# INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHAR LAL & ORS. ETC

- **Citation:** [2019] 15 S.C.R. 1085
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2019-10-23
- **Case number:** Writ Appeal Nos.514, 799 and 772 of 2006
- **Bench:** Arun Mishra, Indira Banerjee, Vineet Saran, M.R. Shah, S. Ravindra Bhat
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/indore-development-authority-v-manohar-lal-ors-etc-33329
- **Pages:** 62

## Headnote

Justice Delivery System: Practice and Procedure - Recusal
of judge - Whether a Judge who has expressed an opinion in a
smaller Bench and the case has been referred to a larger Bench,
because of the conflict of the opinion or otherwise, can hear the
matter in a larger bench - Held: Rendering a decision on any issue
of law and the corrective procedure of it cannot be said to be ground
for recusal of a Judge; otherwise, no Judge can hear a review,
curative petition, or a reference made to the larger bench - A Judge
who had rendered any decision in a smaller combination is not
disqualified from being part of a larger Bench when a reference is
made to the larger bench - Rather, it is a consistent practice
prevailing in various High Courts as well as of Supreme Court to
include
the
same
Judge/Judges
in
larger
Benches.
(Arun Mishra, J.)
Justice Delivery System: Practice and Procedure - Recusal
of judge prayed for on the ground of legal pre-disposition - Held:
There is absolutely nothing wrong in holding a particular view in a
previous judgment for or against a view canvassed by a litigant -
No litigant can choose, who should be on the Bench - He cannot
say that a Judge who might have decided a case on a particular
issue, which may go against his interest subsequently or is part of a
larger Bench should not hear his case - Furthermore, if a party or
his Counsel can at length argue on the question of recusal of the
Judge before him, he can also successfully question the correctness
of a judgment rendered by him - If litigants are given the right to
seek recusal of a judge on the ground that in a smaller Bench, a
view has been taken by the Judge, the correctness of which has to
be decided by the larger Bench, which includes the same Judge,
then on a parity of reasoning recusal might be sought on the ground
 [2019] 15 S.C.R. 1085
 1085
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1086
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 15 S.C.R.
of the judge having taken a view one way or the other even in a
different case in which similar issues were involved if the judge has
decided similar issues earlier, in the same Court or in a different
Court - This would open the flood gates of forum shopping -
Recusal upon an imagined apprehension of legal pre-disposition
would, in reality amount to acceding to the request that a Judge
having a particular view and leanings in favour of the view which
suits a particular litigant, should man the Bench - It would not only
be allowing Bench hunting but would also be against the judicial
discipline and will erode the confidence of the common man for
which the judicial system survives - If request for recusal on the
ground of legal pre-disposition in the form of a judgment is acceded
to, that would destroy the very edifice of an independent judicial
system - The entire judicial system is based on sound constitutional
principles - The roster making power is bestowed on the Chief Justice
of India so that litigants are not able to choose the Judges before
whom they have to argue a matter, and he is a constitutional
functionary who has been enjoined with this task at the highest
pedestal to exercise the power of roster making - Once he has
exercised his power, it is not for the Judges to choose - As per their
oath, they have to discharge their duties without fear and favour
and in a dispassionate manner without any ill will, bias towards
litigants, or a cause - Abuse of court - Bench Hunting.
(Arun Mishra, J.)
Abuse of court: Bench hunting - Request for recusal of Judge
by litigants - Held: If requests for recusal are acceded to for the
asking, litigants will be unscrupulously taking over the roster
making powers of the Chief Justice and that would tantamount to
interference with the judicial system, by the mighty to have a
particular Bench by employing several means and putting all kinds
of pressures from all angles all around - Moreover, recusal in such
unjustified circumstances, would become the norm - If recusal is
made, it would tantamount to giv

## Text

_Characters 0–39,996 of 145,362. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39996 for what follows._

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1085
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
v.
 MANOHAR LAL & ORS. ETC.
(Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.9036-9038 of 2016)
OCTOBER 23, 2019
[ARUN MISHRA, INDIRA BANERJEE, VINEET SARAN,
M.R. SHAH AND S. RAVINDRA BHAT, JJ.]
Justice Delivery System: Practice and Procedure - Recusal
of judge - Whether a Judge who has expressed an opinion in a
smaller Bench and the case has been referred to a larger Bench,
because of the conflict of the opinion or otherwise, can hear the
matter in a larger bench - Held: Rendering a decision on any issue
of law and the corrective procedure of it cannot be said to be ground
for recusal of a Judge; otherwise, no Judge can hear a review,
curative petition, or a reference made to the larger bench - A Judge
who had rendered any decision in a smaller combination is not
disqualified from being part of a larger Bench when a reference is
made to the larger bench - Rather, it is a consistent practice
prevailing in various High Courts as well as of Supreme Court to
include
the
same
Judge/Judges
in
larger
Benches.
(Arun Mishra, J.)
