# J_v<Jlish Thakur v. Tarakant Jha

- **Citation:** [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 28
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. llO of 1960
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. c. DAS GUPTA, J. R. MuDHOLKAR
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/j-v-jlish-thakur-v-tarakant-jha-2710
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Revenue Sale---Validity of-C.P. Land Revenue Act, 1947
(C. P. 2 of 1917), s. 149.
The appellants are Lambardars of Mahal No.2 of Mouza
Gujarkhedi, and they held therein an undivided share of As.
-/11/- and as they were found in arrears of land revenue to
the extent of Rs. 730/13/-, the property was sold for Rs. 600/-
but the sale proclamatiori. recited the amount of arrears due
as Rs. 1345-9-0 and that the properties were Leing sold for
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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recovering that amount. It was contended by the appellants,
that it was open to them to have the sale set aside in the Civil
Com t on the ground that the arrear for which the property was
sold was not due. The trial court dismissed tho suit on the
ground that the suit did not lie and the High Court affirmed
the decision.
Held, that s. 149 (2) of the Act was plain and unambiguous and that if the arrear in respect of which the sale was
held was not due it gave a right to the gwner of the property
to have the sale set aside in a Civil Court. The fact that subse1uePt to the sale proclamation but on the date of the sale
further amounts towards land revenue had become due was not
material, the scheme of the Act being that in respect of each
specific arrear separate proceedings had to be taken.
Hd.d, further, that mistakes and irregularities contemplated by the Act which would not furnish grounds for invalidating
and setting aside the sale were of a different kind and from the
scheme of the Act it is clear that a sale for an arrear that was
not due was put in a separate category.
Rewa Mahten v. Ram Kishan Singh ( 1886) L.R. 13 I.A. 106
and Ram Prasad Chondhury v. Ram Jadu Lahiri,
(1936) 40
C.W.N. 1054, diStinguishecl.

## Text

1962
J_v<Jlish Thakur
v.
Tarakant Jha
Das Gupta, J.
1962
Sc/1tember 12.
28
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
on the other hand it was established that the land was
never the raiyati land of the appellant but was the
pradhani jote of Maharaj Rai Ghatwal. It is unnecessary for us to decide whether in the facts and circumstances of that case the decision of the High Court was
correct. We need only say that this case did not
purport to decide that the entry Bakasht would always
imply the negation of a raiyati right. It may be
mentioned that the attention of the learned judges
who decided this case was drawn to the High Court's
decision in the case now under appeal before us and
they distinguished it by saying that the earlier decision should be held to be a finding restricted to its
own facts and circumstances.
Our conclusion therefore is that the High Court
was right in holding that the sale of May 15, 1935
was void with respect to the raiyati interest and only
the right to receive rent passed by this sale to the
defendants first party.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
PARMANAND AND OTHERS
v.
GANPATRAO AND OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. c. DAS GUPTA AND
J. R. MuDHOLKAR, .JJ.)
Revenue Sale---Validity of-C.P. Land Revenue Act, 1947
(C. P. 2 of 1917), s. 149.
The appellants are Lambardars of Mahal No.2 of Mouza
Gujarkhedi, and they held therein an undivided share of As.
-/11/- and as they were found in arrears of land revenue to
the extent of Rs. 730/13/-, the property was sold for Rs. 600/-
but the sale proclamatiori. recited the amount of arrears due
as Rs. 1345-9-0 and that the properties were Leing sold for
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
z9
recovering that amount. It was contended by the appellants,
that it was open to them to have the sale set aside in the Civil
Com t on the ground that the arrear for which the property was
sold was not due. The trial court dismissed tho suit on the
ground that the suit did not lie and the High Court affirmed
the decision.
Held, that s. 149 (2) of the Act was plain and unambiguous and that if the arrear in respect of which the sale was
held was not due it gave a right to the gwner of the property
to have the sale set aside in a Civil Court. The fact that subse1uePt to the sale proclamation but on the date of the sale
further amounts towards land revenue had become due was not
material, the scheme of the Act being that in respect of each
specific arrear separate proceedings had to be taken.
Hd.d, further, that mistakes and irregularities contemplated by the Act which would not furnish grounds for invalidating
and setting aside the sale were of a different kind and from the
scheme of the Act it is clear that a sale for an arrear that was
not due was put in a separate category.
