# JAGDISH CHANDER v. STATE OF DELHI May 3; 1973

- **Citation:** [1974] 1 S.C.R. 204
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1974
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 20 of 1970
- **Bench:** K. K. Mathew, I. D. Dua
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/jagdish-chander-v-state-of-delhi-may-3-1973-6660
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

A
Indian Penal Code s. 304A-Constitution of India
Art.
136-Concurren/
B
finding by Court below that accused was guilty of rash and negligent driri11gThis Court will not interfere in uppeal by special leave-Protected trial a good
reason for reduction of sentence-Scientific in\•estigation of offences, desirability
of-Delay in criminal proceedings .a causie of concern.
The appellant was driving his auto-scooter rikshaw which on account of a
sudden turn taken by the appellant
struck a truck.
After the impact the appellant lost control of his scooter-rickshaw and crashed into a tree.
As a result
C
a man and a woman received simple injuries and the child -v.1hom the woman
was holding in her arms received fatal injuries. The appellant and the truck
driver were charged under s. 304A of the Indian Penal Code and were convicted
by the trial court. The Additional Sessions Judge allowed the appeal of the
truck driver but held the appellant guilty.
On revision a single Judge of the
High Court confirmed the ronvicti'on of the appellant.
Jn appeal to this Court
by special leave.
HELD : (i) According to the findings of the three courts beluw the appelD
lant suddenly turned to the right without paying proper heed to the truck coming from the opposite direction and in doing so he was both :-ash and negligent.
Under article 136 of the Constitution this Court would not like to appraise the
evidence again for determining how far the concurrent conclusion of the three
court below upholding the appellant's act as rash and negligent
was
justified.
[207H]
(ii) The criminal proceeding against the appellant had gone on for a little
more than 8 years.
The circumstances in which the collision between the truck
E
and the appellant's scooter occurred seemed pri1na facie to suggest that both the
drivers were to blame.
Harassme·11t of a criminal trial for more than 8 years
and the expense which the appe1Iant must have incurred could legitimately be
taken into account when considering the question of sentence to be imposed by
this Court at this point of time.
[208FJ
[Sentence of imprisonment reduced to period already undergone. The Court
also observed that the investigation of the case was not conducted on scientific
line_s and that the undue delay in the disposal of the case \Vas a. matter of
F
concern.]

## Text

204
JAGDISH CHANDER
v.
STATE OF DELHI
May 3; 1973
[K. K. MATHEW AND I. D. DUA, JJ.j
A
Indian Penal Code s. 304A-Constitution of India
Art.
136-Concurren/
B
finding by Court below that accused was guilty of rash and negligent driri11gThis Court will not interfere in uppeal by special leave-Protected trial a good
reason for reduction of sentence-Scientific in\•estigation of offences, desirability
of-Delay in criminal proceedings .a causie of concern.
The appellant was driving his auto-scooter rikshaw which on account of a
sudden turn taken by the appellant
struck a truck.
After the impact the appellant lost control of his scooter-rickshaw and crashed into a tree.
As a result
C
a man and a woman received simple injuries and the child -v.1hom the woman
was holding in her arms received fatal injuries. The appellant and the truck
driver were charged under s. 304A of the Indian Penal Code and were convicted
by the trial court. The Additional Sessions Judge allowed the appeal of the
truck driver but held the appellant guilty.
On revision a single Judge of the
High Court confirmed the ronvicti'on of the appellant.
Jn appeal to this Court
by special leave.
HELD : (i) According to the findings of the three courts beluw the appelD
lant suddenly turned to the right without paying proper heed to the truck coming from the opposite direction and in doing so he was both :-ash and negligent.
Under article 136 of the Constitution this Court would not like to appraise the
evidence again for determining how far the concurrent conclusion of the three
court below upholding the appellant's act as rash and negligent
was
justified.
[207H]
(ii) The criminal proceeding against the appellant had gone on for a little
more than 8 years.
The circumstances in which the collision between the truck
E
and the appellant's scooter occurred seemed pri1na facie to suggest that both the
drivers were to blame.
Harassme·11t of a criminal trial for more than 8 years
and the expense which the appe1Iant must have incurred could legitimately be
taken into account when considering the question of sentence to be imposed by
this Court at this point of time.
