# JAGDISH CHANDER CHA'ITERJEE & ORS v. SRI KISHAN " ANR

- **Citation:** [1973] 1 S.C.R. 850
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1971-01-01
- **Bench:** N. Grover, D. G. Palbkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/jagdish-chander-cha-iterjee-ors-v-sri-kishan-anr-5723
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

RajaJtha11 Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1950-S. 13Statutory tenant J.ying--Heir1 whether 'tellQllt,. under A.ct-Whether calf
claim pro1ectio11 of A.ct.
A
•
Plaintiff (Respondent No. 1 herein) filed a suit seeking ejectment from
his house of !us tenant C on the ground of personal need. Delendant C
contended that the landlord did not require the premiseo bonafide.
Tho
C
Munsif, Ajmer, decreed the suil In appeal the District Judge held that
the landtord did not r~quire the premises reasonably and
bonafide
and
11ilow1Dg the appeal, d1s~ssed the swt.
The landlord filed an appeal in
the RaJaslhan High Court. During the pendency of the appeal C died and
thereafter the appeal was contested by bis heirs. The High Court in second
appeal held (i) that it was not necessary to 10 into the ques.ion of bonafide and reasonable necessity of the landlord as that was only a protection
9
provided to the statutory tenant personally under s. 13 of the Rajasthan
Premises (Control and Eviction) Act, 1950; (ii) that the tenancy <if C
having been duly terminated by notice there was no bar to the passing of
the decree.
In appeal by C's legal representatives, to this Collrt, the
ques.ions that fell for consideration were : (i) whether the High Court
should have remanded the case for determination o( the question whether
the contractual tenancy bad been terminated; (ii) whether the protection
afforded by the 1950 Act to the statutory tenant was personal to such
i;
tendnt or was also available to heirs and legal represe1tatives, (iii)
whether the heirs of the tenant were tenants within the definition of that
term in s. 3(vii) of the Act,
DLmissing the appeal.
HELD : (i) The landlord had alleged in the suit that by a notice dated
26-6-1972 served upon the tenant, the tenancy had been duly terminated.
1
This was not denied in. the written statement nor was an issue demanded
at the time of the trial. The High Court had a'fter hearing both sides come
to the conclusion that the oontractual tenancy bad been duly terminated
by a notice.
In these circumstances there was no substance in the sul>-
miasion that the High Court ahould ha>-e remanded the case.
J 852HJ
(ii) It is now settled that after the termination
of the contractual"
tenency the statutory tenant has only a personal right to continue in p0>-
<e5sion till evicted in 11ccordance with the provisions of the Act. The contention based on the ground of bonafide requirement by the landlord was
personal to the statutory tenant and on his death the same is not open to
his le1al representatives unless there is anything in the provis'on of the
Act which makes the legal representath-cs &talutory tenants to the same
extent as t'te deceased. It was not the case of the appel'ants-in the present
caae that there was anything in the provisions of the Act which gives ; '11
protection to·tbe le&al representative of the deceased statutory tenant.
[853H; 855F]
A.nnid/yas (Private) Ltd, v. A.nandji Ka/yon# Pedhi .t Or.
[1964] 4
S.C.R.. 892, 908 applied.
A
B
c
J. c. CHATTERJEE v. Sill IJSHAN (Pakkar, J.)
851
(iii) The contention that.since the rent in the present case was payable
by the heirs and it was in fact paid during the pendency of the proceedinall
Ibey were tenants within the definition could not be accepted.
Rent was
however not payable by the legal representatives.
and if the rent was
paid by.them during the cpurse of the proceedings it was not because they
were recognised as tenants by the landlord but becauso the amount was
RCCived by him, without prejudiec to his rights under the orders of tho
court. Therefore the heirs and legal rc11resentatives of the deceased C
could not in their own right .claim to be a 'tenant' within the meaning of
the Act. The only contentions which they could put forward were \he
contentions appropriate to their representative character Qlld not one wh1cl!
was personal to the deceiued. f8SSB-E]
CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 428(N)
of 1971.
