# J. 0. JAIN v. R. A. PATHAK AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1960] 2 S.C.R. 701
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1960
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 75 of 1956
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. SuBBA RAO, K. c. DAS GUPTA
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/j-0-jain-v-r-a-pathak-and-others-1768
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

701
Payment of Wages-EmPl<?yer's right of appeal--When accrues
-Paym_ent of Wages Act, r936 (4 of r936), ss. r5(3), r6, r7(r) (a) ••
The expression " the total sum directed to be paid " used
in s. 17(1) (a) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, properly
construed, does not mean the total sum directed to be paid to
each individual applicant. Consequently, an employer against
whom a direction for .payment is made under s. 15(3) of the
Act has a right of appeal under s. 17(1) (a} not only when a
single applicant is awarded a sum exceeding Rs. 300 but also
when an award of a like amount is made on a single application
made under s. 16(2) of the Act on behalf of several employees
belonging to the same unpaid group or on several applications
consolidated into one under s. 16(3) thereof. Section 17(1) (a)
does not contemplate that before the right to appeal can accrue
to the employer in the latter case each individual applicant must
be awarded Rs. 300 or more.
;
Since the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous
no consideration of any possible hypothetical anomaly can be
allowed to affect its plain meaning.
Laxman Pandu and Others v. Chief Mechanical Engineer, Western Railway (B. B. and C. I. Railway), Lower Parel, Bombay.
(1957) 57 B.L.R. 399, overruled.
Union of India, Owning the South Indian Railway by General
Manager v. S. P. Nataraja Sastrigal & Ors. A.LR. 1952 Mad.
808; A. C. Arumugam & Ors. v. Manager, ]awahar Mills Ltd.,
Salem ]unction, A.IR. 1956 Mad. 79; Promod Ranjan Sarkar v.
R. N. Mullick, A.LR. 1959 Cal. 318 and Cachar Cha Sramik
Union v. Manager, Martycherra Tea Estate & Anr. A.LR. 1959
Assam 13, approved.

## Text

•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
J. 0. JAIN
v.
R. A. PATHAK AND OTHERS .
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAO and
K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)
701
Payment of Wages-EmPl<?yer's right of appeal--When accrues
-Paym_ent of Wages Act, r936 (4 of r936), ss. r5(3), r6, r7(r) (a) ••
The expression " the total sum directed to be paid " used
in s. 17(1) (a) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, properly
construed, does not mean the total sum directed to be paid to
each individual applicant. Consequently, an employer against
whom a direction for .payment is made under s. 15(3) of the
Act has a right of appeal under s. 17(1) (a} not only when a
single applicant is awarded a sum exceeding Rs. 300 but also
when an award of a like amount is made on a single application
made under s. 16(2) of the Act on behalf of several employees
belonging to the same unpaid group or on several applications
consolidated into one under s. 16(3) thereof. Section 17(1) (a)
does not contemplate that before the right to appeal can accrue
to the employer in the latter case each individual applicant must
be awarded Rs. 300 or more.
;
Since the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous
no consideration of any possible hypothetical anomaly can be
allowed to affect its plain meaning.
Laxman Pandu and Others v. Chief Mechanical Engineer, Western Railway (B. B. and C. I. Railway), Lower Parel, Bombay.
(1957) 57 B.L.R. 399, overruled.
Union of India, Owning the South Indian Railway by General
Manager v. S. P. Nataraja Sastrigal & Ors. A.LR. 1952 Mad.
808; A. C. Arumugam & Ors. v. Manager, ]awahar Mills Ltd.,
Salem ]unction, A.IR. 1956 Mad. 79; Promod Ranjan Sarkar v.
R. N. Mullick, A.LR. 1959 Cal. 318 and Cachar Cha Sramik
Union v. Manager, Martycherra Tea Estate & Anr. A.LR. 1959
Assam 13, approved.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal No.
75 of 1956.
Appeal by special leave from judgment and order
dated March 17, 1955, of the Small Causes Court,
Bombay, in Appeal No. 1 of 1955.