Justice Delivery System: Practice and Procedure - Recusal
of judge prayed for on the ground of legal pre-disposition - Held:
There is absolutely nothing wrong in holding a particular view in a
previous judgment for or against a view canvassed by a litigant -
No litigant can choose, who should be on the Bench - He cannot
say that a Judge who might have decided a case on a particular
issue, which may go against his interest subsequently or is part of a
larger Bench should not hear his case - Furthermore, if a party or
his Counsel can at length argue on the question of recusal of the
Judge before him, he can also successfully question the correctness
of a judgment rendered by him - If litigants are given the right to
seek recusal of a judge on the ground that in a smaller Bench, a
view has been taken by the Judge, the correctness of which has to
be decided by the larger Bench, which includes the same Judge,
then on a parity of reasoning recusal might be sought on the ground
 [2019] 15 S.C.R. 1085
 1085
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1086
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 15 S.C.R.
of the judge having taken a view one way or the other even in a
different case in which similar issues were involved if the judge has
decided similar issues earlier, in the same Court or in a different
Court - This would open the flood gates of forum shopping -
Recusal upon an imagined apprehension of legal pre-disposition
would, in reality amount to acceding to the request that a Judge
having a particular view and leanings in favour of the view which
suits a particular litigant, should man the Bench - It would not only
be allowing Bench hunting but would also be against the judicial
discipline and will erode the confidence of the common man for
which the judicial system survives - If request for recusal on the
ground of legal pre-disposition in the form of a judgment is acceded
to, that would destroy the very edifice of an independent judicial
system - The entire judicial system is based on sound constitutional
principles - The roster making power is bestowed on the Chief Justice
of India so that litigants are not able to choose the Judges before
whom they have to argue a matter, and he is a constitutional
functionary who has been enjoined with this task at the highest
pedestal to exercise the power of roster making - Once he has
exercised his power, it is not for the Judges to choose - As per their
oath, they have to discharge their duties without fear and favour
and in a dispassionate manner without any ill will, bias towards
litigants, or a cause - Abuse of court - Bench Hunting.
(Arun Mishra, J.)
Abuse of court: Bench hunting - Request for recusal of Judge
by litigants - Held: If requests for recusal are acceded to for the
asking, litigants will be unscrupulously taking over the roster
making powers of the Chief Justice and that would tantamount to
interference with the judicial system, by the mighty to have a
particular Bench by employing several means and putting all kinds
of pressures from all angles all around - Moreover, recusal in such
unjustified circumstances, would become the norm - If recusal is
made, it would tantamount to giving room to unscrupulous litigant
to have a Judge of their choice who can share the views which are
to be canvassed by them - No such right can be given to any person
under the said guise - Justice Delivery System. (Arun Mishra, J.)
'Judicial Recusal' by Grant Hammond, a former Judge
of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand - referred to.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1087
Justice Delivery System: Recusal of Judge - Who to decide -
Held: Recusal is not to be forced by any litigant to choose a Bench
- It is for the Judge whose participation is objected to, to decide
recusal application - Further, the embarrassment of hearing the
lengthy arguments for recusal should not be a compelling reason to
recuse - Nothing should come in the way of dispensation of justice
or discharge of duty as a Judge and judicial decision-making.
(Arun Mishra, J.)
M/s. Ujagar Prints v. Union of India (1986) Suppl. SCC
652 - relied on.
Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Harakchand
Misirimal Solanki & Ors. (2014) 3 SCC 183 : [2014] 1
SCR 783 ; Yogesh Neema & Ors. v. State of Madhya
Pradesh (2016) 6 SCC 387; Sree Balaji Nagar
Residential Assn. v. State of Tamil Nadu (2015) 3 SCC
353 : [2014] 7 SCR 799 ; Indore Development Authority
vs. Shailendra (Dead) through LRs. & Ors., 2018 SCC
Online SC 100 ; State of Bombay v. United Motors India
Ltd., [1953] SCR 1069 ; Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v.
State of Bihar, [1955] 2 SCR 603; M/s. Ujagar Prints
and Ors. (II) v. Union of India & Ors.(1989) 3 SCC
488 : [1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 770; Empire Industries
Ltd. v. Union of India (1985) 3 SCC 314 : [1985] 1
Suppl. SCR 292; Gyan Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar
& Ors.(1985) 2 SCC 683 : [1985] 1 Suppl. SCR 1 ;
Ganpat Ladha v. Sashikant Vishnu Shinde (1978) 2
SCC 573 : [1978] 3 SCR 198 ; Sajjan Singh v. State of
Rajasthan 1965 AIR SC 845 : [1965] SCR 933;
Damadilal v. Parashram (1976) 4 SCC 855 : [1976]
Suppl. SCR 645 ; Kesavananda Bharati v. the State of
Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225 : [1973] Suppl. SCR 1;
Hyderabad Industries Limited and Anr. v. Union of India
& Ors. (1995) 5 SCC 338 : [1995] 2 Suppl. SCR 287;
Khandelwal Metal & Engineering Works v. Union of
India (1985) 3 SCC 620 : [1985] 1 Suppl. SCR 750;
Hyderabad Industries Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India &
Ors. (1999) 5 SCC 15 : [1999] 3 SCR 471 ; M/s. Cloth
Traders (P) Ltd. v. Additional C.I.T., Gujarat-I, (1979)
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.
 MANOHAR LAL & ORS.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1088
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 15 S.C.R.
3 SCC 538 : [1979] 3 SCR 984; Distributors (Baroda)
Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors.,(1986) 1 SCC 43:
[1985] 1 Suppl. SCR 778 ; Petlad Turkey Red Dye Works
Co. Ltd. v.
