# INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD v. SANJAY DALIA&ANR

- **Citation:** [2015] 8 S.C.R. 210
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2015
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos. 10643-10644 of 2010
- **Bench:** Jag Dish Singh Khehar, Arun Mishra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/indian-performing-rights-society-ltd-v-sanjay-dalia-anr-30777
- **Pages:** 53

## Headnote

Jurisdiction - Territorial jurisdiction - Determination
c of-In view of s.62 of Copyright Act and s.134 of Trade Marks
Act- Held: Accrual of cause of action is sine qua non for a
suit to be filed- s. 20 of CPC provides institution of suit where
the cause of action arises - s. 62 and 134 only provide for an
additional forum - The provisions uls. 62 and 134 have to be
D interpreted in a purposive manner - The interpretation has
to be such which prevents the mischief of causing
inconvenience to parties -
The mischief or defect of
inconvenience I deterrence to the plaintiff in the existing law
(s.20 CPC) was sought to be removed bys. 62 and 134 -
E The avoidance of counter mischief to the defendant is also
necessary while giving relief to the plaintiff- Such a countermischief was unforeseen by Parliament- It is court's duty to
mitigate the counter-mischief - Right to approach the legal
remedy cannot be made farce or oppressive - Thus, if the
F plaintiff is residing or carrying on business etc. at a place
where cause of action, wholly or in part, has also arisen, he
has to file suit at that place - In the present case, since the
principal place of business of the plaintiff was Mumbai and
cause of action also arose there, the provisions of ss. 62 and
G 134 would not confer jurisdiction an Delhi Court, just because
the plaintiff had his branch office in Delhi - Copyright Act,
1957-s.62- Trade Marks Act, 1999-s.134- Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 -
s.20 - Interpretation of Statutes -
H Administration of Justice.
210
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 211
DALIA&ANR.
lnterprtation of Statutes:
Heydon's Mischief rule - Discussed.
Words and Phrases - 'Cause of action' - Meaning of
- Discussed.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
A
B
HELD: 1. The provisions of section 62 of the
Copyright Act and section 134 of the Tr.;de Marks Act
have to be interpreted in the purposive manner. No C
doubt that a suit can be filed by the plaintiff at a place
where he is residing or carrying on business or
personally works for gain. He need not travel to file a
suit to a place where defendant is residing or cause of
action wholly or in part arises. However, if the plaintiff is D
residing or carrying on business etc. at a place where
cause of action, wholly or in part, has also arisen, he
has to file a suit at that place. [Para 47] [261-G-H; 262-A]
2. By section 62 of the Copyright Act and section E
134 of the Trade Marks Act, an additional forum has been
provided by including a District Court within whose limits
the plaintiff actually and voluntarily resides or carries on
business or personally works for gain. The object of the
provisions was to enable the plaintiff to institute a suit at F
a place where he or they resided or carried on business,
and not to enable them to drag defendant further away
from such a place. [Para 12] [228-E-F]
ExpharSA &Anr. v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd. &Anr.
G
2004 (3) sec 688 - referred to.
3. The expression "notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code of Civil Procedure" does not oust
the applicability of the provisions of section 20 of CPC H
212
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015) 8 S.C.R.
A and it is clear that additional remedy has been provided
to the plaintiff so as to file a suit where he is residing or
carrying on business etc., as the case may be. Section
20 of CPC enables a plaintiff to file a suit where the
defendant resides or where cause of action arose.
B Section 20(a) and section 20(b) usually provides the
venue where the defendant or any of them resides,
carries on business or personally works for gain. Section
20(c) of CPC enables a plaintiff to institute a suit where
the cause of action wholly or in part, arises. [Para 12]
C [228-G-H; 229-A-B]
4. The intendment of the Explanation to section
20 of CPC is that once the corporation has a subordinate
office in the place where the cause of action arises wholly
D or in part, it cannot be heard to say that it cannot be sued
there because it did not carry on bu

## Text

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[2015] 8 S.C.R. 210
A
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD.
B
v.
SANJAY DALIA&ANR.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 10643-10644 of 2010)
JULY01, 2015
[JAG DISH SINGH KHEHAR AND ARUN MISHRA, JJ.]
Jurisdiction - Territorial jurisdiction - Determination
c of-In view of s.62 of Copyright Act and s.134 of Trade Marks
Act- Held: Accrual of cause of action is sine qua non for a
suit to be filed- s. 20 of CPC provides institution of suit where
the cause of action arises - s. 62 and 134 only provide for an
additional forum - The provisions uls. 62 and 134 have to be
D interpreted in a purposive manner - The interpretation has
to be such which prevents the mischief of causing
inconvenience to parties -
The mischief or defect of
inconvenience I deterrence to the plaintiff in the existing law
(s.20 CPC) was sought to be removed bys. 62 and 134 -
E The avoidance of counter mischief to the defendant is also
necessary while giving relief to the plaintiff- Such a countermischief was unforeseen by Parliament- It is court's duty to
mitigate the counter-mischief - Right to approach the legal
remedy cannot be made farce or oppressive - Thus, if the
F plaintiff is residing or carrying on business etc. at a place
where cause of action, wholly or in part, has also arisen, he
has to file suit at that place - In the present case, since the
principal place of business of the plaintiff was Mumbai and
cause of action also arose there, the provisions of ss. 62 and
G 134 would not confer jurisdiction an Delhi Court, just because
the plaintiff had his branch office in Delhi - Copyright Act,
1957-s.62- Trade Marks Act, 1999-s.134- Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 -
s.20 - Interpretation of Statutes -
H Administration of Justice.
