# IQBAL SINGH MARWAH v. MEENAKSHI ETC - **Citation:** [2005] 2 S.C.R. 708 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 2005-03-11 - **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 402 of 2005 - **Bench:** R.C. Lahoti, 8.N. Agrawal, H.K. Sema, G.P. Mathur, P.K. Balasubramany An - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/iqbal-singh-marwah-v-meenakshi-etc-20454 - **Pages:** 25 ## Headnote Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 195(l)(b)(ii): Cognizance of certain offences on complaint of Court,;_Bar contained in Section C 195(/)(b)(ii)-Applicability and scope of-Held: The said Section would be applicable only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document _after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis-Offence committed should be of such type which directly D affects the administration of justice-However, Court is not bound to make a complaint in this regard-Such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Interpretation of statutes-Headings vis-a-vis Marginal Notes-Held : Language employed in a heading cannot be used to give a different effect to E clear words of the Section where there cannot be any doubt as to their ordinary meaning-They are not to be treated as if they were marginal notes or were introduced into the Act merely for the purpose of classifying the enactmentsThey constitute an important part of the Act itself, and may be read not only as explaining the Sections which immediately follow them. F Words and phrases-Expression "when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in a Court"-Connotation of-In the context of Section 195(l)(b)(ii) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In a probate proceedings, the appellant no. I filed a will allegedly G executed by his deceased brother. Respondent contested the proceedings on the ground that the will was forged and moved criminal court for prosecution of appellants and their mother for forgery. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that Section 195(l)(b)(i) and (ii) CrPC H 708 • - 1.S. MARWAHv. MEENAKSHI 709 operated as a bar for taking cognizance of the offences alleged. Respondent A then filed revision before sessions judge who relying upon Sachida Nand Singh case* held that the bar contained in Section 195 (l)(b)(ii) Cr.P£. would not apply where forgery of a document was committed before the said document was produced in Court. The revision petition was accordingly allowed and the matter was remanded back. The appellants B unsuccessfully moved High Court for quashing of the order. Hence the present appeals. Appellant contended that the purpose of Section 195 is to bar private prosecution where the cause of justice is sought to be perverted leaving it to the Court itself to uphold its dignity and prestige; that if a very C restricted interpretation is given to Section 195(l)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C., as held in Sachida Nand Singh case*, the protection afforded by the provision will be virtually reduced to a vanishing point, defeating the very object of the enactment; that the provision does not completely bar the prosecution of a person who has committed an offence of the type described 'thereunder, but introduces a safeguard in the sense that he can be so prosecuted only D on the complaint of the Court where the document has been produced or given in evidence or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. Dismissing the appeals, the Court E HELD : Sachida Nand Singh case* has been correctly decided and the view taken therein is correct. Section 195(l)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court i.e. during the time when F the document was in custodia legis. (731-8-C) Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (199812SCC493, affirmed. Surjit Singh v. Balbir $ingh, (1996) 3 SCC 533, referred to. 2. Section 195 Cr.P.C. deals with three distinct categories of offences G which have been described in clauses (a), (b)(i) and (b)(ii). Clause (a) deals with offences which directly affect the functioning of or discharge of lawful dutie ## Text _Characters 0–39,971 of 62,512. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39971 for what follows._ A IQBAL SINGH MARWAH v MEENAKSHI ETC. MARCH 11, 2005 B [R.C. LAHOTI, CJ., 8.N. AGRAWAL, H.K. SEMA, G.P. MATHUR AND P.K. BALASUBRAMANY AN, JJ.] