# J. D. JAIN v. THE MANAGEMENT OF STATE BANK OF INDIA & ANR

- **Citation:** [1982] 2 S.C.R. 227
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1981-12-17
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 495 of 1979
- **Bench:** V.D. Tulzapurkar, Baharul Islam, A. Varadarajan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/j-d-jain-v-the-management-of-state-bank-of-india-anr-8898
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

227
Constitution of India 1950, Art. 226-Award of Industrial Tribunal-Jurisdiction of High Court-interference-When arises.
Industrial Disputes Act 1947, S. lJA-Comp/aint-Depositor against bank
employee-Debit authority alteration of-Withdrawal of excess money-Confession
by employee to officer of alteration and withdrawal-Holding of domestic enquiryD
Non examination of depositor-Chari:e of.fraud and misappropriation provedEmployee discharged from service-Dispute raised-Issue referred to TribunalTribunal holding depositor (complainant) not examined-Evidence against employee
'hearsay'-Direcring reinstatement-High Court in writ petilion setting aside
award of tribunal-High Court whether correct in interfering with award-Award
whether vitiated by misconception of law.
Labour Law-Domestic enquiry-Guilt whether to be established beyond
reasonable doubt-Proof of misconduct alone-Whether sufficient,
Words & Phrases 'hearsay'-Meaning of
E
The Appellant was working as a Cashier in a Bank. A depositor who had
a Savings Bank Account with the Bank came 10 the Bank to receive his Pass
ID'
Book. On receipt of his Pass Book from the Counter Clerk he complained to
the ledger keeper that on a certain date he had withdrawn only Rs. 500 but a
debit entry of Rs, l ,500 had been shown in the Pass Book. The Ledger kc~f)er
took the depositor to the Supervisor and the Agent and his complaint was
recorded. When the documents pertaining to the withdrawal were examined it
was found that the depositor had given a letler of authority to the appellant
authorising withdrawal from his account. The letter of authority showed that it
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was for withdrawal of Rs. l 500 though there appeared to be some interpolation
suggesting that the figure of Rs. 500 had been altered to the figure of Rs. l 500.
A memorandum of charge was served on the appellant by the Management
respondent No. I and a disciplinary enquiry was held. The Enquiry Officer
submitted his report and his findings were that the appellant had fraudulently
altered the amount in the letter of authority given by the depcsitor, withdrew
Rs. 1500 from the depositor's account and paid Rs. 500 only to the depositor and
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SUPilEMil COURT REPORTS
[1982) 2 S.C.R.
misappropriated Rs.1500. In pursuance of the enquiry the appellant was discharged from service.
The appellant having raised an industrial dispute the matter was referred to
the Industrial Tribunal. Before the Tribunal the appellant denied the charges
and pleaded that as the depositor was not examined in the discplinary enquiry
there was no legal evidence before the Enquiry Officer for finding that he was
guilty. Before the Tribunal the Management examined no witnesses but
produced documents and relied on them. The Tribunal held that on the evidence
before it the appellant could not be held guilty as in the absence of the evidence
of the depositor, the evidence recorded was 'hearsay' and directed re-instatement
of the appellant with full back wages.
The respondent moved the High Court under Article 226 and 227 which
held that the charge against the appellant had been established and quashed the
award of the Tribunal.
In the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant : (1)
that the Tribunal exercised its powers under Section 1 !A of the Industrial Disputes Act and the High Court exercising powers under Article 226/227 had no
jurisdiction to interfere with the award ; (2) the Tribunal rightly refused to rely
on the evidence which was hearsay; the depositor not having been examined,
and (3) the High Court committed an error in not considering the receipt executed by the depositor showing payment of Rs. 1000 to the depositor.
,
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : The award of the Tribunal is vitiated by misconception of the law
involved. It erred in holding that as Kansai (depositor) was not examined, fraud
and misappropriation on the part of appellant cannot be held to be proved and in
failing to appreciate the confession made

## Text

,
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J. D. JAIN
v.
THE MANAGEMENT OF STATE BANK OF
INDIA & ANR.
December 17, 1981
[V.D. TULZAPURKAR, BAHARUL ISLAM AND
A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.)
