# !\IRS. DOSSIBAI N. B. JEEJEEBHOY v. KHEMCHAND GORUMAL AND OTHEl\S

- **Citation:** [1962] 3 S.C.R. 928
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 503 to 506 of 1958
- **Bench:** K. N. 'Vakchoo, K. C. Das Gupta, J. c. SIIAJI
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/irs-dossibai-n-b-jeejeebhoy-v-khemchand-gorumal-and-othel-s-2404
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

lea .. -Open land for co11stn1ction of reBidential and busine&
building-Letting, if for residfnce or business-Subuqmnt
letting of b!<ilding in absence of a contract pumitting 81lb-letti>1gl,'jJect-Bombay Rent•, l!otel and Lodging l/ou"e Rates Control,
Act, 1947 (Born. 57 of 1947), as. 6, 15, 25, 28-Part II, Sch. J.
The appellant took lease of an open laH<l for construction
of Luildings suitable for
residential, business, industrial or
office purposes.
The appellant brought rnits in the City
Civil court, Bombay, for the recovery of arrears of rent in
respect of premises built on the sai<l open land, all within the
city of Bombay thus in the area specified in Schedule I of the
llombay Rents, Hotel an<l Lodging House Rates Control Act,
1947. The appellant stated in the Plaint itsdf that the Bombay
Rent Control Act, I 947, did not apply to the demised premises.
The defendants pleaded that the Rent Act applied and the
City Ci"il Court had no juri•diction to try the suit. The trial
Ju<lge held that part II of the Rent Act applied to the premises and consequently only the special courts specified in s. 28
of the Rent Act had jurisdiction to en terrain the suit and
ordered the plaints in the suits to be returned to the plaintiff
for presentation to the proper court. The ll<imbay High Court
summarily dismissed the appeals from the said orders. The
point at issue for decision \\·as 'vhcthcr "'vhen a lessee takes
lease of open land for
the purpose of constructing on it
buildings intended to be used for residt::ncc or for business,
this amounts to "letting for residence" or "letting for busi·
ness".
The appellants contention was that as open land not
intended to be used, as it is, for residence or husiness but for
construction of buildings for residence or business \Vas taken on
lease the land was not being let for re.idence or business.
J/F:lcl, that the v-·ords "let for
residence, education,
business or storage" in s.G of the fiomhay Rents, Hotel and
Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, are wide enough to
include a letting for the achievrncnt of these: purposes by con·
struction of buildings as also ,,·ithout construction of buildings.
l!eld, further, that on the facts of the present case, in
<".ach of these ca"-es, the lease \vas taken \Vith a view to const·
ruct buildings thereon for residet1tial, business, industrial or
offi~e purpO&CI and the land let was therefore 'premises' to
"
.,
,.
'
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
929
which under s. 6(1) of the Bombay Rent Act, the provisions of
Part II of the Act applied.
Vinayak Gopal v Laxman ]{ashinaih I. L. R. (1956) Bom.
82 7, approved.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Civil
Appeals Nos. 503 to 506 of 1958.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment
and orders dated August 4, 1957, of the Bombay
High Court in Letters patent Appeals Nos. 29 to 3:!
of 1957.
J. C. Bhatt, R. P. Bhatt, R. A. Gagrat and
G. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellants.
N. C. Chatterjee, Madhowdas C. Bhagat and
Radhey Lal Agarwal, for the respondents in C. A.
-,.
No. 503 of 58.
..
JJfadhowdas C. Bhagat and Radh"Y Lal Agarwol,
for the respondents in C. As. Nos. 504 to 506 of
1958.
1961. September 29. Tho Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
DAS GUPTA, J.-When a lessee takes lease of
open land for the purpose of constructing on it
buildings intended to be used for residence or for
business is this "letting for residence", or "letting
for business"? That is the short question which
arises for decision in these four appeals.
The
appellant brought these fJur suits in the City Civil
Courts, Bombay, for recovery of arrears of rent in
respect of the premises mentioned in the pbint of
these several suits. It is clear under the law that
the City Civil Court, Bombay, would have no jurisdiction to try these suits if the provisions of Part II
of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House
Rates Control Act, 1947 (Born. 57 of 1947), which
later in this judgment we shall refer to as the
"Rent Act", applied to the permises in suits. For

## Text

1961
Se;ttmbtr 29.
()28
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962)
!\IRS. DOSSIBAI N. B. JEEJEEBHOY
v.
