# J. PANDURANGARAO v. ANDHRA PRADESH 1 U BLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

- **Citation:** [1963] 1 S.C.R. 707
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, N. Rajagopala. Ayyangar, T. L. Venkatarama_Aiyer
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/j-pandurangarao-v-andhra-pradesh-1-u-blic-service-commission-2628
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

State Judicial Service -Appointment-Notification laying
down conditio'M-Oonstitutionat
validity-The High
Court
Meaning of-Andkta State Judicial Service Rules, r. 12(b)-
Oonstitution of India, Arts. 14, 16 (2).
In January 1962, the Andhra Pradesh Public Service
Commission invited applications for selection for the posts ~f
District Munsifs in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The pet1·
tioner applied but his application was rejected on the ground
that he did not fulfil the first condition in para 4A( 1) of the
Commission, notification which reads thuf·:-4-A( 1 )-"that
at the time when the petitioner applies he is practising as
an Advocate of the High Court". The question is whether
the expression "The High Court" in the notification refers
to the Andhra High Court alone or to all the High Courts
in lndia. If the expres5ion means the Andhra High Court
then the further question would be whether the R~le pr~
scribing the said requirement is ultra vires as being d1scr1m1natory. The ~Clause in the notification is based on r. 12 (b)
of the Andhra State Juducial Service Rules and reads that
"no person shall be eligible for appointment to the post of
District Munsiff by the method specified in column ( ~) of
the table below unless he possess the qualifications specified in
the corresponding entries in column (2) thereof" and among
the qualifications specified is die same as in 4(A) (1) of
the noti ication.
Held, that the subject matter of the rules is the appoint·
ment of subordinate judicial orficers who would work in
courts subordinate to the Andhra ·High Court, and so, the
use of the definite pronoun "The" in the expression "the
High Court" clearly indicates that it is not any High Court
that is intended but it is the particular High Court of
Andhra Pradesh that is in view. Therefore the expreasion
«The High Court" in the context means the Andhra High
Court.
1962
April, Jl.
•
'4.ttdltrtJ Prad~sh
Public Se11Jice
Com nu ssion
708
SUPREM1£ COURT REPORTS (1963]
Held, further, that though Art. 14 forbids class Legislation, it docs not forbid reasonable classification for the
purposes of legislation. When any impugned rules or statutory provision is assailed on the ground that it contravenes
Art. H, its v•lidity can be sustained if two tests arc satisfied.
The first test is that the classification on which it is founded
must be based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes
persons or things grouped together from others left out of
the gro'lp; and the second is that the differentia in question
must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be
achieved by the rule or statutory provision in question. The
classification on which the statutory provision may be founded
may be referable to different considerations. It may be
based on geographical considerations or it may have reference
to objects < r occupations or the like.
In every case, there
must be some nexus between the basis of the classification
and the object intended to be achieved by the statute.
The plea that all the rules must be considered together
is entirely misconceived. It is quite clear that in testing the
validity of any one of these rules, the true scope and effect
of the impugned rule itself will have to be considered and
the decision of the question would have to be confined to
the relevant considerations in respect of the said rule and
no more. Just as the presence of one invalid rule cannot
invalidate the other rules which may be valid, so the presence
of a number of valid rules would not help to validate an
impugned rule if it is otherwise invalid.
There is no rational basis for differentiating the advocates enrolled into the Andhra High Court from the rest
as tne impugned rule purports to do. If the basis of the
impugned rule is that a person who applies for appointment
to the post of a District Munsiff, should have been enrolled
as an Advocate of a High Court, that basis can be sati.fied
even if the person is enrolled as an Advocate not of the
Andhra H

## Text

l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
707
J. PANDURANGARAO
v.
ANDHRA PRADESH 1 U BLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N.
WANCHOO, N. RAJAGOPALA. AYYANGAR, and
T. L. VENKATARAMA_AIYER, JJ.)
State Judicial Service -Appointment-Notification laying
down conditio'M-Oonstitutionat
validity-The High
Court
Meaning of-Andkta State Judicial Service Rules, r. 12(b)-
Oonstitution of India, Arts. 14, 16 (2).