210
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 211
DALIA&ANR.
lnterprtation of Statutes:
Heydon's Mischief rule - Discussed.
Words and Phrases - 'Cause of action' - Meaning of
- Discussed.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
A
B
HELD: 1. The provisions of section 62 of the
Copyright Act and section 134 of the Tr.;de Marks Act
have to be interpreted in the purposive manner. No C
doubt that a suit can be filed by the plaintiff at a place
where he is residing or carrying on business or
personally works for gain. He need not travel to file a
suit to a place where defendant is residing or cause of
action wholly or in part arises. However, if the plaintiff is D
residing or carrying on business etc. at a place where
cause of action, wholly or in part, has also arisen, he
has to file a suit at that place. [Para 47] [261-G-H; 262-A]
2. By section 62 of the Copyright Act and section E
134 of the Trade Marks Act, an additional forum has been
provided by including a District Court within whose limits
the plaintiff actually and voluntarily resides or carries on
business or personally works for gain. The object of the
provisions was to enable the plaintiff to institute a suit at F
a place where he or they resided or carried on business,
and not to enable them to drag defendant further away
from such a place. [Para 12] [228-E-F]
ExpharSA &Anr. v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd. &Anr.
G
2004 (3) sec 688 - referred to.
3. The expression "notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code of Civil Procedure" does not oust
the applicability of the provisions of section 20 of CPC H
212
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015) 8 S.C.R.
A and it is clear that additional remedy has been provided
to the plaintiff so as to file a suit where he is residing or
carrying on business etc., as the case may be. Section
20 of CPC enables a plaintiff to file a suit where the
defendant resides or where cause of action arose.
B Section 20(a) and section 20(b) usually provides the
venue where the defendant or any of them resides,
carries on business or personally works for gain. Section
20(c) of CPC enables a plaintiff to institute a suit where
the cause of action wholly or in part, arises. [Para 12]
C [228-G-H; 229-A-B]
4. The intendment of the Explanation to section
20 of CPC is that once the corporation has a subordinate
office in the place where the cause of action arises wholly
D or in part, it cannot be heard to say that it cannot be sued
there because it did not carry on business at that place.
The linking of the place with the cause of action in the
Explanation where subordinate office of the corporation
is situated is reflective of the intention of the Legislature
E and such a place has to be the place of the filing of the
suit and not the principal place of business. Ordinarily
the suit has to be tiled at the place where there is principal
place of business of the corporation. [Para 13][229-D-F]
F
Code of Civil Procedure by Mui/a, 181h Edn. - referred
to.
5. 'Corporation' in the Explanation would mean not
only the statutory corporation but companies registered
G under the Companies Act. The domicile of the company
is fixed by the situation of its principal place of business.
In the case of companies registered under the
Companies Act, the controlling power is, as a fact,
generally exercised at the registered office, and that
H
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 213
DALIA&ANR.
office is therefore not only for the:purposes:.of:the Act, A
butfor other purposes, the·principal plaee•ofbusiness.
A company may have subordinate or branch offices in
fifty different jurisdictions and it may be sued in any one
of such jurisdictions in respect of a cause of action
arising there. [Para 14] [229·G•H; 230-A·C]
B
Pate/Roadways Ltd., Bombay v. Prasad Trading Co.
etc. 1991 (4) SCC270: 1991 (3)SCR 391; New Moga
Transport Co., through its Proprietor v. United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. 2004 (4) SCC 677: 2004 (1)
C
Suppl. SCR 623; Peoples' Insurance Co. v. Benoy
Bhushan·AIR 1943 Cal. 190; Home Insurance Co. v.
Jagatjit Sugar Mills Co. AIR 1952 Punj. 142; Prag Oil
. Mils Depot v. Transport Corpn. of India AIR 1978·0ri.
167 - referred to.
D
· Jones v. Scottish Accident Insurance Co .. (1886) 17
QBD 421. Watkins v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co.
(1889) 23 QBD 285- referred to.
6. Accrual of cause of action is a sine qua non for E
a suit to be filed. Cause of action is a bundle of facts
which· is required to be proved to grant relief to the
plaintiff. Cause of action not only refers to the
infringement but also the material facts on which right is F
founded. Section 20 of the CPC recognises·the territorial
jurisdiction of the courts il'!ter alia where the cause of
action wholly or in part arises. It has to be decided in
each case whether cause of action wholly or in part arises
. at a particular place. [Para 15] [230-D-F]
G
Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. Union
of India & Ors. AIR 2001 SC 416: 2000 (5) Suppl.
