansol Indian Iron and Steel Workers'
Union with one Prof. Abdul Bari as President was
recognised by the Company. On the death of Prof.
Bari, one Mr. Michael John became President and the
Union continued to be recognised by the Company.
In 1951 the Company was declared a Public Utility
Service under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It
was alleged on behalf of the Company that on September 12, 1951, a procedure was established for an amicable settlement of such disputes as might arise between the Company and its employees. The procedure
was substantially this: in case of a dispute regarding
an individual employee, the dispute would be referred
first to the Shop-in-charge and then to a Works Committee, and the Union would discourage an individual
approach to the management of the Company; if the
Works Committee was able to effect a settlement, it
would be final; but if it failed, the Union could take
up the case on merits, with the management of the
Company. The above procedure, it is stated, was
accepted at a joint meeting of the Works Committee
held on November 13, 1951. Then we come to 1953.
The case of the company was that on January 18,
1953, certain workers of the Hot Mills section resorted
1957
7ndlan Iron &
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Their Workmen
S. K. Das, J.
1957
Indian Iron &:
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Their Work1nen
S.K. Das, J,
670
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
to an illegal stoppage of work, and on the next day all
the three shifts of the Hot Mills section commenced a
'slow down' strike. This adversely affected the production of the Company, and it addressed a letter to
the Secretary of the Union on January 27, 1953, drawing the attention of the Union to the illegal stoppage
of work and 'slow down' tactics; the letter further
stated that if there was no improvement in the attitude
of the workers, the Company would be compelled to
take such action as it considered necessary to bring
about resumption of normal work. Two days later, the
workers of the Hot Mills section submitted certain demands, but not through the Union. With regard to the
demands made by the workers of the Hot Mills section, they were informed that joint petitions, without
reference to the Union or the Works Committee, would
not be accepted and so long as normal work was not
resumed, no consideration could be given to the demands made. It appears that the .Union also informed the Company that the workers concerned had made
no representation to the Union, and the Union did not
support their activities. It is obvious that at this stage
there was a cleavage between some of the workers of
the Hot Mills section and the Union. The Company
then issued certain notices to the workmen advising
them of the consequences of their action. The workers
in their turn elected a committee of six men to press
their demands; the Company, however, refused to
negotiate with this committee. The impasse continued
and in March, 1953, there was a tripartite conference
between the Labour Commissioner of the Government
of West Bengal, the General Manager of the Company
and the President of the Union. Before this, the Company had issued a notice closing 'B' and 'C' shifts of
the Hot Mills section. The tripartite conference came
to certain conclusions but failed to restore harmony,
and one of the reasons for its failure was that the representatives of the workers of the Hot Mills section
were not included therein. The workers' committee
protested against the closing of two shifts, and the
trouble continued till April 8, 1953, when the Com-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
671
pany issued a notice to the workmen that unless they
voluntarily recorded their willingness to do· normal
work, they would be considered as no longer empl'>yed
by the Company from 2 p.m. on April 10, 1953. It
was stated that on April 11, 1953, some 700 workers
resorted to an illegal stoppage of work. The Labour
Minister, Government of West Bengal, then visited
Asansol, and met the representatives of the workers,
and of the Union and the Management. He made
some suggestions, which did not hdwever end the trouble. Meanwhile, an Action Committee was set up by
the workmen. There was a strike on April 27, 1953.
The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Asansol, promulgated
an order under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the situation continued to worsen. Iron
and Steel were declared to be essential to the life of
the community under the provisions of the West Bengal Security Act, 1950, and leave to all employees
was stopped by the Company. Some 38 workers of
difference departments were discharged for alleged
disobedience of orders, arid on August 18, 1953, the
Action Committee gave a strike notice to the Company, stating that the workmen would resort to strike
and abstain from duty from September 11, 1953. We
now come to the crucial date, August 23, 1953. On
this date the Company declared a lock-out and issued
a notice, which must be set out in full, because a good
part of the argument of learned counsel for both parties has centred round this notice :.
"NOTICE.