In January 1962, the Andhra Pradesh Public Service
Commission invited applications for selection for the posts ~f
District Munsifs in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The pet1·
tioner applied but his application was rejected on the ground
that he did not fulfil the first condition in para 4A( 1) of the
Commission, notification which reads thuf·:-4-A( 1 )-"that
at the time when the petitioner applies he is practising as
an Advocate of the High Court". The question is whether
the expression "The High Court" in the notification refers
to the Andhra High Court alone or to all the High Courts
in lndia. If the expres5ion means the Andhra High Court
then the further question would be whether the R~le pr~
scribing the said requirement is ultra vires as being d1scr1m1natory. The ~Clause in the notification is based on r. 12 (b)
of the Andhra State Juducial Service Rules and reads that
"no person shall be eligible for appointment to the post of
District Munsiff by the method specified in column ( ~) of
the table below unless he possess the qualifications specified in
the corresponding entries in column (2) thereof" and among
the qualifications specified is die same as in 4(A) (1) of
the noti ication.
Held, that the subject matter of the rules is the appoint·
ment of subordinate judicial orficers who would work in
courts subordinate to the Andhra ·High Court, and so, the
use of the definite pronoun "The" in the expression "the
High Court" clearly indicates that it is not any High Court
that is intended but it is the particular High Court of
Andhra Pradesh that is in view. Therefore the expreasion
«The High Court" in the context means the Andhra High
Court.
1962
April, Jl.
•
'4.ttdltrtJ Prad~sh
Public Se11Jice
Com nu ssion
708
SUPREM1£ COURT REPORTS (1963]
Held, further, that though Art. 14 forbids class Legislation, it docs not forbid reasonable classification for the
purposes of legislation. When any impugned rules or statutory provision is assailed on the ground that it contravenes
Art. H, its v•lidity can be sustained if two tests arc satisfied.
The first test is that the classification on which it is founded
must be based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes
persons or things grouped together from others left out of
the gro'lp; and the second is that the differentia in question
must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be
achieved by the rule or statutory provision in question. The
classification on which the statutory provision may be founded
may be referable to different considerations. It may be
based on geographical considerations or it may have reference
to objects < r occupations or the like.
In every case, there
must be some nexus between the basis of the classification
and the object intended to be achieved by the statute.
The plea that all the rules must be considered together
is entirely misconceived. It is quite clear that in testing the
validity of any one of these rules, the true scope and effect
of the impugned rule itself will have to be considered and
the decision of the question would have to be confined to
the relevant considerations in respect of the said rule and
no more. Just as the presence of one invalid rule cannot
invalidate the other rules which may be valid, so the presence
of a number of valid rules would not help to validate an
impugned rule if it is otherwise invalid.
There is no rational basis for differentiating the advocates enrolled into the Andhra High Court from the rest
as tne impugned rule purports to do. If the basis of the
impugned rule is that a person who applies for appointment
to the post of a District Munsiff, should have been enrolled
as an Advocate of a High Court, that basis can be sati.fied
even if the person is enrolled as an Advocate not of the
Andhra High Court but of any other High Court. All the
High Courts have the same stat.us; all of them stand for the
same high traditions of the Bar and the administration of
justice.
The impugned rule has introduced a classification
between one class of Advocates and the rest, and the said
classfication must be said to be irrational inasmuch as there
is no nexus between the basis of the said classification and
the object intended to be achieved by the relevant scheme
of riiles. The impugned rule and the corr esp on ding portion
of the paragraph of the notification based on it must Le held
to be u!tra vire• and unconstitutional.
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
709
Nallanthighal
Bhaktavataalam Iyengar
v.
Secretary
Amlhra Public Service Commission,, A.I.R. 1956. Andh. 14,
overruled.
Shri R. K. Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar, [1959]
S.C.R. 279, relied on.
ORIGIN.AL JURISDICTION : Petitions Nos. 355
of 1961 and 1 of 1962.
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India for enforcement of Fundamental rights.
Sarjoo Prasad, A. V eilavalli, A.. V. Rangam
and T. Satyanarayan for the petitioner {in :Petn.
