# ISHA BEEVI ON BEHALF OF THE MINOR UMAIBEN BEEVI & ORS v. THE TAX RECOVERY OFFICER & ADDL. P.A. TO COLLECTOR, QUILON & ORS

- **Citation:** [1976] 1 S.C.R. 681
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1975-09-05
- **Bench:** H. R. Khanna, M. H. Beg, A. C. Gupta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/isha-beevi-on-behalf-of-the-minor-umaiben-beevi-ors-v-the-tax-recovery-officer-6658
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

I'ractice-JVrii of Prohibition or Mandamus-When can be issued.
lncofne .Tax Act, 1961-Second Sclredule rr. 11 and 48-Notices for recovery
df tax-Whether Persona! Assistant to Collector could issue.
Purporting to act under the provisions of Income-tax Act, 1961, the Additional Personal Assistant to the Collector, who was functioning as the tax
recovery officer, issued notices to the appellants prohibiting them from transferring or otherwise dealing with the properties in their possession on the basis
of 22 certificates issued to them under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and
the Income-tax Act, 1961 because. arrears of income tax were dlre from the
deceased assessee. The appellants
who claimed that the properties
were
gifted to them by the deceased assessee, questioned (i) the jurisdiction of the
Tax Recovery ·Officer, as al~ his competence to the issue of recovery proceedings under the 1961 Act, because the taxes became ·due under the Trawancore Income-tax Act and 1922 Act; (ii) and the issue of 22 certificates on the
ground that'neithe_r the Travancore .Act nor the 1961 Act warranted the issue
of certificates against an assesse~ after bi's death. The appellants prayed for
the issue of writs of mandamus, certiorari and prohibition.
The High Court dismissed the petitions.
Dismissing the apPeals,
HELD : ( 1) (a) The orders sought to be quashed
were only notices of
commencetm:nt of recovery proceedings by attachment of certain ptoperties.
Final orders could only be passed after the appellants have~ had their oppor•
tunities to object under r.11 of the Second Schedule to 1961 Act because the
notices purported to be only preliminary notices under r. 48 of the Second
Schedule to the 1961 Act. These proceedings could only be quashed if they
were entirely without jurisdiction. Otherwise a prayer for quashing the J)rdJ
ceeding9 would obviously be premature. [684 E-F]
(b) No occasion for the issue of writ of mandamus could arise unless the
appellants showed non-compliance with some mandatory provision and seek to
get1 that provision enforced because some obligation towards them is not carried
out by the authority alleged to be flouting the law.
[684 F-0]
( c) The appellants have asked for writs of prohibition.
The existence of
an alternative remedy is not generalJy a bar to the issuance of such a writ
or order.
But, in order to substantiate a right to obtai':O a writ of prohibition
from a High Court or from this Court, an applicant has to demonstrat>e total
absence of jurisdiction to proceed on the part or the officer or authority com ..
p~ained against.
It is not enough if a wrong section or provision of law is
01ted in a notice or order if the power to proceed is actually there
under
another provision. [684 HJ
(2) T!ie appellants not ~aving raised the question at any earli'er stage that
the Additional Personal Assistant to .the Collector was not an officer authorised
to issue notices, could not do so in appeal to this Court. Even if the Peshkar
was the competent officer under the Travancore Inconie-tax Act. his duties
as tax recovery officer wpuld. by operation of the various provisions of law
contained in s.8(1) of the General Clauses Act, s.13(1) of the Finance Act
1950, s.2(44), and s.221 or the 1961 Act. automatically devolve upon
the
Collector or Additional Collector o_r upon such officer as may be empowered
13~L925SupCI/75
682
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] I S.C.R.
by the State Government, by a special or general notification in the official
gazette to effect recovery of land revenue or other public demand under any
law relating to land revenue or other publiC demand. [688 A; 687 HJ
(3) If any part of the property is illegally or unjustiably attached, it does
not really affect the jurisdiction of the Tax Recovery Officer to
proceed to
deal with an objection under r. I I in Schedule 2 of the 1961, Act.
[688 El

## Text

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681
ISHA BEEVI ON BEHALF OF THE MINOR UMAIBEN BEEVI
& ORS.
v.