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 195(l)(b)(ii): Cognizance of certain offences on complaint of Court,;_Bar contained in Section C 195(/)(b)(ii)-Applicability and scope of-Held: The said Section would be applicable only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document _after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis-Offence committed should be of such type which directly D affects the administration of justice-However, Court is not bound to make a complaint in this regard-Such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Interpretation of statutes-Headings vis-a-vis Marginal Notes-Held : Language employed in a heading cannot be used to give a different effect to E clear words of the Section where there cannot be any doubt as to their ordinary meaning-They are not to be treated as if they were marginal notes or were introduced into the Act merely for the purpose of classifying the enactmentsThey constitute an important part of the Act itself, and may be read not only as explaining the Sections which immediately follow them. F Words and phrases-Expression "when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in a Court"-Connotation of-In the context of Section 195(l)(b)(ii) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In a probate proceedings, the appellant no. I filed a will allegedly G executed by his deceased brother. Respondent contested the proceedings on the ground that the will was forged and moved criminal court for prosecution of appellants and their mother for forgery. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that Section 195(l)(b)(i) and (ii) CrPC H 708 • - 1.S. MARWAHv. MEENAKSHI 709 operated as a bar for taking cognizance of the offences alleged. Respondent A then filed revision before sessions judge who relying upon Sachida Nand Singh case* held that the bar contained in Section 195 (l)(b)(ii) Cr.P£. would not apply where forgery of a document was committed before the said document was produced in Court. The revision petition was accordingly allowed and the matter was remanded back. The appellants B unsuccessfully moved High Court for quashing of the order. Hence the present appeals. Appellant contended that the purpose of Section 195 is to bar private prosecution where the cause of justice is sought to be perverted leaving it to the Court itself to uphold its dignity and prestige; that if a very C restricted interpretation is given to Section 195(l)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C., as held in Sachida Nand Singh case*, the protection afforded by the provision will be virtually reduced to a vanishing point, defeating the very object of the enactment; that the provision does not completely bar the prosecution of a person who has committed an offence of the type described 'thereunder, but introduces a safeguard in the sense that he can be so prosecuted only D on the complaint of the Court where the document has been produced or given in evidence or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. Dismissing the appeals, the Court E HELD : Sachida Nand Singh case* has been correctly decided and the view taken therein is correct. Section 195(l)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court i.e. during the time when F the document was in custodia legis. (731-8-C) Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (199812SCC493, affirmed. Surjit Singh v. Balbir $ingh, (1996) 3 SCC 533, referred to. 2. Section 195 Cr.P.C. deals with three distinct categories of offences G which have been described in clauses (a), (b)(i) and (b)(ii). Clause (a) deals with offences which directly affect the functioning of or discharge of lawful duties of a public servant. Clause (b)(i) refers to offences which relate to giving or fabricating false evidence or making a false declaration in any judicial proceeding or before a Court of justice or before a public H 710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) 2 S.C.R. A servant who is bound or authorized by law to receive such deelaratioit, and also to some other offences which have a direct co-relation with the proceedings in a Court of justice. This being the scheme of two provisions or clauses of Section 195, the expression "when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in B evidence in a proceeding in a _Court" occurring in clause (b)(ii) should normally mean commission· of such an offence after the document has actually been produced or given in evidence in the Court. The situation o .. contingency where an offence as enumerated in this clause has already been committed earlier and later on the document is produced or is given in evidence in Court, does not appear to be in tune with clauses (a)(i) and . C (b)(i) and consequently with the scheme of Section 195 Cr.P.C. (718-H, 719-A, B, C-E] · 3. Section 195(1) mandates a complaint in writmg of the Court for taking cognizance of the offences enumerated in clauses (b) (i) and (b)(ii) thereof. Sections 340 and 341 Cr.P.C. which occur in Chapter XXVI give D the procedure for filing of the complaint and other matters connected therewith. The heading of this Chapter is-'Provisions As To Offences Affecting The Administration of Justice'. Though, as a general rule, the language employed in a heading cannot be used to give a different effect to clear words of the Section where there cannot be any doubt as to their E ordinary meaning, but they are not to be treated as if they were marginal notes or were introduced into the Act merely for the purpose of classifying the enactments. They constitute an important part of the Act itself, and may be read not only as explaining the Sections which immediately follow them, as a preamble to a statute may be looked to explain its