Appeal by special

## Text

850
JAGDISH CHANDER CHA'ITERJEE & ORS.
v.
SRI KISHAN " ANR.
A ugu.st 9, 1972
[A, N. GROVER AND D. G. PALBKAR, JJ.]
RajaJtha11 Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1950-S. 13Statutory tenant J.ying--Heir1 whether 'tellQllt,. under A.ct-Whether calf
claim pro1ectio11 of A.ct.
A
•
Plaintiff (Respondent No. 1 herein) filed a suit seeking ejectment from
his house of !us tenant C on the ground of personal need. Delendant C
contended that the landlord did not require the premiseo bonafide.
Tho
C
Munsif, Ajmer, decreed the suil In appeal the District Judge held that
the landtord did not r~quire the premises reasonably and
bonafide
and
11ilow1Dg the appeal, d1s~ssed the swt.
The landlord filed an appeal in
the RaJaslhan High Court. During the pendency of the appeal C died and
thereafter the appeal was contested by bis heirs. The High Court in second
appeal held (i) that it was not necessary to 10 into the ques.ion of bonafide and reasonable necessity of the landlord as that was only a protection
9
provided to the statutory tenant personally under s. 13 of the Rajasthan
Premises (Control and Eviction) Act, 1950; (ii) that the tenancy <if C
having been duly terminated by notice there was no bar to the passing of
the decree.
In appeal by C's legal representatives, to this Collrt, the
ques.ions that fell for consideration were : (i) whether the High Court
should have remanded the case for determination o( the question whether
the contractual tenancy bad been terminated; (ii) whether the protection
afforded by the 1950 Act to the statutory tenant was personal to such
i;
tendnt or was also available to heirs and legal represe1tatives, (iii)
whether the heirs of the tenant were tenants within the definition of that
term in s. 3(vii) of the Act,
DLmissing the appeal.
HELD : (i) The landlord had alleged in the suit that by a notice dated
26-6-1972 served upon the tenant, the tenancy had been duly terminated.
1
This was not denied in. the written statement nor was an issue demanded
at the time of the trial. The High Court had a'fter hearing both sides come
to the conclusion that the oontractual tenancy bad been duly terminated
by a notice.
In these circumstances there was no substance in the sul>-
miasion that the High Court ahould ha>-e remanded the case.
J 852HJ
(ii) It is now settled that after the termination
of the contractual"
tenency the statutory tenant has only a personal right to continue in p0>-
<e5sion till evicted in 11ccordance with the provisions of the Act. The contention based on the ground of bonafide requirement by the landlord was
personal to the statutory tenant and on his death the same is not open to
his le1al representatives unless there is anything in the provis'on of the
Act which makes the legal representath-cs &talutory tenants to the same
extent as t'te deceased. It was not the case of the appel'ants-in the present
caae that there was anything in the provisions of the Act which gives ; '11
protection to·tbe le&al representative of the deceased statutory tenant.
[853H; 855F]
A.nnid/yas (Private) Ltd, v. A.nandji Ka/yon# Pedhi .t Or.
[1964] 4
S.C.R.. 892, 908 applied.
A
B
c
J. c. CHATTERJEE v. Sill IJSHAN (Pakkar, J.)
851
(iii) The contention that.since the rent in the present case was payable
by the heirs and it was in fact paid during the pendency of the proceedinall
Ibey were tenants within the definition could not be accepted.
Rent was
however not payable by the legal representatives.
and if the rent was
paid by.them during the cpurse of the proceedings it was not because they
were recognised as tenants by the landlord but becauso the amount was
RCCived by him, without prejudiec to his rights under the orders of tho
court. Therefore the heirs and legal rc11resentatives of the deceased C
could not in their own right .claim to be a 'tenant' within the meaning of
the Act. The only contentions which they could put forward were \he
contentions appropriate to their representative character Qlld not one wh1cl!
was personal to the deceiued. f8SSB-E]
CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 428(N)
of 1971.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
January 1, 1971 of the High Court at Jodhpur in S. Il. Civil
Second Appeal No. 390 of 1965.