Having regard to the continued existence of the
go-slow strike and the unsatisfactory working of the
Plant and in consequence of the illegal strike which
took place on-
( 1) 18-1-53.
(2) 9-3-53.
(3) 11-4-53 to 20-4-53.
( 4) 27-4-53 and 28-4-53.
(5) 15-7-53.
the Management has no option but to declare a lockout of the entire works except the special shifts in the
1957
Indian Iron &:
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Their Workmen
S. K. Das, J.
1957
Indian Iron &:
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Their Workmen
S. K. Das, J.
672
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1958]
Hot Mills Section of the Sheet Mills with effect from
Monday, the 24th August, 1953.
The following Departments will continue to
operate:
No. 3 Boiler Plant.
No. 2 Power House.
Nos. 1 and 2 Reservoir Pump Houses.
Riverside Pump Station.
Town Water Works.
Town Sub-Station.
Coke Ovens.
Workers required in the above Departments will
be notified. The services of all other workers shall be
deemed to be discharged with effect from Monday,
August 24th, 1953.
Burnpur;
(Sd.) J. Mccraken.
23rd August, 1953.
General Manager."
On September 17, 1953, another notice was issued by
the Company lifting the lock-out with effect from 6
a.m. on Friday, September 18, 1953. This notice stated
inter alia:
"All employees on the Works rolls of the Company
on the 23rd August, 1953, and who wish to report for
duty, must resume work between 6 a.m. on Friday,
the 18th September, 1953, and 10 p.m. on Saturday,
the 19th September, 1953, on their regular shift. If,
however, any worker in the vicinity of the Works is
unable to resume duty on account of illness, he should
report himself to the Company's Medical authorities
or if unable personally to attend, send written intimation of his sickness to the Company by Saturday, the
19th September, 1953. In the latter case the Company
will make arrangements for his medical examination.
Such worker should resume duty from the date he is
declared fit by the Company's Medical authorities.
Any worker who has left the vicinity of the Works
may resume duty on or before Thursday, the 24th
September, 1953, provided he produces evidence satisfactory to the Company of his absence."
On September 23, 1953, the Company issued a third
notice, which quoted a request received from the
-
<
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
673
President of the Asansol Iron and Steel Workers'
J957
Union for extension of the time given to the workIndian Iron&:
men to resume work, and then concluded as follows : Steel co., Ltd.
"The Company is pleased to accede to tpis request
to the extent of one week's extension ·and its notice
No. GM/CS-3B/571dated17-9-53 may be considered
amended accordingly, i.-2., the extension will b~ until
Friday, the 2nd October, 1953."
·
Of the workmen with whom we are now concerned,
98 workmen reported for duty on October 1, 1953, 4
reported for duty on October 2, 1953, and. on~ on
·October 9, 1953. They .:were not, however, allowed by
the Company to resume their duties. This led to an
industrial dispute which the Government of West
Bengal referred to the Fifth Industrial Tribunal. The
two issues were-(1) whether the Company was
justified in keeping the workmen mentioned in three
lists A, B & C, out of employment; and (2) whether.
the said workmen were entitled to employment ·and
any other relief and/or compensation. The Tribunal
held that all the workmen who turned up on or before
Ootober 2, 1953, in pursuance of the notices issued by
the Company were entitled to be taken back into
employment without condition and of the two men who
came later, one was ill of typhoid fever and had sufficient reason for reporting himself for duty on October
9, 1953. On the second issue, the Tribunal said:
"Accordingly, I award that these men, baning
Shri Satyanarayan, No. 5 of the list C, attached to
the order of reference, would get half salary for the
entire period from the 2nd October, 1953, up to the
date of their actual return to duties after this award.
I allow only half basic pay and no dearness allowance
and no other allowance."
From the decision of the Fifth Industrial Tribunal,
two appeals were preferred to the Labour Appellate
Tribunal, Calcutta. The appeal on behalf of the Company was mainly against the order directing that the
employees who had turned up on or before October 2,
1953, must be taken back in employment, and the
appeal on behalf of the workmen raised the question
L2SC/61 PV-6
v.