Commissioner
of
Income
Tax,
Bombay
North,
Ahmedabad
[1963]
Suppl.1
SCR 871 ; Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Income Tax, Bombay North, Ahmedabad [1965] 2 SCR
908 ; Jamal Uddin Ahmad v. Abu Saleh Najmuddin,
(2003) 4 SCC 257 ; State of W.B. v. Shivananda Pathak,
(1998) 5 SCC 513 : [1998] 1 SCR 811 ; Asok Pande v.
Supreme Court of India, (2018) 5 SCC 341 : [2018] 3
SCR 337; Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record
Association & Anr. v. Union of India (recusal matter),
(2016) 5 SCC 808 : [2015] SCR 975; Subrata Roy
Sahara v. Union of India & Ors. (2014) 8 SCC 470 :
[2014] 12 SCR 573 ; R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi
High Court (2009) 8 SCC 106: [2009] 11 SCR 1026;
Kamini Jaiswal v. Union of India & Anr. (2018) 1 SCC
156 ; Bal Kishan Giri v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014)
7 SCC 280 : [2014] 6 SCR 545 ; All India Institute of
Medical Sciences v. Prof. Kaushal K. Verma (2015) 220
DLT 446 - referred to.
John Patrick LITEKY v. United States 510 U.S. 540
(1994) - referred to.
Shri M.C. Setalvad, in his Autobiography "My Life,
Law and other things" - referred to.
Justice Delivery System: Recusal of Judge - Practice and
procedure - Reference before five judge Bench comprising of Justice
Arun Mishra and four other Hon'ble Judges - Application for
Recusal of Justice Arun Mishra on ground that as a Judge he had
expressed an opinion in a case in a smaller Bench and that case
has now been referred to this larger five-Judge Bench - Justice
Arun Mishra rejected the application for recusal - Held: (per other
four members of the Bench): The Judge who decided a previous
cause finally can and very often has participated in the later larger
bench to which such previous decision is referred for reconsideration
- There is no legal impediment or bar to participation of Justice
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1089
Arun Mishra to hear reference on the merits in the present Bench -
This Bench shall proceed to hear and decide the reference made to
it, on its merits.
Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association & Anr.
v. Union of India (2016) 5 SCC 808: [2015] SCR 975
- relied on.
Case Law Reference
In the Order of Arun Mishra, J.
[2014] 1 SCR 783
referred to
Para 2
(2016) 6 SCC 387
referred to
Para 2
[2014] 7 SCR 799
referred to
Para 2
[1953] SCR 1069
referred to
Para 14
[1955] 2 S.C.R. 603
referred to
Para 15
[1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 770
referred to
Para 16
[1985] 1 Suppl. SCR 292
referred to
Para 16
(1986) Suppl. SCC 652
relied on
Para 16
[1985] 1 Suppl. SCR 1
referred to
Para 17
[1978] 3 SCR 198
referred to
Para 17
[1976] Suppl. SCR 645
referred to
Para 17
[1973] Suppl. SCR 1
referred to
Para 19
[1965] SCR 933
referred to
Para 19
[1995] 2 Suppl. SCR 287
referred to
Para 20
[1985] 1 Suppl. SCR 750
referred to
Para 20
[1999] 3 SCR 471
referred to
Para 20
[1979] 3 SCR 984
referred to
Para 21
[1985] 1 Suppl. SCR 778
referred to
Para 21
[1963] 1 Suppl. SCR 871
referred to
Para 22
[1965] 2 SCR 908
referred to
Para 22
 INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.
 MANOHAR LAL & ORS.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1090
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 15 S.C.R.
(2003) 4 SCC 257
referred to
Para 23
[1998] 1 SCR 811
referred to
Para 25
[2018] 3 SCR 337
referred to
Para 26
[2015] SCR 975
referred to
Para 34
[2014] 12 SCR 573
referred to
Para 35
[2009] 11 SCR 1026
referred to
Para 37
(2018) 1 SCC 156
referred to
Para 38
[2014] 6 SCR 545
referred to
Para 39
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition
(Civil) Nos.9036-9038 of 2016
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.11.2015 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore in Writ Appeal Nos.514, 799 and
772 of 2006
With
Civil Appeal Nos.4835 of 2015, 19532--19533, 19356, 19362, 19361,
19358, 19357, 19360, 19359, 19363, 19364, 19412 of 2017, Special Leave
Petition (C) Nos. 9798-9799 of 2016, 17088-17089, 37375, 37372, 16573-
-16605, 34752-34753 of 2016, 15890, 33022, 33127, 33114 of 2017, 30452
of 2018, 16051 of 2019, Special Leave Petition (C) No....CC No. 15967
of 2016, Diary No. 23842 of 2018, M.A. No.1423 of 2017 in Civil Appeal
No.12247 of 2016, M.A. No.1787 of 2017 in Civil Appeal No.10210 of
2016, M.A. No.1786 of 2017 in Civil Appeal No.10207 of 2016, M.A.
No. 45 of 2018 in Civil Appeal No.6239 of 2017.
Tushar Mehta, SG, Ms. Pinky Anand, ASG, Ajay Bansal, AAG/
Haryana, R. Balasubramanium, Shyam Divan, Gopal Sankaranarayanan,
Mohan Parasaran, Dinesh Dwivedi, Anoop George Chaudhari, Dhruv
Mehta, Anukul Chandra Pradhan, Shashikiran Shetty, K. S. Namdar,
Rameshwar Singh Malik, Jayanth Muth Raj, V. Shekhar, Anup Roy
Choudhary, Sr. Advs., Kanu Agrawal, Manan Popli, Rajeev Ranjan, B.
