# IUKHABDAS v. BALLABHDAS AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 475
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, K. N. Wanchoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/iukhabdas-v-ballabhdas-and-others-2433
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Arbitration-Award-Arbitrator filing in court umtatn1XJd
award-Court'• power lo remit-Arbitration Act, 1940 (JO of
1940), 81. J.J(d), 14(1), 15(b) (c), 16(1)(c), 20-Code of Civil
Procedure, J908(Act 6 of 1908), B. 161.
An arbitration agreement was filed in court under s. 20
of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and an order of reference was
made thereon. The arbitrator entered upon the reference
and in due course filed his award in court. The award was
however, unstamped and on objection raised that no judgment
J96J
Manoharlal Ckopra
••
Rai Bohadur Rao
Roja Seth Hiralal
Shah J.
1961
1~1
RiJ;habdos
v.
BaU.bM••
476 SUPREilffi COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
could be passed on such an award, the trial court passed an
order remitting the award to the arbitrator for re-rnbmitting
it to the court on duly stamped paper.
The High Court took
the view that want of stamp .would be an illegality apparent
on the face of the award, which could therefore be remitted
under s, 16( 1) ( c) of the Act.
Held, that an unstamped award cannot Le remitted
under s. 16(1) (c) of tbe Arbitration Act, 19~0, to the arbitrator to get it stamped, because want of stamp is a defect dehors
the award or the decision of the arbitrator and docs not
amount to an illegality apparent upon the face of it within
the meaning of that section.
Ramkumar v. Ku•ltalcharnl, A.I.R. 1928 Nag. 166 and
Lakshmidumd v. Kalloolal, 1956 N.L.J. 504, disapproved.
Nani Bala Saha v, Ram Gopal Saha, A.I.R. 1945 Cal. 19,
approved.
Held, further, that after making an award the arbitrator
is functus officio, and s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
cannot therefore give the court power to direct the arbitrator
lo make a fresh awa1d and re-submit it after writing it on
proper stamp paper.
Mordue v. Palmu, ( 1870) L.R. 6 Ch. App. 22, relied on.
Dubitantt, it iJ doubtful if the fees and charges mentioned
ins. 14(1) of the Arbitration act, 1940, include the stamp
duty payable on the award.
C1YIL APPELLATE Jt;IUSDICTION; Civil Appeal
No. 144 of 1960.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment
a.nd order dated July 26, 1957, of the Madhya.
Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision No. 966 of
1955.
B. R. L. Iyengar and K. P. Bhatt, for the
appellant.
G. S. Pathak, S. N. Andley, Ram'"'hwar Nath
and P. L. Vohra, for the respondents.
19GI. November 16. Tho Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
SARKAR, J.-In this caee an arbitration agreement had been filed in court under s. 20 of the
Arbitration Act, 1940, and an order of reference
made thereon. The arbitrator in due coUl'le enterod
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
477
upon the reference and made and filed his award in
court on July 14, 1955.
Th9 award concerned
partition of certain properties between the wife and
children of one Bhairon Bux.
The a.ward was however unstamped and unregistered. An objection was taken to a judgment
being passed on such an award. On such objection,
the trial court passed an order remitting the award
to the arbitrator
for re-submitting it to the
court on a duly stamped paper and after getting it
registered.
Against this order the High Court at Nagpur
was moved in revision. The learned Single Judge
hearing the revision application took the view that
the award required to be stamped.
But he felt
that it could not be remitted to the arbitrator
under s. 16 of the Arbitration Act, which is the only
provision under which an award can be remitted to
an arbitrator. It appears that there was an earlier
judgment of the Nagpur High Court in the case of
Ramkumar v. Kushalchand {') in which it had been
held that where the award was unstamped it could
under paragraph 14 of Schedule I to the Code of
Civil Procedure be remitted to the arbitrator with
a direction to re-write it on a stamped paper and
re-submit it to court.
