# INDU BHUSHAN GUPTA v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS

- **Citation:** [1980] 1 S.C.R. 179
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1979-08-01
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 2371 of 1969
- **Bench:** N. L. Untwalia, A. P. Sen
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/indu-bhushan-gupta-v-state-of-u-p-ors-7731
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

UP. Zamindari & Land Reforms Act, 1950 Ss. 6, 289(1), 291(3)-Scope
of-Taccavi loan taken by agriculturist-If could be deducted from compensa~
lion payable to him for abolition of Zamindaris.
The appellant and the sixth respondent, who were brothers, constituted a
A
B
joint Hindu family.
Though younger in age than the sixth respondent,
the
C
appellant by virtue of a settlen1ent, became Karfit of the joint family.
The
family o\vnc<l vast Zamindari properties, one of which was a•
Farn1 known as
Mukundpur Farm. For the improve1nent of the Farm the
appellant
took
taccaiii loan by offering his half share in the joint family property as security.
On his failure to repay the loan the Collector of the District ordered attach·
rnent of the hypothecated property under s. 150 of the U.P. Land Revenue
Act, 190i'. The appellant ·alleged that as a result of the partition of properties
D
between him and his brother the hypothecated property fell to the share of his
brother, that under the compromise decree his brother
undertook
to
dis·
charge the loan and that therefore it was he who was responsible for repayment of the loan.
(The Government, however was not impleaded as a party
to the suit in \\'hich compromise was arrived at between the brothers.)
Sometime later the sixth respondent resiled from the compromise decree
E
and stated that he was not liable to repay the loan because it was not taken by
the .appellant in his capacity as Karta of the joint family but that it was taken
only in his (appellant's) personal capacity and that, therefore, he alone was
liable to repay it. The Collector made enquiries and held that the loan was
taken by the appellant in his individual capacity and not as Karta of the joint
family and held that he was personally liable to repay the loan. EventuaHy
it was decided that the realisation of the dues should be made from the hypoF
thecated property as well as from his person and accordingly proceedings for
realisation of the principal and interest on the loan were started.
The High Court rejected the appellant's writ petition. In appeal the following three questions Vt'ere raised.
(I) whether the taccavi loan was taken by
the appellant as Karta of the joint family, and, therefore, had to be recovered
from the sixth respondent to whose share the hypothecated property had fallen
in the partition ·of. the property; (2) Whether the Collector was precluded from
taking resort to any one or other i:nodes prescribed by s. 7 (1) of the land Im·
provement Loans Act, 1883 for recovery of the sum
remaining
unrealised
towards the taccavi loan; (3) Whether the Government had no right to recover
the outstanding amount due except from the compensation amount in terms
of s.6(e) thereof?
HELD : I. The loan in question was taken by the appellant in his individual
ctlpacity and not as Karta of the joirit family .. By the terms of the taccavi bond
the appellant had bound him.elf to discharge the liability from his property. Even
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
180
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1980] l S.C.K.
assuming that he took the loan as Karta, he was personally and severally liable
to pay. In the compromise suit the Government was not made a party and,
therefore, was not bound by the terms of the compromise decree; nor ~'as the
Government bound by the ·alleged partition effected between the appellant and the
sixth respondent.
[185-D-E; 186C]
2. (a) Section 7(1) of the Land Improvement Loans Act empowers the Collector to recover taccavi dues from the defaulter as UTrears of land revenue and
the Collector could have taken resort to s. 289(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, for the recovery of the unrealised amount of
raccavi loan by attacb1nent and sales of properties belonging to the appellant.
Section 289 applies only to those cases in which the provision of s. 243(1)
have been made applicable and it is nobody's case that a notification couten1plated by s. 243 (2) was ever issued. The question of s. 289 (2) operating as a

## Text

INDU BHUSHAN GUPTA
v.
STATE OF U.P. & ORS.