KHEMCHAND GORUMAL AND OTHEl\S
( K. N. 'VAKCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
J. c. SIIAJI, JJ.)
lea .. -Open land for co11stn1ction of reBidential and busine&
building-Letting, if for residfnce or business-Subuqmnt
letting of b!<ilding in absence of a contract pumitting 81lb-letti>1gl,'jJect-Bombay Rent•, l!otel and Lodging l/ou"e Rates Control,
Act, 1947 (Born. 57 of 1947), as. 6, 15, 25, 28-Part II, Sch. J.
The appellant took lease of an open laH<l for construction
of Luildings suitable for
residential, business, industrial or
office purposes.
The appellant brought rnits in the City
Civil court, Bombay, for the recovery of arrears of rent in
respect of premises built on the sai<l open land, all within the
city of Bombay thus in the area specified in Schedule I of the
llombay Rents, Hotel an<l Lodging House Rates Control Act,
1947. The appellant stated in the Plaint itsdf that the Bombay
Rent Control Act, I 947, did not apply to the demised premises.
The defendants pleaded that the Rent Act applied and the
City Ci"il Court had no juri•diction to try the suit. The trial
Ju<lge held that part II of the Rent Act applied to the premises and consequently only the special courts specified in s. 28
of the Rent Act had jurisdiction to en terrain the suit and
ordered the plaints in the suits to be returned to the plaintiff
for presentation to the proper court. The ll<imbay High Court
summarily dismissed the appeals from the said orders. The
point at issue for decision \\·as 'vhcthcr "'vhen a lessee takes
lease of open land for
the purpose of constructing on it
buildings intended to be used for residt::ncc or for business,
this amounts to "letting for residence" or "letting for busi·
ness".
The appellants contention was that as open land not
intended to be used, as it is, for residence or husiness but for
construction of buildings for residence or business \Vas taken on
lease the land was not being let for re.idence or business.
J/F:lcl, that the v-·ords "let for
residence, education,
business or storage" in s.G of the fiomhay Rents, Hotel and
Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, are wide enough to
include a letting for the achievrncnt of these: purposes by con·
struction of buildings as also ,,·ithout construction of buildings.
l!eld, further, that on the facts of the present case, in
<".ach of these ca"-es, the lease \vas taken \Vith a view to const·
ruct buildings thereon for residet1tial, business, industrial or
offi~e purpO&CI and the land let was therefore 'premises' to
"
.,
,.
'
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
929
which under s. 6(1) of the Bombay Rent Act, the provisions of
Part II of the Act applied.
Vinayak Gopal v Laxman ]{ashinaih I. L. R. (1956) Bom.
82 7, approved.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Civil
Appeals Nos. 503 to 506 of 1958.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment
and orders dated August 4, 1957, of the Bombay
High Court in Letters patent Appeals Nos. 29 to 3:!
of 1957.
J. C. Bhatt, R. P. Bhatt, R. A. Gagrat and
G. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellants.
N. C. Chatterjee, Madhowdas C. Bhagat and
Radhey Lal Agarwal, for the respondents in C. A.
-,.
No. 503 of 58.
..
JJfadhowdas C. Bhagat and Radh"Y Lal Agarwol,
for the respondents in C. As. Nos. 504 to 506 of
1958.
1961. September 29. Tho Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
DAS GUPTA, J.-When a lessee takes lease of
open land for the purpose of constructing on it
buildings intended to be used for residence or for
business is this "letting for residence", or "letting
for business"? That is the short question which
arises for decision in these four appeals.
The
appellant brought these fJur suits in the City Civil
Courts, Bombay, for recovery of arrears of rent in
respect of the premises mentioned in the pbint of
these several suits. It is clear under the law that
the City Civil Court, Bombay, would have no jurisdiction to try these suits if the provisions of Part II
of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House
Rates Control Act, 1947 (Born. 57 of 1947), which
later in this judgment we shall refer to as the
"Rent Act", applied to the permises in suits. For
this reason the plaintiff stated in the plaint itself
that this Rent Act did not apply to the demised
premises. The defendant in each case pleaded on
1961
Mrs. Dossiiai
N. B. Je(jeellwy
v.
Khnnclumd Gorumd
Das Gupt• J.
19il
Mrs . DoJsiiai
J\'. B. Jttittjhay
v.
h/itntcfuvuf (JOfW!la/
Das Gupta J,
'
U30
SlJPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
the contrary that the Hont Act applied and so the
City Cid! Court had no juri8diction to try the
suits. The first is>uo framed in each of these suits
then,forC' was, whether the Court had jurisdiction
to entertain the suit..