K. Satija, Ajay Bansal, Ms. Veena Bansal, Gaurav Yadava, Rajeev Ranjan,
Ms. Veena Bansal, Sanjay Kumar Visen, Ms. Rachana Srivastava,
Ms. Garima Prashad, Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Ms. Jesal Wahi, Ashok
Arora, Shakti Singh, Abhishek Aanand Rai, Dr. Sushil Balwada, Sanjay
Kapur, Ms. Megha Karnwal, Bharath Gangadharan, Harshal Narayan,
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1091
Ms. Harshita Raghuvanshi, V. M. Kannan, Ms. Shubhra Kapur, Pramod
Dayal, Nikunj Dayal, Ms. Payal Dayal, Rakesh Kumar, Ashwani Kumar,
Zoheb Hossain, Ms. Shashi Kiran, Dr. Satish Chandra, Ajay Prajapati,
Manoj Jain, Shankar Chillarge, (for M/s. Lawyer's Knit & Co.), Madhu
Prakash, Rituraj Biswas, Rituraj Choudhary, Chandan Kumar, Prashant
Singh, Ankur Talwar, Ms. Snidhi Mehra, Raj Bahadur Yadav, Ashwani
Kumar, Ms. Saudamini Sharma, Sumit Teterwal, Chakitan V. S. Papta,
Ms. Peeha Verma, Jay Kumar, Ravinder Nain, Ms. Binu Tamta, Pankaj
Pandey, Manish Paliwal, Vikas Kumar, Ms. Sugandha Yadav, Sudipto
Sircar, Gaurav Agrawal, Shrutanjaya Bhardwaj, Vishal Sinha, Zoheb
Hossain, Adeeba Mujahid, Vivek Gurnani, Ms. Aditi Dani, Baldev K.,
Ravi Kumar, K. Mishra, Yasharth Kant, Nishant Singh, Deepak Goel,
Harsh Parashar, Avishkar Singhvi, Siddharth Batra, Ravinder Kumar,
Ms. Garima Sehgal, Ram Shankar, Ashish Chaubey, A. Vasanthakumar,
Amit Arora, Om Prakash Kumar Srivastava, R. V. Kameshwaran,
Mahesh Thakur, Sharan Dev Singh Thakur, Ms. Anuparna Bordoloi,
Ms. Sheffali Chaudhary, Ms. Vipasha Singh, Shailesh Madiyal, Vybhav
Ramesh, Sudhanshu Prakash, Karthik Anand Vijay Kumar, Ms. Farah
Fathima, Hitesh Kumar Sharma, S. K. Rajora, Ms. Sandhya Sharma,
R. K. Sharma, Jitesh Malik, Satish Kumar, K. V. Vijayakumar, Kamlendra
Mishra, Rajeev Kumar Dubey, Shashank Shekhar, Ms. Sheetal Rajput,
Ms. Ritu Reniwal, Nipun Katyal, Rahul Kaushik, Pradeep Aggarwal,
Lal Pratap Singh, Umesh Pratap Singh, Arjun Aggarwal, Ms. Ruchi Kohli,
Kunal Verma, Mrs. Yugandhara Pawar Jha, Ms. Rashmi Nandakumar,
Ms. Ayushma Awasthi, Shankar Narayanan, B. V. Balaram Das, Chandra
Bhushan Prasad, Pradhuman Gohil,. Ms.Taruna Singh Gohil, Ms. Ranu
Purohit, Shiva P., Ms. Jaikriti S. Jadeja, Siddhartha Chowdhury, Gaurav
Goel, Sachin Gupta, Dinesh S. Badiar, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Puneet
Jain, Ms. Christi Jain, Harsh Jain, Harshit Khanduja, Shailendra Sharma,
Pankaj Sharma, Ms. Pratibha Jain, Ritesh Khatri, Abhisth Kumar, Ajay
Choudhary, Ms. Rachana Srivastava, Sudarsh Menon, Simarandra B.,
Ram Gupta, Keshav Ranjan, Senthil Jagadeesan, Ms. Sonakshi Malhan,
Ms. Shruiti Chowdhary, Ms. Mrinal Kanwar, Ambhoj Kumar Sinha,
Abhinav Ramkrishna, Thomas Joseph, Ms. Anannya Ghosh, R. Anand
Padmanabhan, Shashi Bhushan Kumar, Vikas Mehta, Rajat Sehgal,
Apoorv Khator, C. Paramasivam, M. Yogesh Kanna, Arun K. Sinha,
Yashraj Singh Deora, Munawwar Naseem, C. L. Sahu, Varun Thakur,
Brajesh Pandey, Varinder Kumar Sharma, Mrs. Balvinder Kaur Brar,
Rajesh Mahale, Mukesh Verma, Pawan Kumar Shukla, Sanjeet Paliwal,
INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. v.
 MANOHAR LAL & ORS.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1092
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 15 S.C.R.
Yash Pal Dhingra, Pallav Mongia, Dawneesh Shaktivati, A. Goyal,
Dr. M. S. Verma, Ms. Acpana Malik, Ms. Richa Verma, Ms. Shashi
Singh, Rajnish Kumar Jha, M/s. Delhi Law Chambers, Divyakant Lahoti,
Manish Kaushik, Parikshit Ahuja, Praveena Bisht, Kartik Lahoti, K.