August 1, 1979
[N. L. UNTWALIA AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]
UP. Zamindari & Land Reforms Act, 1950 Ss. 6, 289(1), 291(3)-Scope
of-Taccavi loan taken by agriculturist-If could be deducted from compensa~
lion payable to him for abolition of Zamindaris.
The appellant and the sixth respondent, who were brothers, constituted a
A
B
joint Hindu family.
Though younger in age than the sixth respondent,
the
C
appellant by virtue of a settlen1ent, became Karfit of the joint family.
The
family o\vnc<l vast Zamindari properties, one of which was a•
Farn1 known as
Mukundpur Farm. For the improve1nent of the Farm the
appellant
took
taccaiii loan by offering his half share in the joint family property as security.
On his failure to repay the loan the Collector of the District ordered attach·
rnent of the hypothecated property under s. 150 of the U.P. Land Revenue
Act, 190i'. The appellant ·alleged that as a result of the partition of properties
D
between him and his brother the hypothecated property fell to the share of his
brother, that under the compromise decree his brother
undertook
to
dis·
charge the loan and that therefore it was he who was responsible for repayment of the loan.
(The Government, however was not impleaded as a party
to the suit in \\'hich compromise was arrived at between the brothers.)
Sometime later the sixth respondent resiled from the compromise decree
E
and stated that he was not liable to repay the loan because it was not taken by
the .appellant in his capacity as Karta of the joint family but that it was taken
only in his (appellant's) personal capacity and that, therefore, he alone was
liable to repay it. The Collector made enquiries and held that the loan was
taken by the appellant in his individual capacity and not as Karta of the joint
family and held that he was personally liable to repay the loan. EventuaHy
it was decided that the realisation of the dues should be made from the hypoF
thecated property as well as from his person and accordingly proceedings for
realisation of the principal and interest on the loan were started.
The High Court rejected the appellant's writ petition. In appeal the following three questions Vt'ere raised.
(I) whether the taccavi loan was taken by
the appellant as Karta of the joint family, and, therefore, had to be recovered
from the sixth respondent to whose share the hypothecated property had fallen
in the partition ·of. the property; (2) Whether the Collector was precluded from
taking resort to any one or other i:nodes prescribed by s. 7 (1) of the land Im·
provement Loans Act, 1883 for recovery of the sum
remaining
unrealised
towards the taccavi loan; (3) Whether the Government had no right to recover
the outstanding amount due except from the compensation amount in terms
of s.6(e) thereof?
HELD : I. The loan in question was taken by the appellant in his individual
ctlpacity and not as Karta of the joirit family .. By the terms of the taccavi bond
the appellant had bound him.elf to discharge the liability from his property. Even
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
180
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1980] l S.C.K.
assuming that he took the loan as Karta, he was personally and severally liable
to pay. In the compromise suit the Government was not made a party and,
therefore, was not bound by the terms of the compromise decree; nor ~'as the
Government bound by the ·alleged partition effected between the appellant and the
sixth respondent.
[185-D-E; 186C]
2. (a) Section 7(1) of the Land Improvement Loans Act empowers the Collector to recover taccavi dues from the defaulter as UTrears of land revenue and
the Collector could have taken resort to s. 289(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, for the recovery of the unrealised amount of
raccavi loan by attacb1nent and sales of properties belonging to the appellant.
Section 289 applies only to those cases in which the provision of s. 243(1)
have been made applicable and it is nobody's case that a notification couten1plated by s. 243 (2) was ever issued. The question of s. 289 (2) operating as a
bar to the recovery proceedings upon expiry of period of three years, therefore,
does not arise.
Ifs. 289(2) is read in the context of sub-s. (1)
it \Vill be
clear that upon the expiry of the period of three years the village bas to be
restored free of claim on the part of the Government for any arrear of land
revenue due in respect thereof. The consequence that ensures is that liability
for payment of land revenue in respect of the village or any area therein in
respect of which arrears are due stand~ discharged. But in regard to other
sums of money recoverable as arrears of land revenue the liability continues.