SCR 743 - relied on.
7. In view ofsection.20 of the CPC, section 62 of H
214
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 8 S.C.R.
A the Copyright Act and section 134 of the Trade Marks
Act, and the object with which the latter provisions have
been enacted, it is clear that if a cause of action has arisen
wholly or in part, where the plaintiff is residing or having
its principal office/carries on business or personally
B works for gain, the suit can be filed at such place/s.
Plaintiff(s) can also institute a suit at a place where he is
residing, carrying on business or personally works for
gain de hors the fact that the cause of action has not
arisen at a place where he/they are residing or any one
C of them is residing, carries on business or personally
works for gain. However, this right to institute suit at
such a place has to be read subject to certain
restrictions. The very intendment of the insertion of
0
provision in the Copyright Act and Trade Marks Act is
the convenience of the plaintiff. The rule of convenience
of the parties has been given a statutory expression in
section 20 of the CPC as well. The interpretation of
provisions has to be such which prevents the mischief
E of causing inconvenience to parties. [Para 16) [230-GH; 231-A-D]
8. The interpretation of the provisions has to be
such which prevents mischief. According to the mischief
F rule, four points are required to be taken into
consideration. While interpreting a statute, the problem
or mischief that the statute was designed to remedy
should first be identified and then a construction that
suppresses the problem and advances the remedy
G should be adopted. [Para 22) [233-G-H; 234-A)
Heydon's case 76 ER 637 - referred to.
Interpretation of Statutes by Justice GP. Singh, 12t11
Edn. - referred to.
H
9. The common law which was existing before
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 215
DALIA&ANR.
the provisions of law u/ss. 62 and 134 were passed, was A
section 20 of the CPC. It did not provide for the plaintiff
to institute a suit except in accordance with the
provisions contained in· section 20. The defect in existing
law was inconvenience/deterrence caused to the
authors suffering from financial constraints on account B
of having to vindicate their intellectual property rights at
a place far away from their residence or the place of their
business. The said mischief or defect in the existing law
was sought to be removed. Hence, the remedy was
provided incorporating the provisions of section 62 of C
the Copyright Act. [Para 23] [235-E-G]
10. The Legislature has never intended that the
plaintiff should not institute the suit where he ordinarily
resides or at its Head Office or registered office or where D
he otherwise carries on business or personally works
for gain where the cause of action too has arisen and
should drag the defendant to a subordinate office or
other place of business which is at a far distant place
under the guise of the fact that the plaintiff/corporation E
is carrying on business through branch or otherwise at
such other place also. If such an interpretation is
permitted, the abuse of the provision will take place.
[Para 23] [236-C-E]
11. In the instant cases, the principal place of
business is, admittedly, in Mumbai and the cause of
action has also arisen in Mumbai. Thus, the provisions
F
of section 62 of the Copyright Act and section 134 of the
Trade Marks Act cannot be interpreted in a manner so G
as to confer jurisdiction on the Delhi court in the
aforesaid circumstances to entertain such suits. The
Delhi court would have no territorial jurisdiction to
entertain it. [Para 23] [236-F-G]
H
216
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 8 S.C.R.
A
12. The avoidance of counter mischief to the
defendant is also necessary while giving the remedy to
the plaintiff under the provisions in question." The
provisions of the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act
provide for the authors/trade marks holders to sue at their
B ordinary residence or where they carry on their business.
The said provisions of law never intended to be
oppressive to the defendant. [Para 24] [236-H; 237-A-C]
13. Heydon's rule is not applicable where the
C words of the statute are clear. When the provision is
unambiguous and iffrom the provision legislative intent
is clear, the court need not call into aid the other rule of
construction of statutes such as that of 'mischief'.
However, when two interpretations are possible, the
D court has to adopt the one which furthers the object as
provided in the statute itself. [Para 25] [237-G-H; 238-AB]
Mis. Hirata/ Rattan/al etc. etc. v. State of U.P. and Anr.
E
etc. 1973 (1) sec 216: 1973 (2) scR 502;
Padmasundara Rao (Dead) & Ors. v. State of Tamil
Nadu and Ors. AIR 2002 SC 1334: 2002 (2) SCR 383;
Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay
2002 (4) SCC 297: 2002 (2) SCR 945 ; Busching
F
Schmitz Private Ltd. v. P.T. Menghani 1977 (2) SCC
835: 1977 (3) SCR 312 - relied on.
Bennion on Statutory Interpretation - referred to.
14. Strict construction may be avoided or at least
G reduced by limiting the remedy where a counter mischief
would arise if the remedy provided by the Act was
eschewed widely. It may appear to the court that one of
the opposing construction of the enactment, if adopted,
would operate a mischief of its own. The prospects of
H this would constitute a negative factor in weighing the
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 21·7
DALIA&ANR.
applicability of the construction in question. The court A
also has in mind the consequences for the public welfare.