The provisions of that
para.graph of the Code have now been substantially
reproduced in s. 16 of the Arbitration Act. The
trial Judge had based himself on this earlier judgment of the High Court. Tho learned Single Judge
was apparently

## Text

(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
475
contrary or differant from the procedure expressly provided in the Code."
The Court in that case held that in exercise of the
powers under s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 the Court cannot issue a commission for
seizing books of account of plaintiff-a purpose
for which a commission is not authorized to be
issued bys. 75.
The principle of the case is destructive of the
submission of the appellants. Section 75 empowers the Court to issue a commission for purposes
specified therein: even though it is not so expressly
stated that there is no power to appoint a commissioner for other purposes, a prohibition to that
effect is, in the view of the Court in Padam Sen 's
case, implicit in s. 75. By parity of reasoning, if
the power to issue injunctions may be exercised,
if it is so prescribed by rules in the Orders in
Schedule I, it must he deemed to be not exercisable
in any other manner or for purposes other than
those set out in O. 39 rr. l and 2.
Appeal allowed.
IUKHABDAS
v.
BALLABHDAS AND OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, and
K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
Arbitration-Award-Arbitrator filing in court umtatn1XJd
award-Court'• power lo remit-Arbitration Act, 1940 (JO of
1940), 81. J.J(d), 14(1), 15(b) (c), 16(1)(c), 20-Code of Civil
Procedure, J908(Act 6 of 1908), B. 161.
An arbitration agreement was filed in court under s. 20
of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and an order of reference was
made thereon. The arbitrator entered upon the reference
and in due course filed his award in court. The award was
however, unstamped and on objection raised that no judgment
J96J
Manoharlal Ckopra
••
Rai Bohadur Rao
Roja Seth Hiralal
Shah J.
1961
1~1
RiJ;habdos
v.
BaU.bM••
476 SUPREilffi COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
could be passed on such an award, the trial court passed an
order remitting the award to the arbitrator for re-rnbmitting
it to the court on duly stamped paper.
The High Court took
the view that want of stamp .would be an illegality apparent
on the face of the award, which could therefore be remitted
under s, 16( 1) ( c) of the Act.
Held, that an unstamped award cannot Le remitted
under s. 16(1) (c) of tbe Arbitration Act, 19~0, to the arbitrator to get it stamped, because want of stamp is a defect dehors
the award or the decision of the arbitrator and docs not
amount to an illegality apparent upon the face of it within
the meaning of that section.
Ramkumar v. Ku•ltalcharnl, A.I.R. 1928 Nag. 166 and
Lakshmidumd v. Kalloolal, 1956 N.L.J. 504, disapproved.
Nani Bala Saha v, Ram Gopal Saha, A.I.R. 1945 Cal. 19,
approved.
Held, further, that after making an award the arbitrator
is functus officio, and s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
cannot therefore give the court power to direct the arbitrator
lo make a fresh awa1d and re-submit it after writing it on
proper stamp paper.
Mordue v. Palmu, ( 1870) L.R. 6 Ch. App. 22, relied on.
Dubitantt, it iJ doubtful if the fees and charges mentioned
ins. 14(1) of the Arbitration act, 1940, include the stamp
duty payable on the award.
C1YIL APPELLATE Jt;IUSDICTION; Civil Appeal
No. 144 of 1960.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment
a.nd order dated July 26, 1957, of the Madhya.
Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision No. 966 of
1955.
B. R. L. Iyengar and K. P. Bhatt, for the
appellant.
G. S. Pathak, S. N. Andley, Ram'"'hwar Nath
and P. L. Vohra, for the respondents.
19GI. November 16. Tho Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
SARKAR, J.-In this caee an arbitration agreement had been filed in court under s. 20 of the
Arbitration Act, 1940, and an order of reference
made thereon. The arbitrator in due coUl'le enterod
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
477
upon the reference and made and filed his award in
court on July 14, 1955.
Th9 award concerned
partition of certain properties between the wife and
children of one Bhairon Bux.