[186D; G, 187E-Fl
(b) As s. 291(3) contemplates that upon expiry of the period of lease, the
holding shall be restored to the tenure·holder concerned free of any claim on
the part of the State Government for any arrears in resp_ect of such holding.
In this case the period of the lease had not expired when the recovery pro·
ceedings were initiated. [188A-B]
3. Section 6(c) provides that all amounts due under the
Land
JJnprove·
ment Loans Act shall becon1e due forthwith upon the vesting of the Zamindari
rights.
It also provides that such dues may, without prejudice to any other
mode of recovery provided therefor, be realised by deducting the amount from
the compensatiori n1oney paya-ble to such intermediary.
What it provides is
an additional mode of recovery for roolisation of the dues.
Under the scheme
the Government has the option and the mode indicated in the sectiori is not the
one and the only mode available.
The recovery proceedings pending before
the Collector were for the remainder of the loan after such adjustment together
with interest. [!88F-G]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 2371
of
1969.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23-5-1968 of the Allahabad
High Court in Special Appeal No. 247 /66.
G. L. Sanghi, Mrs. S. Bagga for the Appellant.
G. N. Dikshit and 0. P. Rana for Respondents 1-5.
H
S. K. Bagga for Respondent No. 6
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
T'
l
j.
'
.
•
J •
I. B. GUPTA v. STATE (Sen, !.)
181
SEN J .-This appeal, by certificate, is directed against a judgment· A
of the Allahabad High Court dated May 23, 1968, whereby it upheld
a judgment of a Single Judge of that Court dated March 16, 1966, dismissing the appellant's writ petition to quash recovery proceedings
initiated by the Collector, Azamgarh for realisation of the sum remaining due on account of a taccavi loan under s.7 (!) of the Land ImB
provement Loans Act, 1883.
¥
~
The; facts leading to this appeal, in brief, are as
follows:
The
-• +
•
·\
appellant and his brother Shashi Bhushan Gupta the sixth respondent,
constituted a joint Hindu fumily owning extensive zamindari properties, over several districts in United Provinces including Azmatgarh
C
zamindari comprising of 34 villages.
They owned an agricultural farm
known as Mukundpur Farm situated in Azmatgarh zamindari. It is
alleged that by virtue of a family settlement in 1940, the appellant
even though younger in age, became the karta of the joint family.
By his application dated February 25, 1947 the appellant applied
for a uiccavi loan of Rs. 1,22,000 in the prescribed form for improvement of Mukundpur Farm, to the Director of Agriculture, United
Provinces through· the Collector, Azamgarh.
The property offered
as se.curity for advance or the loan was the zarnindari rights in Azmatgarh zamindari comprising of the aforesaid 34 villages bearing a ]and
revenue of Rs. 11,000/-. During the verifioation
proceedings, the
appellant by his application dated February 22, 1948, offered a security
of his half share in Azmatgarh zamindari, which on enquiry by the
Collector for the grant of sanction for the loan, was evaluated av
Rs. l,43,869.66p. The taccavi loan was duly sanctioned by the Gov-
. ernment on September 23, 1948.
The appellant having defaulted in payment of the loan, the Collector, Azamgarh by his order dated March 24, 1952 directed that the
entire ilaqa lying in Tahsil Sagri, district Azamgarh forming part of
D
E
F
the hypothecated property be attached under s. 150 of the U.P. Land
G
Revenue Act, 1901. It, however, seems that no attachment of wy
land situated in Tahsil Sagri forming part of the hypothecated property
had, in facf, been effected either under s.150 of the U.P. Land Revenue
Act ors. 289 (1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms
Act, 1950. It appears that some plots at the Mukundpur Farm lying
in two villages, Mahnajpur and Ghaibipur, were later taken under the
H
management of the Collector under s. 290 of that Act and half share
thereof let out to tenants, and the proceeds were adjusted towards the
182
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1980] l S.C.R.
A ·outstanding taccavi dues. It also appears that a sum of Rs. 38,951.~P
representing the appellant's half share of the compensation money dne
und payable to him: were adjusted under s.6 (e) of the Act towards the
loan.