Sobhag Mal Jain, for the appellants.
D
Yinoo Bhagat and J. K. Sethi, for respondent No. 1.
G
H
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Palekar, J. This appeal by special leave arises in the foilowlng circumstances.
Plaintiff (Respondent No. I) filed Civil Suit No. 35 of 1963
against one B. N. Chaiterji in the court of Munsif, Ajmer City,
for ejectment from the first floor of the house known as "Krishna
Bhawan". The eiectment was sought on the ground that the plaintiff required the house bonafide for the residence of himself and
his family.
B. N. Chatterji-the defendant, contested the suit
and alleged that the landlord did not require 'the premises bonafide.
The learned Munsif by judgment dated January 17, 1964
held in favour of the landlord and decreed the suit for ejectment.
From that decree the tenant filed Civil Appeal No. 59/1964 in
the court of the District Judge, Aimer. The learned Judge held
that the landlord did not require the premises reasonably and
bonafide and allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit.
Thereupon the landlord filed second appeal No. 390/1965
in the Raiasthan High Court. During the oendency of the appeal,
the tenant B. N. Chatterii died on 31-7-1967 and his widow and
children were brought on record as his heirs and legal representatives. The widow Kalyani Devi died on 24-6-1969 and her
heirs are the legal representatives-· already on record. When the
appeal came before a single Judge of the High Court for hearing,
the landlord, who was the appellant in the second appeal, sought
the pem;iission of the court to urge the following paint.
,
852
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] l S.C.R.
"That the respondent (original tenant B. N. Chatterji) died A
after the filing of this appeal. That the deceased after the determination of the tenancy was only a statutory tenant and under
the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction)
Act,
1950 the protection granted by Section 13 of the Rajasthan P1emises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act is not available to the
heirs of the tenant. As such, even if it be held that the landlord
B
has failed to prove the reasonable and bonafide requiremell't,
which the appellant does not concede, che appel.lant is entitled to
a decree in pursuance of the decision of a division bench of this
High Court passed on 7-4-1966 in D.B. Special Appeal No. 3 of
1965".
The le~4 Judge allowed the point to be urged and can1e C
to the conclusion that it was not necessary to go into the question of bonafide and reasonable necessity of the landlord as that
was only a protection provided to the statutory tenant personally
under Section 13 of the Act of 1950. Since the wnancy had been
duly terminated by notice and there was no other bar to the passing of the decree in favour of the landlord the learned Ju<'1e set n
aside the Order of the District Court and restored the decree passed
by the Munsif.
It was contended before us that the term 'tenant' in section 3(vii.) of !lhe Act referred to above included, on a proper
constructio" the heirs of a tenant and, tho~refore, they were entitled in thc;r own right to urge that the landlord did not require
E
the premises reasonably and bonafide. On the other hand, if they
were not tenants, it was no longer open to pass a decree of eviction against them and, if necessary, tho~ plaintiff should be referred
to a separate unit. In any case, it was contended, in view of the
new point urged at the time of the hearing, the High Court should
have remanded the case for the determination of the question
F
whether the contractual tenancy was
validly terminated
anci
whether Ly acceptance of rent from the legal representativ·~s during litigation the heirs and the legal representatives had not been
constituted 'tenants'.
In our opinion there is no substance in this appeal.
The
original tenant of the premises was B. N. Chatterji. The landG
lord had alleged in the sui't that by a notice dated 26-6-1962
served upon the tenant, the tenancy had been duly terminated.
This was not denied in the written statement nor was an is•ue
demanded at the time of the trial.