The a.ward was however unstamped and unregistered. An objection was taken to a judgment
being passed on such an award. On such objection,
the trial court passed an order remitting the award
to the arbitrator
for re-submitting it to the
court on a duly stamped paper and after getting it
registered.
Against this order the High Court at Nagpur
was moved in revision. The learned Single Judge
hearing the revision application took the view that
the award required to be stamped.
But he felt
that it could not be remitted to the arbitrator
under s. 16 of the Arbitration Act, which is the only
provision under which an award can be remitted to
an arbitrator. It appears that there was an earlier
judgment of the Nagpur High Court in the case of
Ramkumar v. Kushalchand {') in which it had been
held that where the award was unstamped it could
under paragraph 14 of Schedule I to the Code of
Civil Procedure be remitted to the arbitrator with
a direction to re-write it on a stamped paper and
re-submit it to court.
The provisions of that
para.graph of the Code have now been substantially
reproduced in s. 16 of the Arbitration Act. The
trial Judge had based himself on this earlier judgment of the High Court. Tho learned Single Judge
was apparently not satisfied with the correctness
of the deoision in Ramkumar's case(')
and he
referred
three
questions for decision
by a
larger bench of that High Court. The questions
referred were :
(a) Is the a.ward made on a reference by
the Court on an application under section
(I) A. I. R. 1928 Nag. 166.
1961
Rikhabda<
..
Ba/labhdaJ
Sarkar J,
1901
Rildiabdaa
v.
Ballahhdas
Sarkar J.
\
478 SUPREME COURT REPOltTS [1962J SUPP.
20 _of tlie Arbitration Act oh1J.rgeable to stamp·
duty?
,
(b) Is such an 'award compulsorily registerable when it refates to partition of immovii.-
ble property qC the .;value . of one hundred
rupees and upwards? ' ;
"
(o) Has the Court powers under ~ection
16 (1) (c) of the Arbitration Act of 1940 or
otherwise to remit an aw!trd to the arbitrator
or umpire fo get it stamped and/or registered?
The matter was thereupon heftrd by a Division
Bench of the High Court constituted by ;two learned
J11dge~ .. Befor~ them it was agreed by both. the
parties that the awar\1 r~quired to be stamped,,
This dispo_sed of the, first question. The .learned
J udgos felt that it .~as !}pt nepcssary .at that stage
of the proceed_ing to ·ana.wer tho second. question,.
namely, w~ether tho award required ~!Jgistration.
In the re~ult they c,inly, ans,11ere.d the third question.
as to whether an awar4 could be remitte~- JY!der
f!· 16 (1) .(c) of the Arbitration Act to the arbitrator
to get it stampec). a,nd, th!Jy
a~swer;~d t)lat question
in the affirmative.
Th~y held,that a want of stamp
would be all illegality apparEtnt on the fa9e of the
awar-0. and therefore the case would fall under
s. i6(l) (c) of the Arbitra~ion Act. They also held,
follq~ing the case .of Lq~hmichand v. Kalloolal (1),
that the qopying of the award on a stamped pa.per
was purely ministerial, and making of an award did
not· deprive the arbitra.~or of the authority to copy
an award on the requisite
~ta.mp paper. They
a.pprov!Jd of the decision in Ram.kumar v. K'U8halchand (1). The present ~ppeal is against this judgment
of the Division Bench. The only qu.estion argued
at the bar was whether the answer of the Division
Bench to the third questio.n was correct.
(1.)
19S6 N. L. J •. 504.
(2)
A. T. R. 1928 Nag. 166.
-
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
479
Now s. 16(1)(0) of the Act is in these
terms:
S. 16 (1): The Court may from time to time
remit the award or any matter referred to
arbitration to the arbitrators or umpire
for reconsideration upon
such terms as it
thinks fit-
................. ' ................. .
(c) where an objection to the legality of
the award is apparent upon the face of it.