227
Constitution of India 1950, Art. 226-Award of Industrial Tribunal-Jurisdiction of High Court-interference-When arises.
Industrial Disputes Act 1947, S. lJA-Comp/aint-Depositor against bank
employee-Debit authority alteration of-Withdrawal of excess money-Confession
by employee to officer of alteration and withdrawal-Holding of domestic enquiryD
Non examination of depositor-Chari:e of.fraud and misappropriation provedEmployee discharged from service-Dispute raised-Issue referred to TribunalTribunal holding depositor (complainant) not examined-Evidence against employee
'hearsay'-Direcring reinstatement-High Court in writ petilion setting aside
award of tribunal-High Court whether correct in interfering with award-Award
whether vitiated by misconception of law.
Labour Law-Domestic enquiry-Guilt whether to be established beyond
reasonable doubt-Proof of misconduct alone-Whether sufficient,
Words & Phrases 'hearsay'-Meaning of
E
The Appellant was working as a Cashier in a Bank. A depositor who had
a Savings Bank Account with the Bank came 10 the Bank to receive his Pass
ID'
Book. On receipt of his Pass Book from the Counter Clerk he complained to
the ledger keeper that on a certain date he had withdrawn only Rs. 500 but a
debit entry of Rs, l ,500 had been shown in the Pass Book. The Ledger kc~f)er
took the depositor to the Supervisor and the Agent and his complaint was
recorded. When the documents pertaining to the withdrawal were examined it
was found that the depositor had given a letler of authority to the appellant
authorising withdrawal from his account. The letter of authority showed that it
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was for withdrawal of Rs. l 500 though there appeared to be some interpolation
suggesting that the figure of Rs. 500 had been altered to the figure of Rs. l 500.
A memorandum of charge was served on the appellant by the Management
respondent No. I and a disciplinary enquiry was held. The Enquiry Officer
submitted his report and his findings were that the appellant had fraudulently
altered the amount in the letter of authority given by the depcsitor, withdrew
Rs. 1500 from the depositor's account and paid Rs. 500 only to the depositor and
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SUPilEMil COURT REPORTS
[1982) 2 S.C.R.
misappropriated Rs.1500. In pursuance of the enquiry the appellant was discharged from service.
The appellant having raised an industrial dispute the matter was referred to
the Industrial Tribunal. Before the Tribunal the appellant denied the charges
and pleaded that as the depositor was not examined in the discplinary enquiry
there was no legal evidence before the Enquiry Officer for finding that he was
guilty. Before the Tribunal the Management examined no witnesses but
produced documents and relied on them. The Tribunal held that on the evidence
before it the appellant could not be held guilty as in the absence of the evidence
of the depositor, the evidence recorded was 'hearsay' and directed re-instatement
of the appellant with full back wages.
The respondent moved the High Court under Article 226 and 227 which
held that the charge against the appellant had been established and quashed the
award of the Tribunal.
In the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant : (1)
that the Tribunal exercised its powers under Section 1 !A of the Industrial Disputes Act and the High Court exercising powers under Article 226/227 had no
jurisdiction to interfere with the award ; (2) the Tribunal rightly refused to rely
on the evidence which was hearsay; the depositor not having been examined,
and (3) the High Court committed an error in not considering the receipt executed by the depositor showing payment of Rs. 1000 to the depositor.
,
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : The award of the Tribunal is vitiated by misconception of the law
involved. It erred in holding that as Kansai (depositor) was not examined, fraud
and misappropriation on the part of appellant cannot be held to be proved and in
failing to appreciate the confession made by the appellant to the higher officer
that he had altered the amount in figures and words in his own band. [236 G]
I. In an application for a writ of certiorari under Article 226 for quashing
the award of an Industrial Tribunal the jurisdiction of the High Court is limited.
It can quash the award when the Tribunal has committed an error of Jaw
apparent on the face of the record or when the finding of facts of the Tribunal
is perverse. (233 BJ
In the instant case, three kinds of proceedings against the delinquent
were possible : (i) departmental proceedings and action, (ii) Criminal prosecution for the alleged misappropriation of the amount, and (iii) civil proceedings
for recovery of the amount alleged to be misappropriated. The respondent adopted the first course and instituted the domestic enquiry. In such an enquiry
guilt need not be established beyond reasonable doubt; proof of misconduct may
be sufficient. (234 G-235 A]
Stale of llaryana & Anr. v. Ra/Ian Singh A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1512, referred
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to
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J.D. JAIN v. STATE BANK (Baharul Islam, J.)