No. 355/61).
A. Vedavalli and A. V. Rangam, for the peti·
tioner (in Ptn. No. 1, l962).
O. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General/ of India,.
T. V. R. Tataohari and P. D . .Llfenon, for the respondents.
1962. April l l. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
1962
J, Panduran.tturao
v.
Andhra Pradesh
Puhlic Service
Commiasion
GAJENDRAG.ADKAR, J.-These two petitions
Gajendrafadkar J.
have been filed by Uindra Bha.skaracharyulu Gupta
and J. Pandurangara.o respectively under Article 32
of the Constitution and, in substance, they challenge
the validity of one of the rules framed by the
Governor of Andhra in exercise of the powers conferred on him by Art. '234 and the proviso to
Art. 309 in
respect of the Andhra Judicial
Service. The facts on which the two petitioners
have ba.eed their challenge are substantially similar
and so, it would be sufficient for the purpose
-
of deciding the point raised by them if we state the
facts only jn one of them. We will accordingly state
the facts in petition No. 355of1961. Our conclusion
on the merits of the point raised by this petition
will govern the decision of the other petition No. 1
of 1962.
196B
J, P•ndur•r111101
v.
Antlhra .P10Jtsh
Public S1rtJ1ct
C.mmi•sion
710
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
The petitioner J. Pa.ndura.ngara.o belongs to a.
family which has been settled in the district of
Guntur in Andhra Pradesh for several generations
past. The petitioner himself was born, brought up
and educated in the said district. He passed his
B. A. examination from the Andhra Christian
College at Guntur 1950. Thereafter, he took his
L.L.B. Degree from the Nagpur University in 1952
and in 1954 he got himself enrolled as an Advocate
of the Mysore High Court. Having thus been enrolled as an Advocate of the Mysore High Court, he
set up his practice in the Court in Tena.Ii in Guntur
district and has been practising the.re ever since.
In January, 1961, the respondent No. I, the Andhra
Pradesh Public Service Commission, invited applications for selection for the posts of District Munsifs
in the State of Andhra. Pradesh. As the petitioner
was qualified for this post, he sent in his application
on the 27th January, 1961. Respondent No. I, however, rejected his applications on the 25th September, 1961 on the ground that he did not fulfil
the 'londition set out in paragraph 4-A (1) of
the Commission's notification published
on the
17th December, 1960, by which applications had
been invited. The said para.graph
reads
as
follows:-
"That at the time whi>n the petitioner
applies:
(I) he ilt' practising as an Advocate of
the High Court:
(2) he has been actually practising in
Courts of Civil or Criminal jurisdiction in India for a period not leBB
than three years."
According to respondent No. 1, the petitioner
1atisfied the second condition but did not 1&tisfy
the first since he had not been practising as an
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
711
AdTooe.te of the Andhra High Court. In his present
petition, the pe.titi'oner alleges that
respon~ent
No. 1 ha.s misconstrued the requirement prescribed
by para. 4A (1) when it assumed that the expression
"the High Court" in that condition refers to the
Andhra High Court and not to all the High Courts
in India. In the alternative' the petitioner's
contention is that if the expression "the High Court"
means the Andhra High Court, then the rule
prescribing the said requ!rement is ultra vire,s
inasmuch as it contravenes the petitioner's fundamental rights guaranteed by articles 14 and 16 (I)
of the Constitution. It is on these to two alternative grounds that the petitioner challenges the
decision of respondent No. I and it is only if the
first ground fails that the petitioner questions the
validity of the impugned rule.
To this petition, the petitioner bas joined respo "\dent No. 1 and respondent. No. 2, the Government of Andhra. Pradesh, represented by its Chief
Secretary. On behalf of the respondents, it is urged
that the construction sougl;tt . to be placed by the
petitioner on the relevant clau~e in the n,otification
is erroneous .. The expression '·the Hi~h Court" in
the context means the Andhra High Court and no
other. It is also urged that even on that construction the requirement of the notification itself
which is based on a corresponding rule is valid.