THE TAX RECOVERY OFFICER & ADDL. P.A. TO COLLECTOR, QUILON & ORS.
September 5, 1975
[H. R. KHANNA, M. H. BEG AND A. C. GUPTA, JJ.]
I'ractice-JVrii of Prohibition or Mandamus-When can be issued.
lncofne .Tax Act, 1961-Second Sclredule rr. 11 and 48-Notices for recovery
df tax-Whether Persona! Assistant to Collector could issue.
Purporting to act under the provisions of Income-tax Act, 1961, the Additional Personal Assistant to the Collector, who was functioning as the tax
recovery officer, issued notices to the appellants prohibiting them from transferring or otherwise dealing with the properties in their possession on the basis
of 22 certificates issued to them under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and
the Income-tax Act, 1961 because. arrears of income tax were dlre from the
deceased assessee. The appellants
who claimed that the properties
were
gifted to them by the deceased assessee, questioned (i) the jurisdiction of the
Tax Recovery ·Officer, as al~ his competence to the issue of recovery proceedings under the 1961 Act, because the taxes became ·due under the Trawancore Income-tax Act and 1922 Act; (ii) and the issue of 22 certificates on the
ground that'neithe_r the Travancore .Act nor the 1961 Act warranted the issue
of certificates against an assesse~ after bi's death. The appellants prayed for
the issue of writs of mandamus, certiorari and prohibition.
The High Court dismissed the petitions.
Dismissing the apPeals,
HELD : ( 1) (a) The orders sought to be quashed
were only notices of
commencetm:nt of recovery proceedings by attachment of certain ptoperties.
Final orders could only be passed after the appellants have~ had their oppor•
tunities to object under r.11 of the Second Schedule to 1961 Act because the
notices purported to be only preliminary notices under r. 48 of the Second
Schedule to the 1961 Act. These proceedings could only be quashed if they
were entirely without jurisdiction. Otherwise a prayer for quashing the J)rdJ
ceeding9 would obviously be premature. [684 E-F]
(b) No occasion for the issue of writ of mandamus could arise unless the
appellants showed non-compliance with some mandatory provision and seek to
get1 that provision enforced because some obligation towards them is not carried
out by the authority alleged to be flouting the law.
[684 F-0]
( c) The appellants have asked for writs of prohibition.
The existence of
an alternative remedy is not generalJy a bar to the issuance of such a writ
or order.
But, in order to substantiate a right to obtai':O a writ of prohibition
from a High Court or from this Court, an applicant has to demonstrat>e total
absence of jurisdiction to proceed on the part or the officer or authority com ..
p~ained against.
It is not enough if a wrong section or provision of law is
01ted in a notice or order if the power to proceed is actually there
under
another provision. [684 HJ
(2) T!ie appellants not ~aving raised the question at any earli'er stage that
the Additional Personal Assistant to .the Collector was not an officer authorised
to issue notices, could not do so in appeal to this Court. Even if the Peshkar
was the competent officer under the Travancore Inconie-tax Act. his duties
as tax recovery officer wpuld. by operation of the various provisions of law
contained in s.8(1) of the General Clauses Act, s.13(1) of the Finance Act
1950, s.2(44), and s.221 or the 1961 Act. automatically devolve upon
the
Collector or Additional Collector o_r upon such officer as may be empowered
13~L925SupCI/75
682
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] I S.C.R.
by the State Government, by a special or general notification in the official
gazette to effect recovery of land revenue or other public demand under any
law relating to land revenue or other publiC demand. [688 A; 687 HJ
(3) If any part of the property is illegally or unjustiably attached, it does
not really affect the jurisdiction of the Tax Recovery Officer to
proceed to
deal with an objection under r. I I in Schedule 2 of the 1961, Act.
[688 El
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal Nos. 1489-1499,
1159 & 1160 (NT) of 1970.
From the Judgment and Decree dated the 30th September 1969
of the Kerala High Court at Ernakulam in Writ Appeals Nos. 493
to 495, 497 to 500, 502 to 505, 492 and 501 of 1969.
D. V. Patel, M. Ramchandran and A. S. Nambiyar for the appellants.
B. Sen, B. S. Ahuja and S. P. Nayar for the respondents.
The J udgrnent of the Court was delivered by
BEG, J.