229
2.
The word 'hearsay' is used in various senses. Sometimes it means whatA
ever a person declares on information given by someone else. [235 E]
In the instant case, the Tribunal after having made a detailed reference to
the evidence of the witnesses found that a complaint was made by Kansai and that
the appellant confessed that he had altered the debit authority, but held that as
Kansai was not examined, this was not direct evidence but was of the nature of
'hearsay' evidence, with regard to the fact whether the appellant manipulated the
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documents, withdrew the excess amount and misappropriated it, there is no direct
evidence of any of the witnesses except the appellant's confession. The evidence on
which reliance has been taken by the respondent is the confession and circumstantial evidence. The evidence of Kansai would have been primary and material. if
the fact in issue were whether Kansai authorised the appellant to make the altera~
tions in the authority letter. But Kansal's complaint was to the contrary. No rule
of law enjoins that a complaint has to be in writing as insisted by the Tribunal:
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For the purpose of a departmental enquiry, complaint substantiated by circumstantial evidence is enough. What the respondent sought to establish in the
domestic enquiry was that Kansai had made a verbal complaint with regard to the
withdrawal of excess money by the appellant. On the factum of complaint of
Kansai the evidence of these four witnessess is direct as the complaint is said to
have been made by Kansai in their presence and hearing. It is not therefore
'hearsay'. The respondent has succeeded in proving that a complaint was made
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by Kansai on the evidence of these four witnesses. [236 A-El
Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 W.L.R. 965, referred to.
3. The receipt executed by Kansai showing payment by the appellant of
Rs. 1000 to the former is destructive of the appellant's defence and on the
contrary proves the respondent's case. [236 H-237 A]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :
Civil Appeal
No.
495
of 1979.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
the 18th October, 1978 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 1292 of 1975.
R.K. Garg, U.R. La/it and Randhir Jain for the Appellant.
M.C. Bhandare, S.A. Shroff, S.S. Shrofj and Miss C.K.
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Sachurita for Respondent No. 1.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BAHARUL ISLAM J. This appeal by special leave is by the
appellant, J.D. Jain. who was a workman and whose services have
been terminated by the management of the St11te; Bank of {ndi11
(hereinafter called the respondenq.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1982) 2 s.c.R.
2.
The material facts are these.
The appellant was working as a cashier in the Meerut City
Branch of the State Bank of India. On June 21, I 971, one Dish an
Prakash Kansai ('Kansai' for short) who had a Savings Bank account
with the said branch of the State Bank came to the Bank to receive
his Pass Book.
On receipt of the Pass Book from the counter
clerk, Kansai complained to Wadhera
who was
the
Ledgerkeeper, that on
February 8, 1971, he
had withdrawn
only
Rs. 500
but a debit
entry of
Rs. 1,500 had
been shown
in the Pass
Book.
Wadhera thereupon
took
Kansai
to the
the Supervisor, R.P. Gupta, before whom Kansai repeated his
complaint. Necessary documents pertaining to the said withdrawal
were then examined and it was found that Kansai had given a 'li:tter
of authority' (which expression means, we are told, the withdrawal
application form) to the appellant on February 8, 1971 authorising
him to withdraw the amount from his account.
The letter of
authority showed that it was for withdrawal of Rs. 1,500 though
there appeared to be some interpolation suggesting that the figure
of Rs. 500 had been altered to the figure of Rs. 1,500.
The matter
was then brought to the notice of M. Ramzan, the Agent of the
State Bank, before whom also Kansai is said to have repeated his
complaint.
3.
Eventually on September 18, 1972, a memorandum of
charges was served on the appellant by the respondent stating, illler
alia that in the letter of authority, the appellant altered in his own
handwriting with different ink the amount of Rs. 500 to Rs. 1,500
and thus received Rs. 1,000 in excess, passing only Rs. 500 to the
pass-book holder, and that he subsequently, on June 24, 1971,
deposited Rs 250 in the account of Kansai to liquidate a part of the
amount mirnppropriated by him.