We think that the Division Bench of the Hillh
Court was clearly in error. Under s. 16 of the
Arbitration Act an award can be remitted to the
arbitrators only for reconsideration. When it is
remitted for re-writing it on a stamped paper, it is
not remitted for reconsideration. Recosideration
by the arbitrators necessarily imports fresh con·
sideration of matter& already considered by them.
Now they can only consider and give a decision
upon matters which are referred to them under t.he
arbitration agreement. It follows that the recon-
'lideration can only be as to the merits of the
award. They reconsider nothing when they re-write
the award on a stamped paper. We think the
matter was correctly put by Mitter, J., in Nani Bala
Saha v. Ram GopaJ Saha (1) in the following observation:
"That cl. (c) means this and nothing more:
namely, that where the court finds an error
of law in the award itself or in some document
actually incorporated thereto on which the
arbitrator had based his award, that is to say,
finds the statement of some erroneous legal
proposition which is the basis or the award, it
can remit the award to the arbitrator for
reconsideration" and "Want of registration is
a defect dehors the award or the decision of
(I} A. I. R. 1945 Cal. 19, 22.
1161 --
Ril!Ulbdas
v.
Ba//abltdas
Sarkar J,
l~I
RiJhabd4s
••
Ba//a6M11
5.,U,J.
480 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962.1 SUPP •
•
the arbitrator, and so in our judgment is not
covered by cl. (c) of S. l6 (I l, Arbitration Act
of 1940".
What was said there about a want of regi~tration is
clearly equally applicable to a want of stamp.
Mr. Pathak appearing for the respondent
contended that under s. 14 (I) of the Arbitration
Act it was clearly the duty of the arbitrator to
inform the parties of the amount of stamp duty
payable on the award. Section 14 (I) is in thMe
terms:
Section 14 (I) When the arbitrators or
umpire have made their award, they shall sign
it and shall give notice in writing to the parties
of the making and siiming thereof and of the
amount of fees and charges payable in respect
of the arbitration and award.
We are unable to see how this section can provide
the basis for the order made in this case. It only
says that tho arbitrators shall inform the parties
of the fees and charges payable.
Even assuming
that the word 'charges' includes duty payable for
the stamp to be affixed to the award, at best, this
section would support an order
direoting the
arbitrators to supply this information.
It would
not justify an order requiring the arbitrators to
inscribe the award afrl'sh on a stamped paper and
re.submit it to court. As at present advised, we
have grave doubts if the foes and charges men·
tioned in s. 14 (l) include the stamp duty payable
on the award. Section 17 or the Stamp Act requires that stamping shouM be at the time of execution. Under s. 14 (I) of the Arbitration
Act
it is only after the singing of the
award
that is its execution, that the arbitrators are
required to supply tho information about the
foes and charges. It is, of course, no part of the
duty of the arbitrators under the Aot or otherwise
to find the costs of stamp themselves.
Therefore
-
(l) s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
481
it is difficult to appreciat.e how the word 'charges'
mentioned in this section includes stamp.
But on
this question it is not necessary for us to express
any final opinion in this case.
Mr. Pathak contened that even if the caBe did
not come within s. 16 ( 1) ( c) of the Arbitration
Act, the order in the present case can be supported
under s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure wltich
preserves the inherent power of a court to make
such orders as may be necessary for the ends of
justice. it is true that s. 41 of the Arbitration
Act makes the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings before a court
under tho Arbitration Act. But it is well known
that after making his award the arbitrator is
functus officio. To cite one authority for this proposition we may quote the observations of Mellish,
L. J., in Mordue v. Palmer(•).
.
"I think the result of the cases at law is
that when an arbitrator has signed a document as and for his award, he is functus
officio, and he cannot of his own authority
remedy any mistake."
In the present case, ex-hypothesi, the award
has already been made and the arbitrator has
therefore become funotus officio. It is that award
which requires stamp. Section 151 of the Code
cannot give the court power to direct the arbitrator
to make a fresh award; that would be against
well-established principles of the law of arbitration.
It would again be useless to havti another copy
of the award prepared and stamped for the copy
would not be the award and no action in a court
can be taken on it. The order cannot therefore be
supported by s. 151 _of the Code.
