# J(eshavlal M ohanlal Shah v. The State of Bombay Raghubar Dayal]. March 2I - **Citation:** [1962] 1 S.C.R. 456 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1962 - **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 194 of 1956 - **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, s. K. DAS, A. K. Sarkar, K. C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/j-eshavlal-m-ohanlal-shah-v-the-state-of-bombay-raghubar-dayal-march-2i-2137 - **Pages:** 14 ## Headnote Evacuee Property-Meaning of-Malafide transfer-Effect of -Custodian-Interference with questions not before him in appeal -Revisional Jurisdiction-Notice, if essential before exercising jurisdiction-Non-issue of notice, when fatal-Partnership at will -Dissolution of-Assets, if and when vest in Custodian-Indian Partnership Act, r932 (IX of r932), s. 43-Government of India Ordinance No. XXV II of r949, s. 7(I)-Administration of Evacuee Property Act, z950 (XXXI of z950), ss. 2(f), 26, 40. F, the appellant, and A his brother, were partners in a business of hides and skins. On August ro, 1949, A executed a deed of sale in respect of some immoveable properties in Orissa and Madras in favour of F. A deed of dissolution of the partnership was also executed on August 12, 1949, wherein it was inter alia stated that the partners had agreed that the said partnership shall stand dissolved as from November 2, 1948. On receipt of information that A had migrated to Pakistan after transferring his properties to his brother F, the Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property, issued a notice to Funders. 7(1) of the Ordinance 27 of 1949 in respect of immoveable properties in Orissaincluding the properties covered by the sale deed and the business in hides and skins and certain immoveable properties standing in the name of the firm. In reply F contended that he had become the sole proprietor of the business with all assets and liabilities, with effect from November 2, 1948, when the partnership was dissolved • • - J > > I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 457 and that while some of the immoveable properties as mentioned z96z in the notice had been conveyed to him by a deed of sale by A, -- the rest being assets of the firm, had vested in him after the Fatal Bhai Dhala dissolution of partnership. v. The Assistant Custodian held that though the transfer of Custodian-General the properties mentioned in the sale deed was for adequate of Evacu" . and valuable consideration it was not at all bona fide; as regards p,0P"1Y· Delhi other properties and the hides and skins business itself, A had no interest as the partnership had been dissolved on November 2, r948. Against this decision F appealed to the Custodian, who held that these properties were rightly declared as evacuee properties and that as regards the transfer of other properties, the same amount of mala fides was present and as such these should also be included in the list of evacuee properties. The appeal to Custodian-General was rejected and the appellant moved the Supreme Court by special leave. Four contentions were urged by the appella!lt:- Firstiy, that the Custodian-General should have held that the Custodian acted without jurisdiction in interfering with the order passed by the Assistant Custodian that the hides business and the properties mentioned in Sch. A III of the notice were not evacuee properties and should be released. Secondly, that as against the Assistant Custodian's order in respect of the hides business and the immoveable properties in Sch. A III the Custodian Department had not preferred any appeal, so that the Custodian could not interfere with it, in exercise of his appellate jurisdiction. The Custodian's order in respect of these properties could not have been passod, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction conferred on him by s. 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act as no notice of such intention to examine the records in revision had been issued to F. Thirdly, once the partnership business was dissolved, there could be no question of declaring the dissolved partnership as an evacuee property, in view of s. 43 of the Indian Partnership Act. Fourthly, the transaction evidenced by the two deeds, viz., the sale deed and the dissolution were merely in furtherance of the winding np of the affairs of the dissolved partnership and therefore in determining the validity or otherwise of the transactions, F could not resist the claim of the other partner to wind up. Held, tha ## Text J(eshavlal M ohanlal Shah v. The State of Bombay Raghubar Dayal]. March 2I. 456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] by a Magistrate while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty if he had ceased to be a Magistrate at the time the complaint is made or police report is submitted to the Court, i.e., at the time of the taking of cognizance of the offence committed. We accordingly dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed. F AZAL BHAI DHALA v. CUSTODIAN-GEKERAL OF EVACUEE PROPERTY, DELHI (B. P. SINHA, c. J., s. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR, K. C. DAS GUPTA and N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.) Evacuee Property-Meaning of-Malafide transfer-Effect of -Custodian-Interference with questions not before him in appeal -Revisional Jurisdiction-Notice, if essential before exercising jurisdiction-Non-issue of notice, when fatal-Partnership at will -Dissolution of-Assets, if and when vest in Custodian-Indian Partnership Act, r932 (IX of r932), s. 43-Government of India Ordinance No. XXV II of r949, s. 7(I)-Administration of Evacuee Property Act, z950 (XXXI of z950), ss. 2(f), 26, 40. F, the appellant, and A his brother, were partners in a business of hides and skins. On August ro, 1949, A executed a deed of sale in respect of some immoveable properties in Orissa and Madras in favour of F. A deed of dissolution of the partnership was also executed on August 12, 1949, wherein it was inter alia stated that the partners had agreed that the said partnership shall stand dissolved as from November 2, 1948. On receipt of information that A had migrated to Pakistan after transferring his properties to his brother F, the Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property, issued a notice to Funders. 7(1) of the Ordinance 27 of 1949 in respect of immoveable properties in Orissaincluding the properties covered by the sale deed and the business in hides and skins and certain immoveable properties standing in the name of the firm. In reply F contended that he had become the sole proprietor of the business with all assets and liabilities, with effect from November 2, 1948, when the partnership was dissolved • • - J > > I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 457 and that while some of the immoveable properties as mentioned z96z in the notice had been conveyed to him by a deed of sale by A, -- the rest being assets of the firm, had vested in him after the Fatal Bhai Dhala dissolution of partnership. v. The Assistant Custodian held that though the transfer of Custodian-General the properties mentioned in the sale deed was for adequate of Evacu" . and valuable consideration it was not at all bona fide; as regards p,0P"1Y· Delhi other properties and the hides and skins business itself, A had no interest as the partnership had been dissolved on November 2, r948. Against this decision F appealed to the Custodian, who held that these properties were rightly declared as evacuee properties and that as regards the transfer of other properties, the same amount of mala fides was present and as such these should also be included in the list of evacuee properties. The appeal to Custodian-General was rejected and the appellant moved the Supreme Court by special leave. Four contentions were urged by the appella!lt:- Firstiy, that the Custodian-General should have held that the Custodian acted without jurisdiction in interfering with the order passed by the Assistant Custodian that the hides business and the properties mentioned in Sch. A III of the notice were not evacuee properties and should be released. Secondly, that as against the Assistant Custodian's order in respect of the hides business and the immoveable properties in Sch. A III the Custodian Department had not preferred any appeal, so that the Custodian could not interfere with it, in exercise of his appellate jurisdiction. The Custodian's order in respect of these properties could not have been passod, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction conferred on him by s. 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act as no notice of such intention to examine the records in revision had been issued to F. Thirdly, once the partnership business was dissolved, there could be no question of declaring the dissolved partnership as an evacuee property, in view of s. 43 of the Indian Partnership Act. Fourthly, the transaction evidenced by the two deeds, viz., the sale deed and the dissolution were merely in furtherance of the winding np of the affairs of the dissolved partnership and therefore in determining the validity or otherwise of the transactions, F could not resist the claim of the other partner to wind up. Held, that where the Custodian had made an order against that portion of the order of the Assistant Custodian which was not before him in appeal it must be taken to have been passed in the exercise of the ,Custodian's revisional jurisdiction and the mere fact that this was not expressly stated in the order could 58 458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] i96r be no ground for holding that he was not exercising his revisioFazal - nal jurisdiction. It was quite another matter whether in the Bhai Dhala exercise of the revisional jurisdiction, he proceeded in accorv. dance with law. Custodian-General of Evacuee Property. Delhi The Custodian in exercising his revisional jurisdiction must give the party concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard before any order prejudicial to him is made in revision. If this reasonable opportunity of being heard cannot be given without the service of notice, a notice must be served for otherwise the omission to serve the notice would be fatal, even though s. 26 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act did not specifically provide for service of notice by the Custodian. But in cases where the party affected is before the Custodian and has knowledge of the proceedings before him and is heard, the failure to issue a formal notice is immaterial or does not vitiate the order passed. / Once the fact of dissolution is accepted, the declaration as regards the business must necessarily be construed as a declaration that the property that remained in the evacuee on the dissolution of the firm was evacuee property. Held, further, that where a deed of transfer by an 'evacuee' was without good faith, s. 40 of the Administration of Evacnee Property Act would come into operation, making t.he transfer of no effect and in the case of a firm its property on dissolution would become an evacuee property from the date of the execution of the deed of dissolution of the partnership and vest in the Custodian with all the rights under the provisions of the Partnership Act and the Custodian was not bound by the statements made in the deed of dissolution as regards the settlement of acconnt. In the present case the Custodian did not act without jurisdiction or exercise his jurisdiction irregularly. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 194 of 1956 and 353 of 1958. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and orders dated December 26, 1953 and April 30, 1957, of the Custodian-General and Deputy Custodian-General of Evacuee Property in Revision Nos. 5055R/Judl/ 1953 and 1161/R/Judl/1954 respectively. Achhru Ram and T. R. V. Sastri, for the appellants. N. S. Bindra and D. Gupta, for respondents. 1961. March 21. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ( ) > I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 459 Das GUPTA, J.-Of these two appeals, one (Civil '96' Appeal No. 194 of 1956) is ag~i~st th~ order of t_he Fazal ;;,-;;; Dhala Custodian-General of India, dechnmg to mterfere with v. the order of the Custodian of Evacuee Property, Custodian-General Orissa, in respect of certain properties claimed by the of Evacuee appellant as his; and the other appeal (Civil Appeal Property, Delhi No. 353 of 1958) is against the order of the Deputy Das Gupta J. Custodian-General of India, declining to interfere with the order of the Custodian of Evacue Property, Madras, in respect of properties situate in Madras, claimed by the same appellant as belonging to him. Though most of the considerations that arise in the two appeals are identical, it will be convenient to take them up one after the other so as not to confuse a clear understanding of the facts on which these considerations which are all based on question of law arise. The appellant Fazal Bhai Dhala and his brother Abdulla Dhala were partners in a business of hides and skins. A deed of partnership was executed on January 1, 1941, and the firm was registered in the Register of Firms, Cuttack, under s. 59 of the Indian Partnership Act. On August 10, 1949, Abdulla Bhai Dhala executed a deed of sale in respect of some immovable properties at Jharsuguda in Orissa, and also certain properties, at Madras, in favour of Fazal Bhai Dhala. The consideration in the document was mentioned as Rs. 85,000 of which Rs. 50,000 was mentioned as the value of the Madras properties and Rs. 35,000 as the value of the Orissa properties. The sum of Rs. 85,000 appears to have been paid in the presence of the Registrar by Fazal Bhai to Abdulla Bhai on August 11, 1949. A deed of dissolution of the partnership was also executed on the following day-the 12th August, 1949. It was stated therein that the two partners had agreed "that the said partnership shall stand dissolved as and from 2-11-48 and it has further been agreed that as from that .day, 2-11-1948, the said business of Fazalbhoy Dhala & Co., shall belong to and be continued and carried on by Fazalbhoy Dhala." It was also stated that in view of the fact that "accounts of the said partnership have not yet been taken or settled and cannot be taken or 460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] r96r settled without much delay and trouble it has further Fazal ~~;; Dhala been agreed that Fazal Bhai Dh~la shall pay to Abdulla Dhala a sum of Rs. 40,000 m full settlement v. custodian-General and satisfaction of all the claims, as partner of Abdulla of Evacuee Bhai Dhala against the partnership, its assets, goodProperty. Delhi will etc., in respect of his share therein". A receipt of -- the sum of Rs. 40,000 was also acknowledged in this Das Gupta f. deed. On receipt of information that Abdulla Dhala had migrated to Pakistan after transferring his properties to his brother Fazal Bhai Dhala, the Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property, Sambalpur (Orissa), issued a notice under s. 7(1) of the Ordinance XXVII of 1949 to Fazal Bhai Dhala on December 30, 1949, in respect of immovable properties at Jharsuguda including the properties covered by the sale deed of August 10, 1949, and the business in hides and skins under the name of Fazalbhoy Dhala & Co., and certain immovable properties standing in the name of that firm. In reply to the notice, Fazal Bhai contended that Abdulla Bhai was not an evacuee; and that in any case, he, Fazal Bhai, had become the sole proprietor of the business, with all assets and liabilities, with effect from November 2, 1948, when the partnership was dissolved and that while some of the immovable properties as mentioned in the notice had been conveyed to him by a deed of sale by Abdulla Bhai, the rest being assets of the firm of Fazal Bhai Dhala, had vested in him after the dissolution of partnership, he prayed that his "title" in the assets of the firm, and in the immovable properties, mentioned in the notice should be confirmed. The Assistant Custodian held after consideration of the evidence that though the transfer of the properties mentioned in the sale· deed was for adequate and valuable consideration it was not at all bona fide: as regards the other properties and the hides and skins business itself the Assistant Custodian held that Abdulla Bhai had no interest as the partnership had been dissolved on November 2, 1948. Against this decision Fazal Bhai appealed to the Custodian and prayed that