Such a counter mischief to the defend.ant w.as
unforeseen by Parliament and it is. the court's duty.- fo
mitigate the counter mischief. Right to. approach, the
court/pursuing the legal remedy cannot be mad.ea.farce B
or oppressive as that would not be conduciv.e for the
effective administration of justice. [Para27 and·29) [238F-G; 240-F; 241-C]
State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Narmada Bachao
C
Ando/an & Anr. 2011 (7) SCC 639: 2011 (6)SCR 443
-relied on.
Justice G.P. Singh in 'Principles of Statutory
Interpretation' by Justice GP. Singh,. 1.21h Edition -
o
referred to.
15. It is the court's duty to avoid. hardship,
inconvenience, injustice, absurdity and anomaly while
selecting out of different interpretations. The doctrine E
must be applied with great care and in case absurd
inconvenience is to be caused that interpretation has to
be avoided. Cases of individual. hardship or injustice
have no bearing for enacting the natural construction.
[Para 32] [243-B-D]
F
16. It can be presumed that Parliament intends
that while construing an enactment, the court.will avoid
a construction that is unworkable or impracticable,
inconvenient, anomalous or illogical as the same is G
unlikely to be intended by the Parliament.
Common
sense construction rule should be taken recourse, in
certain cases. [Para 33] [247-A-C]
17. There will be no violence to section 62 of H
Copyright Act and section 134 of Trade Marks Act by the
218
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 8 S.C.R.
A interpretation adopted by this Court and the right of the
plaintiff which has been conferred under the provisions,
also remains intact. There is no question of giving
disadvantage to the plaintiff vis-a-vis the defendant, but
both will stand to gain by proper interpretation. [Para
B 43] [260-F-G]
c
D
E
F
G
H
Sonic Surgical v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2010 (1)
SCC 135: 2009 (15) SCR 265; Rosali V. v. Taico Bank
and Ors. 2009 (17) sec 690: 2001 (1) SCR 1169 ;
Patel Roadways Ltd., Bombay v.Prasad Trading Co.
etc. 1991 (4) sec 270: 2001 (1) SCR 1169; Dhodha
House v. S. K. Maingi 2006 (9) SCC 41: 2005 ( 5) Suppl.
SCR 751 - relied on.
Daburlndia Ltd. v. KR. Industries 2008 (10) SCC 595:
2008 (9) SCR 652 - held inapplicable.
Union of India & Anr. v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal 1992
Supp. (1) SCC 323; Paragon Rubber Industries & Ors.
v. Pragathi Rubber Mills & Ors. 2014 (57) PTC 1(SC);
New Moga Transport Co., through its Proprietorv. United
India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. 2004 (4) SCC 677: 2004
(1) Suppl. SCR 623; Smithkline Beecham & Anr. v.
Sunil Singhi &Anr. 2000 (1) PTC 321 (Del.); Caterpillar
Inc. v. Kai/ash Nichani & Ors. 2002 (24) PTC 405 (Del.);
lntas Pfiarmaceuticals Ltd. v. Allergan Inc. 132 (2006)
Delhi Law Times 641; Patel Roadways Ltd., Bombay v.
Prasad Trading Co. 1991 (4) SCC 270: 1991 (3) SCR
391 ; Ford Motor Co. & Anr. v. C.R. Borman & Anr. 2008
(38) PTC 76 (Del.); Wipro Ltd. & Anr. v. Oushadha
Chandrika Ayurvedic India (P) Ltd. & Ors. 2008 (37)
PTC 269 Mad.; Hindustan Unilever Ltd. v. Ashique
Chemicals & Ors. 2011 (47) PTC 209 (Bom.); Ultra
Tech Cement Ltd. & Anr. v. Shree Balaji Cement
Industries & Ors. 2014 (58) PTC 1 (Bom.) - referred.
to.
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 219
DALIA&ANR.
- - .,
Case Law Reference
A
1991 (3) SCR 391
referred to
Para 8
2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 623
referred to
Paras 14, 37
AIR 1943 Cal. 190
referred to
Para 14
B
AIR 1952 Punj. 142
referred to
Para 14
AIR 1978 Ori.167
referred to
Para 14
(1886) 17 QBD 421
referred to
Para 14
(1889) 23 QBD 285
referred to
Para 14
c
2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 743 relied on
Para 15
76 ER 637
referred to
Para 22
2009 (15) SCR 265
relied on
Para 25
D
2009 (15) SCR 265
relied on
Para 25
1973 (2) SCR 502
relied on
Para 25
2002 (2) SCR 383
relied on
Para 26
2002 (2) SCR 945
relied on
Para 26
E
1977 (3) SCR 312
relied on
Para 31
2011 (6) SCR 443
relied on
Para 34
1992 Supp. (1) sec 323
referred to
Para 35
F
1991 (3) SCR 391
relied on
Para 36
2007 (1) SCR 1169
. relied on
Para 36
2004 (1 ) Suppl. SCR 623 referred to
Para 37
2004 (3) sec 688
referred to
Para 38
G
2005 (5) Suppl. SCR 751
relied on
Para 39
2014 (57) PTC 1(SC)
referred to
Para 40
2008 (9) SCR 652
held•
H
inapplicable
Para 41
220
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 8 S.C.R
A
2000 (1) PTC 321 (Del.)