Their Workmen
s. K. Dasi.
1957
Indian Iron &
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Their Workmen
S.K. Das J.
674
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19581
that full compensation should be given to the workmen who were directed to be taken back in employment. The Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed both
appeals-the appeal of the Company on ·merits and
the appeal of the workmen on the ground that it did
not involve any substantial question of law. Both
parties then asked for and obtained special leave from
this Court to appeal from the decision of the Labour
Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta.
In Civil Appeal No. 44, Mr. M. C.
Setalvad,
Attorney-General, has appeared for the Company and
has argued that both the Tribunals below went wrong
-
on principle in construing the notices dated August
23, 1953, and September 17, 1953,. respectively.
According to him, the continued illegal stoppages of
work, 'slow-down' tactics and strikes indulged in by
the workmen despite the advice of their Union, left
the Company no alternative but to discharge the workmen, except in some essential departments with effect
from August 24, 1953, and the notice dated August 23,
1953, though it stated that the Company declared a
lock-out of the entire Works except for some special
shifts, really terminated the services of the respondents by discharging them with effect from August
24, 1953. He has further submitted that the notice
dated September 17, 1953, did not revoke the earlier
order of discharge, but merely gave the respondents
an opportunity of re-employment at the pleasure of
the Company on fulfilment of certain conditions. The
learned Attorney-General contends that if the notices
are so construed, then the Tribunals below are wrong
in holding that the respondents are entitled to be
taken back in employment as of right. He has further submitted that the Fifth Industrial Tribunal was
wrong in law in holding that there could not be a lockout and discharge at the same time.
In our view, the two notices in question are not
capable of bearing the construction which the learned
Attorney-General has pressed for our acceptance,
apart altogether from the question if under the Industrial Disputes Act, .194 7. there can be a simultaneous
order of discharge and lock-out in respect of the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
675
same employees. The question of construction , is
1957
really a question of intention-to be gathered primariIndian Iron&:
ly from the words used in the documents; and if the Stul co., Ltd.
words used are ambig~ous; then surrounding circumTheir ;orkmen
stances can be looked mto for the purpose of construing the notices. It is worthy of note that the first notice
s. K. DM J.
states inter alia that in consequence of the illegal
strikes which took place on several previous dates, the
Management has no option but to declare a lock-out
of the entire Works except some special shifts with
effect from Monday, August 24, 1953; then in the concluding portion the notice states-"The services of all
other workers shali be deemed to be discharged with
effect from Monday, August 24, 1953." The expression "shall be deemed to be discharged" has to be read
in the context of the declaration of a lock-out; such an
expression is neither usually employed nor apt to
effectuate an intention to terminate the services of
the workmen altogether. A 'lock-out', according to
the definition in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
means the "closing of a place of employment, or the
suspension of work, or the refusal by an employer to
continue to employ any number of persons employed
by him". In this context, the notice when it said that
the services of all other workers shall be deemed to be
ciischarged with effect from the date of the lock-out
really meant that the Company refused to employ
the respondent workmen during the period when the
place of employment was closed. The second notice
dated September 17, 1953, places the matter beyond
any doubt. It starts by saying that 1he "management
have reasons to believe that many workers are desirous of reswning work" etc.; then it states that "all
employees on the Works rolls of the Company on
August 23, 1953, and who wish to report for duty,
must resume work between 6 a.m. on Friday, September 18, 1953, and 10 p.m. on Saturday, September 19,
1953." The expressions used in the second notice
clearly show that the intention was not re-employment
of discharged workmen, but resumption of work by
employees who desfred to resume work and whose
employment had been stopped on account of the
1957
Indian Iron &:
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Tluir Workmen
S.K. Das J.
676
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
lockout. The third notice dated September 23, 1953,
which extended the date of joining to October 2, 1953,
again said that "a large number of workers might
have been prevented from resuming their work for
reasons beyond their control" and gave that as the
reason for extending the date. If the three notices
referred to above are read together against the background of events which had happened prior to August
23, 1953, the only reasonable construction is the one
adopted by the Tribunals, viz., that the employees
whose employment had been refused during the lockout were permitted to resume work without any conditions if they reported for duty by a particular date,
and on fulfilment of a condition if they reported for
duty after that date.