Rewa Mahten v. Ram Kishan Singh ( 1886) L.R. 13 I.A. 106
and Ram Prasad Chondhury v. Ram Jadu Lahiri,
(1936) 40
C.W.N. 1054, diStinguishecl.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. llO of 1960.
'l\ppeal by special leave from the judgment and
decree dated April 13, 1956, of the former Nagpur
High Court in F.A. No. 99 of 1947.
Naunit lal, for the appellants.
B. A. 1Wasodkar, B. D. Najbile and Ganpat Rai,
for the respondents.
1962. September 12. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
1962
Parmanand
v.
Ganpatrao
GAJENDRAGADKAR, ].-This appeal by special
Gaj<nd,.gadka" J
leave raises a short question about the construction of
section 149 (2) of the C. P. Land Revenue Act, 1917
(No II of 1917) (hereinafter called the Act). The
validity of a revenue sale of their properties held on
Febmary 27, 1941 under section 128(f) of the
Act was challenged by the appellants by their suit
1962
Parman and
v.
Ganpatrao
GaJtndragadkar, J,
30
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]SUPP.
filed in the Court of the Additional Judge, Nagpur
OI! November 12, 1946. Ganpatrao Vishwanathji
Deshmukh who had purchased the properties at the
said auction sale was impleaded as defendant No. l to
the said suit. During the pcndency of the litigation,
the said Ganpatrao has died and his heirs have been
brought on the record. They will be referred to as
respondent No. 1 in the course of this judgment. The
appellants challenged the impugned sale on five
different grounds. They alleged that the sale was
without jurisdiction; that as the final bid was not
accepted by the Dy. Commissioner, it was invalid;
that as the sale was brought about fraudulently by
respondent No. l in collusion with the Revenue Clerk,
it was invalid; that as the Commissioner was not
competent to confirm the sale on November 13,
1945, it was invalid; and that the sale could not be
held validly for the recovery of Rs. 1,354/9/- which
was shown in the proclamation of sale as the arrear
for which the property was put to sale. The trial
court rejected all the contentions raised by the
appellants in impeaching the validity of the sale .and
so, the relief claimed by the appellants against respondent No. 1 by way of injunction restraining him from
recovering possession of the property and disturbing
the appellants' possession thereof was rejected.
The appellants then preferred an appeal in the
Nagpur High Court. The High Court has confirmed
the findings of the trial court and accordingly, the
appeal has been dismissed.
It is against this decree
that the appellants have come to this Court by special
leave; and the only point which has been raised on
their behalf by Mr. N aunit Lal is that the view taken
by the courts below that the impugned sale could not
be effectively challenged by the appellants under
s. 149 (2) is not justified on a fair and reasonable
construction of the said provisions.
The material facts leading to this point are
very few, and they are not in dispute. The appellants
are Lambardars of Mahal No. 2 of Moma Gujarkhedi,
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31
Tehsil Saoner, District Nagpur, and they held therein
an undivided interest of As. -/11/- . On or about
October 4,
1940,
thev
were
found
to
be in
arrears of land revenue t~ the extent of Rs. 730/ 13/-
in respect ol the suspended Rabi kist of 1938-39 and
the Rabi kist of 1939-40.
The Tehsildar of Saoner
made a
report on
October 4,
1940
to
the
Dy. Commissioner that the said arrears were due from
the appellants and asked for sanction to sell by auction the property in suit.
Along with this report, a
draft of the sale proclamation containing the relevant
details ..was also submitted for the signature of the
S.D.O. in case the Dy. Commissioner sanctioned the
sale.
The S.D.0. forwarded the said report to the
Dy. Commissioner who accorded sanction to the
proposal of the Tehsildar on December 17, 1940 .
Thereafter, on
December
:?3, l 940. the S.D.O.
signed the said proclamation and on getting the said
documents
back,
the
Tchsildar
ordered
on
January 7, l!JH that the sale proclamation should be
published and that the sale should be
held on
February :?!i,
l!H L
On
that
date, the
sale
was
adjourned to
February 27,
l!l41 for
want
of adequate bids.
On the next day the sale was held
and the property was sold to respondent No. I for
Rs. HOO/-.
Ultimately, the said sale was confirmed.