However, the point being
essentially a point of law. the learned Judge in second appeal permitted both sides to address him on the ooint and came ~o the
R
wnclusion that the contractual tenancy had been dulv termmated
by a notice. In •he'e circum,tance'. we do not think ti.at there
is any substance in the submission of the learned couns~I for the
B
c
D
E
r
G
H
J. c. CHATTERJEE v. SRI KISHAN (Palekar, J.)
853
appellant before us that the learned Judge should have remaaded
the case for a determination of that question.
·
The position, therefore, is this. The contractual tenancy of
the tenant B. N. Chatterii had been duly terminated by notice
as after 31st July, 1962 and after that date the tenant would be
merely a statutory tenant liable to be evicted only in accordance
with the special law namely the Rajasthan Premises (Control of
Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 referred to herein as "the Act".
Section 13 of that Act provides that Notwithstandin,g anything
contained i11 any law or contract, no Court shall pass any decree,
or make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution
of a decree. or otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is
ready and willing to pay' rent therefor to the full extent allowable
by this Act, unless it is satisfied that there are in the case one or
the other of the several reasons given .in clause (a) to ( 1) of
sub-section ( 1) of that Section. One of such reasons is th.at the
premises., are required reasonably and bonafide by the landlord
for the use or occupation of himself or his family. If the Court
is satisfied about this reason the court would be entitled to pass
a decree against the original itenant. The Trial Court, as we liave
already seoen, was satisfied about this reason and gave a decree
for eviction against the tenant. In appeal this finding has been
reversed. So the landlord, when he came in second appeal, would
have to show that the finding of the Appellate Court on that poin
was wrong and that of the Trial Court was correct. There is no
dispute whatsoever that if the original tenant B. N. Chatterji had
lived till the disposal of the second appeal, this point could have
been agitated before the High Court and the court would have
been required to give a finding on that point. But the original
tenant who was now merely a statutory tenant died during the
pendency of the appeal and his heirs and legal representatives
were brought on record. It was contended on behalf of the land·
lord in second appeal that the protection given by tbe Act was
personal to the statutory tenant B. N. Chatterii and on his death
it was no longer necessary for the landlord to show that he
required the premises bonafide and reasonably and he was entitled
to the eviction of the legal representatives on showing that the
contractual tenancy had been properly terminated before the suit.
The point for consideration is what is the position of the parties
before the Court with regard to the relief claimed by the landlord
in his eviction suit
It is now settled that after the termination of the contractual
tenancy the statutory tenant has only a personal right to continue
in possession till. evicted in accordance with the provisions of the
Act. It is pointed out bv this Court in Anand Nivas (Private Ltd.
v. Anandji Kalyanii Pedhi & Ors.(1) ~t page 908 "A person
(i).Ti964J 4 S.C.R. 892 @ 908.
854
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1973] l S.C..R.
remaining in liX:cupation of the premises let to him after the deterA
mination 0f or expiry of the period of the tenancy is commonly
though in law not accurately, called a "statutory tenant": Such a
person ii not a tenant at all; he has no estate or interest in the
premises occupied by him. He has merely the protection of the statute in ~at he cannot be turned out so long as he pays tb.e standard rent •d permitted increases, if any, and performs the other B
conditions of the tenancy. His right to remain in possession after
the determination of the contractual tenancy is personal : it is
not capable of being transferred or assigned, and devolves on
his death only in the manner provided by the statute".
These
observations have been made with reference to the provisions of
the Bombay Rents Hotel & Lodging House Rates (Control) Act,
<£
1947. But <they equally apply to the provisions of tho Act w•th
which we are concerned. The protection given to B. N. Chatterii
was personal to him and if that protection is withdrawn either
because there is a change in the statute or because the person
who is to t~ personally protected is no longer living, the question
arises as to what is the position of the legal representatives of the D
deceased statutory tenant qua the landlord in a proceeding of
the nature with which we are concerned.