Parameshwar, M. V. Mukunda, P. V. Dinesh, Ms. Sindhu T. P., Mukund
P. Unny, Bineesh K., R. S. Lakshman, Ashwini Kumar Singh, Aniruddha
Deshmukh, Rajesh Srivastava, K. K. Trivedi, Mayank Trivedi, Mahavir
Godvi, Rabin Majumder, Sourav Roy, Harsh Anand, Gaurav Majumdar,
Ms. Devika Khanna, Yash Ahlawat, Mrs. V. D. Khanna, Devendra Singh,
Manish K. Bishnoi, Hiren Dasan, Abhimanue Shrestha, Abhishek Gupta,
M/s. S. Narain & Co., Shree Pal Singh, Balaji Srinivasan, Advs. for the
appearing parties.
The Orders of the Court were passed by
ARUN MISHRA, J.
1. The question of interpretation of Section 24 of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, 'the Act of 2013'), has been referred
to a five-Judge Constitution Bench of this Court.
2. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pune Municipal
Corporation & Anr. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki & Ors. (2014)
3 SCC 183, had delivered a judgment interpreting section 24 of the Act
of 2013. In Yogesh Neema & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016)
6 SCC 387, a two-Judge Bench, doubted the decision of Sree Balaji
Nagar Residential Assn. v. State of Tamil Nadu (2015) 3 SCC 353
and referred the matter to a larger Bench.
3. Yet in another Civil Appeal No.20982 of 2017 arising out of
S.L.P. (C) No.2131 of 2016 (Indore Development Authority vs.
Shailendra (Dead) through Lrs. & Ors., 2018 SCC Online SC 100)
the matter was referred to a larger Bench on 7.12.2017. The following
observations were made in Indore Development Authority (supra):
"19. It was also urged that this Court is also bound to prevent the
abuse of process of law. The cases which have been concluded
are being revived. In spite of not accepting the compensation
deliberately and statement are made in the Court that they do not
want to receive the compensation at any cost, and they are agitating
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1093
the matter time and again after having lost the matters and when
proceedings are kept pending by interim orders by filing successive
petitions, the provisions of section 24 cannot be invoked by such
landowners.
20. There is already a reference made as to the applicability of
section 24 in SLP (C) No.10472/2008 - Yogesh Neema & Ors v.
State of M.P. & Ors. vide order dated 12.01.2016. There are
several other issues arising which have been mentioned above
but have not been considered in Pune Municipal Corpn. (supra).
Thus, here is a case where the matter should be considered by a
larger Bench. Let the matter be placed before Hon'ble the Chief
Justice of India for appropriate orders."
4. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (Dead) thr.
Lrs. & Ors. (supra), the bench consisting of one of us, namely, Arun
Mishra, J., Adarsh Kumar Goel, J. and Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J.
has decided the matter, and the view taken is that in Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra), the Court did not consider several aspects as to
the interpretation of section 24 of the Act of 2013. The decision mentioned
above was accepted unanimously by the three Judges. However, as
Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was a judgment by a bench of
coordinate strength, two of us, namely, myself and Adarsh Kumar Goel,
J. opined that decision is per incuriam. However, Mohan M.
Shantanagoudar, J. opined that it would be appropriate to refer the matter
to a larger Bench. In the majority opinion in Indore Development
Authority (supra), the questions formulated have been answered thus:
 "228. Our answers to the questions are as follows:
Q. No. I:- The word 'paid' in section 24 of the Act of 2013 has
the same meaning as 'tender of payment' in section 31(1) of the
Act of 1894. They carry the same meaning, and the expression
'deposited' in section 31(2) is not included in the expressions 'paid'
in section 24 of the Act of 2013 or in 'tender of payment' used in
section 31(1) of the Act of 1894. The words 'paid'/tender' and
'deposited' are different expressions and carry different meanings
within their fold.
In section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 in the expression 'paid,' it is
not necessary that the amount should be deposited in Court as
provided in section 31(2) of the Act of 1894. Non-deposit of
 INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.
 MANOHAR LAL & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1094
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 15 S.C.R.
compensation in Court under section 31(2) of the Act of 1894
does not result in a lapse of acquisition under section 24(2) of the
Act of 2013. Due to the failure of deposit in Court, the only
consequence at the most in appropriate cases may be of a higher
rate of interest on compensation as envisaged under section 34 of
the Act of 1894 and not lapse of acquisition.
Once the amount of compensation has been unconditionally
tendered, and it is refused, that would amount to payment, and the
obligation under section 31(1) stands discharged, and that amounts
to the discharge of obligation of payment under section 24(2) of
the Act of 2013 also. It is not open to the person who has refused
to accept compensation, to urge that since it has not been deposited
in Court, the acquisition has lapsed. Claimants/landowners, after
refusal, cannot take advantage of their own wrong and seek
protection under the provisions of section 24(2).
Q. No. II:- The normal mode of taking physical possession under
the land acquisition cases is drawing of Panchnama as held in
Banda Development Authority (supra).
Q. No. III:- The provisions of section 24 of the Act of 2013, do
not revive barred or stale claims such claims cannot be entertained.