The learned Attorney-General has referred us to
some oral and documentary evidence to show that
the workmen themselves understood the notice dated
August 23, 1953, as a notice of discharge. He has
referred particularly to the letter dated September 2,
1953, written by the Action Committee to the General
Manager of the Company in which the notice dated
August 23, 1953, was referred to as "an illegal and
unconstitutional notice of discharge". On the other
side, Mr. S. K. Acharya appearing for the respondent
workmen has referred us to the evidence given by
some of the CompaDy's servants, which showed that
no formal order of discharge was recorded in the service, book of the employees, as required by the rules;
nor any notice of one month given for discharging the
workmen; but on the contrary the workmen were
given continuity of service for the entire period of
their absence. We do not, however, think that when
the words used in the notices sufficiently and clearly
bring out the intention of the Company, it is necessary
to refer to other evidence in the record. Moreover,
this Court does not sit as a regular Court of appeal
over Industrial Tribunals, and does not ordinarily subject the evidence given on behalf of the parties to a
fresh review and scrutiny, unless it is shown that
exceptional or special circumstances exist, or that substantial and grave injustice has been done or that the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS '
677
case in question presents features of sufficient gravity
to warrant a review of the decision appealed from.
It is necessary now to consider an alternative argument of the learned Attorney-General. He has con ..
tended that assuming that the notices bear the construction which we have put on them, the respondent
workmen did not join on or before Saturday, September 19, 1953,-the latest day by which they could
reimme work without any condition; they· reported for
duty on October 1, 1953, or October 2, 1953, but failed
to produce evidence satisfactory to the Company of
their absence as required by the notice dated September 17, 1953, and, therefore, they were not entitled
to be taken back as of right and without any condition. It is necessary to state here what happened
between November 1953; and April 1954. It appears
that a large number of workmen who reported for
duty on October l, 1953, and October 2, 1953, were
subsequently interviewed, and as a result of that interview 144 workmen were not taken back to employment. What happened at the interview was stated by
Shri S. K. Kanwar, witness for the Company, who
said:
"Question : Why these 144 men were not taken?
Answer : These men were interviewed, but they
could not give Satisfactory explanation for not reporting for duty within the time given. These men did not
comply with the condition laid down in the notice of
the 17th September, 1953. Whatever happened during the interview has been put in writing."
The writing which embodied the result of the interview was not, however, produced. The same witness
said that some workmen who were also subsequently
interviewed were taken back without any explanation
of their absence. The evidence on this point is very
conflicting; one witness said that about 2,000 men
came to the main gate of the Company on October 1,
1953, and October 2, 1953, and from October 2, 1953,
the instruction of the company was "to take back only
those who were not harmful to the running of the
factory".
Another witness said that he did not
1957
lndi'111 Iran &
Sket Co., Lt.d.
v.
Their Workmen
S.K. DasJ,
I9S7
Int/iQlf Iron &:
Sten Co., Ltd.
v.
Their Worklnt'n
S. K. Das J.
678
' SUPREME COURT· REPORTS
[ 1958]
remember if any of the respondent worknien appeared
before him on October 1, 1953, or October 2, 1953, and
if any of them gave any reasons for their absence.
In view of the conflicting evidence on the point, it is
not possible to proceed on the footing that the respondent workmen failed to produce satisfactory evidence
of their absence, and that was the reason why they
were not taken back by the Company. The learned
Attorney-General drew our pointed attention to the
evidence of Shri Promotho Nath Mukherji, witness
No. 9 for the workmen, who said : "When the lock-out '
was lifted I did not think it proper to join immediately
because most people were then outside, secondly,
my colleagues and others had not then joined, and
lastly, my social status in the place combined with
the above circumstances restrained me from joining."
It may be that some of the workmen could have
presented themselves earlier than they actually did.