These are fifteen Civil Appeals arising out of petitimu
for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus a11ainst certain tax
recovery proce~dings instituted against the heirs and legal representatives of Thangal Kunj Musaliar of Kerala who died on 19.2.1966.
It appears that there were arrears of Income-tax due under the Travancore Income-tax Act (of 1121 ME) (hereinafter referred to as
'the Travancore Act') and other enactments on income from the cashew nut export business.
By an order passed on 10.6.1968, the
Additional Personal Assistant of the District Collector, Quilon, functioning as the Tax Recovery Officer, attached a number of immovable
properties mentioned in a schedule to the order.
He purported to
act under Rule 48 in the second schedule to the Indian Income-tax
Act of 1961, (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1961 Act'). He prohibited the appellants from transferring or otherwise dealing with properties in their possession on the basis of 22 certificates covering a
total amount of Rs. 50,42,970.34 np.
Some of the certificates were
issued under Section 46, sub. s. (2) of the Indian Income-tax Act
.of 1922 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1922 Act') and others under
Section 221 of the 1961 Act.
The appellants, claiming to be in
possession of immovable properties gifted in 1947, 1953, 1954 a!nd
1956 by T. K. Musaliar objected to the attachment of their properties
on the ground that the. income-tax dues against the deceased could
not be recovered by attachment or sale of properties belonging to
the appellants.
The appellants question the .iurisdiction of the Tax
Recovery Officer to proceed with the recovery against their properties.
The appellants also contended that taxes having become due under
the Travancore Act and the 1922 Act from the deceased, recovery
proceedings by their attachment u?der the 1961 Act were not legally
competent.
Furthermore, they ob1ected that all ont of 22 certificates
having been issued after the death of T. K. Musaliar, expressly stating
that the deceased was the assessee, were prima facie invalid because
neither Section 66, Subs. (3) of the Travancore Act, nor Section 221
of 1961 Act warranted the issue of certificates against an assessee after
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!SHA BEEVI V. TAX RECOVERY OFFICER (Beg. /.)
6 83
his death.
They submitted that as the amounts covered by the certificates issued after the death of T. K. Musaliar were tacked on to the
amounts covered by the other certificates the whole attachment was
vitiated.
Questions of title to the properties, said to have been gifted
by the deceased long ago, were ajso raised.
At this stage, it may be mentioned that there had been an agreement recorded in a settlement dated 10. 7 .1957 the terms of whi<:h
were binding upon the deceased and T. K. Musaliar & Sons Ltd. This
related to assessments under the Travancore Income-tax Act and the
Indian Income-tax Act of 1922.
By clause 4 of this settlement it was
agreed that the Appellate Authority before which an appe;il in respect
of these assessl!J-ents were pending could enhance or reduce the assess-
. ments in accordance with this settlement. It was also agreed that
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the Writ Petitigns in connection with assessments for certain years will
be withdrawn and that. penal interest under Section 18A pf the 1922
Act will be paid, but rio other penalties will be leviable in respect
of the asses~roent years covered by this settlement.
On 25. 9. 195'7,
an order sig_ned by a Deputy Secretary to the Government of India
was passed under Section 9, sub. s. (2) of the Travancgre Taxatidn
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in Income (Investigation Commission) Act 1124 showing that the
Government accepted the terms and conditions of the settlement re- ·
corded by the Commissioner of Income-tax and directing that demand
notices in accordance with the ten:ns of the settlement be served on
T. K. Musaliar for a sum of Rs. 9,15,458/- and that such other proceedings under the Travancore Income-tax Act or "under any other
law", as may be required, should be taken in order to enforce the
payment of the amount demanded.
Thus, for the amounts sought to
be recovered in pursuance of the settlement, the machinery to realise under Section 297(2) (j) 1of the 1961 Act is available according
to the Depart_ment.
The learned Judge of the Kerala High Court before whom tho
Writ Petitions came up overruled al! the objections of th.!' appellants.
He held that, although the attachment order purports to, have been
passed under Rule 48 of the 2nd Schedule, the Recic>very Officer had
authority to proceed under the Ttava:ncore Act to recover dues under
that Act by recourse to the provisions of Travancore-Cochin Revenue
Recovery Act 7 of 1951.