Q. No. IV:- Provisions of section 24(2) do not intend to cover the
period spent during litigation and when the authorities have been
disabled to act under section 24(2) due to the final or interim order
of a court or otherwise, such period has to be excluded from the
period of five years as provided in section 24(2) of the Act of
2013. There is no conscious omission in section 24(2) for the
exclusion of a period of the interim order. There was no necessity
to insert such a provision. The omission does not make any
substantial difference as to legal position.
Q. No. V:- The principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit is
applicable, including the other common law principles for
determining the questions under section 24 of the Act of 2013.
The period covered by the final/ interim order by which the
authorities 196 have been deprived of taking possession has to be
excluded. Section 24(2) has no application where Court has
quashed acquisition."
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1095
Question Nos.2, 3, 4, and 5, which have been decided, did not
arise in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra).Question No.2 was
a general question with respect to the mode of taking possession
under the land acquisition cases. Remaining question arose out
of Yogesh Neema (supra).
5. A three-Judge Bench of this Court on 21.2.2018 requested the
other benches to defer the hearing until a decision, one way or the other,
on the issue whether the matter should be referred to the larger Bench
or not.
6. A Division Bench presided by Adarsh Kumar Goel, J. on
22.2.2018 in Indore Development Authority v. Shyam Verma and Ors.,
(S.L.P. (C) No.9798 of 2016) considered it appropriate to refer the matter
to Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India to refer the issues to be resolved by
a larger Bench at the earliest.
7. On 22.2.2018, a Bench consisting of myself and Amitava Roy,
J. have in State of Haryana v. Maharana Pratap Charitable Trust
(Regd.) & Anr. (Civil Appeal No. 4835 of 2015) referred the matter to
the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate bench
for consideration of the larger issue. Thus, it is apparent that two-division
Benches, i.e., one consisting of myself and another consisting of Adarsh
Kumar Goel, J. referred the matter to Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India.
Hon'ble, the Chief Justice of India, considered it appropriate to constitute
a Constitution Bench to deal with all the issues in an apposite manner.
8. The case was listed before a five-Judge Constitution Bench on
6.3.2018. The Constitution Bench observed that it would consider all
the aspects including the correctness of the decision of Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra) and the other judgments following the said decision
as well as the judgments rendered in Indore Development Authority
(supra). Thus, all the questions are kept open to be decided. No particular
question has been referred to the larger bench. After that, Hon'ble, the
Chief Justice of India has constituted this Bench to decide the reference.
9. Mr. Shyam Divan, Mr. Dinesh Dwivedi and Mr. Gopal
Sankarnarayanan, learned Senior Advocates on behalf of the respondents,
have raised a preliminary objection for recusal of one of us, namely;
Arun Mishra, J. on the ground that Constitution Bench consists of one of
 INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.
 MANOHAR LAL & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1096
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 15 S.C.R.
the Judges who were on a smaller panel and the correctness of the
opinion cannot be, thus, judged by the Constitution Bench independently,
as a final view has been expressed in Indore Development Authority
(supra) wherein the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra)
has been held to be per incuriam. Thus, the Judge who has decided the
matter in Indore Development Authority (supra) is pre-disposed to decide
the matter only in a particular way. It was also submitted that there is
reasonable apprehension that the Judge may have some bias in dealing
with the matter by a larger Bench. As such, one of us, namely; Arun
Mishra, J. should recuse. It was further submitted that a Judge could
not sit in appeal to adjudge his judgment. The jurisdictions are primarily
corrective jurisdictions under the hierarchal system, and professional as
well as institutional integrity demands that the same person should not
be a Judge at both levels. The Judge who has decided the matter may
be pre-disposed to support the previous reasoning and, in that case, it
would seem that he is or she is a Judge in his or her own cause. The
learned Counsel for the respondents are of the view that the Indore
Development Authority (supra) is wrongly decided. The Court or
Tribunal should be above unfairness or bias. The Judge has to step
down, in case he cannot impart justice impartially. The judge or judges
concerned should excuse themselves and abstain from sitting in the case.
A Judge cannot hear an appeal against his/ her own decisions.
10. Per contra, Shri Tushar Mehta, Learned Solicitor General,
Shri Mohan Parasaran, Shri Anoop Chaudhary and Shri Vivek Tankha,
learned Senior Advocates submitted that there is no question of recusal
and as a matter of substance it is the practice of this Court that the
Judges who have decided the matter earlier or have referred it are made
part of the Bench. They have cited several decisions to the effect that
Judges who have delivered a Judgment in a three-Judges Bench formed
part of a five-Judges Bench or the larger Benches which decided the
matter. The plea of bias or pre-disposition is not attracted in the matter
of judicial decisions. The plea of bias or pre-disposition is based on
extra-judicial factors. What the Court is required to answer is only a
pure question of law, and there are occasions when Hon'ble, the Chief
Justice of India, has considered it appropriate to constitute an appropriate
bench having decided a case. Recusal of any Judge cannot be sought on
the ground that the decision rendered by him in a smaller bench has to
be considered by the larger bench.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1097
11. Learned Solicitor General submitted that a tendency is growing
in that as soon as important matters are listed, particular articles are
written in the newspapers concerning the Constitution of the bench or to
influence the decision on merits of a case. Newspaper articles are written
to influence Court. The very independence of the judicial system is at
stake, if in this kind of scenario, recusal is sought by powerful lobbies,
and any recusal would be defeating the very oath of the office which a
Judge takes.