TJ1e learned Judge held that
Part II of the l{cnt Act applied to the premises in
each of theso suits and con8e'}tl<'ntly only tho special
courts fipccified in s. 28 of tt10 Rent Act had jurisdi·
ction to eutortain the suits and tho Citv Civil Court
had no jurisdiction. Accordingly, he. ordered the
plaint in each of the four suits to Le returned to
the phintiff for presentation to the proper Court.
Tho plaintiff appealed to the High Court ofBomLay
but all the four appeals were 8Ummal'ily dismissed.
The Let tors Patent appeals preferred by the plaintiff
from the decision of the Single .Judge were also
dismissed ~ummarily. These appeals have Leen pre·
fcrrecl against that decision of the Bombay High
Court in Letters Patc11t Appeals on special leave
oLtaincd from this Court.
l:nder s. 5, sub-s. 8 of tho Hcnt Act unl66B
thorn is anything repugnant in the context, "premis·
es" mt•ans, among other things, "any land not boing
usod for agricultural purposes." It is undisputed
in thc8e C<\SCS that the land in rospcd of whieh tho
suits were brought was not being used for agricul·
turn] purposes and so comc8 within the <lefo1ition
of "prcmieos" in s. ii.
'I11e provisions of Part II of tho Act du not
howe,·er apply to all premises whieh fall within
this definition. Section G with which this Part II
opens providos in its firnt sub-sectiou that this part
shall apply to pr<'mises let for residence, education,
Lusiurns, trade or storage in areas sp<,cificd in Sch. I.
It is rnbjcct to a proviso that tho State Government may direct that in any of the ;aid nreas, this
Part shall cease to apply to premists let for any of
the said purposes, with a further proviso that the
State Govornment may again direct that in any of
tho said nroas this Part shall re-apply to premisos lot
-
(
..
f +
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
931
for such of the aforesaid purposes. As there has
been no notification under these provisos affecting
the premises in suit, we are not concerned with
them; nor are we concerned with sub·s. l(A) under
whioh the State Government may direct that this
Part shall apply to premises let for any other purposes. The four premises in respect of which the four
suits were brought are all within the city of Bombay
and thus in the area
specified in Schedule I
of the Act. In each of these caHes we have therefore to examine the purpose of the lease and to
decide whether it was let for residence or for education, busineAs, trade or storage.
The lease mentions that. the leasee will construct buildings suitable for residential, business, industrinl or office
purposes. The plnintiff's case is that as open land
is not intended to be used as it is for residence or
business but for construction of buildings for residence or business
the
land
is not
being
let for residence or business. The defendant in
each case contends that the letting was for residence or business as that was the ultimate purpose
of taking the lease. Mr. Bhatt addressed his arguments to the question whether the letting could be
said Jo be for residence and did not separately
address us on the question of letting for business
as obviously if the land could not be said to be
let for residence it could not also be said to be let
for business.
The
extreme propisition which Mr. Bhatt
raised first of all on behalf of the appellant is
that open land can never be let for residence and
so whens. 6 speaks of premises being let for residence, land as defined in sub-s. 8 (a) of s. o is
outside
tho word "premises". There is, in our
opinion, no substance in this contention.
It is quite clear that open land as it is can
be used for residence and so there is no reason to
think that open land was not intended to be included in "premises" when s. 6 speaks of premisee
being let for residence.
I9BJ
Afrs. Doisihai
Jrl:B.Jtijtebhoy
v.
Khtmchand Gorumal
Das Gupta J.
19/il
!'.!rs. DOJsib•i
4V. B. J11jttiM_1
v.
K"""'hnJ Gmm,.I
932
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962)
The more substantial quoation for consideration is whether when open land is being leased not
to be used for residence in its condition of open land
but to be used for the purpose of residence after
constructing buildings thereon, the letting of the
open land can reason'!.bly be called to be letting for
residence. Mr. Bhatteontends that as, what is to be
ronsidered is whether the letting of the open land is
for residence the land cannot be said to be for residence if not the open land, but, something constrnetcd on the open land is to be used for residence.