referred to
Para42(a)
2002 (24) PTC 405 (Del.)
referred to
Para 42)b)
132 (200.6) DLT 641
referred to
Para42(c)
B
2008 (38) PTC 76 (Del.)
referred to
Para 42(d)
2008 (37) PTC 269 Mad
referred to
Para 42(f)
2011 (47) PTC 209 (Born.)
referred to
Para 42(g)
2014 (58) PTC 1 (Born.)
referred to
Para42(h)
c
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
10643-10644 OF 2010.
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.11.2008 in
FAO (OS) No. 359 of2007 and order dated 17.12.2008 in the
.D review petition being R. P. No. 14 785 of 2008 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi.
WITH
E
Civil Appeal No. 4912 of2015.
T. R. Andhiarujina, Sudhir Chandra, Dhruv Anand,
Lakshmi, Tanvi Misra, Anshuman Upadhyay, Ravin Gargotia,
Soumir Ghosal, Vikas Singh Jangra, Anuradha Salhotra, K.
V. Mohan, SumitWadhwa, Yatin Grover, ManmeetArora, Faria
F
Khan, Kavita Wadia, Shashank Tripathi, E. c;. Agarwala for
the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
ARUN MISHRA, J. 1. Leave granted in SLP[C]
No.8253 of 2013.
2. In the appeals, the question arising for consideration
is as to the interpretation of section 62 of the Copyright Act,
H 1957 and section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 with
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 221
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J:]
regard to the place where a suit can be instituted by the plaintiff. A
3. The plaintiff/appellant in Civil Appeal Nos. 1064344/2010 had filed a suit praying for relief against defendant
No.1 so as to prevent infringement of the rights of the plaintiff
without obtaining the licence. The defendant owns cinema halls B
in Maharashtra and Mumbai where infringement is alleged and
the entire cause of action, as alleged in the plaint, has arisen
in Mumbai, Maharashtra.
4. Civil Suit FAQ (OS) No. 359/2007 has been filed in c
the High Court at Delhi, by virtue of the fact that the Branch
Office of the plaintiff is situated at Delhi and the plaintiff is
carrying on the business at Delhi. However, it is not disputed
that the plaintiff's Head Office is situated at Mumbai. The
objection was raised by the defendant with regard to the D
territorial jurisdiction of the court at Delhi. The single Bench
and the Division Bench of the High Courfhave upheld the
objection and held that the suit should have been filed in the
facts of the case, in the court at Mumbai. Hence, the impugned
order has been questioned in the appeals.
E
5. In Civil Appeal arising out of SLP {C] No. 8253/2013
- (Advance Magazine Publishers Inc. & Anr. v. Just Lifestyle
Pvt. Ltd.), the suit has been filed with respect to the
infringement of the trademark. The registered office of 'Vogue F
India" is in Mumbai. The magazine is processed and published
in Mumbai. It was submitted that because the plaintiff has
branch office at Delhi, it had sufficient ground for invoking the
jurisdiction under section 134 of the Trade Marks Act. The
plaintiff filed an application seeking an amendment in the plaint G
under0rder6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to
indicate how the court at Delhi would have the jurisdiction. The
magazine is sold and circulated to the subscribers at Delhi.
The application seeking amendment has also been dismissed
by the High Court as even if allowed, amended pleadings
H
222
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 8 S.C.R.
Ir •
A would not confer jurisdiction upon the court. Merely situation of
branch office is not enough as no cause of action as per the
plaint, has arisen in Delhi. The Division Bench has allowed
the appeal and set aside the order passed by the Single Bench,
allowing the amendment. The said order has been impugned
B in SLP [CJ No.8253/2013.
6. It was submitted by Shri T.R. Andhiarujina, learned
senior counsel representing the appellants, that a special right
has been conferred under section 62(2) of the CopyrightAct
C and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act containing non-obstante
clause to the applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure or
any other law for the time being in force, and the plaintiff has
been conferred a right to file a suit where it carries on its
business. That cannot be whittled down by combining with it
D the cause of action. The impediment of section 20 of the Code
I
of Civil Procedure is not applicable. Section 62(2) of the
Copyright Act and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act have no
co-relation to the cause O'f·action and suit can be filed where
plaintiff resides or carries on his business or personally works
E for gain. The interpretation made by the High Court is contrary
to the aforesaid provisions'."'Convenience of the defendant is
not a relevant consideration. The binding decision of this Court
in Exphar SA & Anr. v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd. & Anr
F [2004 (3) SCC 688] has been violated. The judgment has not
been taken into consideration though it was decided earlier to
the passing of the impugned decision. Reliance has also been
placed on the decisions of this Court in Dhodha House v. S.K.