It is obvious that the appellant landlord's right to proceed
with the appeal with a view to obtain possession of his premises
did survive under Order 22 Rule 4 read with rule 11 Civil Procedure Code. There the right to sue and prosecute the appeal
survives, the appellant is bound to cause the legal representa·tivee E
of the deceased re~. 1ndent to be made a party and proceed with
the appeal. Thereh.ire, the heirs and le~al representatives of the
aforesaid B. N. Chatterji were rightly brought on record and the
appeal had to proceed.
Under sub-clause (ii) of Rule 4 of Order 22 Civil Procedure
Code any person so made a party as a legal representative of the
11
deceased respondent was entitled to make any defence appropriate
bis character as legal repre>entative of the deceased respondent.
In other words, the heirs and the legal representatives could urge
all contentions which the deceased could have urged except only
those
which were personal to the deceased.
Indeed this doee
not prevent the legal representatives from setting up also their G
own independent title, in which case there could be no objection
to the court impleading them not m:rely as the legal representatives of the deceased but also in their personal capacity avoiding
thereby a separate suit for a decision on the independent title.
The heirs of the tenant purported to contend :that after the
death of the statutory tenant. they, as next heirs, enjoyed the H
status of 'tenant'. For this ret1ance was placed on the definition,
of the w0rd 'tenant' given in secti.Jn 3 clause (vii) of the Ari..
According to the definition unless there i~ anything repugnant in
-
A
B
•
'
F
G
H
:r. C; CHATTER;JEE v. SRI KISHAN (Palekar, J.)
855
the subject or context-"tenaut" means the person by whom sent
is, or but for a contract express or implied would be, payable
for any premises and includes any person holding or occupying
the premises as a sub-'tenant or any person continuing in possession
after the termination of a tenancy in his favour otherwise than
under the provisions of the Act. It was contended before us that
since "the rent was payable by the heirs and in fact it was paid
during the oendency of the proceedings, they were tenants within
the definition. In our opinion, rent was not payable by the legal
representatives and if the rent was paid by 'them
during
the
course of the proceedings it was not because they were recognised
as
tenants
by
the
landlord but because,
the
amount
was received by him without prejudice to his
rights
under
the orders of the court. Indeed, if the original tenant had died
before. the contractual tenancy had been terminated then the
heirs would haw inherited the tenancy and in that sense the rent
'l'.'Ould have become payable by them. But that is not the position here.
When B. N. Chatterji d:d, he was only a statutory
tenant-with a personal righ( to remain in possession till eviction
under the provisions of the Act, and the heirs were incnpable of
inheriting any estat>e or interest in the original tenancy.
It was
also not shown to us that they fell within any other part of the
definition of 'tenant' reproduced above. Therefore, the heirs and
legal representatives of the deceased B. N. Chatterji could not
in their own right claim to be "tenant" within
the meaning
of the Act. Therefore, the only contentions that they could put
forward in the appeal were the contentions appropriate to their
representative character and not one which was personal to the
deceased.
The contention based on the ground of bona fide
requirement by the landlord was personal to the statutory tenant
and on his death tlie same is not open to his legal representatives
unless there. is anythini( in the provision of the Act which makes
the leii:al representatives statutory tenants to the same extent as
the deceased. It is not the case that there is any other provision
of the Act which gives protection to the legal representatives of
the deceased statutory tenant.
As already stated, all contentions except those which are personal to the deceased were open to the lel!;al representatives to
put forward in the second appeal.
The contention about the
validrty of the notice for the termination of the tenancy was one
such contention on which they could have supported the decision
of the District Court. But as already pointed out the learned
Judge has correctly decided that the contractual tenancy had been
duly terminated by notice. Apart from that point no other point
was uriied before the Hfoh Court or before us and hence the pre1ent appeal must fail. There will be no order as to costs.
O.C.
Appeal dismissed.