[208FJ
[Sentence of imprisonment reduced to period already undergone. The Court
also observed that the investigation of the case was not conducted on scientific
line_s and that the undue delay in the disposal of the case \Vas a. matter of
F
concern.]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 20 of
1970.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 11, 1969 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Rev. No. 291-D
of 1966.
G
I. M. Lall, S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagara1a and M. Qumaruddin, for
the appellant,
H. R. Khanna and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DUA, J.
Jagdish Chander appellant has preferred this appeal
by special leave from the judgment and order of the High Court of
Delhi dated September 11, 1969 dismissing the appellant's revision
from the judgment and order of the
learned
Additional Sessions
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.JAGDISH CHANDER V. DELHI STATE (Dua, /.)
205
Judge, Delhi dated September 7, 1966 dismissing his ap~al against
the order of a Magistrate 1st Qass, New Delhi dated Apnl 30, 1966
convicting him for an offence under s. 304-A, I. P. C. and sentencing
him to rigorous imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 500/-
The occurrence giving rise to these criminal proceedings against
the appellant took place on April 20, 1965 at about 8: ~O a.n;i.
According to the prosecution version, the appellant was dnvrng his
auto-scooter rickshaw No. DLR 5614 and was proceeding from
the
side of Yusaf Sarai when near the D. T. U. Bus Stand Engineering
College Hanz Khas I. I. T. he suddenly turned. to his right towards
Mehrauli Road.
Apparently, h~ wanted to turn back and reverse
his direction.
A truck No. DLG 8468 dpven hy one Labh Singh
was coming from the opposite direction, that is, from Mehrauli Side.
It is said that the appellant turned to his right
suddenly
without
giving any signal and without. paying any heed to the traffic on the
right. The result was the accident giving rise to the present criminal proceedings.
The front bumper on the left side of the truck
struck the rear left side of the body of the
appellant's
scooterrickshaw.
As a result of this impact the appellant lost control of
his scooter-rickshaw and swerved to the right and after crossing the
edge of the road, crashed into a tree under which Smt. Vidya Sharma
was standing with her baby in her arms and her brother
Sat Pal
standing by her side.
On being hit by the appellant's scooter-rickshaw. Smt. Vidya Sharma could not keep control over her baby who
fell down on the ground and received iniuries.
Smt. Vidya Sharma
and Sat Pal also sustained simple hurts but the injuries suffered by
the baby were serious and indeed they proved fatal
resulting
in
the child's death, in the hospital soon after the occurrence in question.
Both, Labh Singh, driver of the truck and the appellant, were
challaned and convicted by the learned Magistrate under section
304A, I. P. C.
The trial court sentenced both of them to rigorous
imprisonment for 6 months each and also to a fine of Rs. 500/-
each and in default of payment of fine they were both directed to
undergo further rigorous imprisonment for 2 months each.
Out of
the fine, if realised, Rs. 500/-
were directed to be paid
to
the
pareHts of the deceased child.
Both the convicted drivers appealed to the Sessions Court.
The
learned Additional Sessions Jndge,
somewhat surprisingly,
allowed
the appeal of Labh Singh holding that he was not in a position to
stop the truck instantanously with a view to avoid the collision of
the two vehicles because the appellant had all of a sudden brought
his vehicle in front of the truck after taking a turn at a high speed.
The Addl, Sessions Judge also observed that the back portion of
the appellant's scooter-rickshaw was not seriously damaged by the
impact with !he truck and the vehicle remained in a normal functioning condition.
On this premise, the appellate Judge took the
view that it was in order to save himself that the appellant took his
vehicle towards the kacha side of the road in a state of utter con-
206
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1974 J 1 s.c.R.
fusion, his vehicle having got out of his control. In spite of this,
however, according to the appellate Colll't, J agdish Chander was in
a position to avoid hitting Smt. Vidya Sharma. The scooter-rickshaw,
to use the words of the Addi. Sessions Judge, "was not thrown towards the tree because of the· violent push given
by
the
truck
but ... · it was actually driven by the accused
Jagadish
Chander
towards the direction where Smt. Vidya Sharma and herl brother
were standing". The entire occurrence in this case, according to the
Sessions Judge, had taken place as a result of the rashness or negligence of the appellant because he had decided to take a turn in
a sudden manoer at a high speed in the middle of the road and
that in spite of the fact, that he had seen the truck of the accused
coming towards him from a · distance of less than 30 yards. The
driver of the .truck was considered by the Addi. Sessions Judge to
be within his right to drive the vehicle on Mehrauli Road at the
speed of 30 to 40 _miles per hour.