B
c
D
E
F
G
B
It is the appellant's case that there was a partition between the
appellant and his brother, the sixth respondent in 1951, and the hypothecated property was allocated to the shure of the sixth respondent.
This resulted in ,i compromise decree between the appellant and his
brother, the sixth respondent, in Civil Suit No. 72 of 1952 under the
terms of which, the sixth respondent undertook upon himself the liability to discharge the loan as the property offered in security had fallen
to his share.
In compliance thereof, the sixth respondent u~tually paid
Rs. 16,012.SOP. The Government was admittedly not impkaded as a
party to the suit.
On Jnly 15, 1952, the sixth respondent resiled from the terms of
compromise and objected to the recovery proceedings being
taken
against him on the ground that the loan in question had noi been taken
by him nor bud the appellant borrowed it in the capacity as karta of
the joint family.
He, indeed, denied the factum of partition.
These
objections were, however, over-ruled by the Sales Officer, Azamgarh
on October 22, 1952. .
·
On May 15, 1953, the appellant applied to the State Government
for expunging his name from the debtor-sheet.
The application was
forwarded by the Government to the Collector, Azamgarh for enquiry
and report. The appellant raised an objection alleging biter alia that
the loan had been incurred by him in his capacity as kar~a of the joint
Hindu family and that since the hypothecated property had fallen to
to the share of the sixth respondent, he was not personally liable to repay the loan.
The Collector by his order dated January 18, 1955,
after holding an enquiry held that the appellant had taken the taccavi
loan in his individual capacity and not as kart>a of the joint family and
accordingly h€ was personally liable to repay the loan.
He, however,
directed the Sales
Officer that the recovery be made, in the first
instance, from the hypothecated property before proceeding against
the appellant! personally.
The actiou taken by the Collector was duly
endorsed by the Land Reforms Commissioner by his letter dated April
7, 1955, and approved of the State Government by its order dated July
22, 1955. The recovery proceedings were accordingly initiated against
the -appellant.
It appears that the appellant was a
Member of the
Legislative
Assembly and apparently wielded considerable influence.
He appears
•
"'·
"
~
..
• "- e
':r~c.'
~,-,
,.
•
•
I. B. GUPTA v. STATE (Sen, J.)
183
to have addressed a representation to the Chief Minister on April lU,
1956.
The State G-Ovemment referred the matter to the Commissioner,
Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur who by his letter dated October 19,
1956 stated that he was fully in agreement with the Collector that the
appellant must be treated as having taken the loan in his individual
capacity and proceedings for its recovery had to be taken against the
hypothecated property as well as against him personally.
The latter
also mentioned that the Collector had been asked, if necessary, to
explain the case personally to the Chief Minister.
Evidently, the State Government after reviewing the matter 'at all
levels, by its order dated August 13, 1957 directed that the realisation
of the taccavi dues outstanding against the appellant should be made
from the hypothecated property >as well as from his person immediately.
It further directed that 'all the modes for recovery legally permissible
should be adopted against him simultaneously and pursued vigorously'.
Despite all this, the appellant has not paid a pie towards the outstanding debt except through coercive process.
On December 17,
1957, the appellant addressed a representation to the Board of Revenue
although under the taccavi rules no appeal or revision lay to the
Board. It is somewhat strange that the Addi.
Lwd Reforms Commissioner, contrary to the Government's orders in that behalf, submitted a report, on his own, upholding the appellant's contention that he
had borrowed the loan in his capacity as kmta of the joint family, and
recommending that the loan in question should be recovered from the
hypothecated property.
The State Government naturally did not act
upon this gratuitous advice.
On June 19, 1959, the appellant woas
informed of the Government's decision.
Thereafter, the
Collector
started proceedings for realisation of Rs. 72,152.50P as principal and
Rs. 23,689.81P as interest.
Thereupon, the appellant on August 4, 1959 moved the Al!ahaVad
High Court under. Art. 226.