It is common ground that though at the relevant
time, arrears due from the appellants amounted only
to Rs. 730/l:~I-, in the Parchanama the said amount
was shown as Rs. 1,354/9/- and the property in fact
was sold to recover the said amount of arrears under
s. 128( f) of the Act. The appellants' contention is
that the arrear, Rs. l)l:J4/!JI-, for which his property
has been sold under s. l :?8( f) was not clue; what was
due was the lesser amount of Rs. 7:30/13/- and so, the
sale in question is invalid under s. 1.J-(l (2) of the Act.
In dealing with this point, it is necessary to
refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. Chapter X
of the Act deals with the collection of land revenue,
and it consists of sections 122 to IGO.
Section 124
1962
Parmanand
v.
Ganpatrao
Gaiendragadkar, J.
1962
Parmanand
v.
Ganpalrao
Gajendragadkar, J.
32
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
confers power on the State Government to regulate
payment of sums payable under the Act and provides
for the number and amount of the instalments, and
the time, place and manner of payment of any sum
payable under a settlement or sub-settlement, or
otherwise under an assessment made under this Act.
Sub-section (2) of s. 124 requires that unless the State
Government otherwise directs, all such payments
shall be made as prescribed under sub-s. (1). A notice
of demand can be issued by Tehsildar or Naib Tehsildar under s. 127 and it may be served on any defaulter before the issue of any process under s. 128 for
the recovery of an arrear. Section 128 provides for
the process for recovery of an arrear and it prescribes
that an arrear payable to Government may be recovered, inter alia,. .. (f) by selling such estate, mahal
or land, or the share or land of any co-sharer who has
not paid the portion of the land revenue which, as
between him and the other co-sharers, is payable by
him. Section 131 prescribes the procedure for attachment and sale of movables and attachment of immovable property. Then s. 132 provides for holding
enquiry into claims of third persons in respect of property attached or proceeded against. Section 138 (1)
provides that the purchaser of any estate, mahal, share
or land sold for arrears of land revenue due in respect
thereof shall acquire it free of all encumbrances
imposed on it, and all grants and contracts made in
respect of it, by any person other than the purchaser.
Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) make other proVISions, but
it is unnecessary to refer to them. Section 143 lays
down that if the arrear in respect of which the property
is to be sold is paid at any time before the lot is
knocked down, the sale shall be stayed. Section 145
provides for application to set aside sale on deposit
of arrear, and s. 146 provides for application to set
aside sale for irregularity. Under s. 148 it is provided
that on the expiry of 30 days from the date of sale,
if no application has been made under section 145 or
146 or no claim has been made under s. 151, or if
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such application or claim has been made and rejected,
the Dy. Commissioner shall pass an order confirming
the sale. Section 151 refers to claims of pre-emptions.
That takes us to section 149. Section 149 reads
as follows:
"(l) If no application under section 146
is made within the time allowed therefor, all
claims on the grounds of irregularity or mistake
shall be barred.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall bar
the institution of a suit in the Civil Court to set
aside a sale on the ground of fraud or on the
ground that.the arrear for which the property
is sold is not due."
It would thus be seen that the scheme of the relevant
provisions of the Act in relation to revenue sales
appears to be self-contained. The revenue process
for recovering arrears begins with the report as to
the arrears and ends with the confirmation of sale.
Provision is made for the examination of claims of
third parties as well as for setting aside sales on account
of deposit or on account of irregularities committed
in conducting the sales. It is in the light of this selfcontained scheme that s. 149 ( 1) provides that if no
application under s. 146 is made within the time
prescribed, all claims on the grounds of irregularity
or mistake shall be barred. In other words, the
effect of this provision is that if a party aggrieved by
a revenue sale of his property w~ nts to challenge
the validity of the said sale on grounds of irregularity
or mistake, the Act has provided a remedy for him by
s. 146 and it he fails to avail himself of that remedy,
it would not be open to him to challenge the impugned sale on the said grounds by a separate suit. The
grounds of irregularity or mistake ml!st be urged by an
application made under s. Ho and if no such application is made, then the party is precluded from taking
the said grounds othernise. Thus far there is no
difficulty or dispute .
1962
Parman and
v.
Ganpatr(J(}
G"fendragadkar, J.
1962
Parmariamr
v.