At the time of the occurrence
in question when driving his truck at this speed, Labh Singh was
considered not to be in a position to avoid
the
collision. The
sentence on the appellant was upheld by the appellate Court and it
was directed that the fine, if paid by him,
should be paid
by
way of compensation to the parents of the deceased child.
On revision, a learned single Judge of the High Court referred
to the evidence of Asa Nand, P·W. 3, Vidya Sharma P.W. 11 and
Sat Pal, P. W. 12, the three witnesses on whom the
two courts
below had placed reliance.
After referring to the relevant
version
given by these three witnesses and also after noticing
what
the
Motor Vehicles Inspector had said about the damage done to the appellant's auto-rickshaw and to the truck in question, the High Court observed that the road between Yusaf Sarai & Mehrauli had not 'much traffic,
particularly in the early hours of the morning.
Vehicles could therefore, be expected to be driven on that road at a fairly high speed. The
appellant's act in taking a sudden turn on that road without ensuring
that there was no vehicle coming from the opposite direction, was however, considered to be a rash or negligent act and it was this act which
resulted in the impact between the truck and the apm:llant's autorickshaw and this impact was the direct and proximate cause of the
death of Smt. Vidya Sharma's child and of the injouries caused to
her and to her brother Sat Pal. So holding, the appellant's conviction and sentence were confirmed by the High C<?urt.
In this Court it was streously contended that the courts below
had approached_ the case from an erroneous point of view and had
not read the evidence correctly. The appellate court and the High
Court, according to the submission, also erroneously absolved the
driver of the truck who had no justification for driving at a fast
. speed, even if it be in the early hours of the morning.
According
to the appellant's learned counsel, 8. 50 a.m. in the month of April
cannot be describe!f as early hours of the morning, it being added
that t.ltere is no evidence on the record showing that at that time
there was not much traffic on Mehrauli Road. The High Court was
also not right in observing that vehicles could be expected to be
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JAGDISH CHANDER v~ DELHI STATE> (Dua, /.)
207
driven at a fairly fast speed, argued the counsel, adding that if the
vehicles could be expected to be driven at a fast speed, then tbe
appellant should also have been held justified in ~riving bil; auto\.
rickshaw at a fast speed. The appellant's case should ·in that event
have also been considered with leniency. Particular stress was laid
on the contention that the unfortunate death of the child could on
no rational or logical reasoning be considered to be the direct and
natural result of .,the collision between the truck and the rickshaw;
in other words, this COilision was not the proximate and immediate
cause of the unfortunate death of the child. Our attention was also
invited by the appellant's ~ounsel to the evidence for showing that
it was the truck driver and not the appellant who was to blame for
this accidental collision.
After going through the record to which our attention was drawn,
we cannot help observing that the . investigation into the offience in
question was not conducted on sl:ientific lines and it leaves much
to be desired: · Our attention was not dra'f'n to any material on the
record showing if the tyre rilarks of the two· vehicles on the road
were carefUlly examined with tho object of findinj! out the approximate speed and the !l)Bnner of application of brakes at tbe time of
the c-Olli&ion.
Nor were photographs taken of the position of the
site soon after the unfortunate ·occurrence which is usually done in
the course of efficient investigations.
Our attention was no doubt
ilrawn to the site·plan. Ext. P. W. 9 A which purports to show that
the two vehicles. iD · qqestion which were col!ling from opposite directions,
started swerving to their right presumably on seeing each
other and that the ·collil!ion took place at point 'A' from where the
truck drove st£aiaht on the. road, while the auto-rickshaw was driven
towards its right to the point 'B' where Smt. Vidya Sharma
was
standing with her baby in her arms and her brother by her side.
This plan, however, seems to be a rough plan. Our .attention was
not invited to ;my statement of the witnesses explaining
at whose
instance various notings were made on this plan.