The appellant's writ petition was
dismissed by a learned Single Judge. It appears that the contention that
the loan was incurred by him as karta of the joint Hindu family was
not raised before the learned Single Judge, as he observes "It appears
that recovery proceedings were taken against the Mukundpur Farm,
which, it is not disputed, belongs exclusively to the petitioner''. He
negatived the contention that the Collector had let out a part of the
Mukundpur Farm in 1952 and therefore, a.fter expiry of a period of
ten years, the Government was precluded by reason of s.291 (3) of
the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act from
further
continuing the recovery proceedings. He held that this involved
a
1 l-475 SCI/79
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
fl
184
SUPKEME COURT REPORTS
, (1980] 1 S.C.R.
disputed question of fact as according to the Government certain plots
of Munkundpur Farm were first let out iu 1959-60 and not in 1952,
and therefore, the bar of s.291 (3) was not applicable.
As regards
the contention based on s.6 (e) of the Act that the Government had
no power to make the recovery except frorn out of the compensation .
amount, .he held that the provision did not debar the Government from
proceeding otherwise.
On the question of accounting he held that the
submission calls for an accounting of the amount received by such Jetting out and there was no material upon which the decision of the
Court could rest.
On appeal, the appellant for the first time raised an objection as
to his personal liability alleging that the loan in question was incurred
by him in the capacity of karta, and, therefore, recoverable from the
hypothecated property alone. There was a difference of opinion on
the question between the learned Judges constituting the Bench as to
whether he had taken the loan •as karta of the joint family or in his
individual capacity, but nonetheless the appeal failed because they repelled all other contention$.
Four questions arise in this appeal : 1. Whether the taocavi Joan
was incnrred by the appellant as a Jmrta of the joint Hindn family au!
not in his individual capacity and, therefoce, the loan in queition bas
to be recovered frorn the sixth respondent, inasmuch as the hypothecated property had fallen to his share in a family partition ? 2. Is
the Collector precluded from taking resort to any one or other modes
prescribed by s.7 (1) of the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883, for
recovery of the sum remaining unrealised towards the taccavi loan, by
reason of s.289 (2) or s.291 (3) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act, 1950?
3. Have the Government no right to recover the outstanding amount due except from the compensation
amount in terms of s.6 (e) thereof? 4. Was the Government. bound
to render an account of the rents and profits derived from Jetting ovt
of the plots of Mukundpur Farm?
Section 7 ( 1) of the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883, roods as
follows:
"7 (1) Subject to· such rules as may be made under section ten, all loans granted under this Act, all interest (if any)
chargeable thereon, and costs (if any)
incurred in making
the same, shall, when they become due, be recoverable by
the Collector in all or any of the following modes, namely :-
(a) from the borrower--as if they were arrears of landrevenue due by him;
"
' ...
• •
...
-·
-
!. B. GUPTA v. STATE (Sm, J.)
185
(b) from his surety (if any)-as if they were arrears of landA
revenue due by him;
( c) out of the land for the benefit of which the loan lras been
granted-as if they were arrears of land-revenue due in.
respect of that land;
( d) out of the property comprised in the collate.ral security
(if any )-according to the procedure for the realization
of land-revenue by the sale of immovable property other
than the land on which that revenue is due."
On the first point, we agree with one of the learned Judges (Uniyal
J .) . The conclusion reached by the learned Judge that 'the taccavi
loan was taken by the appellant in his individual capacity' is the only
conclusion possible.
The appellant maintained that the loan was incurred for family purposes i.e., for improvement of Munkundpur Farm
by the appellant in his capacity as the karta and it having fallen to the
share of the sixth respondent in the family partition, the recovery proceedings against the appellant under s. 7 were not maintainable.
We
fail to see how can the appellant escape liability on this account.
The
Government was not a party fo Civil Suit No. 72 of 1952 and was,
therefore, not bound by the terms of the compromise decree. Nor was
the Government bound by the alleged partition effected between the
appellant and the sixth respondent.
It matters little whether there was a partition or not in 1951; and
if so, whether the hypothecated property had fallen to the share of the
sixth respondent.