He relied upon the well established proposition that where the <power to proceed is actually there, the mere
reference to .a wrong section for authority to act, will not vitiate the
action taken.
(See : L. Hazari Mal Kuthiala v. Income-tax Officer,
Special Circle, Ambala Gantt. & Anr.(11); Incometax Officer, Kolar
Circle & Anr. v. Seghu Buchiah Setty( 2 ) and P. M. Bharucha & Co.
v. G. S. Venkatesan, lncome,.tax Officer, Circle I, Ward A, Bhavnagar('). The learned Judge also took the view that the Income-tax
dues covered by the abovementioned settlement were realized by virtue
of an order mad~ under Section 3 of the Opium & Revenue Laws (Extension of application Act No. 33 of 1950), and, the last me:ntioned
(1) [1961] 41 !TR 12.
(2) [1964] 52 I.T.R. 538.
(3) [1969] 74 l.T.R. 513.
684
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 1 S.C.R.
enactment having authorised the Income-tax authorities to apply the . A
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the recovery proceedings for those years, even under the provisions of
the 1961 Act, were unassailable.
The learned Judge also thought
that, as the appellants had not objected to the validity of the 11
certificates issued after the death of the deceased, when notices wereserved upon them under rule 85 of the second schedule to the 1961
Act, they were debarred from taking up such an objection in their
Writ Petitions.
As regards the title claimed to properties alleged to
have been wrongly attached, the learned Judge pointed out that the
appella:nts had not only already resorted to alternative remedies by way
of suits but had not yet availed themselves of their remedy by preferring objections under Rule 11 .of the Second Schedule to the 1961
Act, where such objections could also be decided.
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A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, consisting of P. T.
Raman Nayar, C.J., and K. K. Mathew, J., agreed with the views
expressed by the learned .single Judge on the questions mentioned above
except as regards the 11 certificates which were issued after the death
of the assessee·. It allowed the objections of the appellants to the
extent that it held that the claims sought to be enforced under the
attachment order of 10.6.1968 (Ex. P.l) will not include the arrears
of Income-tax mentioned in the 1 11 certificates issue.d after the death
of T. K. Musaliar. The appellants have, after grant of certificates
of fitness of the cases for appeals to this Court, repeated before us
the submissions mentioned above.
We may point out that the reliefs claimed in the Writ Petitions
were writs of Certiorari and Mandamus and Prohibition. It is clear
to us, after perusal of the so called "orders" sought to be qU1aShed
that they were only notices of conunencement of recovery proceedings
by attachment of certain properties. Final orders could only be passed after the appellants have had their opportunities to object under
Rule 11 of the 2nd Schedule of the 1961 Act because the notices
purport to be only preliminary notices under Rule 48 of the 2nd
Schedule to the 1961 Act.
These proceedings could only be quashed,
even at this stage, if they were entirely without .iurisdiction. Otherwise, a prayer for quashing proceedings would obviously,
be prematnre.
No oecasion for the issue of a writ of Mandamns can arise
unless the applicants show non-compliance with some mandatory provision and seek to get that provision enforced becanse some obligation
towards them is not carried out ~y the authority alleged to be flouting
the law.
The grievance of the appellants, however, is that the tax
recovery officer had no jurisdiction whatsoever to start tax recovery
. proceedings a[ainst them.
They have, therefore, asked for writs
of Prohibition. The existence of an alternative remedy is not generally
a bar to the issuance of such a writ or order. But,. in order to
substantiate a right to obtain a Writ of Prohibition from a High Court
or from this Court, an applicant has to demo•nstrate total absence of
jurisdiction to proceed on the part of the officer or authority complained
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!SHA BEEVI V. TAX RECOVERY OFFICER (Beg, J.)
88 5
against. It is not enoμgh if a wrong Section or provision of law is
cited in a notice or order if the power to proceed is actμally there
under another provision.
One of the identically similar notices to which objection was taken
by the appellants may be reproduced here. It runs as follows :
"Form No. ITCP 16.
(See rule 48 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961)
Order of Attachment of Inunovable property.
To
Office· of the Tax Recovery Officer,
Smt. Isha Beevi, on behalf of Minors
1.