12. Shri Mohan Parasaran, learned Senior Counsel has also pointed
out that the practice of this Court makes the law, and the Judges who
have decided the matters in a smaller Bench have ordinarily formed
quorum of the larger Benches. The question is of deciding the legal
principle. In the Review jurisdiction and Curative Petitions; the same
Judge hears the matter. There is nothing wrong in case the Judges who
have heard the matter in smaller Benches form part of the larger bench.
There is no question of any pre-disposition in such matters or bias, and
as such, the decision rendered in smaller formation cannot be a ground
for seeking recusal.
13. The first question before us is whether a Judge who has
expressed an opinion in a smaller Bench and the case has been referred
to a larger Bench, because of the conflict of the opinion or otherwise,
can hear the matter in a larger bench. For finding an answer to the
same, we have to look into the practice of this Court.
14. Shri M.C. Setalvad, in his autobiography "My Life, Law and
other things" has referred in Chapter 12 the events between 1955 to
1969. He has referred to one of the important decisions of this Court
delivered by S.R. Das, J., who was the then Acting Chief Justice. It
was the Bengal Immunity case. In 1953, a bench presided over by
Chief Justice Sastri of which Justice Bhagwati was a member held that
State could impose sales tax on goods delivered for consumption in that
State, even though the sale was an inter-State sale as held in State of
Bombay v. United Motors India Ltd., 1953 SCR 1069 with Justice
Bose and Justice S.R. Das, Justice Bose delivered a dissenting judgment
and S.R. Das, J. as a Junior Judge had also expressed a contrary opinion
in another decision.
15 The same question arose in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State
of Bihar, 1955 (2) S.C.R. 603, which came up when S.R. Das, J. was
 INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.
 MANOHAR LAL & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1098
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 15 S.C.R.
acting as the Chief Justice. S.R. Das, J. who held strong views on the
matter, had the matter placed before larger Bench of seven Judges,
including the two, Justice Bose and Justice Bhagwati, who had participated
in the earlier decision. Justice Bhagwati, who had formed part of the
majority in the United Motors case (supra), agreeing with the view of
Chief Justice Sastri, had reversed his former view, giving his reasons in
detail and held that earlier decision was erroneous. Following are the
extracts from "My Life, Law and other things" by M.C. Setalvad :
 "One of the important decisions of the Supreme Court
delivered while S.R. Das was the Chief Justice, was the Bengal
Immunity Case. That case had an interesting history. Article 286
of the Constitution (as it then stood) prohibited a State Legislature
from imposing sales tax on transactions of inter-State sales and
sales in the course of export. The Article was not, however,
happily worded. In 1953, a Bench of the Supreme Court presided
over by Chief Justice Sastri, of which Justice Bhagwati was a
member, held that a State could impose sales tax on goods delivered
for consumption in that State, even though the sale was an interState sale1. This decision was contrary to the express provision of
the Constitution that Parliament alone could authorise the imposition
of a tax on sales in the course of inter-State sales and was based
on an explanation to Article 286(1)(a), which was not applicable.
Justice Bose had delivered a dissenting judgment, and S.R. Das
as a puisne judge had also expressed a contrary opinion in another
decision.
 The same question arose in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v.
State of Bihar2 which came up when S.R. Das was acting as the
Chief Justice. The Bengal Immunity Co. manufactured medicinal
products in Bengal and sold them all over India including Bihar.
The Company had no office or agent in Bihar but the Bihar sales
tax authorities sought to compel the Company to register as a
dealer in Bihar and pay sales tax on the ground that goods delivered
in Bihar for consumption in Bihar as a direct result of the sale
were liable to sales tax in Bihar even though the sale had taken
place in Bengal. The view of the State of Bihar was in accordance
with the decision of the Supreme Court in the United Motors
1State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd., (1953) S.C.R. 1069.
2 (1955) 2 S.C.R. 603.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1099
Case but Das, who held strong views in the matter, had the matter
placed before a larger Bench of seven judges including two, Justice
Bose and Justice Bhagwati, who had participated in the earlier
decision.
 The matter was of vital importance to the States, because
under the view expressed by Chief Justice Sastri in the United
Motors Case, one State - the State in which goods had been
delivered for consumption as a direct result of the sale - would be
entitled to levy sales tax on such transactions, while, under the
other view, no State at all would be able to tax the goods, as the
transaction of sale would be an inter-State sale. The Centre alone
could make a law for levying a sales tax on inter-State sales.
There is little doubt that the somewhat strained construction put
upon the Explanation to Article 286(1)(a) by Chief Justice Sastri
and the majority was due to the consideration that the sources of
revenue of the States under the Constitution which were already
slender should not be diminished by denying to the States the
opportunity of levying sales tax altogether in such cases.
 Notices were issued to all the States and many of them
intervened by their Advocates-General. N.C. Chatterjee appeared
for the Bengal Immunity Company, and Lal Narayanan Sinha,
then the Government Advocate of Bihar, appeared for the State
of Bihar. I intervened on behalf of the State of West Bengal.
Sikri, as the Advocate-General, represented the State of East
Punjab.
 At the outset arose the question whether the Supreme Court
could overrule its previous decision if it was satisfied that it was
erroneous. That was the first occasion on which the Court was
called upon to deal with this important question.