Maingi[2006 (9) SCC 41], Daburlndia Ltd. v. KR. Industries
G [2008 (10) SCC 595] and various other decisions of the High
Court of Delhi viz., Smithkline Beecham & Anr. v. Sunil Singhi
& Anr. [2000 (1) PTC 321 (Del.)], Caterpillar Inc. v. Kai/ash
Nichani & Ors. [2002 (24) PTC 405 (Del.)], lntas
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Allergan Inc. [ 132 (2006) Delhi Law
H Times 641] to contend that under the aforesaid provisions
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 223
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
accrual of cause of action wholly or in part is not necessary at A
a place where the plaintiff chooses to file a suit where he is
carrying on business.
7. On behalf of the applicants in C.A. Nos. 10643-44/
2010, Mr. Sudhir Chandra, learned senior counsel, submitted
B
that while interpreting section 62 of the Copyright Act and
section 134(2) of the Trademarks Act, the intention of
Parliament is to be gathered from plain and natural meaning.
Heydon's 'rule of mischief is not attracted where the words of
the statute are clear and unambiguous. There is no challenge C
to the vires of section 62 of the Copyright Act. Thus, the court
cannot invoke the doctrine of reading down the provisions.
Section 62 of the Copyright Act is a special legislation and
confers a special right on the plaintiff where it carries on
business or resides. Reading the Explanation to section 20 of D
the Code of Civil Procedure into section 62 will do violence to
the Co(lyright Act. The requirement of cause of action or
Explanation as to the corporaticwi of Section 20 C.P.C. cannot
be added to the aforesaid prpvisions. Facts of few cases
cannot be considered so <1;>to make interpretation of E
provisions. Interpretation of the statute is to be made de hors
the facts of individual cases. Jne intention of legislation is also
clear from the Parliamentary [lebates and where the law has
held the field for a long time it should not be unsettled. The
decision in Dhodha House (supra) holds the field. As such, if F
a different interpretation is to be made, the case should be
referred to a larger Bench of this Court. Non-obstante clause
cannot be diluted.
8. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondents, it G
was submitted that abuse of provisions of section 62 of the
Copyright Act and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act cannot
be permitted at the hands of multi-national corporations to
harass the defendant/s. With respect to the suit being filed by H
224
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 8 S.C.R.
A the Corporation, section 20 is not inapplicable. 'Carrying on
business' cannot be defined subjectively. Reliance has been
placed upon Patel Roadways Ltd., Bombay v. Prasad Trading
Co. [1991 (4) SCC 270]. The object of the Parliament behind
enacting section 62 of the Copyright Act and section 134 of
B the Trade Marks Act has to be taken into consideration while
interpreting the said provisions. The mischief rule of Heydon
has been pressed into service so as to prevent harassment of
the defendants and abuse of the said provisions. Court is dutybound to avoid disproportionate counter mischief while
C interpreting a provision. Public policy and convenience to
parties have to be taken into consideration. The interpretation
of provisions must be such so as to avoid hardship and
absurdity. The decisions relied upon by the appellants have
0
been sought to be distinguished.
E
9. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 contains the
provisions under section 20 with respect to institution of the
suits where defendant resides or cause of action arose.
Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads thus:
"Section 20 - Other suits to be instituted where
defendants reside or cause of action arises. -
Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be
instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose
F
jurisdiction -
(a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there
are more than one, at the time of the commencement of
the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on
G
business, or personally works for gain; or
(b) any of the defendants, where there are more than
one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually
and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or
H
personally works for gain, provided that in such case either
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 225
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do
A
not reside, or carry on business, or personally work for
gain, as aforesaid, ac;quiesce in such institution; or
(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.
B
[Explanation]. : A corporation shall be deemed to carry on
business at its sole or principal office in India or, in respect of
any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a
subordinate office, at such place."
10. In order to amend and consolidate the law relating C
to copyrights, the matter was referred to a Joint Committee.
The Joint Committee of the Houses submitted the report which
contained the object of the provisions of section 62 is that many
authors are deterred from instituting infringement proceedings 0
because the court in which the proceedings are to be instituted
are at a considerable distance from the place of their ordinary
residence. Such impediments should be removed and the
proceedings may be institute~"in the local court where the
person instituting the proceedings ordinarily resides, carries E
on business etc. Clause 61 of the Report of the said Committee
is extracted below :
"Clause 61 (Original clause 65)~ -Sub-clause (2) of the
original clause 65 has been omitted and replaced by a
new sub-clause. The Committee feels that the provisions
of the original sub-clause (2) would virtually make
registration of copyright compulsory and-.would be an
undue restriction on the owner of the copyright to exercise
his rights. In the opinion of the Committee many authors
are deterred from instituting infringement proceedings
because the court in which such proceedings are to be
instituted is situated at a considerable distance from the
place of their ordinary residence. The Committee feels
that this impediment should be removed and the new
F
G
H
226
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2015] 8 S.C.R.