the order of the Assistant Custodian as regards the properties mentioned in Schedule "A" (I) and (II) mentioned in the notice under ~~sub-sec. tion 1 of s. 7 of the Government of India Ordinance • ' 1 S,C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 461 No. XXVII of 1949 should be set aside. The Cus1961 to.dian agreed with the Assistant Custodian, in respect Fazal Bhai Dhala of these properties, and held that these had been v rightly declared as evacuee properties. He went Custodian-Gene.al further and held that there was no justification for the of Evacuee Assistant Custodian taking a different view as regards Property, Delhi the other properties. His conclusion was that "in fact, Das Gupta ]. with regard to these properties also the same amount of mala fides was present and as such these should also be included in the list of evacuee properties"; and that "it is but proper that the entire 8 annas share of the properties mentioned in Schedules A and B of the evacuee Abdulla should be treated as evacuee properties". The Custodian finally ordered: "in consequence of my above decision according to s. 6 of the Evacuee Interest Separation Act, the entire properties in Schedules A and B should now be treated as evacuee properties and revised action should be taken to notify as such under s. 7(3) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act and the appellant be directed to get his 8 annas share in tho properties separated in the Court of the Competent Officer". Fazal Bhai moved the Custodian-General of India for revision of this order of the Custodian, Orissa. The Custodian-General, however, refused to interfere. It is proper to mention at the outset that it is no longer disputed that Abdulla Bhai is an evacuee, though the exact dat,e from which he became such an evacuee does not clearly appear from the record, and that all the immovable properties, which are the subject-matter of the appeal, were the assets of the firm Fazalbhai Dhala & Co. Four contentions were urged in support of the appeal. The first contention, and the one to which Mr. Achhru Ram devoted a considerable portion of his argument, was that the Custodian-General should have held that the Custodian acted without jurisdiction, and at any rate, irregularly in the exercise of his jurisdiction, if he had any, in interfering with the order passed by the Assistant Custodian that the immovable property and the hides business and the properties mentioned in Sch. A III, that is, the properties 462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] z96z other than those covered by the sale deed, were not F l Bh . Dh 1 evacuee properties and should be released. Mr. Achhru aza ai a a R h ' t d h · h ' C v. am as porn e out t at agamst t e Assistant usCustodian-General todian's order in respect of these two items of properof Evacuee ties the hides business and the immovable properties Property, Delhi in Sch. A III mentioned in the notice, the Custodian's department had not preferred any appeal, so Das Gupta 1 · that the Custodian could not interfere with it, in exercise of his appellate jurisdiction. Learned Counsel then contends that the Custodian's order in respect of these properties-the hides business and the Jharsuguda properties in Sch. A III-could not have been passed, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction conferred on him by s. 26 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act (Act No. XXXI of 1950), as no notice of such intention to examine the records in revision, had been issued to Fazal Bhai. While it is true that the order does not clearly mention that in respect of the hides business and the Sch. A III properties it was being made in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, it is clear that the only jurisdiction the Custodian could exercise, in the absence of any appeal against that portion of the Assistant Custodian's order wou)d be his revisional jurisdiction under s. 26. When we find that the Custodian has made the order it is proper and reasonable to hold that he passed it in the exercise of the only jurisdiction he had-viz., the revisional jurisdiction and the fact that this was not clearly stated in the order can be no ground for holding that he was not exercising revisional jurisdiction. It is quite another matter whether in the exercise of that jurisdiction, he proceeded in accordance with law. Mr. Achhru Ram contended that under the law, the Custodian was required to issue a notice to the parties concerned before exercising his revisional jurisdiction. Admittedly, no such notice was issued; and this omission to issue a notice was put by the appellant in the forefront of his grievances both in his petition for revision before the Custodian-General and in the application for special leave to appeal to this Court. Turning however to s. 26 we find that there is no • -- ) • I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 463 provision for service of any notice. The section runs '96' thus:- Fazal Bhai Dhala "26. Powers of review or revision of Custodian etc. v. (1) The Custodian, Additional Custodian, or Custodian-General Authorised Deputy Custodian may at any time, of Evacuee either on his own motion or on application made to Prop,,ty. Delhi him in this behalf, call for the record of any proA h. h . d" b .c Das Gupta ]. ceeding under this ct w IC IS pen mg e.ore, or has been disposed of by, an officer subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any orders passed in the said proceeding, and may pass such