 The Court naturally considered the practice followed in other
final Courts of appeal. The Privy Council had held that though it
was not absolutely bound to follow its earlier decisions it would
seldom differ from them in constitutional matters as they would
have been acted upon both by Governments and subjects. The
United States Supreme Court had on a number of occasions
expressly overruled its previous decisions. The majority of the
3.In England the position has since changed; the House of Lords is no longer bound by
its own decisions.
 INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.
 MANOHAR LAL & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1100
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 15 S.C.R.
Supreme Court including Das preferred to follow the American
practice. Das pointed out the difference between the position in
England where the House of Lords had held that it was bound by
its earlier decisions3 and India and observed:
 But, in a country governed by a federal constitution, such as
the United States of America and the Union of India are, it is by
no means easy to amend the Constitution, if an erroneous
interpretation is put upon it by this Court. An erroneous
interpretation to the Constitution may quite conceivably be
perpetuated or may at any rate remain unrectified for considerable
time to the great detriment to public well-being. The considerations
adverted to in the decisions of the Supreme Court of America
quoted above are, therefore, apposite and apply in full force in
determining whether a previous decision of this Court should or
should not be disregarded or overruled There is nothing in our
Constitution which prevents us from departing from a previous
decision if we are convinced of its error and its baneful effect on
the general interests of the public.
 He then proceeded to point out a number of circumstances
which made it necessary to set right what he considered to be the
harmful effects of the earlier decision which he believed to be
erroneous. He ultimately formulated the governing principle in
these words:
 Reference is made to the doctrine of finality of judicial
decisions and it is pressed upon us that we should not reverse our
previous decision except in cases where a material provision of
law has been overlooked or where the decision has proceeded
upon the mistaken assumption of the continuance of a repealed or
expired statute and that we should not differ from a previous
decision merely because a contrary view appears to us to be
preferable. It is needless for us to say that we should not lightly
dissent from a previous pronouncement of this Court. Our power
of review, which undoubtedly exists, must be exercised with due
care and caution and only for advancing the public well-being in
the light of the surrounding circumstances of each case brought
to our notice; but we do not consider it right to confine our power
within rigidly fixed limits, as suggested before us.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1101
 The minority, consisting of three Judges, did not, however,
accept this position.
 On the merits, the majority of the Court consisting of four
judges, including the acting Chief Justice, came to the conclusion
that the provisions of several parts of Article 286 made it clear
that it had to deal with different topics and one part could not be
projected or read into another. The conclusion reached was that
the Explanation to clause (1) (a) could not be ultimately extended
to clause (2) either as an exception or as a proviso and read as
limiting the ambit of clause (2). Until Parliament provided otherwise
by law in exercise of its powers under clause (2) of the Article, no
State could impose any tax on sales or purchases taking place in
the course of inter-State trade or commerce. The decision of
Chief Justice Sastri to the extent that it decided to the contrary
could not be accepted as well-founded on principle or authority.
 The dissenting view was expressed in powerful opinions by
each of the three dissenting Judges. They took the view that the
scheme of the Article was that it fixed the situs of the sales with
a view to avoid multiple taxation. For that purpose, it divided
sales into two categories, "inside sales" and "outside sales", and
enacted that a State cannot tax an outside sale. When, in the
same context, the Explanation declared that a sale must be deemed
to have taken place in the State in which the goods are delivered
for consumption, its purpose clearly was to take such sales out of
inter-State trade and stamp them with the character of inter-State
sales.
 The most powerful dissent was that delivered by Justice
Aiyar, whose judgment was the most exhaustive and the longest
of the judgments delivered by the various Judges. One of the
notable judgments in the case was that of Justice Bhagwati who
had formed part of the majority in the United Motors case,
agreeing with the view of Chief Justice Sastri. He reversed his
former view with skill, giving his reasons in detail. He had the
courage to state that his opinion in the earlier decision "was clearly
erroneous and public interest demand the same should be
reversed."
 (emphasis supplied)
 INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.
 MANOHAR LAL & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1102
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 15 S.C.R.
16. In M/s. Ujagar Prints and Ors. (II) v. Union of India &
Ors. (1989) 3 SCC 488, a Constitution Bench of this Court was constituted
consisting of R.S. Pathak, C.J., Sabyasachi Mukherji, S. Natarajan, M.N.
Venkatachaliah and S. Ranganathan, JJ. The question which arose for
consideration was the correctness of the decision in Empire Industries
Ltd. v. Union of India (1985) 3 SCC 314, which was decided by a
Bench consisting of three-Judges, namely S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, S.
Varadarajan, and Sabyasachi Mukherji, JJ. Sabyasachi Mukherji, J.
delivered the judgment on his behalf and S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.
Varadarajan partly concurred. The matter was referred to examine the
correctness of the view of Justice Sabyasachi Mukherji expressed for
the Court in Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (supra). The
view taken in the previous decision by Sabyasachi Mukherji, J., was
held to be good law. It was a case where the correctness of the view
taken in Empire Industries case (supra) on certain aspects was doubted
by another Bench of this Court in M/s. Ujagar Prints v. Union of
India (1986) Supp. SCC 652. Accordingly, the matter was referred to a
five-judge Bench. Sabyasachi Mukherji, J. was one of the members of
the Bench which affirmed his decision in the Empire Industries case
(supra).
17. There is yet another instance of a Constitution Bench which
comprised of Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J., P.N. Bhagwati, S. Murtaza Fazal
Ali, Amarendra Nath Sen, P. Balakrishna Eradi, JJ. in the matter of
Gyan Devi Anand v.