Ganpatrao
Gajendragadkar, J ..
34
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]SUPP·
Sub-section (2) of s. 149 provides an exception
to ss. (1 ), and it says that the institution of a suit
would not be barred in a Civil Court to set aside a
sale on two grounds; if the sale is challenged on the
ground of fraud, a suit will lie; similarly, if a sale is
challenged on the ground that the arrear for which
the property is sold is not due, a suit will lie.
The
effect of this provision is that if fraud is proved in
regard to a revenue sale, a suit will lie and the sale
will be set aside; similarly, if it is shown that the
arrear for which the property is sold was not due, a
suit will lie and the sale will be set aside.
There
is no difficulty or dispute about this position also.
The question on which the parties are at issue
before us is in regard to the interpretation of the
clause "the arrear for which the property is sold."
It has been held by the High Court that what this
clause requires is not that the arrear for which the
property is sold should be stated with meticulous
accuracy, if a mistake is made in showing the actual
amount of arrear due from the defaulier for which
the property is sold, that mistake would not render
the sale invalid; it would be a mistake within the
meaning of ss.(1) and so, to cases of that kind subsection (2) will not apply.
On the other hand, Mr.
Naunit Lal contends that the clause "the arrear for
which the property is sold" is plain and unambiguous.
In considering the question as to whether this clause
is attracted or not, one has to look at the' proclamation of sale and enquire whether the amount shown
as arrears due from the defaulter was in fact due or
not. If the said amount was not due, the clause will
apply notwithstanding the fact that a lesser amount
may have been due from the said defaulter.
In construing s. 149(2) it is relevant to remember that the provision in question is made in relation
to revenue sales and there is no doubt that the revenue
sales are authorised to be held under the summary
procedure prescribed by the relevant sections of the
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
35
Act, and so, it would not be unreasonable to construe
these provisions strictly. That is why we are not
inclined to accept the view that in interpreting the
relevant clause, we should assume that the Legislature
did not expect the authorities to specify the arrear
for which the property is sold with meticulous care.
If the defaulter's property is being sold under revenue
sale and the object of issuing the proclamation is to
show for what arrear it is being sold, it is, we think,
fair to assume that the said arrear must be stated with
absolute accuracy. It would not be enough to say
that some arrear was due and so, the sale should be
upheld though it was purported to be held for reco·
very of a much larger arrear.
Nor is this consideration purely academic.
As
we have seen, s. 143 provides that if the arrear in
respect oi which the property is to be sold is paid
before the lot is knocked down, the sale shall be
stayed. In the present case, if the arrear had been
properly shown at Rs. 730/13/-, it is
theoretically
possible that the appellants may have been in a position to deposit this amount before the lot was knocked
down and the sale would have been stayed. Since
the arrear was shown to be much larger, it is theoretically possible that the appellants could not make a
successful attempt to deposit the said amount.
Now,
in working out the provisions of s. 143, there should
be no difficulty in determining the amount wliich the
defaulter has to deposit to avoid the revenue sale.
The arrear in question must be correctly stated in the
proclamation so that everybody concerned knows the
exact amount for which the revenue sale is held.
That is another consideration which supports the
construction for which the appellants contend.
Mr. l\1asodkar for respondent No. 1 argued
that the construction for which the appellants contend
is mechanical and it may !"ad to anomalies. In
support of this argument, he took the illustration of a
case where the amount of arrears is accurately shown
in the proclamation. but after the proclamation is
1962
Parmanand
v.
Ganpatr(l(J
Gajtndragadkar, J.
1962
Parmanand
v.
Ganpat'•
Gajendragaikar, J.
36
SUPREME COURT RE.PORTS [1963] SUPP.
. •.
issued, a part of it is paid by the defaulter;-( as in fact
Rs. 291/- were deposited by the appellants in the
present case)-the contention is that in such a case,
if the origin a I amount of arrears continues to be
shown in the proclamation, the sale would be invalid
on the construction suggested hy the appellants. We
are not impressed by this argument. Our attention
has not been drawn to any specific provision of the
Act under which a partial payment of the arrear due
is allowed to be made by the defaulter. If such a
payment is made, it may at best, be treated as depo·
sited on account, aniJ. no deduction would be made
from the a~rear notified to be due from him in the
proclamation at that stage. The only
provision
which has been cited before us in that behalf is s. 143
anci s. 143 expressly provides for the payment of the
whole of the arrear due and lays down that on such
payment before the lot is knocked down, the sale
shall be stayed. Therefore, the complication sought
to be introduced by Mr. Masodkar by taking a
hypothetical case of a part payment of the arrears
due from the defaulter, does not affect the construe·
tion of s. 149(2).