It is of some
interest to read here the following passage from
Russel on Arbitration 14th Ed., p. 325.
(I} (\870 71) L. R. 6 Cb. App. 22, 31.
J9Gl
Riklr•bias
v.
Ball abhdas
Sarkar J,
1961
Ri'lehah<laJ
v.
BallatJ11/a1
Sarkar .T.
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
"'.rhe usual practice
in preparing an
award is to have two copies ma.de of it. One
the arbitrator RignR, which then becomes the
original award, and thiR is delivered to tho
party who tak<'s up the award.
The other
copy is a.vaihhlc for tho other parties if they
apply for it."
"The original award, before it is a.va.ilabl1.1 for any purpose whatsoever, must be
duly stamped, but there is no obligation
upon tho arhitmtor to Rtamp it, and he does
not usually do so.''
\Ve
should observe here that
tho last paragraph in the aforesaid. quotation does not appear
in the 16th edition of Russel's work.
Perha.p~ this
is bccauRc in England a.n award is no more reGuircd
to be stamped by virtue of s. 35 Sched. 8, of tho
Fina.nee Act, 1949, which was passed after tho 14th
edit ion was published.
Lastly, Mr. Pathak tried to support the order
under ss. 13 ( d) and 15 (b) and ( c) of the Arbitration Act.
A bare perusal of the provisions mentioned would show that the order made in this case
cannot bo based on any of them.
S<'ction 13 (d)
deals with correction of clerical mi&ta.kcs or acciden•
ta.I slips in tho a.ward, neither of which we think an
omission to stamp is.
Further more, s. 13 is only
an enabling section giving certain powers to tho
arbitrator. Tho arbitrator cannot bti compelled to
exerciFe these powera.
Section 15 deals with a.
court's power to modify or correct an award.
In
the present case, the (',ourt did not purport to 11xercise that power.
We, therefore, think that the Division Bench
w&S in error in thinking that 'ln order could be
made remitting the awe.rd to the arbitrator with a.
rlirection to re-write it on a. stamped paper anti resubmit it to court. That is the only point that wo
decide in thiR case.
.
(I) S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
483
In the result this appeal is allowed.
The
orders of the Courts below remitting the award are
set aside. The appellant 'vill get the cost throughout. Nothing that we have said in this judgment
will aff3ct the right of the parties to take such
steps, if any are available to them at law, for cur·
ing the defect arising from the award being on an
unstamped paper.
Appeal allowed.
THE CALCUTTA JUTE MFG. CO. LTD.
v.
CALCUTTA JUTE MFG. WORKERS' UNION
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR and
K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
Industrial Dispnte-Oharge of defiance and insubordinationAuthority if m1Mt be a direct superior-Enquiry-Incidental
matter if could be considered-Standing Order 14 (c) (i).
J, a sardar of the Batching Department of the appellant
company, brought to the notice of G, a supervisor of the department, that one R of the Spinning Department was throwing
away as unusable some workable roves.
G on finding the
report correct, with a view to make a complaint against R's
work to the superior authority asked J to collect the roves
thrown away. R tried to prevent J from collecting the roves;
on G intervening R took a menacing attitude and abused G
in filthy language. .Soon another sardar S took R's side and
also abused G and threatened him with violence. The management of the appellant company on the complaint of G
served charge·sheets on the 2 workmen R and S which stated
that as they had used abusive and filthy language and threa·
tened to assault G, a supervisor, they were guilty of misconduct
under standing order No. 14 \c) (i) which contemplated two
types of misconduct; one wilfu insubordination and the other
disobedience of any lawful and reasonable order of a superior.
The tribunal inter alia held that G not being the supervisor of the Spinning Department where R and S worked was
not a direct superior of these workmen and they were not
guilty of insubordination or disobedience within the Standing
Order.
1961
Rikhabdas
v.
Bal/ahhdas
Sarkar J.
1961
Nou1111bt1 16,