But that does not prove that the Company refused to
take only those workmen who had failed to produce
satisfactory evidence of their absence. If that was
the case of the Company, then it should have produced
the writing which embodied the result of the interview
or given sufficient evidence to establish that in each
case the respondent workmen failed to produce satisfactory evidence of absence. On the contrary, the
Tribunal found that the Company scrutinised the conduct of the workmen to find out how far they were
associated with the Action Committee, how far they
took part in the meetings, etc., and on that basis, some
workmen were taken back and some were not taken
back. It is somewhat late in the day to try to make
out a case that each of the respondent workmen in
these two appeals failed to produce satisfactory evidence of their absence.
For these reasons, we do not think that the appellant Company in Civil Appeal 44 has made out any
case for our interference \vi.th the decision appealed
from. There was some argument before us as to the
illegal nature of the strike declared by the workmen
and also as to the legality of the lock-out declared b:'
the Company. We do not pause to decide those
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
679
questions, because it is unnecessary to do so in the present appeals. We must make it clear, however, that
our reluctance to pronounce on the conduct of the
workmen: prior to August 23, 1953, does not signify an
approval of that conduct which rightly came in for a
good deal of criticism by the Industrial Tribunal. It
has been somewhat faintly suggested that if the notice
dated August 23, 1953, terminated the services of the
workmen and the .second notice, dated September · 17,
1953, operated as a conditional revocation of the earlier notice, then there was no consideration for the
condition imposed and the Company could change its
mind and ignore the condition. In the view which we
have taken of the three notices, it becomes unnecessary also to examine this submission.
As to Ci•1il Appeal 45 on behalf of the workmen in
which the prayer is for payment of full compensation,
it is sufficient to state that no question of prini;iple is
involved. The Fifth Industrial Tribunal refused to
give compensation for the period anterior to October
2, 1953, on the ground that the workmen themselves
tried to coerce the Company by 'slow-down' tactics
etc.; for the period after October 2, 1953, the Tribunal
allowed half the wage as compensation on the ground
that some of the workmen were near Burnpur and
might have joined earlier, some claimed to come back
to their services as of right without any explanation,
and none of the workmen had done any actual work
for the period. As we have said, no q4estion of principle is involved and we do not think that the Tribunal has committed any error in tl1e matter of awarding compensation.
Civil Appeals 336 and 337 .
. We now turn to the other two appeals. We have
stated that the case out of which these two appeals
have arisen dealt initially with 74 workmen who ·had
been discharged or suspended by the Company for
one reason or another. The question which was referred to the Fifth Industrial Tribunal was whether the
discharge and/or suspension of these 74 workmen was
justified : if not, to what relief these men were entitled.
The Tribunal classified these men in four categ·ories1957
Indian Iron &;
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Their Workme11
S. K. DasJ.
1957
Indian Iron &
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Their ff'orkmen
S.K. Das J.
680
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958}
(1) those whose ser,vices were terminated in accordance with the Standing Orders of the Company, for
absence without permission for 14 consecutive days;
(2) those who were dismissed for major misdemeanour; (3) those who were suspended but whose cases
could not be disposed of finally; and (4) those who
were dismissed· for disobedience of orders and other
activities in pursuance of a concerted plan of "goslow" strike. The Tribunal considered the case of
each workman under the four categories mentioned
above and ordered reinstatement of 25 out of 74 workmen and granted to 24 of the workmen directed to be
reinstated compensation equal to half basic pay for
the period of forced unemployment. From the
decision of the Fifth Industrial Tribunal two appeals
were taken to the Labour Appellate Tribunal,
Calcutta,-one on behalf of the Company and the
other for the workmen. The Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed both the appeals.
Hence the two
appeals before us by special leave.
In Civil Appeal 336 we are concerned with only
10 workmen, seven of whom fall in the category of
those whose services were terminated in accordance
with Standing Orders of the Company for absence
without permission for 14 consecutive days. These
seven men are---(1)
Bamapado Mukherji,
(2)
Chandrasekhar Mukherji,
(3) Niaz Hossain,
(4)
Dhani Ram, (5) Chandrabhan Sing, (6) Raja Sing,
and (7) Jai Kishore Sing. Two others, Samar Sen
and Abharani Debi, fall in the category of those who
were said to have been dismissed for major misdemeanour. The tenth workman Himansu Chattoraj
falls in a class by himself.