enactments, but as affording a better key to the const_ructions of the Sections which F follow them than might be afforded by a mere preamble. The fact that the procedure for filing a complaint by Court has been provided in Chapter XXVI dealing with offences affecting administration of justice, is a clear pointer of the legislative intent that the offence committed should be of such type which directly-affects-t-he-administration of justice, viz., which is committed after the document is produced or given in G evidence in Court. Any offence committed with respect to a document at a time prior to its production or giving in evidence in Court cannot, strictly speaking, be said to be an offence affecting the administration of justice. [719-F-H, 720-A-Cl H Craies on Statute Law, 7th Ed. Pages 207, 209, ref erred to .. I-r- '" I.S. MAR WAH v. MEENAKSHI 711 4.1. Section 190 Cr.P.C. provides that a Magistrate may take A cognizance of any offence (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence, (b) upon a police report of such facts, and (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has beC'n committed. Section 195 Cr.P.C. is a sort of exception to this general provision and creates an embargo upon the power of the Court tO take cognizance of certain types B of offences enumerated therein. The procedure for filing a complaint by the Court as contemplated by Section 195(1) Cr.P.C. is given in Section 340 Cr.P.C. and sub-section (l) and (2). 1720-B-D) 4.2. In view of the language used in Section 340 Cr.P.C. the Court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence C · referred to in Section 195( l )(b ), as the Section is conditioned by the words "Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice." " This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the Court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect D that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(i)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the Court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, hut having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice. It is possible that such forged document E or forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of .evidence produced or given in evidence in Court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of evidenc~ nn the broad concept of F administration of justice may be minimal. Jn such circumstances, the Court may not consider it expedient in the inkrest of justice to make a complaint. The broad view of clause (b)(ii), as can,assed by the appellants, would render the victim of such forgery or forged document remedyless. Any interpretation which leads to a situation where a victim of a crime is rendered remedyless, has to be. discarded. [726-D-H) G 4.3. An enlarged interpretation to Section l 95(l)(b)(ii), whereby the bar created by the said provision woilld also operate where after commission of an act of forgery the document is subsequently produced in Court, is capable of great misuse. After preparing a forged document or committing an act of forgery, a person may manage to get a proceedfng H 712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) 2 S.C.R. A instituted in ·any civil, criminal or revenue court, either by himself or through someone set up by him and simply_ file the document in the said . proceeding. He would thus be protected from prosecution, either at the instance of a private party or the police until the Court; where the document has been filed, itself chooses to file a complaint. The litigation may be a prolonged one due to which the actual trial of such a person B may be delayed indefinitely. Such an interpretation would be highly detrimental to the interest of society at large. (727-E-G] Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493, affirmed. 4.4. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the Courts are C normally reluctant to direct filing of a criminal complaint and such a course is rarely adopted. It will not be fair and proper to give an interpretation which leads to a situation where a person alleged to have committed an offence of the type enumerated in clause (b)(ii) is either not placed for trial on account of non-filing of a complaint or if a complaint D is filed, the same does not come to its logical end. Judging from such an angle will be in consonance with the principle that an unworkable or impracticable result should be avoided. (727-G-H; 728-A-B] 5. The section 195(1)(b)(ii) is not a penal provision but is part ofa procedural law, namely, Code of Criminal Procedure which elaborately E gives the procedure for trial of criminal cases. The provision only creates a bar against taking cognizance of an offence in certain specified situations except upon complaint by Court. A penal statute is one upon which an action for penalties can be brought by a public officer or by a person aggrieved and a penal act in its wider sense includes every statute creating an offence against the State, whatever is the character of the penalty for F the offence. (729-G-H; 