The appellant replied to the
charges.
He denied the allegations.
Thereupon. the respondent
appointed one Rajendra Prasad as an Enquiry Officer and a formal
disciplinary enquiry was held against the appellant.
The Enquiry
Officer submitted his report to the respondent on February 13, 1973.
The findings of the Enquiry Officer were that the appellant ha.d
fraudulently altered the amount in the letter of authority given to
bim by Kansai, withdrew Rs. l ,500 from Kansal's account and paid
Rs. 500 only to Kansai and misappropriated Rs. 1000. The disciplinary authority on receipt of the report of the Enquiry Officer passed
the followin~ order (material portion only) :-
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J.D. JAIN v. STATE BANK (Balwrul Islam, J.)
"2. Although, the charges against you are of a serious
nature which would, in normal course, warrant your dismissal from the service of the Bank, yet keeping in view
your past record, I am inclined to take a lenient view in
the matter. Upon consideration of the <natter, I have tentantively come to the 1'edsion that your misconduct be
condoned and you be merely discharged of in terms of
paragraphs 521 (5) (e) of the Sastry Award read with paragraph 18.28 of the Desai Award and paragraph I. I of the
Agreement dated the 3 lst March 1967 entered into between
the Bank and the State Bank of India Staff Federation.
Before, however, I take a final decision in the matter I
would like to give you a hearing as to why the proposed
punishment should not be imposed upon you. To enable
you to do so, I enclose copies of tl:e proceedings of the
enquiry and findings of the Enquiry Officer.
3.
You may ask for a hearing or if you so prefer
show cause in writing within one week of receipt by you
thereof. If you fail therein, I will conclude that you have
no cause to show in this behalf."
231
The appellant then submitted a representation to Shri V.B.
Chadha, the Regional Manager of the State Bank of India on
June 15, 1973.
Shri Chadha after perusing the representation of
the appellant and hearing him in person, recommended that the
proposed punishment should not be imposed upon the appellant,
on the grounds that Kansai had not been examined as a witness and
that there had been no written complaint against the appellant.
The respondent, however, did not accept the recommendation, and,
by its memorandum of December 7, 1973, discharged the appellant
from service with effect from the close of the business on December 22, 1973.
4.
The appellant then having raised an industrial dispute,
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the Central Government, by its order dated January 17, 1975,
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referred the following issue to the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal at Delhi for adjudication :
"Is the management of State Bank of India justified in
discharging from service Shri J.D. Jain, Cashier of Meerut
Branch, with effect from 22nd. December, \973? lf not to
what relief is he entitled ?'"
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1982] 2 s.c.R.
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5.
Before the Tribunal, the appellant denied the charges,
He
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inter alia, pleaded that as Kansai was not examined in the enquiry,
there was no legal evidence before the Enquiry Officer for a finding
that he was guilty.
The Tribunal framed the following two issues :-
"I. Whether a proper and valid domestic enquiry was
held by the Bank and its effect ?
2.
Is the management of State Bank of India justified in
discharging from service Shri J.D. Jain, Cashier of
Meerut Branch with effect from 22nd December, 1973 ?
If not to what relief is he entitled ?"
Before the Tribunal, the Management examined no witnesses
but produced certain documents and relied on them. The appellant
also did not adduce any evidenc.
On a perusal of the evidence recorded by the Enquiry Officer,
the Tribunal held that on the evidence before it, the appellarlt could
not be held guilty as, according to it, in the absence of the evidence
of Kansai, the evidence recorded was hearsay, with the result that
it directed reinstatement of the appellant with full back wag~s from
22nd December, 1973. The respondent moved the High Court
under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing
the award of the Tribunal. The High Court held that the charges
against the appellant had been established and quashed the award
ot the Tribunal. It is against this judgment of the High Court
that the present appeal by special leave is directed.
6.