It would thus be seen that though the petitioner
technically did not challenge the validity of the ru]e
on which the relevant clause in the notification itself
is based, in substance, the dispute between the parties in the present proceedin'~s ultimately resolves
into a dispute as to the validity of the basic rule
fram~d by the Governor of the Andhra Pradesh
under A "t. 234 and the proviso to Art. 309 of the
Cunstitution. The oorresponding rule is Rule 12(b).
T.he said rule provides speoia.l qualifications and says
that ''no person shall be eligible for appointment
J. Panduranv•r•o
7 •
.&ndhra l'ra<ilsh
Publie s.ruice
Commission
Gajmlragodkllf' J,
19~2
J. PaadUtanzaru
v.
Antihro Prad1sh
Publ~ ~1r1i,,
Cornm1ssi1•
712
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
to the post of District Munsif by the method specified in column ( 1) of the table below unless he posSPBses the qualifications specified in the corresponding entries in column (2) thereof." For direct recruitment its
District Munsif,
several
qualifications are mentioned.
One of them is that
the
applicant
must
be
practising
as an
Advocate of the High Court, and the other
is that he must be
actually
practising
in
Courts of Civil or criminal jurisdiction in India for
a period not less than three years. It would thus
be seen that the relevant cl&11ses in the notification,
the validity of one of which is challenged before us,
are based on these provisions in the statutory
rules.
The first question which calls for our rlecision
is: what does the expres•ion "the Hirrh Court" me11.n
when the rule requires that the 11.nnlic• nt mnst be
practising as an Advocate of the High Court? It is
urged by. Mr. Sarjoo Prasad that the expression
"the Hi!!'.h Court" need not receive the narrow
c<>nstruction as contended for by the respondents.
He suggests that the expression "the High Court"
really means a,ny High Court. In other words' his
argument is that as soon as it is shown that the
applicant has been practising as an Arlvocate is any
High Court in India, that should be deemed to meet
the requirement in question. We do not think th&t
this arirument is well-founded. In the context. tli.e
expression "the High Court" must, we think, mAan
the Anrlhra High Court. In construing the expression
"the High Court", we must bear in minrl the fact
that the
subject-matter of the rules
is the
appointment of subordinate judicial officers who
would work in courts subordinate to the Andhra
High Court; and so, the use of the definite pronoun
'•the'' clearly indicates that it is not any or a Hi2h
Court that is intended but it is the partfoular High
Court of Andhra Pradesh that is in view.
-
I
'
I •
•
~ • •
..
• •
•
'
4f ..
..
• •
•
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
713
Besides, the scheme of the notification issued
by respondent No. 1 clearly indicates that a person
practising as an Advocate of the High Court to
whom the impugned rule refers, must be a person
practising in the Andhra High Court. In that
conneotion, it is significant that the notification
re.quires that the applications should be submitted
to the. Commission through the High Court of And .
bra. Pradesh if the candidates are practising in the
High Court a.nd through the District Judge concerned and the High Oourt of Andhra Pradesh if they
are practising in the subordina.te Courts. There can
be no doubt that the High Court mentioned in the
impugned rule is the Andhra High Court through
which applications are required to be sent by the
Advvcates practising in that Court. It would be
unreasonable to assume that an Advocate · practising in any other High Court should have been
required to send his application through the Andhra
High Court; but that would be the result if the expression "the High Court" in this rule is read as meaning any High Court. Therefore, it is clear that the
expression "the High Court" in the context means
the Andhra High Court.
That immediately raises the question about
the validity of the impugned rule. The petitioner
argues that by prescribing the limitation that the
applicant must be an Advocate of the Andhra.
High Court, the rule has violated his fundamental
rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16( l) of
the Constitution. As a result of the rule, persons
who are not practising as Advocates of the Andhra
High. Court a.re disqualified and that amounts
to
unconstitutional
discrimination.
Art.
14
whioh provides that the State shall not deny to
any person equality b~fo~e the Ia-w: or the equal
protection of the lawA w1thm the territory of India,
as well a.s Artide 16 (1) which provides that there
shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in
1111
J. P11111iura111ara•
v •.