730-A) 6. In the present case, the will has been produced in the Court subsequently; It is nobody's case that any offence as enumerated in Section 195(b)(ii) was committed in respect to the said will after it had been produced or filed in the Court of District Judge. Therefore, the bar G created by Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. would not come into play and there is no embargo on the power of the Court to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of the complaint filed by the respondents. The view taken by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court is perfectly correct and calls for no interference. (731-D-E] H Emperor v. Kushal Pal Singh, AIR (1931) All 443; Patel Lalji Bhai LS. MARWAHv.MEENAKSHI [G.P.MATHUR,J.] 713 Somabhai v. The State of Gujarat, (19711 2 sec 376; Raghunath v. State of A U.P., (19731 1 SCC 564; Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan (19741 3 SCC 628; Legal Remembrancer, Govt. of West Bengal v. Haridas Mundra, [1976} 1 SCC 555; Mahadev Bapuji Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, [19941 3 Supp SCC 748; Gopalkrishna Menon v D. Raja Reddy, (1983) 4 SCC 240; Sanmukh Singh v. The King, AIR (1950) Privy Cou~cil 31; Sushi/ Kumar v. B State of Haryana, AIR (1988) SC 419; Murlidhar ¥eghraj Loya v. State of Maharasthra, AIR (1976) SC 1929; Kisan Trimbak Kothula v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1977) SC 435; Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs to Govt. of West Bengal v. Abani Maity, AIR (1979) SC 1029; State of Maharashtra v. Natwar/al Damodardas Soni, AIR (1980) SC 593; Tolaram Relumal v. State of Bombay, (19551 1 SCR 158; Lolita Jalan v. C Bombay Gas Co., (2003) 6 SCC 107 and MS. Sherijf v. State of Madras, AIR (1954) SC 397, referred to. Sheffield City Council v. Yorkshire Water Services Ltd., (1991) 1 WLR 58 and S.J. Grange Ltd. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners, [1979) 2 A!I ER 91, referred to. D Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion (Third ed.), referred to. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 402 of 2005. From the Judgment and Order dated 15.9.2000 of the Delhi High Court at Crl.M. No. 13 of 1999. WITH Crl.A. Nos. 904 and 1069-1070 of 1998. Dr. A.M. Singhvi, T.L.V. Iyer, Y.P. Narula, Joy Basu, Vinod Kumar, Rahul Tyagi, Madhurendra Kumar, B.K. Satija, V. Krishnamurthy, P.R. Kovilan, V. Balachandaran, Gopalakrishnan, Abhay Kumar, Subramonium Prasad, Abhijeet Chatterjee, Subodh Pathak, Ms. Seema Bengani, Chanchal E F Kr. Ganguly, Raghuvendra, S. Srivastava, V. Senthil Kumar, V.J. Francis, G P.I. Jose, Jenis V. Francis, Anupam Mishra, E.M.S. Anam, Shantha Kr. V. Mahale and Rajesh Mahale for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G.P. MATHUR, J. 1. Leave granted in Special Leave Petition (Cr!) H 714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 2 S.C.R. A No. 4111 of 2000. 2. In. view of conflict of opinion between two decisions of this Court each rendered by a bench of three learned Judges in Surjit Singh v'. Bd!hir .. .. Singh, [1996] 3 SCC 533 and Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, [1998] 2. SCC 493, regarding interpretation of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of Code of B Criminal Procedure 1973 (for short 'Cr.P.C.'), this appeal has been placed -C before the present Bench. ·· · 3. The facts of the case may be noticed in brief. The appellant nos. I and 2 are real brothers of Mukhtar Singh Marwah, while respondent nos. I and 2 are his widow and son respectively. Mukhtar Singh Marwah died on 3.6.1993. The appellant no. I filed Probate Case No. 363 of 1993 in the Court of District Judge, Delhi, for being granted probate of the will allegedly executed by Mukhtar Singh Marwah on 20.1.1993. The.petition was contested by the respondents on the ground that the will was forged. On their application the appellant no. 1 filed the original will in the Court of District Judge on D 10.2.1994. Thereafter, the respondents moved an application under S~ction 340 Cr.P.C. requesting the Court to file a criminal complaint against appellant no. I as the will set up by him was forged. A reply to the said application was filed on 27. 7. l 994 but the application has not been disposed of so far. Thereafter, the respondents filed a criminal complaint in May 1996 in the E ~ourt of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, for prosecution of the appellants and their mother Smt. Trilochan Kaur Marwah under Sections 192, 193, 463, 464, 465, 467, 469, 471, 499 and 500 IPC on the ground that the will of Mukhtar Singh Marwah set up by the appellants is a forged and fictitious document. It is stated in the complaint that though Mukhtar Singh Marwah was an educated person, but the will bears his thumb impression. He F had accounts in Bank of Tokyo and Standard Chartered Bank which he used to operate by putting his signature. Under the will he had completely divested the respondents, who were his widow and son respectively and also a daughter who was spastic and had bequeathed his entire property to his mother and after her death to his brothers and sisters. The appellant no. I Iqbal Singh Marwah was appointed as the sole executor and trustee of the will. Before the G learned Metropolitan Magistrate, the complainant examined six witnesses including two persons from the banks who brought the relevant records and deposed that Mukhtar Singh Marwah used to operate the accounts by putting his signature. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate hdd that as the question whether the will was a genuine documept or a forged one, was an issue H before the District Judge in the probate proceedings where the will had been - - l.S. MARWAH v. MEENAKSHI [G.P. 1\1/\TI IUR . .I.] 71 ') filed, Sections 195 (I )(b)(i) and (ii) Cr.P.C. operated as a bar for taking A cognizance of the offences under Sections 192, 193, 463, 464, 471, 475 and 476 !PC. The complaint was accordingly dismissed by the order dated 2.5.1998. The respondents thereafter filed a criminal revision against the order of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, before the Sessions Judge, who, relying upon Sachida Nand Singh V. State of Bihar, [ 1998] 2 sec 493, B held that the bar contained in Section I 95 (l)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. would not apply where forgery of a document was committed before the said document was produced in Court. The revision petition was accordingly allowed and the matter was remanded to the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate for proceeding in accordance with law. The appellants challenged the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge by filing a petition under Section 482 C Cr.P.C. before Delhi High Court, but the same was dismissed on 15.9.2000 following the law laid down in Sachida Nand Singh. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants have preferred the present appeal in this Court. 4. Sub-section (l) of Section 195 Cr.P.C., which according to the appellants, creates a bar in taking cognizance on the complaint filed by the D respondents, reads as under : 195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence. - (1) No Court shall take cognizance - (a) (i) of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or (ii) of any abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence, or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate ; E F (b) (i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections G · of the Indian Penal Code·(45of1860), namely, Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, or H 716 )~UPREME COURT.~EPORTS .. ·"f .• f4Q05] 2 S.C.R . . ;·,... - ';· ~: ilf,it .d:tf·l,1j. A (ii) of any offence described in Section 463, or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, or B (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt·to commit, or c the abetment of, any offence specified in sub-clause (i) or subclause (ii), except on the complaint in writing of that Court, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. 5. The principal controversy revolves round the interpretation of the expression "when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court" occurring in clause (b)(ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 195 Cr.P.C. The appellants place reliance on the following observations made in para 10 of D the report in Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh : E F G H "It would thus be clear that for taking cognizance of an offence, the document, the foundation of forgery, if produced before the court or given in evidence, the bar of taking cognizance under Section 195(1 )(b )(ii) gets attracted and the criminal court is prohibited from taking cognizance of offence unless a complaint in writing is filed as per the procedure prescribed under Section 340 of the Code by or on behalf of the Court. The object thereby is to preserve purity of the administration of justice and to allow the parties to adduce evidence in proof of certain documents without being compelled or intimidated to proceed with the judicial process. The bar of Section 195 is to take cognizance of the offence covered thereunder." to contend that once the document is produced or given in evidence in Court, the taking of cognizance on the basis of private complaint is completely barred. In Sachida Nand Singh after analysis of the relevant provisions and noticing a number of earlier decisions (but not Surjit Singh), the Court recorded its conclusions in paragraphs II, 12 and 23 which are being reproduced below: " 11. The scope of the preliminary enquiry envisaged in Section 340(1) ._!,_ I.S. MAR WAH v. MEENAKSHI [G.P. MATHUR, J.] 717 of the Code is to ascertain whether any offence affecting administration A of justice has been committed in respect of a document produced in court or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court. In other words, the offence should have been committed during the time when the document was in custodia legis. 