A
sub-clause (2) accordingly provides that infringement
proceedings may be instituted in the district court within
the local limits of whose jurisdiction the person instituting
the proceedings ordinarily resides. carries on business.
etc."
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
(emphasis supplied by us)
Section 62 of the Copyright Act is extracted below :
"62. Jurisdiction of court over matters arising under
this Chapter. -
( 1) Every suit or other civil proceeding arising under this
Chapter in respect of the infringement of copyright in any
work or the infringement of any other right conferred by
this Act shall be instituted in the district court having
jurisdiction.
(2) For the purpose of su,b-section (1 ). a "district court
having jurisdiction" shall, notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908), or any other law for th~ time being in force, include
a district court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction,
at the time of the institution of the suit or other proceeding,
the person instituting the suit or other proceeding or.
where there are more than one such persons, any of them
actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or
personally works for gain."
Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act is also extracted
below:
"134. Suit for infringement, etc., to be instituted
before District Court. -
(1) No suit-
( a) for the infringement of a registered trade mark; or
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 227
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
(b) relating to any right in a r~gist~red trade mark; or
A
(c) for passing off arising out of the use by the defendant
of any trade mark which is identical with or deceptively
similar to the plaintiff's trade mark, whether registered
or unregistered,
B
shall be instituted in any court inferior to a District Court
having jurisdiction to try the suit.
· ·
(2) For the purpose of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section
(1 ). a "District Court having jurisdiction" shall,
notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5of1908) or any other law for the time
being in force, include a District Court within the local
limits of whose jurisdiction, at the time of the institution of
the suit or other proceeding, the person instituting the
suit or proceeding, or, where there are more than one
such persons any of them, actually and voluntarily resides
or carries on business or personally works for gain.
Explanation.- For the purp~s'es of sub-section (2),
"person" includes the regisr~Ved proprietor and the
registered user."
1tlc
11. Following portion of the Parliamentary Debates as
to Copyright Act has been relied upon :
"Shri P. Trikamdas: Ordinarily it should fall within the
jurisdiction of the court where the infringing copy was
published. But there is nothing to prevent Parliament
from making a law, as for instance in the case of divorce,
and saying that the cause of action may also arise at any
place where the author resides or where the original
publication took place, so that you could drag the infringer
to that court. Instead of making the another run all over
the country facing the infringer, the right may be given to
c
D
E
F
G
H
228
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 8 S.C.R
A
the injured party-the author-to sue the main in the place
where the author resides or where the first copy was
published.
B
Dr. Raghubir Sinh: So you agree to that?
Shri P. Trikamdas: Yes, and I am obliged to you for asking
me that question.
Dr. Raghubir Sinh: Does Mr. Masani also approve of it?
C
Shri Masani : Yes.
Shri P. Trikamdas: It is desirable, also because it may
act as a deterrent on the infringer when he knows that he
may have to go a few hundred miles off to a High Court
D
where the author lives or where the book got published
first."
12. Considering the very language of section 62 of the
Copyright Act and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, an
E additional forum has been provided by including a District
Court within whose limits the plaintiff actually and voluntarily
resides or carries on business or personally works for gain.
The object of the provisions was to enable the plaintiff to
institute a suit at a place where he or they resided or carried
F on business, not to enable them to drag defendant further away
from such a place also as is being done in the instant cases.
In our opinion, the expression "notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code of Civil Procedure" does not oust the
applicability of the provisions of section 20 of the Code of Civil
G Procedure and it is clear that additional remedy has been
provided to the plaintiff so as to file a suit where he is residing
or carrying on business etc., as the case may be. Section 20
of the Code of Civil Procedure enables a plaintiff to file a suit
where the defendant resides or where cause of action arose.
H
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 229
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
Section 20(a) and section 20(b) usually provides the venue A
where the defendant or any of them resides, carries on
business or personally works for gain. Section 20(c) of the
Code of Civil Procedure enables a plaintiff to institute a suit
where the cause of action wholly or in part, arises. The
Explanation to Section 20 C.P.C. has been added to the effect B
that Corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its
sole or principal office in India or in respect of any cause of
action arising at any place where it has subordinate office at
such place. Thus, 'corporation' can be sued at a place having
its sole or principal office and where cause of action wholly or C
in part, arises at a place where it has also a subordinate office
at such place.
13. Learned author Mu Ila in the Code of Civil Procedure,
181h Edn., has observed that under clauses (a) to (c) of section D
20, plaintiff has a choice of forum to institute a suit. The
intendment of the Explanation to section 20 of the Code of
Civil Procedure is that once the corporation has a subordinate
office in the place where the cause of action arises wholly or in
part, it cannot be heard to say that it cannot be sued there E
because it did not carry on business atthat place. The linking
of the place with the cause of action in the Explanation where
subordinate office of the corporation is situated is reflective of
the intention of the Legislature and such a place has to be the
F
place of the filing of the suit and not the principal place of
business. Ordinarily the suit has to be filed at the place where
there is principal place of business of the corporation.