Antlhra Prailesb
Pu.•Uc Sert1i&1
Commissio11
111!
J. P1indt1r'lntarao
••
~nihra Pr1ul1sfl
Public St¥vic1
Commissi1n
Gaje'fl.rbopcl~oir J.
7l~
SUPREME COURT REPonTs (1963)
matters relating to employment or appointment
to anv office under the State, have been frequently
considered by this Court. The scope and effect of
the provisions of Article 14 can no longer be the
Rubject-m'ttter of any doubt or dispute. It is well
Aettled that t.hough Art. 14 forbids class legislation,
it does not forbid reasonable classification for the
purposes of legislation. When any impugned rule
or statutory provision is assailed on the ground
that it contravenes Art. 14, its validity can be sustained if two tests are satisfied. The first test is
that the classification on which it is founded must
be based on an intelligible difforentia which distin·
guishes persons or things groupetl together from
others left out of the group; and the second is that
the differentia in question must have a reasonable
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the
rule or statutory provision in question.
As the
decisions of this Court show, the classification on
which the statutory provision may be founded may
be referable to different considerations. It may be
based on geographical consideratio11s or it may have
reference to objects or occupations or the like. In
every case, there must be dome nexus between the
ha.sis of the classification and the object intended
to be achieved by the statute, vide Shri Ram Krishna
Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar (') It is in
the light of these principles that we must now
proceed to examine the problem raised by the petitioners for our decision in the present proceedings.
The object of the rule is to recruit suitable
and proper persons to the Judicial Service in the
State of Andhra with a view to senure fair and
. efficient administration of justice, .and so, there can
be no doubt that it would be perfectly competent
to the authority concerned to prescribe qualifications for eligibility for appointment to the said
Service. Knowledge of local Jaws as well as knowledge of the regional language and adequate
\I) [1959] S. C.R. 279.
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
715
experience a.t the bar may be prescribed as qualifi·
cations which the applicants must satisfy befor6
they apply for the post. In that connection, pra<>-
tice in subordinate Courts or in the High Court may
also be a. relevant test to prescribe. The respondents contend that the impugned rule seeks to do
nothing more than to require the applicant to possess knowledge of local laws and that being so, the
validity of the rule can"Qot be impeached on the
ground of discrimination. In support of this argument, reliance is placed on the decision of the
Andhra High Court in N allantkigkal Bhaktavatsalam
Iyenger v. Se.cret,ary, Andhra Public Service Commission, Kurnool (')
in which the validity of the
impugned rule has been upheld.
It is also con tended that in considering the
validity or the impugned rule, we must have regard
to all the rules considered together. The a.rimment
is that it would not be fair or reasonable to pick
out one rule for challenge and in that sense, to
ignore the context in which the said rule along with
others has been framed. In this connection, our
attention has been drawn to the fact that several
qualifications have been prescribed by the rules.
'J hese relate to the educational qualifications, to
the requirement as to age, to the knowledge of the
local language and some other factors which undoubtedly are relevant to the appointment to the
judicial post in question. Thus considered, it is
urged, the validity of the impugned rule cannot be
successfully challenged.
Dealing with
f his latter argument first, it
seems to us that the plea that all the rules must be
considered together is entirely misconceived. It
is quite clear that in testing the validity of any one
of these rnles, we will have to consider the true
scope and effect of the impugned rule itself and
the decision of the question would have to be
1 J A. I. R. 1956 Andhra J4,
19~1 --
J. Panduronz.;r•n
'·
.A.iidhrtJ PrtJd1sh
Public 8n1>ic•
Commissio
1962
J. Pandwangaroo
••
Andhro Proihsh
Public Sered"
Commission
Go/11ldragadkar J,
716
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (l!l63J
confined to the relevant oon~iderations in respect
of the said rule and no more. .Just as the presence
of one invalid rule cannot invalidate the other rules
which may be valid, so the presence of a number
of valid rules would not help to validate an impugned rule if it is otherwise invalid. If, while prescribing relevant tests which must bl' satisfied by an
applicant, the rule had stated that the applicant
should satisfy the test, of a particular height or
colour for instance,-which factors are irrelevant
for judicial service-the respondents could not be
heard to say that because the other rules are
valid, the ir~elevant rule about the requirement of
the applicant's height or colour must also be treated
as valid. If the heiuht or colour of the applicant
is wholly irrelevimt in making an appointment to
a judicral post, it must be treated as irrelevant and
invalid though it may havo been placed in a code
of rules and the rest of the rules may be perfectly
valid. Therefore, we cannot accept the argument
ur'.led by the learned Solicitor-General that the
impugned rule cannot and need not be considered
by itself but must be treated as a part of a bigger
scheme of rules and since the other rules are valid,
the impugned rule must also be treated as valid.