In Civil Appeal 337 on behalf of the workmen there
are 31 appellants, nine of whom (except Samar Sen)
are those who figure in the Company's appeal. The
rest are those who were not ordered to be reinstated.
The cases of two of these men Akka Hossain and
D. P. Das, have been specially placed before us by
Mr. S. K. Acharya, on the ground that Akka Hossain
stands on the same footing as Himansu Chattoraj and
D. P. Das on the same footing as those whose leave
was not granted and who were absent for 14 consecutive days without permission.
-
...
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
681
We now proceed to consider the cases of the 10
workmen in Civil Appeal 336. Let us first take the
seven workmen who were absent without leave for
14 consecutive days.
Standing Order No. 9 of the
Company, which is the relevant Standing Order on
the .subject, is in these terms :·
"Absenteeism-Workers absent without leave will
be subject to disciplinary action. Overstaying ieave
will be considered as absence without leave.
Any worker who is absent for 14 consecutive days.
without permission will be automatically discharged.
Also, any worker who is absent for 14 individual days
during any period of 12 months is liable to discharge."
What happened in the case of these men is that on
diverse dates between July 5, 1953, and July 10, 1953,
they were taken in custody by the police and remained in custody for some time; they applied for leave
when in custody but leave was refused. The Industrial Tribunal took the view that Standing Order No.
9 was not an inflexible rule, and a mere application
for leave was sufficient to arrest the operation of the
Standing Order. When the case was before the
Appellate Tribunal, Mr. S. K. Acharya on behalf of the
workmen conceded that he was no.t in a position to
support the view of the Fifth Industrial Tribunal in
this respect; he contended, however, that the Industrial Tribunal had in each case considered the justification for absence without leave, and in view of the
circumstance that the men were in custody, the Company was not justified in refusing leave. This con-"
tention found favour with the Labour Appellate Tribunal.
The point is now covered by a decision of this
Court: Burn and Co., Caicutta v. Their Emp'loyees(').
In that case one Ashimananda Bannerji was arrested
under the West Bengal Security Act and detained in
jail from January 25, 1949, to April 5, 1949. The Company. terminated his services on April 22, 1949, on
the ground of continued absence. The Appellate Tribunal ordered his reinstatement on the ground that
he had been discharged without a charge and without
(1)[1956] S. C.R. 781, 798.
19-57
Indian Iron &
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Their Workmen
S; K. Das J
19S7
Indian Iron &
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Their Workmtn
S.K. DasJ.
682
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
holding an enquiry. This Court observed :
"We are unable to agree with this decision. The
ground of discharge is the continued absence of the
employee, and his inability to do work, and it is difficult to see what purpose would be served by a for:mal
charge being delivered to him and what conceivable
answer he could give thereto. The order of the Appellate Tribunal is manifestly erroneous and must be set
aside."
The same principle should apply in the present case.
It is true that the arrested men were not in a position
to come to their work, because they had been arrested
by the police. This may be unfortunate for them; but
it would be unjust to hold that in such circumstances
the Company must always give leave when an application for leave is made. If a large number of workmen are arrested by the aut.horities in charge of law
and order by reason of their questionable activities in
connection with a labour dispute, as in this case,. the
work of the Company will be paralysed if the Company is forced to give leave to all of them for a more
or less indefinite period. Such a principle will not
be just; nor will it restore harmony between labour
and capital or ensure normal flow of production. It is
immaterial whether the charges on which the workmen are arrested by the police are ultimately proved
-0r not in a court of law. The Company must carry on
its work and may find it impossible to do so if a large
number of workmen are absent. Whether in such
circumstances leave should be granted or not must be
left to the discretion of the employer. It may be
readily accepted that if the workmen are arrested at
the instance of the Company for the purpose of victimisation and in order to get rid of them on the ostensible pretext pf continued absence, the position will be
different. It will then be a colourable or mala fide
·exercise of power under the relevant Standing Order;
that, however, is not the case here. We are of the
view that the two Tribunals below have misdirected
themselves as to the true scope and effect of the Standing Order in question, and their decision with regard
to the seven workmen mentioned above cannot be
supported.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
683
We now turn to the two persons in the second
category Samar Sen and Abharani Debi, remembering what we hav~ already stated. as to the exercise
of . our jurisdictiop on an appeal by special leave.