_14. 'Corporation' in the Explanation would mean not
·only the statutory corporation but companies registered under G
the Companies Act, as held by this Court in Patel Roadways
Ltd., Bombay v. Prasad Trading Co. etc. [1991 (4) SCC 270]
and New Moga Transport Co., through its Proprietor v. United
India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. [2004 (4) SCC 677]. The H
230
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 8 S.C.R.
A
domicile of the company is fixed by the situation of its principal
place of business as held in Jones v. Scottish Accident
Insurance Co. (1886) 17 QBD 421. In the case of companies
registered under the Companies Act, the controlling power is,
as a fact, generally exercised at the registered office, and that
B office is therefore not only for the purposes of the Act, but for
other purposes, the principal place of business, as held in
Watkins v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co. (1889) 23 QBD
285. A company may have subordinate or branch offices in
fifty different jurisdictions and it may be sued in any one of
C such jurisdictions in respect of a cause of action arising there,
has been held in Peoples' Insurance Co. v. Benoy Bhushan
[AIR 1943 Cal. 190]; Home Insurance Co. v. Jagatjit Sugar
Mills Co. [AIR 1952 Punj. 142]; and Prag Oil Mils Depot v.
0
TransportCorpn. of/ndia [AIR 1978 Ori. 167).
15. Accrual of cause of action is a sine qua non for a
suit to be filed. Cause of action is a bundle of facts which is
required to be proved to grant relief to the plaintiff. Cause of
action not only refers to the infringement but also the material
E facts on which right is founded. Section 20 of the CPC
recognises the territorial jurisdiction of the courts inter alia
where the cause of action wholly or in part arises. It has to be
decided in each case whether cause of action wholly or in part
F
arises at a particular place. As held by this Court in Rajasthan
High Court Advocates Association v. Union of India & Ors.
[AIR2001 SC 416). Thus, a plaintiff can also file a suit where
the cause of action wholly or in part arises.
16. On a due and anxious consideration. of the
G provisions contained in section 20 of the CPC, section 62 of
the Copyright Act and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, and
the object with which the latter provisions have been enacted,
it is clear that if a cause of action has arisen wholly or in part,
H where the plaintiff is residing or having its principal office/
INDIAN PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETY LTD. v. SANJAY 231
DALIA&ANR. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
carries on business or personally works for gain, the suit can A
be filed at such place/s. Plaintiff(s) can also institute a suit at
a place where he is residing, carrying on business or personally
works for gain de hors the fact that the cause of action has not
arisen at a place where he/they are residing or any one of
them is residing, carries on business or personally works for B
gain. However, this right to institute suit at such a place has to
be read subject to certain restrictions, such as in case plaintiff
is residing or carrying on business at a particular place/having
its head office and at such place cause of action has also arisen
wholly or in part, plaintiff cannot ignore such a place under the C
guise that he is carrying on business at other far flung places
also. The very intendment of the insertion of provision in the
Copyright Act and Trade Marks Act is the convenience of the
plaintiff. The rule of convenience of the parties has been given 0
a statutory expression in section 20 of the CPC as well. The
interpretation of provisions has to be such which prevents the
mischief of causing inconvenience to parties.
17. The intendment of the aforesaid provisions inserted
in the CopyrightAct and the Trade Marks Act is to provide a E
forum to the plaintiff where he is residing, carrying on business
or personally works for gain. The object is to ensure that the
plaintiff is not deterred from instituting infringement
proceedings "because the court in which proceedings are to F
be instituted is at a considerable distance from the place of
their ordinary residence". The impediment created to the
plaintiff by section 20 C.P.C. of going to a place where it was
not having ordinary residence or principal place of business
was sought to be removed by virtue of the aforesaid provisions G
of the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act. Where the
Corporation is having ordinary residence/principal place of
business and cause of action has also arisen at that place, it
has to institute a suit at the said place and not at other places .
. The provisions of section 62 of the Copyright Act and section H
232
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 8 S.C.R.
A
134 of the Trade Marks Act never intended to operate in the
field where the plaintiff is having its principal place of business
at a particular place and the cause of action has also arisen at
that place so as to enable it to file a suit at a distant place
where its subordinate office is situated though at such place
B no cause of action has arisen. Such interpretation would cause
great harm and would be juxtaposed to the very legislative
intendment of the provisions so enacted.
18. In our opinion, in a case where cause of action has
C arisen at a place where the plaintiff is residing or where there
are more than one such persons, any of them actually or
voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works
for gain would oust the jurisdiction of other place where the
cause of action has not arisen though at such a place, by virtue
D of having subordinate office, the plaintiff instituting a suit or
other proceedings might be carrying on business or personally
works for gain.
19.