12. It would be a strained thinking that any offence involving forgery B of a document if committed far outside the precincts of the Court and Jong before its production in the Court, could also be treated as one affecting administration of justice merely because that document later reached the court records. 23. The sequitur of the above discussion is that the bar contained in C Section 195(l)(b)(ii) of the Code is not applicable to a case where forgery of the document was committed before the document was produced in a court." 6. On a plain reading clause (b)(ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 195 is capable of two interpretations. One possible interpretation is that when an D offence described in Section 463 or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476 IPC is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document which is subsequently produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, a complaint by the Court would be necessary. The otheli possible interpretation is that when a document has been produced or given in evidence E in a proceeding in any Court and thereafter an offence described as aforesaid is committed in respect thereof, a complaint by the Court would be necessary. On this interpretation if the offence as described in the Section is committed prior to production or giving in evidence of the document in Court, no complaint by Court would be necessary and a private complaint ·woulci be maintainable. The question which requires consideration is which of the tWo F interpretations should be accepted having regard to the scheme of the Act and object sought to be achieved. 7. Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned senior counsel for the appellants, submitted that the purpose of Section 195 is to bar private prosecution where the cause of justice is sought to be perverted leaving it to the Court itself to uphold its G. dignity and prestige. If a very restricted interpretation is given to Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C., as held in Sachida Nand Singh, the protection afforded by the provision will be virtually reduced to a vanishing point, defeating the very object of the enactment. The provision, it is urged, does not completely bar the prosecution of a person who has committed an offence of the type H' 718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] 2 S.C.R. A described thereunder, but introduces a safeguard in the sense that he can be so prosecuted only on the complaint of the Court where the document has been produced or given in evidence or of some other Couh to. which that Court is subordinate. Learned counsel has also submitted that being a penal provision, giving a restricted meaning as held in Sachida Nand Singh, would not be proper as a person accused of having committed an offence would be B deprived of the protection given to him by the legislature. He. has also submitted that on the aforesaid view there is a possibility of conflicting findings being recorded by the civil or revenue Court where the document has been produced or given in evidence. and that recorded by the criminal Court on the basis of private complaint and therefore an effort should be C made to i11terpret the Section in the manner which .avoids such a possibility. 8. Shri Y.P. Narula, learned counsel for the respondents has st1bmitted that the language of the Section is clear and there being no ambiguity therein, the only possible manner in which it can be interpreted is that the complaint by a Court would be necessary when the offences enumerated in the Section D are committed at a time when the document has already been produced or given in evidence in Court i.e. when it is in the proceedings of the Court. The provision has to be strictly :::onstrued as it creates a bar on the power of the Court to take cognizance of an offence and any prnvision which ousts the jurisdiction of the Court, which it otherwise possesses, must be strictly E construed and cannot be given an enlarged meaning. Since the provision deprives a person who is a victim an such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in a Court'' occurring in clause (b)(ii) should normally mean commission of such an offence after the document has actually been produced or given in evidence in the Court. The situation or contingency where an offence as enumerated in this clause has already been committed earlier and later on the document is produced or is E given in evidence in Court, does not appear to be in tune with clauses (a)(i) and (b)(i) and consequently with the scheme of Section 195 Cr.P.C. This indicates that clause (b )(ii) contemplates a situation where the offences enumerated therein are committed with respect to a document subsequent to its production or giving in evidence in a proceeding in any Court. 