Samar Sen worked as the Manager of the Burnpur
hotel, and one of the questions raised was if he was
a 'workman' within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. At the
relevant time, 'workman' was defined in the Act as
follows:
"Section 2(s). "workman" means any person employed (jncluding an apprentice) in any industry to
do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work
for hire or reward and includes, for the purposes of
any proceedings under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, a workman discharged during that dispute, but does not include any person employed in
the naval, military or air service of the Government."
The question is if Samar Sen did any clerical work
for hire or his duties were merely supervisory in
nature. Both the Tribunals have referred to the evidence on this point and have concurrently found that
Samar Sen was a workman within the meaning of that
word as used in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947;
they have referred to Samar Sen's own. evidence which
showed that he had to write ledgers, file correspondence, enter the cash book, etc. We see no reason to
hold that the finding of the two TJ;ibunals on this point
is erroneous.
On merits, the case against Samar Sen was that as
a result of a regular and proper enquiry, he was found
guilty of unauthorised absence and insubordination,
etc., and, therefore, the Company dismiss~d him. The
argument before us is that the Company having held
a regular and proper enquiry in which Samar Sen had
an opportunity of meeting the cllarges against him, it
was for the Company to decide whether the charges
had been proved and the Industrial Tribunal should
not have interfered with the decision of the Company,
unless it found that the decision was mala fide or
amounted to victimisation. It is necessary to state
here, in the words of the Fifth Industrial Tribunal, its
finding about Samar Sen. The Industrial Tribunal
said:
1957
Indian lro11 &:
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
'Their Workmen
S.K. Dasi.
1957
Indian Iron &
Steel Co., Ltd.
v.
Their Workmen
S. K. Dos J.
684
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
{1958]
"Next, I consider the merit of the case. On the
6th July, 1953, he went on leave. On the 16th July,
he applied for extension of leave for one month ( vide
Ex. 6). He got.a reply from the Co;mpany on the 25th
or 26th July, 1953. But as the Company refused his
leave, he jointed on the 1st August, 1953, with a
medical certificate of fitness. So practically he was
within 14 days' admissible grace period for joining
one's duty. When he was on leave, he was suffering
from blood pressure and fever. The doctor advised
him to take rest. Of course, he should have consulted
the Companies' doctor. But even if he had not done
so, it did not matter as he was then on leave allowed
by the Company. So where was his fault? Yes, his
fault was that he was the Secretary of the Action
Committee at that time. The Action Committee to
the Companies was like a red rag to the bull. I find
absolutely no reason why this man should be dismissed. So I set aside the order of dismissal passed against
him, and order his reinstatement. I grant him compensation at half basic pay for the period of his forced
unemployment."
The finding really amounts to this that Samar Sen
was victimised as he was "the Secretary of the Action
Committee; he was really ill and the only fault he
committed was that he did not consult the Company's
doctor.
The learned Attorney-General has very
seriously contested the aforesaid findIDg of the Tribunal and taken us through the relevant evidence
including Samar Sen's own statements before the
Enquiry Committee. He has pointed out that though
Samar Sen was said to be suffering from fever and
blood-pressure, his statements before the Enquiry
Committee showed that he was not taking complete
rest as advised by his doctor but was engaged in doing
some "public work". The argument advanced by
the learned Attorney-General might have been urged
acceptably to a Court or Tribunal of first instance;
but we are not such a Court or Tribunal, and in the
absence of exceptional or special circumstances or of
grave injustice, we shall not be justified ir. interfering
with what really is a finding of fact.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
685
This brings us to the case of Abharani Debi, where
also the same principles apply.