It is then argued that the impugned sale cannot
be said to be irregular in the present case, because on
the date when it was actually held, the amount of
Rs. 1,354/9/- was in fact due from the appellants as
arrears. It is common ground that after the procla·
mation was issued, a further amount of arrears became
due from the appellants and on the date of the sale,
the total amount came to be Rs. 1,354/9/-. In our
opinion, arrears accumulating after an order for sale
has been pasi;ed and the proclamation in that behalf
has been issued, cannot come into the calculation while
construing s.149 (2). Every arrear for which the sale is
ordered must be specifically dealt with as provided by
the Act. It is not open to the authorities to deal with
a specific arrear as prescribed by the Act and to pass
an order for sale of the defaulter's pr9perty on the
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basis of that arrear and then add to it subsequently
accruing arrears without following the procedure
prescribed in that behalf. Once the amount of
arrear is determined and sale is ordered by reference
to it, it is that amount which must be shown in the
proclamation and it is for that amount of arrear for
which the property must be sold. That, in our opinion,
is clearly the effect of the relevant clause in s. 149 (2).
We must, therefore, hold that the High Court was in
error in coming to the conclusion that the sale of the
appellants' property on the 27th February, 1941 was
valid. We are satisfi\:d that the arrear for which the
appellants' property was sold was not due within the
meaning of s.149 (2), and so, the sale must be set
aside .
In support of his argument that the impugned
sale cannot be held to be invalid, Mr. Masodkar
relied on a decision of the Privy Council in
Rewa
Mahton v. Ram Kishen Singh('). In that case, the
Privy Council was dealing with a question which had
reference to the true construction of s. 246 of the
Civil Procedure Code of 1877 (Act X of 1877). The
said section had provided that if cross decrees between
the same parties and for the payment of money be
produced in the Court, execution shall be taken out
only by the party who holds the decree for the larger
sum, and for so much only as remains after deducting
the smaller sum.
It appears that contrary to the
provisions of this section, an auction sale was held and
when the title of the auction-purchaser was challenged,
it became necessary to consider that the effect of
non-compliance with the provisions of s. 246 would
be on the title of the auction-purchaser. The Privy
Council held that a purchaser under a sale in execution is not bound to inquire whether the judgment
debtor had a cross judgment of a higher amount such
as would have rendered the order for execution incorrect. If the Court has jurisdiction, such purchaser
is no more bound to inquire into the correctness of an
(I) (1886) L. R. 13 I. A. 106.
1962
Parmana11d
v.
GMjJatrao
G'qfendragadkar, J.
J9(j2
Parmanand
v.
Ganpatraa
Gajtndragadkar, J.
38
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
order for execution than he is as to the correctness of
the judgment upon which execution issues.
In oth~r
words, the effect of this decision is that if in contraven·
tion of the provisions of s. 24li an executing Court
orders a sale to be held, the auction-purchaser gets a
good title notwithstanding non-compliance withs. 246.
We do not see how this case can assist Mr. Masodkar
in the present appeal. The decision turned upon the
construction of s. 246.
But the present dispute has to
be decided on a construction of s. 140 (2).
It is well·
known that execution sales held under the Code of
Civil.Procedure can be challenged only in the manner
prescribed and for the reasons specified, say, for insta·
nee, by o. XXI r. 8D, 90 and 91.
The fact that
certain irregularities committed during the conduct
of execution sales would not render the sales invalid,
flows from the relevant provisions of the Code and so,
it would not be reasonable to invoke the assistance of
the decisions dealing with irregularities committed in
execution sales in support of the argument that a
revenue sale held under s. 128 (f) should be judged
by the same principles.
The question as to whether
the revenue sale is valid or not must obviously be
determined in the light of the relevant provisions of
the Act and that again takes us to the construction of
s. 149 (2).