/ Does the impugned rule serve the object of
requiring the applicant to possess knowledge of
local laws? That is the next question to consider.
It is urged by the respondents that since actual
practice for three years which is the other condition
prescribed, is practice in Courts of Civil or Criminal
jurisdiction in India, it follows that even lawyers
practising in courts outside the State of Andhra
Pradesh
would
satisfy
that
test and that
means that the satisfaction of the said test
would not meet the requirement that the applicant
should have knowlerlgo of local !awe. That is why,
it is urged, the impugned cnndition requires that
th!> applicant must be practising as an Advocate
of the Andhra High Court. An Advocate of the
1 s.c.B. SUPREltE COURT REPORTS
717
Andhra High Court would generally have had the
benefit of apprenticeship for one year in the
Chambers of a. senior Advocate and may have passed the apprenticeship examination in different
subjects prescribed by the Bar Council. It is in that
way that he would have acquired the knowledge of
local laws which he would have to administer if he
is appointed to the post of a District Munsif.
It is not clear. that the impugned rule can
effectively meet the alleged requirement of the
knowledge of local laws. If the object intended
to be achieved is that the applicant should have
adequate knowledge ef local laws, the usual a.nd
proper course to adopt in that behalf is to prescribe a suitable examination which
oandida.tes
should pass, or adopt some other effective method.
No material has been placed before us to show that
the alleged requirement about the knowledge of
local laws ca.n be met on the two grounds suggested in support of the validity of the rule. Besides,
study of general laws prevailing in the country M
a whole, and the dtudy of important local laws are
.generally included in the curriculum prescribed for
the law Degree, and obtaining a Law Degree which
would entitle a person to be enrolled as an Advocate, in substance, meets the requirement of the
knowledge of important lees.I laws.
There is another aspect of the problem which
is very important. It is common ground that
under rule l(ii) of the Andhra Bar Council Rules,
an·.advocate entered on the roll of Advocates of a
High Court <·stablished by law in India, other than
·the High Court of Andhra, is entitled to practise
as an Advocate of the An<lhra High Court, provided there is reciprocity between the Andhra High
Court on whose roll hi} has been entered as an
AdToO&te.
This rule is subject to the further
proviso th~t where any vcison ·.had been admitted
J. Panduranttn'U
v.
A.ndh•a Pradds"
Public S1111ie1
Commission
1961
J. Pandutanttlt'tJIJ
••
.Andhra P1aiksh
Public S1 viei
Commiuion
(Jaj1ntlragadkar J.
718
SUPREME OOUR1' REPORTS [196:l]
as an advocate of such High Court without under·
going a course of study in the chambers of a practising advocate for a period of one year, he shall
be of not less than one yea.r's standing as an
advocate of such High Court. It is thus clear
that an Advocate enrolled in any other High Court
who is entitled to the benefit of rule l(ii) would be
eligible to praoties in the Andhro. High Court and
as such, would satisfy the test of the impugned
rule ; and in such a ease, the theory that the impu·
gned rule serves the purpose of requiring the
applicant to possess knowledge of local laws completely break down. By operation of rule l(ii)
which is, doubt, based on the health convention
of reciprocity between the different High Court
in this country, Advoclte who can have no know·
ledge of the local laws prevailing in Andhra would
satisfy the test of the impugned rule, therefore,
the main argument that the object intended to be
achieved by the impugned rule is that the applicant
should possess knowledge of local laws, cannot be
sustained.