So far
as
the
witnesses deposing as having seen the occurrence in question
are
concerned, their evidence ·has alway$ to
be carefully
scrutinised
because such witnesses only observe accidents after their attention is
drawn to the impact resulting from the collision. Their statement
about the events immediately preceding the occurrence are generally
and. to a ve~ large extent influenced by what they imagine must have
happened.· · After lookin~ at the plan and going through the evidence
to whicfi our attention was drawn, one forms an impression that both
the truck driver and the appellant were equally ·guilty of rash and
negligent dri\ring,
But since the driver of the truck has been
acquitted by the learned Addi. Sessions Judge and no
appeal was
preferred against his acquittal, we have to take his acquitta I to be
final. . According to the findings of the three courts below the appellant suddenly turned to ,the right without paying proper heed to the
truck coming from the opposite direction and in d9ing so he was,
both rash and negligent. Under Article 136 of the Constitution we
should not like to appraise the evidence for ourselves to see how
208
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1974 J 1 S.C.R.
far the concurrent conclusion of the three cocrts below upholding
the appellant's act as rash and negligent is justified.
The argument
raised b~fore us on beha'.f of the appellant on this point relates
only to the appreciation of evidence and no seriou> legal
infirmity
was brougkt to our notice.
The question, however, remains if the death of the
baby
in
Smt. Vidya Sharma's arms was the proximate, direct and immediate
consequence of the appellant's rash and negligent driving.
Looking
at Exht. P. W. 9A, it does appear that after the impact between
the heavy vehicle like a truck and a very much lighter auto-rickshaw,
the latter must in all probability, have been so pushed as to make its
.driver lose all control of the rickshaw.
In such circumstances it
could, no doubt, have been contended with a certain amount
of
reason that the death of the child was a remote and indirect result
of the rash and negligent driving on the part of the aJlpellant and
not an immediate direct, natural and proximate consequence.
But the
three courts having so held, we do not think this Court will
be
justified in appraising the evidence for itself on this part of the case
on the peculiar facts and circumstances disclosed on
the
printed
record.
The appellant's conviction must, therefore, be upheld
in
ugreement with the conclusions of the three courts below.
The more difficult question seems to be one of sentence in
the
present case.
The accident took place on April 20, 1965, the trial
Court convicted the appe!iant on April 30, 1966 sentencing him to
rigorous imprisonment for 6 months and to a fine of Rs. 500/-. His
appeal was dismissed by the Addi. Sessions Judge on September 7,
1966 and his revision was disallowed on September 11, 1969. He was
ordered to be released on bail by this Court on February 2, 1970. We
are now in May 1973. The criminal proceedings against the appellant have thus gone on since April 1965 which means a little more
than 8 years.
The circumstances in which the collision between the
. truck and the appellant's scooter occurred seems prima facie to suggest that they (their drivers) were both to blame. Penalties designed
to deter crime should be guaged so far as possible to the degree of
social danger that is represented by the crime and its repetition. To
·send the appellant back to Jail to serve the sentence of 6 months
after 8 years c·~ems ro us to be highly unjust for the kind of offence
which has been upheld against him by the three courts below. It is
unlikely to have any reformatory effect on him.
Harassment of a
criminal trial for more than 8 years and the expense which he must
have incurred, in our opinion, can legitimately be taken into 'account
when considering the question of sentence to be imposed by this Court
at this point of time. The appellant is stated to have served out only
three weeks of imprisonment but on a consideration of all the relevant
circumstances of the case we ·think it would be just and proper to
reduce the sentence of imprisonment to that already undergone but to
increase the sentence of fine from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 700/-. Out of
the fine, if realised, Rs. 5001- should be paid to the mother of the
deceased child. We, however, cannot help expressing our grave conA
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JAGDISH CHANDER v. DEl.HI STATE (Dua, 1.)
209
A cern over the inordinate delay in the disposal of criminal cases including appeals and revisions. If our criminal jus1ice is to achieve its real
purpose and if it is to inspire the confidence of the people generally,
causes for such delays should be eliminated as early as practicable.
Law's delays tend to turn justice sour. The appeal is allowed in part
in the terms staJ,ed above.
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G.C.
Appeal allowed in part.
15-l.944SupCJ/73