Mr. R.K. Garg, learned counsel appearing for the appellant makes three submissions before us :-
(I) That the Tribunal exercised its powers under Section 11 A of the Industrial Disputes Act and the High
Court, exercising powers under Article 226/227 of the
Constitution, had no jurisdiction to interfere with the
award of the Tribunal ;
(2) The Tribunal in the perspective of the broad contours
of the case rightly refused to rely on the evidence
which was hearsay, Kansai not having been exa111ined;
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233
(3) Assuming the evidence could be relied on,
th High
Court committed error in not considering the receipt
executed by Kansai showing payment of Rs. 1000 to
Kansai and its judgment is vitiated.
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7.
In an application for a Writ of Certiorari under Article
226 of the Constitution for quashing an award of an Industrial TriB
bunal, the jurisdiction of the High Court is limilld. It can quash
the award, inter alia, when the Tribunal has committed an error of
law apparent on the face of the record or when the finding of facts
of the Tribunal is perverse.
In the case before us, according to the
Tribunal, as Kansai was not examined, the evidence before it was
hearsay and as such on the basis there0f the appellant could not be
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legally found guilty.
8.
Before the Enquiry Officer, the respondent examined the
following witnessess :
Gupta (Witness I), Wadhera, the Ledger Keeper (Witness
2), Mahesh Chander who was incharge of Savings Bank
Account on 8.2.1971 (Witness 3), M. Ramzan, Agent of
the Bank (Witness 4), Sarkar (Witness 5), and Bhardwaj
(Witness 6).
Bhardwaj was a leader of the employees' union of the respondent. He did not support the case of the respondent. The other
witnesses supported the case of the respondent. Witnesses Nos. 1, 2,
4 and 5 depose that a verbal complaint was made by Kansai in
their pr;:sence to the effect that he had authorised the appellant
to withdraw Rs. 500 which sum was paid to him, but the entries
showed that Kansai had withdrawn Rs. 1,500.
Witnesses Vadhera,
Ramzan and Sarkar als.1 deposed that the appellant had confessed
before them that he had made the alterations in the figure and in
words of the sum. The Tribunal after having made detailed references to the evidence of the above witnesses in fact found, "All that
this evidence thus, proves is that a complaint was made by Shri
Kansai and that the workmen confessed that he had altered the debit
authority." (emphasis added). Curiously, however, it held, "This
evidence, by no means prove that the workman altered the debit
authority to defraud or that he actually defrauded or that he mis·
appropriated the amount of Rs. 1,000 after paying Rs. 500 only
to Mr. Kansai from the amount of Rs. 1,500 withdrawn from the
bank by him as it was not direct evidence but was in the nat1.1re of
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1982] 2 S.C.R.
hearsay evidence since it was learnt through the medium of a third
person and that person was not available." It further held, "There
can be no hesitation, therefore, that the enquiry officer rdied on
hearsay evidence in arriving at his findings and it vitiated the
enquiry." It went on, "All this could be enough for raising a suspicion only. In order to be called 'proved' it needed evidence which
was not there." It further observed, "But the question was whether
it was done without the consent or knowledge of Mr. Kansai. There
was no evidence on the record to prove it.
The only person who
could speak about it was Mr. Kansai.
He did not appear before the
inquiry officer, therefore, there was no direct evidence that the
change that was admittedly made by the workman in the debit authority was without Mr. Kansal's consent or knowledge or that it was
designed to defraud." (emphasis added)
The positive findings of the Tribunal are :
(i) Kansai made the complaint as alleged by the management,
(ii) The appellant confessed that he had made the alterations charged with, as alleged by the management,
(iii) By implication it has also found that Rs. 1,000 in
excess of the original amount of Rs. 500 was received
by the appellant as a result of the alternations. But it
has held that as Kansai was not examined, fraud and
misappropriation on the part of the appellant cannot
be held to be proved, as the evidence was 'hearsay'.
9.
The learned Tribunal, it appears, was obvious of th1~ fact
that it was examining the evidence in a domestic enquiry, and not
the evidence in a criminal prosecution entailing conviction and
sentence.
In a case like the one before us, three kinds of proceedings
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against the delinquent are possible :
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(i) departmental proceedings and action,
(ii) oriminal prosecution for forgery and misappropriation,
(iii) civil!proceedings for;,recovery of the amount alleged to
be misappropriated.
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J,D. JAIN v. STATE BANK (Baharul Islam, J.)