Umaibeu Beevi, 2. Mynioon Beevi.
3.
Mariam Beevi and 4.
Safia Beevi,
Kantanchalil
Veedu,
Kannimelcherry,
Kilokoloor, Quilon.
Collector, Quilon.
Dated_ 10th May, 1958.
Whereas you, the legal representative of late Shri A. Thangal
Kunju Musaliar, have failed to pay Rs. 50,42,970.34 payable by late
Shri A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar, Cashew Exporter, Quilon, in respect
of certificates mentioned in the attached statement, forwarded by the
Income-tax Of!jcer, Special Investigation Circle, Trivandrum and Income-tax Officer; Quilon, and the interest payable under Section 220(2)
of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the period conunencing 'immediately
after the said date.
It is ordered that you, said Isha Beevi be and you are hereby
prohibited and restrained until the further order of the undersigned,
from transferrillg or charging the properties as per attached list in
any way and that ali persons be, and that they are hereby prohibited
from taking any benefit under such transfer or charge.
Given under my hand and seal at Quilon on this 10th day of May,
1968.
Sd/-
Tax Recovery Officer and Addi.
Personal Assistant to Collector,
Quilon".
· As regards the authority of the Additional Personal Assistant to
the Collector, Quilon, as the Tax Recovery Officer, no objection appears to have been taken anywhere relating to his appointment in
accordance with the law as the Tax Recovery Officer. The Division
Bench of the High Court had held that recovery of the dues for the
years 1119 to 1 ~25 ME oould not take place under the 1922 Act,
and, therefore, no proceedings for their recovery could be taken under
686
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] I S.C.R.
the provisions of the 1961 Act.
Nevertheless,
~s proceedings could
be taken under the Travancore Income-tax Act, it was argued before
it was that the "Peshkar" alone would have been competent to initiate
recovery proceedings under Section 66(3) of the Travancore Act.
The corresponding officer, according to the appellants, was th~ Collector and therefore the certificates could only be forwarded, it was
submitted,' to the C~llector of the District who alone coμld have initiated the proceedings.
The Division Bench over-ruled this cont~n
tion on the ground that the proviso to Section 13 (I) of the lndum
Finance Act 1950 made it clear that the anthority constituted under
the Provisions of the Act of 1922, empowered to proceed, must be
determined by resorting to the provisions of Section 8 (!) of the
General Claus_es Act, which reads as follows :
"Wh~re this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made
after the commencement of this Act, repeals and re-enacts,
with or ~ithout modifications, any provision of a former
enactment then references in any other enactment or in any
instrum'l_nt to the provision so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as refer~nces to the
provision so re-enacted":
The 1922 Act was repealed by the 1961 Act. Hence, it held that
Section 2( 44) ·of the 1961 Act, read with Section 221 of that Act,
were sufficient to enable the Additional Personal Assistant to the
Collector to proceed as a Tax Recovery Officer.
Sec. 13, sub. s. (1) of the Finance Act, 1950 laid down :
"13 (1) If immediately before the· last day of April 1950,
there is in force in any part B State other than J ammu and
Kashmir or in Manipur, Tripura or Vindhya Pradesh or in
the merged territory of Cooch-Behar any law relating to
income-tax or super-tax or tax on profits of business, that
law shall cease to have effect except for the. purposes of the
levy, assessment and collection of income-tax and super-tax
in respect of any period not included in the previous year for
the purposes of assessment under the Indian Income-tax,
Act, 1922 (XI of 1922) for the year ending on the 31st
day of March, 1951, or for any subsequent year, or, as
the case may be, the levy assessment and dollection of the
tax on profits. of business for any chargeable accounting period
ending on or before the 31st day of March, 1949;
,
Provided that any reference in anv . such law to an officer, authority, tribunal or Court shall be donstrued as a
reference t~ the corresponding officer, authority, tribunal or
Court appointed or constituted under the said Act, and if
any que,stion arises as to who such dorresponding officer
anthority, tribnnal or Court appoin•ed or constituted unde;
the said Act, and if any question arises as to who such
corresponding officer, authority Tribunal ior Court is the
decision of the Central Govern~ent thereon shall be fin~!"· ,
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!SHA BEEVI V. TAX RECOVERY OFFICER (Beg, J.)