order in relation thereto as he thinks fit: Provided that the Custodian, Additional Custodian or Authorised Deputy Custodian shall not pass an order under this sub-section revising or modifying any order prejudicial to any person without giving such person a reasonable opportunity of being heard: Provided further that if one of the officers aforesaid takes action under this sub-section, it shall not be competent for any other officer to do so .......... ". The proviso secures the requirements of the principles of natural justice when it says that any order prejudicial to any person shall not be passed without giving such person a reasonable opportunity of being heard. No specific provision for service of notice in order that such a reasonable opportunity of being heard be given has however been made by any rule. It goes without saying that in the large majority of cases, the Custodian will, in order to give the party concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard, first give him a notice of his intention to examine the records to satisfy himself as to the legality or the propriety of any order passed by the subordinate officer and require such person to show cause if any why the order should not be revised or modified, and then if and when the party appears before him in response to the notice, the Custodian has also to allow him, either personally or through counsel, a reasonable opportunity of being heard. In suitable cases it may be proper and necessary for the Custodian to allow 464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] '96' the party concerned even to adduce evidence. There Fazal ;;;;;; Dhala may be cases however 'Yhere the party concerned is v. already before the Custodian, so that all that is necesCustodian-General sary for the Custodian to do is to inform such party of Evacuee of his intention to examine the records to satisfy himProperty, Delhi self whether a particular order should be revised, and then to give him a reasonable opportunity of being . Das Gupta ]. ld b heard. There wou e no necessity in such a case to serve a formal notice on the party who is already before the Custodian and the omission to serve the notice can be of no consequence. What the law requires is that the person concerned should be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before any order prejudicial to him is made in revision. If this reasonable opportunity of being heard cannot be given without the service of the notice the omission to serve the notice would be fatal; where however proper hearing can be given without service of notice, it does not matter at all, and all that has to be seen is whether even though no notice was given a reasonable opportunity of being heard was given. A perusal of the Custodian's judgment makes it reasonably clear that he informed the counsel who appeared on Fazal Bhai Dhala's behalf, that he proposed to consider whether the order made by the Custodian in respect of the hides business and the Sch. A III properties had been rightly made and to revise the same, if necessary, after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to Fazal Bhai on this point. It is equally clear that the appellant's advocate was fully heard in the matter. We have no doubt therefore that the requirements of law as embodied in the proviso to s. 26( 1) of the Act were fully satisfied. The contention that the Custodian acted without jurisdiction or irregularly exercised his jurisdiction must therefore fail. The next contention raised in the appeal is-to use the learned counsel's own words-that in view of s. 43 of the Indian Partnership Act the partnership stood dissolved from November 2, 1948 and the Custodian had no jurisdiction to declare the "business" to be an evacuee property. It does not appear to have been .1 • • • 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 465 disputed either before the Assistant Custodian or the r96r Custodian that the partnership of Fazalbhai Dhala & F 1 Bh . Dh 1 Co., was a partnership-at-will. Thedeed of dissolution aza v~' a a was dated August 12, 1949 and it has been found by custodian-General the Custodian that the deed of dissolution was purof Evacuee posely concluded to provide a common safeguard for Property. Delhi properties to remain in the hands of the brothers. D -- The mention of the date November 2, 19'48 as the date as r,;upta f. of dissolution cannot therefore be accepted. The firm must however be held to have been dissolved on August 12, 1949 on which date the deed of dissolution was executed. The argument of the learned counsel appears to be that once the partnership-business was dissolved there could be no question of declaring the dissolved partnership as an evacuee property. Once the fact of dissolution is accepted the declaration as regards the business must necessarily be construed as a declaration that the property that remained in Abdulla Bhai on the dissolution of the firm was an evacuee property. It seems to us clear that that was really what is intended to be meant by the order made by the Custodian. A further contention of the appellant is that the transactions evidenced by the two deeds, viz., the sale deed and the dissolution were merely in furtherance of the winding up of the affairs of the dissolved partnership and therefore in determining the validity or otherwise of the transactions it has to be borne in mind that Fazal Bhai could not resist the claim of the other partners to wind up. The story that the dissolution of partnership had taken