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, S. N.
Andley, J. B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for
the appellant.
K. R. Ohoudhuri, for the respondents.
:r960
January :rz
702
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]
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1960. January 12. The JudgmentoftheCourtwas
J. c. Jain
delivered by
v.
GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-When does an employer get
R. A. Pathak
a right to prefer an appeal against a direction made
and Others
under sub-s. (3) of s. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act,
Gajendragadkar J.1936 (4 of 1936) (hereinafter called the Act)? That is
·
the short question which arises for our decision in the
present group of four appeals. The decision of this
question depends on the construction of s. 17 (l)(a) of
the Act. In dealing with the question thus posed by
the present group of appeals we will refer to the facts
in Civil Appeal No. 75 of 1956, and our decision in it
would govern the three remaining appeals.
Civil Appeal No. 75of1956 which has been brought
to this Court by special leave arises from a dispute
between the General Manager of the Times of India
Press, Bombay, owned by Benett Coleman & Co, Ltd.,
(hereinafter called the appellant) and some of the
employees in his service (hereinafter called the respondents). ·In November 1953, 1,066 applications were
made by the Vice-President of the Times of India
Indian Employees Union on behalf of some of the
respondents before Mr. C. P. Fernandes, the authority
appointed under the Act in which a claim was made
for arrears of increments alleged to have been withheld by the appellant from July 1, 1951, to September iJO, 1953, as also for increased dearness allowance
from January 1, 1953, to August 31, 1953. The
authority dealt with the whole group of the said
applications as a single application under s. 16(3) of
the Act, and held that the claim made by the respondents for increased dearness allowance was not justi.
fied. In regard to the claim of arrears of increments
alleged to have been withheld the authority rejected
the claim made by 761 employees and allowed the
same in respect of 305 employees. In the result the
order passed by the authority on 31-12-1954 directed
the appellant to deposit Rs. 22,698 for payment to
the said 305 employees.
The direction thus issued by the authority gave rise
to two appeals before the Small Causes Court at
Bombay, which is the appellate authority appointed
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
703
under the Act. Appeal No. 1 of 1955 was filed by the
1960
appellant while Appeal No. 187.of 1954 was filed by
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h
j C. Jain
the respondents. Meanwhi e t e quest10n a out t e
v.
extent of the right conferred on the employer to
R. A. Pathak
prefer an appeal by s. 17(l)(a) of the Act had been
and Others
considered by the Bombay High Court in Laxman
.
Pandu & Ors. v. Chief Mechanical Engineer, Western Ga;endragadkar J.
Railway (B.B. & 0.1. Railway), Lower Parel, Bombay (1);
and it had been held that under the said section the
employer gets a right of appeal only if the order of the
'
authority under the Act awards payment of an amount
· of Rs. 300 or more in respect of a single individual
worker; the right does not exist if the order awards a
sum exceeding Rs. 300 collectively to an unpaid group
of workers every one of whom gets an amount under
Rs. 300.
Following this decision the appellate
authority held that the appeal preferred by the appel.
lant was incompetent and so dismissed it. The
appellant then applied for and obtained special leave
from this Court to prefer an appeal against the said
appellate decision; and so the main point raised by the
appeal is about the construction of s. l 7(l)(a) of the Act.
The Act has been passed in 1936 with a view to
regulate the payment of wages to certain classes of
persons employed in industry. Section 15(1) of the
Act authorises the State Government by notification
in the official Gazette to appoint any Commissioner
for W orkrnen's Compensation or other officer with
experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as a
stipendiary Magistrate to be the authority to hear and
decide for any specified area all claims arising•out of
deductions from the wages, or delay in P.ayment of
wages of persons employed or paid in that area.