In such~ case, says l\fr. Bhatt, the land is let for
construction of a. building and not for residence. We
arc unable to accept this argument. Land can be used
fur many purposes. It may be used for agriculture;
for residence of human beings; fur keeping cattle or
other animals; for holding meetings; for carrying
on busineBS or trade; for storage of goods; for
supply of water by excavating tanks, and many
other purposes. )fony of these purposes can be
achieved on tho open land without tho construction of any buildings. But many of thorn can be
better achieved if some kind of structure is created
on tlte open land. It scorns reasonable to us to
think that when tho Bombay Legislature took
particular care to include open land not being used
for agricultural purposes within the word "premises"
and then wont on in tho very next section to speak
of premises being let for several specified purposC3,
it was thinking of the purposes to which the land
will be uaed irrespective of whether the purpose
was intended to be arhioved with or without oonstructbn of a structure. Tho intention in mentioning only some purposes, viz., rosidPnce, edu ·
cation, business, trade or storago in s. 6 was to
exclude land let for purposes like, keeping of cattle,
(except in the way of business or trade), and numerous othor purposes to 1vhich the land may be put
from the benefit of part II of the Act.
It seems to us that when people speak ordinarily of land being let for busin•lBB, they a.re only
...
'f
1
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
933
· thinking that the ultimate purpose behind the
lettinir is that business will be carried on and they
are not thinking whether the business will be carried
on on the land in its present state or by the construction of temporary sheds or by putting up
permanent buildings.
Similarly, when a man says
that he will take lease of a. plot of land for storage
of his goods, what he has in mind is tha.t by taking
lease of the Ja.nd he will achieve the object of
storing goodR,
irrespective of whether for such
storage he will have to put up a structure or not.
In the same way, we think, that when land has been
let for the purpose of constructing buildings for
residence, people will say that it is being let for
residence, just as they will say that the land ha.s
been let for residence if the lessee intends to use it
as caravan site so that the people may live on the
open land in ~aravans.
In our opinion, the words "let for residence,
education, business, trade or storage" are wide
enough to include a letting for the achievement of
these purposes with construction of buildings as
also without construction of buildings.
But, says Mr. Bhatt, look at sub-s. (i) of s. 15
of tbe Rent Act which is in this very part II and
that will
show that
the
Legislature _ could
not have intended !<ind which is let for the construction of buildings for residence to be within
the phrase "premises let for residence".
Section
15 of the Act after its amendment by Bombay
Act 49 of 1959 reads thus:-
"Notwithstanding
anything contained in any law, but subject to any
contract to the contrary, it shall not be lawful,
after the coming into operation of this Act for
any tenant to sublet the whole or any part of the
premises let to him or to assign or transfer in any
other manner his interest therein."
It may he
mentioned that as the section originally stood the
words "but subject to any contract to the contrary" were not there.
When the amending Act
1961
Mrs. Dossibai
N. B. Jetjeebh,y
v.
Khemchand Gorumal
Das Gvp1a ].
JHJ
Mrs. D8S.liiai
"V. B. Jujuhhoy
v.
Kntmcluwi c.,umal
Da10~ra J,
•
934
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962]
of I 959 introduced thes~ words the amendment
further provided that these words shall be deemed
always to have been there. Even nJter tho amendment, it remains unlawful, where there is no contract to the contrary, for any tenant of premises to
sublet the whofo or any part thereof. Mr. Bhatt's
an;ument is that in every case where therois nosueh
contract to the contrary the difficulty that will rosult
if land let for construction of residential buildings
be h" Id to ho premises lot for rcsi<lonee within tlrn
meaning of s. 6. is that after the building is constructed the lessee will not be able to sublet the
building or any portion of it; so that in many cases
w hero the real purpose of taking the land is for
the construction of building for letting out
the
snmP, that purpoRe will be defeated. This argument
ru; regards the difficulty in the matt-0r of letting out
the building eonstructcd on the land on which
leas<> has been taken was more plausible when tho
saving phrase "bul subject to any contract to the
contrary" did not form part of the section.
Now,
however, the eases in which such difficulty will
arise. if at all, would be few and far between; for,
it. is rea.sonablo to expect that when taking lease
of land for the construction of building intended
to be let ont to others for residence, the lessee of
the In.nd would take caro to inclutlf." in the contract
of Jea~e a
term pennitting him to let out the
buil<ling.
Assuming that tl1oro mn..v be cases where
the contract of leaRe does not contain any such
term and &SSuminμ- further that it will not be lawful f•>r the leBSeo of the land to let out the building
constructed bv him, the prob~bility of such difficultv in some. oases, can bo no reason to cut down
the 'ordinary and reasonable connotation of the
worcls "let for residence" in s. 6.
It is unneces.~ary for us to decide whether if
there is no contract to the contrary, s. lo will
really stand in tho way of a lcsReo. of tho land letting out buildings constructed by !~1~ on such !a~d.
~Ve may 11ay howcvN that there ism our opm10n
.,.
r
•
•
I.