place earlier and the two deeds were executed later on has not been accepted by the Custodian and we can see no reason to interfere with his conclusion. The deeds of sale were executed prior to the actual dissolution which was effected by the deed of dissolution there is no scope therefore for saying that the sale deed was in the course of the winding up of the affairs of the dissolution of partnership. As regards the deed of dissolution itself it is wholly beside the point whether Abdulla Bhai could have resisted the claim to wind 59 466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] '96' up; for the declaration merely is that Abdulla Bhai's F B- 7 . Dh 1 share in the dissolved partnership as it stood on the azal 'a' a ad t f d' ] . . Th l' v. a e o 1sso ut10n ts an evacuee property. e va 1cu,todian-Gnuml dity of the dissolution is not touched. It is hardly of Evacuu necessary to add that the dissolution of the partnerhoperty, Delhi ship did not by itself mean that Abdulla's share stood transferred to Fazal Bhai any more than that Fazal Das GuJ,ta J. Bhai's share stood tramferred to Abdulla Bhai. A purported transfer of Abdulla's share was made by the deed itself. But this having been held to be without good faith, had in view of s. 40 of the Evacuee Property Act, no effect. It has to be made clear that the Custodian would not be bound by the statements made in the deed of dissolution as regards the settlement of the accounts of the firm and that the Custodian, in whom the evacuee properties vest will have in respect of the dissolved business all the rights which Abdulla had under sections 37, 46, 47, 48 and other sections of the Partnership Act. There remains for consideration the appellant's contention that in any case the Custodian acted illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction in ordering that "the entire properties in Schs. A and B should now be treated as evacuee properties". It appears that the order by the Custodian was made in these terms even though his conclusion was that "the entire 8 annas share of the properties mentioned in Schs. A and B of the evacuee Abdulla should be treated as evacuee properties", in view of the fact that under the original definition of evacuee property in s. 2(f) of the Administration of ·Evacuee Property Act (Act XXXI of 1950) it meant "any property in which any evacuee has any right or interest''. This definition has however since been amended and now evacuee property means "any property of an evacuee" instead of "any property in which an evacuee has any right or interest". The legal position after the amendment therefore is that it is only the 8 annas share of Abdulla set out in the Scb.edule in the Assistant Custodian's order dated the 28th January, 1950, which is evacuee property. It is therefore necessary to state in clarification of the position that instead of the . ' • • • I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 467 entire Schedules A and B properties being treated as I96' e_vacuee probpe 1 rty odnly 8hannas shareAbodf t1h1 eseh pr1o1 pebr- Fazal Bhai Dhala ties which e onge to t e .evacuee u a s ou c e v. treated as evacuee properties. Cn;todian-General W'ith this clarification of the Custodian's order the of Evarnee appeal is. dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Property. Delhi The other appeal-C. A. No. 353 of 1958 is in respect of properties in Madras. I<'azal Bhai made an Das Gupta J. application on July 21, 1950 purporting to be under s. 40 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act (Act XXX£ of 1950) in reply to a notice which had been issued on him under s. 7 of the Act. His case, as in respect of the Orissa properties mentioned earlier, was that the dissolution of the firm took place in N ovember, 1948 and that the final transaction and settlement of accounts was brought about by a deed of sale elated August 11, 1949 in respect of Orissa and Madras properties and a deed of dissolution elated August 12, 1949 for a consideration of Rs. 40,000 making in all the entire amount of Rs. 1,25,000 which in this final settlement had been agreed to be paid to Abdulla. He prayed for a declaration that the properties mentioned in the notice be held to have been legally ·and properly passed to him, and that the transfer in his favour may be confirmed. The Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property, Madras, accepted Fazal Bhai's case that the transfer was only a st11p in the apportionment of the assets of the firm and not a transfer outside the partition of the· assets of the firm. He held that the transfer was bona fide and made an order in these ·terms:- "l therefore accept the dissolution of the firm of Fazalbhai Dhala and Company covered by the dissolution deed dated 12-8-49 and confirm the transfer of the immoveable properties covered by the deed dated 10-8-49 under section 40(5) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950." When this matter came to the notice of the Cnstodian-General of Evacuee Property in the course of the proceedings before him in respect of the Orissa property, he observed:- "As for the Madras properties, I notice that Mr. 468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] '96' Rathanam's order was allowed to go unchallenged Fazal Bha; Dhala by the department and as it is not before me, therev. fore, I am not called upon to express my opinion." Custodian-General This was on December 26, 1953. It appears that the 0! Evacuee . Custodian-General also made a suggestion to the Prop