Section 7 has. provided for deductions which may be
made fr©m wages. Any deductions made not in
accordance with the said se0tion and contrary to the
provhlions of the Act as well as wages the payment of
which has been delayed can be brought before the
authority under sub-s. (2) of s. 15. • Sub-sec.tion (3) of
s. 15 empowers the authority to deal with the applications made under sub-s. (2) and to direct a refund to
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(I) (195~) 57 '.a.I,,R. 399,
704
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1960(2)]
r96o
the employed person of the amount deducted or the
payment of delayed wages together with the payment
J c~.Jain
of such compensation as the authority may think fit,
R. A. Pathak
not exceeding ten times the amount deducted in the
and Others
former case and not exceeding Rs. 10 in the latter.
.
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Sub-section (4) provides that in cases where the
Ga1endragadkar f. authority is satisfied that the application made by the
employee was either malicious or vexatious it may
direct that a penalty not exceeding Rs. 50 be paid to
the employer or other persons responsible for the
payment of wages by the applicant. It would thus be
seen thats. 15 provides for the making of applications
by the employees and for their decision in accordance
with the provisions of the Act. It is necessary to
refer to s. 16 as well before dealing with the question
of the construction of s. l 7(l)(a). Section 16 provides
for the making of a single application in respect of
claims fr.om unpaid group. Section 16(1) provides that
employed persons are said to belong to the same
unpaid group if they are borne on the same establishment and if their wages for the same period or periods
have remained unpaid after the day fixed by s. 5.
Sub- section (2) provides for the making of a single
application under s. 15 on behalf of or in respect of
any number of employed persons belonging to 'the
same unpaid group, and prescribes that in such a case
the maximum compensation that may be awarded
under sub-s. (3) of s. 15 shall be Rs. 10 per head. Subsection (3) then provides that the authority may deal
with any number of separate pending applications
presel'\ted under s. 15 in respect of persons belonging
to the same unpaid group as a single application
presented under sub·s. (2) of the said section, and the
provisions of that sub-section shall apply accordingly.
Thus the effect of s. 16 is that a single application
may be made on behalf of any number of employed
persons belonging to the same unpaid group, or if
separate applications are made by employed persons
belonging to the same unpaid group they may be
consolidated and tried as a single application.
Let us now read s. 17 which provides for appeals.
Section 17(1) provides that an. appeal against a
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
705
direction made under sub-s. (3) or sub-s. (4) ofs 15 may
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be preferred within thirty days of the date on which
the direction was made, in a Presidency-town before
J. c. fain
v.
the Court of Small Causes and elsewhere before the
R. A Pathak
District Court-(a) by the employer or other person
and Others
responsible for the payment of wages under s. 3, if the
.
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total sum directed to be paid by way of wages and Ga;endragadkar J.
compensation exceeds Rs. 300, or (b) by an employed
person, if the total amount of wages claimed to have
been withheld from him or from the unpaid group to
which he belonged exceeds Rs. 50, or (c) by any person
directed to pay a penalty under sub.s. (4) of s. 15.
Sub-section (2) of s. 17 makes the directions made
under sub-s. (3) and sub-s. (4) of s. 15 final save as
provided in sub-s. (1).
On a plain reading of s. l 7(l)(a) it seems fairly clear
that the only test which has to be satisfied by the
appellant before preferring an appeal against a direction issued under s. 15(3) is that the total sum directed
to be paid by him should exceed Rs. 300.
Where a
single application has been made on behalf of a
number of employed persons belonging to the same
unpaid group under s. 16, sub.s. (2), and a direction
has been issued for the payment of the s:r:ecified
amount, it is the said specified amount that must be
considered in deciding whether the test prescribfd by
s. l 7(l)(a) is satisfied or not. The view tn,ken by the
Bombay High Court, however, is that s. l 7(l)(a) is
applicable only where the amount directed to be paid
to each single applicant exceeds Rs. 300. In other
words, on this view the expression " the total sum
directed to be paid" used ins. l 7(l)(a) is construed to
mean the total sum directed to be paid to each individual applicant, and that clearly involves the addition
of certain words in the section. If the application is
made by a single employee an appeal can be preferred
by the employer against the direction issued in such
an application if the total sum directed to be paid to
the applicant exceeds Rs .. 300; but if a single application is made on behalf of several employees belonging
to the same unpaid group the test to be applied is not
.whether a direction has been issued that the employer
90
706
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2))
z960
should pay Rs. 300 or more to each one of the applicants; the test clearly is whether a direction has been
]. C. Jain
v.
issued on the said single application calling upon the
R.A. Pathak
employer to pay to the applicants Rs. 300 or more.
and Othm
Reading s. l 7(l)(a) by itself we feel no difficulty in
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reaching this conclusion.