The appellant had bound himself by the terms of
the taccavi bond to discharge the liability from his property.
The
instrument is not on record.
The document was, however, before the
High Court. Uniyal J. in the course of his judgment, with regard to
~ppellant's personal liability, observes:
"He pledged his half share in 34 villages of Tahsil Sagri.
After verification of the proprietary rights of the appellant in
the hypothecated property, the Collector issued a certificate
decfaring that the same wus sufficient to cover the amount of
taccavi loan.
Thereupon a formal document in the nature
of taccavi bond was executed by the appellam of the one part
and the Collector of the other part evidencing the transaction
of loan. A list containing particulars of the immovable property was annexed to the bond, and it was stated therein that
a half share of the appellant in the said zamindari property
had been pledged by way of security." (Emphasis supplied)
The correctness of this observation is not open to question.
The
learned Judge then goes on to say:
B
c
D
E
F
G
B
B
c
D
E
11
G
186
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1980] l S.C.R.
"The naqsha maliyat aftached to the tacoavi bond clearly
mentioned the details of the hypothecated property in tahsil
Sagri consisting of one half share of the appellant."
He then rightly concludes, saying:
"It is of no consequence if the creditor proceeds against
the share of the Karta alone in the joint family
property
hypothecated as security for the loan, or from his person, or
both."
We concur in the conclusion reached by the learned Judge that the
loan in question was taken by the appellant in his individual capacity
and not as a karta of the joint Hindn family. Even assuming he took
the loan as karta, still he would be personally and severally liable to
repay it.
The remaining points are equally devoid of substance. The contention based on s. 289 (2) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950 does not arise.
No doubt, the Collector is empowered under s. 7 ( 1) of the Land Improvement Loans Act to recover
all the taccavi dues from the defaulter as arrears of land revenue, and
by reason of s. 288, the provisions of s. 289 are attracted. By s. 21!8,
it is provided that the provisions of the Act witli regard to the recovery
of arrears of land revenue shall apply to all arrears of land revenue and
'sums of money recoverable as arrears of land revenue' due at the commencement of the Act. The Collector could, therefore, have mken
resort to s. 289 (1) for the recovery of the unrealised amonnt of the
t,accavi loan by attachment and sale of properties belonging to the
appellanf. But, the ilaka of Tahsil Sagri was not, in fact, ever attached
under s. 289 ( n.
In the instant case, no previous sanction of the
Board of Revenue was obtained under s. 272(2). Consequently, the
attachmen~ could not be said to be one made under s. 289 ( 1). Further, s. 289 applies only to those cases in which the provisions of
s. 243 ( 1) have been made applicable by the Government under a notification issued under s. 243(2).
It is nobody's case that a notification
contemplated bys. 243 (2) was ever issued. The question of s. 289 (2)
operating as a bar to the recovery proceedings after expiry of a period
of three years, therefore, does not arise.
There is also a fallacy in the argument. The provisions of s. 289
run thus:
"289. Attachment of village for arrears of land revenue.-
Cl) At any time after an arrear of land revenue has accrutld, the Collector may attach the village or any area therein
L
...
-
• •
•
...
'
...
•
•
I. B. GUPTA v. STATE (Sen, J.)
187
in respect of which the arrear is due and place it under his own
management or that of an agent appointed by him for that
purpose for such period as he may consider nece~sary :
Provided that the period for which any village or 1my
area therein may be so attached, shall not exceed three years
from the commencement of the agricultural year next following the date of attachment, and the attachment shall be cancelled if the arrears are sooner liquidated.
(2) Upon the expiry of the period of attachment, the
village shall be restored free of any claim on the part of the
Government for any arrear of land revenue due in respect
thereof."
When an arrear of land revenue has accmed, the Collector may
under s. 289 ( 1) attach a village or any area therein in respect of which
the arrear is due and place it under his own management or that of an
agent appointed by him for that purpose.,
The proviso to s. 289 ( 1) ,
however, interdicts that the period for which any village or any area
therein may be so attached, shall not exceed three years from the
commencement of the agricultural year next following the date
of
attachment, and the attachment shall be cancelled if the arrears are
sooner liquidated.