235
The respondent herein adopted course (i) and instituted the
domestic enquiry in which the principle Uapplied by the Tribunal is
not applicable ; in such an enquiry guilt need not be established
beyond reasonable doubt, proof of misconduct may be sufficient.
The learned Tribunal has committed another error in holding
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that the finding of the domestic enquiry was based on "hearsay"
B
evidence.
The law is well-settled that the strict rules of evidence are
not applicable in a domestic enquiry.
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This Court in the case of State of Haryana & Anr. v. Rattan
Singh(1) held :
"It is well-settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict
and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian
Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are
logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible.
There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has
reasonable nexus and credibility."
10.
The next question is, is the evidence in the domestic
enquiry really hearsay, as held by the Tribunal ?
The word 'hearsay' is used in various senses. Some times it
means whatever a person is heard to say; some times it means whatever a person declares on information given by someone else. (See
Stephen on Law of Evidence).
The Privy Council it the case of Subramaniam v/s. Public Prosecutor(•), observed : "Evidence of a statement made to a witness who
is not himself called as a witness may or may
not be hearsay. It is
hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement.
It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is prop('Sed to establish by the evidence,
not the truth of the statement but the fact that it was made. The
fact that it was made quite apart from its truth, is frequently relevant
in considering the mental state and conduct thereafter of the witness
or some other persons in whose presence these statements are
made."
(1) AIR 1977 S.C. 1512.
(2) [1956] 1 W.L.R. 96~.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(198~
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I l. In the instant case,. the alleged misconduct of the appellant was that he forged documents, withdrew Rs. 1,500-Rs. I ,000 in
excess of the amount he was authorised to do and misappropriated
the excess amount of Rs. 1,000. With regard to the fact whether the
appellant manipulated the documents, withdrew excess amount and
misappropriated it, there is, of course, no direct evidence of any eye
witness except the appellant's 'confession' referred to above.
The
evidence on which reliance has been taken by the respond1~nt is the
confession and circumstantial evidence, namely, the authority letter
containing the admitted interpolations by the appellant in his own
handwriting in different ink, and the addition of the digit "I" before
500. The evidence of Kansai would have been primary and material,
if the fact in issue were whether Kansai authorised the appellant io
make the alterations in the authority letter. But Kansai' s complaint was
to the contrary. For the purpose of a departmental enquiry complaint
certainly not frivolous, but substantiated by circumstantial evidence,
is enough. What the respondent sought to establish in the domestic
enquiry was that Kansai had made a verbal complaint with regard to
the withdrawal of excess money by the appellant in presence of the
four witnesses, namely, Wadhera, Gupta, Ramzan and Sarkar, aforesaid, against his advice. On the complaint of Kansai, the evidence
of these four witnesses is direct as the complaint is said to have been
made by Kansai in their presence and bearing; it is therefore, not
hearsay.
As the respondent has succeeded in proving that a complaint was made by Kansai on the evidence of the above-named four
witnesses, the respondent has succeeded. No rule of law enjoins that
complaint has to be in writing as insisted by the Tribunal.
12.
The learned Tribunal has committed yet another grevious
error, in failing to appreciate the confessions made by the appellant
"in the presence of witnesses and to the higher officer who appeared
as witness" (as found by itself) namely, Wadhera, Ramzan, Gupta
and Sarkar, aforesaid.
The confessions of the appellant before the
said witnesses were to the effect that he had altered the amount in
figure and words in his own hand.
The award of the Tribunal, therefore, has been vitiated by
misconception of the law involved in the case.
13. The last submission of Mr. Garg that the judgment of the
High Court had been vitiated as it had not taken into consideration
the receipt executed by Kansai showing payment by the appellant of
Rs. 1000 to the former is destructive of the appellant's defence. In
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1.0. JAIN v. STATE BANK (JJaharul Islam, J.)
237
our opinion, this payment on the contrary, proves the respondent's
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case and destroys the appellant's defence which was that he had withdrawn Rs. 1,500 as advised by Kansai and paid the full amount to
Kansai.
14.
In our opinion the High Court was fully in its jurisdiction
in quashing the award of the Tribunal. This appeal has no merit
and is dismissed. We, however, leave the parties to bear their own
costs.
N.V.K.
Appeal dismissed.