GaJendmgadkar J.
It is, however, urged that in construing s. l 7(l)(a) it
would be relevant and material to compare and
contrast its provisions with those of cl. (b) of s. 17,
sub-s. (1).
Providing for the right of an employee to
make an appeal this clause requires that the total
amount of wages claimed to have been withheld from
him or from the unpaid group to which he belonged
should exceed Rs. 50. It is emphasised that this clause
refers expressly to the case of an individual employee
as well as the cases of employees belonging to an
unpaid group; and the argument is that since cl. (a)
does not use the words "unpaid group" it indicates
that the direction about the payment of the amount
prescribed by the said clause has reference to each
individual employee. We are not impressed by this
argument. Since the Act has provided for the making
of a single application on behalf of a number of
employed persons belonging to the same unpaid group
as well as separate applications made by individual
workmen it was unnecessary to refer to the persons
employed in the unpaid group while providing for
appeals against directions made under s. 15(3). On the
other hand, if the Legislature had intended that the
right to prefer an appeal should accrue to the employer
only if Rs. 300 or more are directed to be paid to each
individual employee it would have used appropriate
additional words in cl. (a). Therefore the argument
based upon the use of the words "unpaid group" in
cl. (b) is not of any assistance in construing cl. (a).
We are also inclined to think that it could not have
been the intention of the Legislature to confer on the
employer the right to prefer an appeal only if Rs. 300
or more are ordered to be paid to each one of the
applicants. It is true that the poliqy of the Act is to
provide for speedy remedy to the employees in respect
of unauthorised deductions made by the employer or
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
707
in respect of delayed wages; and with that object the
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Act provides for the appointment of the authority
and prescribes the summary procedure for the decision
J. c. fain
of the claims; but it seems very unlikely that whereas
R. A."Fathak
an appeal by the employee has been permitted by
and Others
cl. (b) whenever the amount in dispute happens to be
Rs. 50 or more in respect of an inQ.ividual applicant Gajendragadkar J.
or in respect of the unpaid group the Legislature
could have intended that the employer should have
no right. of appeal against a direction made on a
single consolidated application even though the total
liability fl.owing from the said direction may exceed
the specified amount of Rs. 300 by several thousands.
In the present case the amount directed to be paid is
more than Rs. 22,000 but it has been held that since
each one of the employees is not ordered to be paid
Rs. 300 or more there is no right of appeal. On
general considerations, therefore, the conclusion which
we have reached on a fair and reasonable construction
of cl. (a) appears to be well-founded.
There is another point to which reference must be
made. Section 16(3) empowers the authority to
consolidate several applications made by individual
employees and hear them as a single application as
though it was presented under s. 16, sub-s. (2); and it
is urged that this procedural provision cannot and
should not have a decisive effect on the employer's
right to prefer an appeal under s. 17(l)(a). If several
applications made by individual employees are not
consolidated and heard as a single application under
s. 16(3) and separate directions are issued, then the
employer would have the right to prefer an appeal
only where the total amount directed to be paid
exceeds Rs. 300. ·On the other hand, if the authority
consolidates the said applications and makes a direction in respect of the total amount to be paid to the
employees belonging to the unpaid group the employer
may be entitled to make an appeal even though each
one of the employees receives less than Rs. 300. It
would be anomalous, it is said, that the right to appeal
should depend upon the exercise of discretion vested
in the authority under s. 1.6(3).
We are unable to see
the force of this argument. We apprehend that
•
]. C. Jain
v.