Ifs. 289 (2) is read in the context of sub-s. (1), it will be clear that
upon the expiry of the period of three years the village has to he restored free of any claim on the part of the Government for any arrear
of land revenue due in respect thereof. The consequence that ensues
is that liability for payment of land revenue in respect of the village or
any area therein in respect of which arrears are due stands discharged.
There is a distinction between arrears of land revenue and other government dues recoverable as if they were arrears of land revenue.
In
respect of other sums of money recoverable as arrears of land revenue,
the debtor is not discharged of his liability for payment of such dues
even after three years.
A
B
c
D
E
F
The next question is whether by virtue of s. 291 (3), the appellant
G
stood relieved of all liability for payment of arrears of taccavi dues
after the expiry of ten years.
We may here reads .. 291 (3). It is in
these terms:
"291 (3) Upon the expiry of the period of lease the holding shall be restored to the tenure-holder concerned free of
any claim on the part of the State Government for any arrears
in respect of such holding."
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
lSS
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1980] 1 S.C.R.
The High Court has relied upon the affidavit of the Chief Revenue
Account>ant, Collectorate stating that certain plots of Mulrnndp<Jr
Farm were for the first time let out in the year 1959-60. It would,
therefore, appear that the period of ten years had not expired when
the recovery proceedings were initiated.
There remains the question whether the Government is bound to
recover the unrealized sum of taccavi loan from the amount of compensation money and relying upon s. 6 (e) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition a,nd Land Reforms Act it is urged that that is the only remedy
left.
The contention, we are afraid, proceeds on a misconception of
the purpo.rt and effect of s. 6 ( e) of the Act, which reads :
"6(e). all amounts ordered to be paid by an intermediary to the State Government under Sections 27 and 28 of
the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act, 1934, and all amounts
due from him under the Land Improvement
Loans Act,
1883, or the Agricultural Loans Act, 1884, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the said enactments, become
due forthwith and may, without prejudice to any other mode
of recovery provided therefor, be realized by deducting the
amount from the compensation money payable to such intermediary under Chapter III."
It is plain upon its terms, that the provisions of s. 6 ( e) are not
obligatory. It is an enabling provision. It provides that all amounts
due under the Land Improvement Loans Act, shall notwithstanding
anything contained therein, become due 'forthwith', upon the vesting
of the zamindari rights. It then lays down that such dues may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery provided therefor, be rel!-
lised by deducting the amount from the compensation money payable
to such intermediary. It, therefore, provides an additional mode of
recovery for realisation of the dues.
The1 word 'may' ins. 6(e) clearly indicates that the Government has the option to fall back upon
the compensation amount. It does not entail in the consequence that
the mode indicated in s. 6 ( e) is the one and the only mode available.
The High Court has observed that the entire amount of compensa"
tion money which fell to
the
appellant's share amonnting
to
Rs. 38,951.8P had been adjnsted towards the loan, on the boasis that
the half share of the appellant in the zamindari property had been
hypothecated as security for the loan.
The recovery proceedings now
pending before the Collector is for the balance remaining after such
adjustment together with interest.
It was faintly argued by learned counsel for the appellant tliat the
Government was bound to render an account of the rents and profits
-
•
-
-
•
I. B. GUPTA V. STATE (Sen, J.)
189
realised from the letting of plots of Mukundpur Farm, but he did not
pursue the argument any further and rightly so.
The High Court
has observed that it had scrutinized the accounts maintained by the
Government and the same have been maintained as required by t11e
taccavi rules as per appendix 'A' to Form VIL It was certainly not
open to the High Court to gr11nt any such relief under Art. 226 of
the Constitution particularly when it involved consideration of disputed question of fact.
The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails and is
dismissed
with costs.
P.B.R.
Appeal dismissed.
A
B