10. Section 195(1) mandates a complaint in writing of the Court for taking cognizance of the offences enumerated in clauses (b) (i) and (b)(ii) thereof. Sections 340 and 341 Cr.P.C. which occur in Chapter XXVI give the procedure for filing of the complaint and other matters connected therewith. F The heading of this Chapter is -'Provisions As To Offences Affecting The G Administration Of Justice'. Though, as a general rule, the language employed in a heading cannot be used to give a different effect to clear words of the Section where there cannot be any doubt as to their ordinary meaning, but. they are not to be treated as if they were marginal notes or were introduced into the Act merely for the purpose of classifying the enactments. They constitute an important part of the Act itself, and may be read not only as H 720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 2 S.C.R. A explaining the Sections which immediately follow them, as a preamble to a statute may be looked to explain its enactments, but as affording a better key to the constructions of the Sections which follow them than might be afforded by a mere preamble.(See Craies on Statute Law, 7th Ed. Pages 207, 209). The fact that the procedure for filing a complaint by Court has been provided B in Chapter XXVI dealing with offences affecting administration of justice, is a clear pointer of the legislative intent that the offence committed should be of such type which directly affects the administration of justice, viz., which is committed after the document is produced or given in evidence in Court. Any offence committed with respect to a document at a time prior to its production or giving in evidence in Court cannot, strictly speaking, be said C to be an offence affecting the administration of justice. D E F G i 1. It will be useful to refer to some earlier decisions touching the controversy in dispute which were rendered on Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure 1908 (for short 'old Code'). Sub-section (l) (c) of Section 195 of Old Code read as under : "Section 195 (1) No Court shall take cognizance - ( c) Prosecution for certain offences relating to documents given in ·evidence.-of any offence described in Section 463 or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476 of the same Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except on the complaint in writing of such Court, or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate" It may be noticed that language used in Section l95(l)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. is similar to the above provision except that the words "by a party to any proceeding in any Court" occurring therein have been omitted. We will advert to the effect of this omission later on. 12. A Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. Kushal Pal Singh, AIR [ 1931] All 443 considered the scope of the aforesaid provision and held, that clause (c) of Section 195 applies only to cases where an offence is committed by a party, as such, to a proceeding to any Court in respect of a document which has been produced or given in evidence in such proceeding. It was held that an offence which has already been committed by f.s. MARWAHv.MEENAKSHI [G.P.MATHUR,J.] 721 a person who does not become a party till, say, 30 years after the commission A of the offence, cannot be said to have been committed by a party within the meaning of clause (c). A three Judge Bench of this Court in Patel La/ji Bhai Somabhai v. The State of Gujarat, [1971) 2 SCC 376 after examination of the controversy in considerable detail observed that as a general rule the Courts consider it expedient i~ the interest of justice to start prosecutions as contemplated by Section 476 (of the old Code which now corresponds to . B Section 340 Cr.P.C.) only if there is a reasonable foundation for the charge and there is a reasonable likelihood of conviction. The requirement of a finding as to the expediency is understandable in case of an offence alleged to have been committed either in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court in case of offences specified in clause (b) [of the old Code corresponding to C clause (b)(i) Cr.P.C.] because of the close nexus between the offence and the proceeding. In case ofoffences specified in clause ( c) they are required to be committed by a party to a proceeding in that Court with respect to a document produced or given in evidence in that Court. The Court approved the view taken by Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. Kushal Pal Singh (supra) and D held as under in para 7 of the report : "(i) The underlying purpose of f!nacting Section l95(l)(b) and (c) Section 476 seems to be to control the temptation on the part of the private parties to start criminal prosecution on frivolous vexations or unsufficient grounds inspired by a revengeful desire to harass or spite E their opponents. These offences have been selected for the court's control because of their direct impact on the judicial process. It is the judicial process or the administration of public justice which is the direct and immediate object or the victim of these offences. As the purity of the proceedings of the court is directly sullied by the crime, the court is considered to be the only party entitled to consider the F desirability of complaining against the guilty party. The private party