..
,
'
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
935
much force in the argument which found favour
with the Bombay High Court in Vinayak Gopal, v.
Laxman Kashinath (1), where the very question,
which is now before us arose for deoision, that
the bar of s. 15 will operate only in the way of
letting out the land of which lea1e has been
taken, but will not stand in the way of letting
the building constructed on the land:
In that case the Bombay High Court held that
where land is leased for the purpose of construction of buildings for residence the land is "let for
residence" within the meaning of s. 6 of the Rent
Act. Mr. Bhatt devoted a considerable part of
his argument to persmtde us that some of the
reasons given in that judgment do not stand
scrutiny. We think it unnecessary however to
examine whether all the reasons given in the
judgment are correct. For, aR already indicated,
the words "let for residence" on a proper construction would cover the case of open land being
let for construction of residential buildings and so
the conclusion reached by the Bombay High Court
in Vinavak Gopal's Case(') is, in our opinion,
correct.
It is unnecessary for us also to consider for
the purpose of the present appeals as to what may
happen to the sub-lessee if and when on the terms
of a particular l~ase the building ultimately vests in
the owner of the land nor as to what may happen
if and when on the terms of a particular lease the
lessee who has constructed the building gets the
right to remove the building. These considerations
should not, in our opinion, affect the construction
of the words "let for residence".
Turning now to tho facts of the present case we
find that in eaoh of these cases the lease w!ls taken
,.._...__,,~-
with a view to construct buildings thereon for residential, business, industrial or office
purposes.
The
premi~es let are therefore "promises" to which
(1)1: L. R. [ 1956) Born. 827.
1961
Mrs. Dossiba.i
N. B. Jeejtehhsy
v.
Khemcharid Gorumal
Daa Gupta J,
1961
JI rs. Dossibai
X. B. Juj11blw.J
v.
Khl1TKl&and GorU111Ql
Das Gupta J.
1961
Septnnbtr 29.
•
936
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
under s. 6 (1) of tho Rent Act the provision of
part II of the Act, apply.
The Trial Court nnd the High Court wer•
therefore right in holding that the City Civil Court,
Bombay, had 'no jurisdiction to try the suitll.
Tho a ppeale arc accordin~ly dismil!&'cl with
costs.
Thero will be one 1et of hearing fee for th•
four appeals.
Ap~nl di.<miased.
MANNALAL JAIN
t'.
TIIF. RTATF. OF ASSAM A?-.J) OTHERS.
(R. T'. 81NRA, c. J., R. K. DAS, A. TC SARIU.R,
N. RA.JAGOPALA AYYANGAR nnd
.T. R. MUDl!OLKAR, .T.T.)
Foo,/ Cnntro/-T.ire•r• '°' U"ho/,.alt dealing in rir• anii
padd.:1-l.icm'1°flfl Orda pre10-ibing co"'1itinna Jnr g,ant of
licP111:R--Stal1, r'r0t"rnml'nt
ia~uing inatructionR
lo
lictnaing
auf.1,oritif'8 to qranf licenceJ to co·oP'rative ~ocielit1 01ily-Propriety of---Grant of licl'nttt to ro-operative .!Dcittit11 and rtfttaal (()
othm-1.egalilf/ ~f-E,.ential Commodili'6 .A<I, 1955, (IO of
195.5), "· 3 mul 6-·-A•ROm FoodgraiM (Lir.<n•;ng and Co11trol)
nrd<r, IP61, cl. 5.
In exercise of the powers ronf<rred by s. 3 of the Ew.ntial O>mmodities Ar.t, 1955, the Assam Government made the
A"am Foo<lizrains (Licensing anrl Control) Order, 1961.
This
Order providt"d that no person could do bu~ine~s in foodgrains
including ric.- and parlrly, in \\•holcsal~ quantities except under
a licenc' i"ued thereunder.
Clause 5 of the Order laid down
in suh-ds. (a) to (e) matters which the licensin<r authority
!l}•all, among otht'r
matters, have rejrard to in granting
or
refusing
a
license;
sub-cl. (e) bring "whether the
applicant is a co-operative society".
In 1959, directions had
he.n issued to aU liccnsing authoritieo by the Government that
the rights of monopoly procurement had been given to Apex
Co-operative Society. The petitioner applied for a licence but
was ref115'd in view of the provisions of sub-cl. (e) of cl. 5 of
the Order. The petitioner challenged the order refusing the
licence on the grounds: (1) that sub-clause :el wu u/trg viua
•
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"
-..--.