Mr. Masodkar had also relied on the decision of
the Calcutta High Court in Ram Prasad Clwudhury
v. Rain J(l(lu
Lahiri (') in support of his argu·
ment that a revenue sale held under s. 128 (f) of the
Act would not be rendered invalid merelv because the
amount of arrears shown in the proclamation is not
accurate.
In the case of Ram Prasad Choudhury,
the sale had been held under the provisions of the
Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act (Act XI of 1859).
Under s. 5 of the said Act; notice had to be issued
before the sale could be held. In the notice issued
prior to the sale had been shown a sum which had then
not become due as an arrear along with other SUIJll
(1) (1936) 40 C.W.N. 1054.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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which had become arrears, and the subsequent sale
was
held on the footing of the
total amount
thus shown being the arrears due. It was urged
that the sale was invalid because of the irregularity committed in the issue of the notice
under s. 5.
This argument was rejected and it was
held that despite the said irregularity, the sale was
valid. Now, in appreciating the effect of this decision,
it is necessary to refer to the provisions of s. 33 of the
said Act under which the sale was challenged. We
have already referred to the fact that s. 5 required a
notice to be issued prior to the sale. The notice
provided for by this section had to specify the namre
and amount of arrear or demand, and the latest date
on which payment thereof shall be received. Section
33 provides that no sale for arrears of revenue shall
be annulled, except upon the ground of its having
been made contrary to the provisions of this Act, and
then only on proof that the plaintiff has sustained
substantial injury by reason of the irregularity complained of ; with the rest of the section we are not concerned. The argument which was urged in the case of
Ram Prasad Choudhury was that the notice under
s. 5 having been irregularly issued, the sale should be
deemed to have been held contrary to the provisions
of the said Act, and this argument was not accepted.
It would be noticed that s. 33 justifies a claim for
annulling the sale only if two conditions are satisfied;
that the sale should have been made contrary· to the
provisions of the Act and that the plaintiff must show
that he has sustained substantial injury by reason of
the irregularity complained of. It is in the context
of these requirements that the Calcutta High Court
held that the inclusion of an amount in the notice
which had not become an arrear on the date of the
notice did not render the impugned s<>le invalid. We
do not think that this decision can assist us in interpreting s. 149 (2) with which we are concerned. The
scope and effect of the relevant provisions of s. 149(2)
are not at all similar to the scope and effect of
1962
Parmanand
".
Gaupatrno
Gajtndragadkar, J.
1962
Parmanand
v.
Ganpatrao
Cajendragadkar, J.
1962
s~ptember 13.
40
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
s. 33 of the Bengal Act. Therefore, we are not inclined
to accept Mr. Masodkar's argument that the defect
in the sale on which the appellants rely would not
render the sale invalid.
The result is, the appeal is allowed, the decree
passed by the High Court is set aside and the appellants' suit decreed. There would be no order as to cost
throughout.
A ppe.al allowed.
Mrs. V. G. PATERSON
v.
Mr. 0. V. FORBES & OTHERS
(J. L. KAPUR, K. c. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUBAR
DAYAL, JJ.)
C'onternpt of C!ourt-.1.Votice to appenl-Failure-Prope.rly
attached-Handed over to Govern1nent-Executri:r-Applicat-ian
to restore-Power to attach-Code
of Criminal Procedure,
1898(Act V of 1898), 88. 81, 88
(7).
The appellant's mother died leaving a will executed in
favour of the appellant her sister and her brother. The appel-
•'
!ant applied for a probate and it was granted to her. Subsequently in connection . with a criminal appeal before the Oudh
Chief Court applications were filed by the counsel for the State
as well a; the appellant for proceeding against her brother one
Mr. Forbes under the Contempt of Courts Act. On the failure
of Mr. Forbes to appear in pursuance of notices issued by the
Court, a proclamation under s.87 of Code of Criminal Procedure
was published and certain properties were attached under s.88 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. These properties were assumed
to belong to Mr. Forbes and they were under the custody of the
appellant. Finding that Mr. Forbes did not even then appear
the Court recorded an order that the attached properties were
at the disposal of the Government and the contempt proceedings would be adjourned sine die until Mr. Forbes appears or is
arrested. On directions from the Court the appellant handed
over the properties to the City Magistrate who in turn forwarded them to the Government. Thereafter Mr. Forbes died.
After his death the appellant made
an application to the