R.A. Pathak
and Others
Gajendragadkar
708
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2))
ordinarily when several applications are made by the
employees belonging to the same unpaid group the
authority would prefer to treat the said applications
as a single application under s. 16(3); but apart from
this practical aspect of the matter, ifs. 16(3) permits
the constilidation of the several applications and in
J. consequence of consolidation they , are assimilated to
the position of a single application contemplated by
s. 16(2), the only question which has to be considered
in dealing with the competence of the appeal is to see
whether the direction appealed against satisfies the
test of s. l 7(l)(a), and on that point we feel no hesitation in holding that the test prescribed by s. l 7(l)(a) is
that the direction should be for the payment of an
amount exceeding Rs. 300.
Besides, we think it would not be right to assume
that it is anomalous if different consequences follow
from the adoption of different procedures in trying
employees' claims and an appeal does not lie where
several applications are tried separately while it lies
where similar applications are heard as a single
application under s. 16(3). This difference is clearly
intended by the Legislature. A similar different
consequence is prescribed in the matter of the award
of compensation by s. 15, sub-s. (3) and s. 16,sub-s. (2)
respectively. Therefore, the argument based on the
alleged anomaly cannot have any validity inconstruing s. l 7(l)(a).
Incidentally, if one or more employees in the same
unpaid group are paid an amount exceeding Rs. 300
and the rest are paid less than Rs. 300, on the alternative construction, the employer would be entitled to
make an appeal only in respect of a workman to whom
more than Rs. 300 is ordered to ·be paid and not
against the others though the total amount directed
to be paid to them may exceed by far the amount of
Rs. 300. In such a case, if the appeal preferred by
the employer in respect of the amount ordered to be
paid to some of the workmen succeeds that would
leave outs'tanding two conflicting decisions, with the
result that a large number of employees in the same
unpaid group may get the a.mount under the direction
of the authority while those who were awarded more
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
709
than Rs. 300 by the authority would get a smaller
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amount under the decision of the appellate authority .
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f
]. C. Jain
We are re1errmg to t is anoma ous aspect o the
v.
matter only for the purpose of showing that where
R. A. Pathak
the words used in the relevant clause are clear and
and Others
unambiguous considerations of a possible hypothetical
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t
ff t •t
l ·
·
Th t . Gajendragadkar J.
anoma y canno a ec
i s p am meanmg.
a is
why we prefer to leave anomalies on both sides out of
account and confine ourselves to the construction of
the words used ins. 17(l)(a). Ifthe said words had
been reasonably capable of two constructions it would
have been relevant to consider which of the two
constructions would avoid any possible anomalies. We
would, therefore, hold that the appellate authority
was in error in dismissing the appeal preferred before
it by the appellant on the ground that_ it was
incompetent under s. 17(l)(a). We would like to add
that the question about the construction of s. l 7(l)(a)
has been considered by the Madras High Court (Union
of India, owning the South Indian Railway by the General
Manager v. S. P. Nataraja Sastrigal & Ors. (1) and
A. 0. Arumugam & Ors. v. Manager, Jawahar Millf
Ltd., Salem Junction (2), the Calcutta High Court
(Promod Ranjan Sarkar v. R.N. Mullick (3) and Assam
High Court (Gachar Cha Sramik Union v. Manager,
Martycherra Tea Estate & Anr. (4} and they have all
differed from the view taken ·by the Bombay High
Court- and have construed s. l 7(l)(a) in the same
manner as we have done.
The result is the appeal is allowed, the order of
· dismissal passed by the appellate authority is set
aside and the appeal sent back to it for disposal in
accordance with law. Since the hearing of the appeal
has been thus delaylild we would direct that the
appellate authority should dispose of the appeal as
expeditiously as possible.
Under the circumstances
of this case we would direct that the parties should
bear their own costs.
Appeal allowed.
(1) A.LR. 1952 Mad. 808.
(3) A.LR. 1959 Cal. 318 S.C.; 63 C.W.N. 6.
(2) A.LR. 1956 Mad. 79.
(4) A.I.R. 1959 Assam 13.