Then it is urged that a person who has been
enrolled as an Advocate of the Andhra High Court
would have feelings of attachment for the institution of the Andhr11. High Court and would be subject
to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the said High
Court and that would afford a rational basis for diff&
rentiating the class of advocates of the Andhra. High
Court from the rest of the Advoeates in this country. In our opinion, neither of the two grounds
can be said to have any nexus with the object
intended to be achieved by the rule. What is
relevant and more important in the matter of recruiting persons to judicial 15erviee is not only the
applicant?' Loyalty and attachment to the institution of a particular High Court but their loyalty
and a sense of dedication to the oases of judicial
administration and this feeling and sense of dedication would be present in the minds of persona
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I -I
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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
719
enrolled as Advooates in the Andhra High Court
as muoh in the minds of other persons enrolled as
Advocates in other High Courts. The test of disoiplina.ry jurisdiation is hardly relevant because
advocates of other High Courts would likewise be
subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of their
High Courts ; and if a person who continues to be
on the roll of the Andhra High Court can be presumed to be a person worthy to belong to the
profession of law and so,
eligible
for
the
judicial post, so
can
a person
who
continues on the roll of any other High Court be entitled to claim the same status. Therefore, in our
opinion. there does not appear to be any rational
basis for differentiating the advocates belongned
to the Andhra High Court from the rest as the
impugned rule purports to do.
In this connection, it may be permissible to
point out that the second condition in regard to
three years' actual practice might more appropri·
ately have required that the said three years'
practice should be in the Civil or Criminal Courts
subordinate to the jurisdiction of the Andhra High
Court. '!'hat would have more effectively secured
the object of requiring the applicants to have
knowledge of local laws and to have experience
in the matter of the administration of the said
laws. As it happens, the said condition under the
relevant rule enables advocates practising in
Civil or Criminal Courts all over India. to apply,
and so, the requirement about the knowledge of
local laws cannot invariably be Qatisfied by the
said condition. But as we have just pointed out,
the said test cannot be said to be satisfied by the
impugned rule as well.
If the basis of tJ>.e impugned rule is that a per8'>n who applies for appointment to the post of a
District Munsif, should have been enrolled as an
Adyooate of a High Court, that basis can be satisfied even if the person is enrolled as an Advocate
1961
J. P.mdu•angtJru
v.
Andhra Pracl11h
Public S1rtJic1
Commis1ion
Gaj1ndragadlo ar J,
1961
J. /'aniur"r.zar::o
v.
And/,;• Prad1sh
Public Servfo1
Commission
O.j1niJ-agad/r,ar J •
720
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
not of the Andhra High Court but of any other High
Court. All the High Courts have the same status;
all of them stand for the same high traditions of the
Bar and the administration of justice, and advocates
e-rolled in all of them are presumed to follow the
same standards and to subscribe to the same spirit
of serving the cause of the administration of justice.
'Pherefore, in our opinion, the impugned rule has
introduced classification between one class of Advocates and the rest, and the said classification must
be said to be irrational inasmuch as there is no nexus
between the basis of the said classification and the
object intended to be achieved by the relevant
scheme of rules. That being so, it must be held that
the decision of the Andhra High Court in the case
of Nallanthighal Bhaktavatsalam Iyengar ia not
correct.
In the result, the impugned rule and the oorresponding portion of the paragraph of the notification based on it must be held to be uUra t'ires and
unconstitutional. In that view of the matter, we
issue a direction calling upon the first respondent to
entertain t.he applications of the petitioners and to
deal
with
them
in
accordance
with
law.
We were told by the learned Solicitor-General that
the Public Service Commission has already conducted the test in respect of a large number of candidates and amongst them, the petitioners' cases have
also been considered. If that be so, our present
decision will not affect the procedure followed by
the Commission. The effect of our decision is that
applications of the persons like the petitioners cannot be rejected on the preliminary ground that they
are not persons practising as Advocates in the
Andhra High Court and that they should be considered on the merits along with the rest of the app!i.
cations. The petitions are accordingly allowed with
easts.
Petiti<ma allowed.