687
Section 46 of the 1922 Act had also laid down :
"46(2) The Income-tax Officer may forward to the Collector a certificate under his signature specifying the amount
of arrears due from an assessee, and the Collector, on
receipt of such certificate, shall proceed to recover from such
assessee the amount specified therein as if it were an arrear
of land revenue : "
Section 2, sub. s. (44) of the Act of 1961 provides:
"(44) 'Tax Recovery Officer' means-
(i) A Collector or an additional Collector;
(ii) any such officer empowered to effect recovery of
arrears of land revenue or other public demand under
any law relating to land revenue or other public
demand fur the time being in force in the State as
may be nuthorised by the State Government, lfy
general or special notification in the Official Gazette,
to exercise the powers of a Tax Recovery Officer;
· (iii) any Gazetted Officer of the Central or a
State
Government who may be authorised by the Central
Government, by general or special notification in the
Official Gazette, to exercise the powers of a Tax
Recovery Officer;"
And, Section 222(1) of the 1961 Act Jays down :
"222(1) When an assessee is in default or is deemed to
be in default in making a payment of tax, the Income-tax
Officer may forward to the Tax Recovery Officer a certificate under his signature specifying the amount of arrears
due from the assessee, and the Tax Recovery Officer on
receipt of such certificate,. shall proceed to recover from
such assessee the amount specified therein by one or more
0£ the modes mentioned below, in accordance with the rules
laid down in the Second Schedule--
(a) attachment and sale of the assessee's movable property;
(b) attachment and sale of the assessee's immovable
property;
(c) arrest of the assessee and his detention in prison;
( d) appointing a receiver for the management of the
assessee's movable and immovable properties".
Hence, even i.f the "Peshkar" was the competent officer under the
Travancore Income-tax Act, the duties of the Peshkar as the Recovery
Officer would, by operation of the above mentioned provisions of law,
automatically devolve upon the Collector or an Additional Collector
or upon such Officer as· may be empowered by the State Government
688
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] I S.C.R.
by a special or General notification in the Official Gazette "to effect
recovery of land revenue or other public demand under any law relating to land revenue or other public demand". The appellants, not
having raised the question at any earlier stage that the Additional
Personal Assistant to the Collector was not an officer so authorised,
ca:nnot do so in appeal to this Court. However, we leave it open to
them to take such an objection, which really raises a question of fact
as to whether the required notification was or was not made, before
the Tax Recovery Officer himself. If such an objection had been
taken there or even in the High Court, the relevant notification may
have been produced. We are unable to see any flaw in the reasoning
adopted by the High Court.
Another objection as to jurisdiction relates to the _lumping together
of demands which were legal as well as those, which could not,
according to the assessee, be covered by provisions of law. The High.
Court had held that 11 out af 22 certificates, which had been issued
after the death of T. K'.. Musaliar, were not legal. To that extent the
demands against property attached could be said to be not covered
by required certificates.
Nevertheless, :neither had any property been
sold nor any action taken against the person of any of the appellants.
The authorities relied upon by .the appellants related only to either
sales ot properties fur recovering amounts which were larger than
those which were legally recoverable or arrest of the judgment debtor
in execution of dues.
The cases before us are those of attachment
only. If any part of the pr0perty is illegally or unjustiably attached,
it does not really affect the jurisdiction of the Tax Recovery Officer
to proceed to deal with an objection under Rule 11. The High Court
has held that the appellants can file all their objections under Rule 11
in Schedule 2 of the 1961 Act.
It has also been stated on behalf of the Department that it has no
objection to the application of the procedure
laid
down
in
the
Travancore Act for recovery of such dues against the appellants as
aie realisable from the assets of the deceased. In view of this concession, it is unnecessary for us to deal with the question whether
there was any additional burden or disadvantage imposed upon the
appellants by the procedure in the 1961 Act In view of this concession, the Tax Recovery Officer will only use the procedure in the
Travancore Act so far as it jg possible to apply it.
For the reasons given above, these appeals are hereby dismissed,
but, in the circumstances of these cases, the parties will bear their own
costs in this Court.
P.B.R'.
Appeals dismissed.
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