who might ultimately suffer can persuade the Civil Court to file complaint. (ii) the offences about which the court alone is clothed with the right to complain may, therefore, be appropriately considered to be only G those offences committed by a party to a proceeding in that court, the commission of which has a reasonably close nexus with the proceeding in that court so that it can without embarking upon a completely independent and fresh inquiry, satisfactorily consider by reference principally to its records the expediency of prosecuting the delinquent H A B 722 SUPRr:vlE COURT REPORTS [2005] 2 S.C.R. party. It, the;i::fore, appears to be more appropriate to adopt the strict construction of confirming the prohibition contained in Section 195(1)(c) only to those cases in which the offences specified therein were committed by a party to the proceeding in character as si.Jch party. The Legislature could not have intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 195(l)(c) to the offences mentioned therein, when committed by a party to a proceeding in that court prior to his becoming such party.". The court clearly rejected any construction being placed on the provision by which a document forged before the commencement of the proceeding in C which it may happen to be used in evidence later on, to come within the purview of Section 195, as that would unreasonably restrict the right to initiate prosecution possessed by a person and recognized by Section 190 Cr.P.C. 13. The aforesaid decision was considered in Raghunath v. State of D U.P., [ 1973] I SCC 564. Here, the accused had obtained sale deed of the property of a widow by setting up of an imposter and thereafter filed a mutation application before the Tehsiidar The widow contested the mutation application on the ground that she had ?ever executed the sale deed and thereafter filed a criminal complaint under Sections 465, 468 and 471 IPC in which the accused were convicted. In appeal, it was contended that the private E complaint was barred by virtue of Section 195(1 )(c) Cr.P.C. and the revenue court alone could have filed the complaint. The court repelled the aforesaid contention ·after relying upon the ratiq of Patel Lalji Bhai v. State of Gujarat and the private complaint was held to be maintainable .. In Mohan Lal v: State of Rajasthan 1974(3) SCC 628, the above noted two decisions were relied F upon for holding that provisions of Section 195(1)(c) (old Code) would not be applicable where mutation proceedings were commenced after a will had been forged. In Legal Remembrancer, Govt. of West Ben.gal v. Haridos Mundra, [1976] I SCC 555Bhagwati,1. (as His Lordship then was), speaking for a three Judge -Bench observed that earlier there was divergence of opinion in various High Courts, but the same was set .at rest by this Court in Patel G Lalji Bhai Somabhai (supra) and approved the view taken therein that the words of Section 195(1)(c) clearly meant the offence alleged to have been committed by a party to the proceeding in his character as such party, i.e. after having become a party to the proceeding, and Sections 195(l)(c), 476 and 476-A (of the old Code) read together indicated beyond doubt that the H legislature could not have intended to extend the prohibition contained in r 1.S. MAR WAH v. MEENAKSHI [G.P. MATHUR, J.] 723 Section 195(1)(c) to the offences mentioned in the said Section when A committed by a party to a proceeding prior to his becoming such party. Similar view has been taken in Mahadev Bapuji Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, (1994] 3 Supp. SCC 748 where the contention that the absence of a complaint by the revenue court was a bar to taking cognizance by the ' criminal court in respect of offences under Sections 446, 468, 471 read with B Section 120-B lPC which were committed even before the start of the proceedings before the revenue court, was not accepted. 14. Dr. Singhvi, learned senior counsel for the appellants, in support of. his contention has placed strong reliance on Gopalkrishna Menon v. D. Raja Reddy, (1983] 4 SCC 240 which is a decision rendered by a Bench of two C learned Judges. In this case, the appellants filed a civil suit for refund of Rs. 20,000 which they claimed to have deposited with the first respondent and for recovery of certain amount. Along with the plaint the appellants produced a receipt for Rs. 20,000 in support of their claim. Thereafter the first respondent filed a criminal complaint against the appellants alleging forgery of his signature on the money receipt and thereby commission of offences punishable· D under Sections 467 and 471 IPC. The appellants moved the High Court for quashing of the proceedings on the ground that in absence of a complaint by the court, the prosecution was barred under Section 195(l)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. The High Court dismissed the petition holding that Section 463 cannot be construed to include Section 467 IPC as well and, therefore, the Magistrate was · E competent to take cognizance on the complaint.