# JAGE RAM AND ORS v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1971] 3 S.C.R. 871
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1971-03-02
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 2034 of 1969
- **Bench:** K. S. Hegde, P. Jaganmohan Reddy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/jage-ram-and-ors-v-state-of-haryana-and-ors-5440
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ss. 17(2) (c), 38 to 44B-Public purposeDecla"ration by Govern1r1ent not, open to challenge unless acquisition is
for collateral purpO!ie or i.i; a colourab/P. ext>rcise of power-Acquisition
for Company-Stale contributing towards cost-Proceedings need not be
taken under ss. 38 to 44B-Sect<on 17(2) (c) cannot be interpreted
ejusdem Generis-Scope of s. 17(2) (c)-Maxims-Ejusdem GenerisScope of Rule.
In March 1969, the respondent State issued a notification under sec•
tion 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, as amended by the Punjab
Legislature, for acquisition of the appellants' land. The notification stated
that the land was likely to be required to be taken by Government, at
public expense, for a public purpose, namely, the sett;ng up of a factory
for the starting of an industry and, further that action under section
17(2) (c) would be taken on the ground of urgency and provisions of
s. 5A will not apply in regard to the said acquisition.
The appellants
filed a writ petition in the High Court questioning the validity of the
acquisition on the ground, inter alia, that there was no urgency in the
matter, of requiring the land therefore recourse to s. 17 was not justified.
The state government pleaded that since the Government of India had
extended the time for completion of the project till April 30, 1969, it
had become nece>&ary to take immediate steps to acquire the land. The
High Court uismissed the petition.
In the appeal to this Court it was
contended that (i) the acquisition in question being one for the benefit
of a Company, proceedings should have been taken under ss. 38 to 44B
of the Act, and that there was no public purpose involved in the case;
(ii) there w"' no urgency and hence recourse could not be had to section
17 of the Act; and (iii) s. 17(2)(c) was inapplicable to the ·facts of the
case, because, though s. 17 ( 2)( c) read by itself covered a very large
field, l!Jlplying the ejusdem generis Rule that provision had to be given
a narrower meaning because of the provisions of s. 17(2) (a) and (b).
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : (i) On the facts of the case the purpose for which land was
acquired was a public purpose. The question whether the starting of an
industry is in public interest or not is essentially a question that has to.
be decided by the Government. So long as it is not established that the
acquisition is sought to be made for some collateral purpose or that there
is a colourable exercise of poww the declaration of the government that
it is made for a public purpose is not open to challenge, [874 E-G]
.smr. Somavantl and Ors. v. State of Pun/ab, (1963] 2 S.C.R. 774 and
Raia Anand Brahma Shah v. State of U.P., [1967) 1 S.C.R. 373, referred
to.
In view of t~e: fact .that the State Government had contributed towsrds
the cost of acqu1S11ton ti was not necessary to proceed wlth the acquisition
under Part VII of the Act, [875 A]
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[1971]3 S.C.R.
(ii) On the facts of the case there was urgency. The conclusion of
the Government in a given case that there was urgency is entitled to. ,
weight, if not conclusive. 1
(iii) ,In_Jnterpreting cl. (c) of s. 17(2) the rule of ejusdem generis
cannot be applied. If a given provision is plain and unambiguous and the
legislative intent is clear, there is no occasion to call into _aid that rule.
Under els. (a), (b) and (c) of sub-s. (2) of s. 17 the decision to acquire
land· has not to be made by the same authority but by different authorities.
Further, the conditions under whlch the acquisition has to be made differ
from clause to clause. Therefore, there is no basis to say that the general
words in cl. (c) follow the particular and specific words in els. (b) and
I c). [877 E; 879 H]
State o/ Bomba.v v. Ali Gulshan, [1952] S.C.R. 867, Lilavati Bal v.
SMe of Bombay, [1957] S.C.R. 721, K. K. Kochuni v. State of Madras,
A.I.R. i 960 S.C. 1050, referred to.

## Text

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871
JAGE RAM AND ORS.
v.
STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS.
March 2, 1971
[K. S. HEGDE AND P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ss. 17(2) (c), 38 to 44B-Public purposeDecla"ration by Govern1r1ent not, open to challenge unless acquisition is
for collateral purpO!ie or i.i; a colourab/P. ext>rcise of power-Acquisition
for Company-Stale contributing towards cost-Proceedings need not be
taken under ss. 38 to 44B-Sect<on 17(2) (c) cannot be interpreted
ejusdem Generis-Scope of s. 17(2) (c)-Maxims-Ejusdem GenerisScope of Rule.
In March 1969, the respondent State issued a notification under sec•
tion 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, as amended by the Punjab
Legislature, for acquisition of the appellants' land. The notification stated
that the land was likely to be required to be taken by Government, at
public expense, for a public purpose, namely, the sett;ng up of a factory
for the starting of an industry and, further that action under section
17(2) (c) would be taken on the ground of urgency and provisions of
s. 5A will not apply in regard to the said acquisition.
The appellants
filed a writ petition in the High Court questioning the validity of the
acquisition on the ground, inter alia, that there was no urgency in the
matter, of requiring the land therefore recourse to s. 17 was not justified.
The state government pleaded that since the Government of India had
extended the time for completion of the project till April 30, 1969, it
had become nece>&ary to take immediate steps to acquire the land. The
High Court uismissed the petition.
In the appeal to this Court it was
contended that (i) the acquisition in question being one for the benefit
of a Company, proceedings should have been taken under ss. 38 to 44B
of the Act, and that there was no public purpose involved in the case;
(ii) there w"' no urgency and hence recourse could not be had to section
17 of the Act; and (iii) s. 17(2)(c) was inapplicable to the ·facts of the
case, because, though s. 17 ( 2)( c) read by itself covered a very large
field, l!Jlplying the ejusdem generis Rule that provision had to be given
a narrower meaning because of the provisions of s. 17(2) (a) and (b).
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : (i) On the facts of the case the purpose for which land was
acquired was a public purpose. The question whether the starting of an
industry is in public interest or not is essentially a question that has to.
be decided by the Government. So long as it is not established that the
acquisition is sought to be made for some collateral purpose or that there
is a colourable exercise of poww the declaration of the government that
it is made for a public purpose is not open to challenge, [874 E-G]
.smr. Somavantl and Ors. v. State of Pun/ab, (1963] 2 S.C.R. 774 and
Raia Anand Brahma Shah v. State of U.P., [1967) 1 S.C.R. 373, referred
to.
In view of t~e: fact .that the State Government had contributed towsrds
the cost of acqu1S11ton ti was not necessary to proceed wlth the acquisition
under Part VII of the Act, [875 A]
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[1971]3 S.C.R.
(ii) On the facts of the case there was urgency. The conclusion of
the Government in a given case that there was urgency is entitled to. ,
weight, if not conclusive. 1
(iii) ,In_Jnterpreting cl. (c) of s. 17(2) the rule of ejusdem generis
cannot be applied. If a given provision is plain and unambiguous and the
legislative intent is clear, there is no occasion to call into _aid that rule.
Under els. (a), (b) and (c) of sub-s. (2) of s. 17 the decision to acquire
land· has not to be made by the same authority but by different authorities.
Further, the conditions under whlch the acquisition has to be made differ
from clause to clause. Therefore, there is no basis to say that the general
words in cl. (c) follow the particular and specific words in els. (b) and
I c). [877 E; 879 H]
State o/ Bomba.v v. Ali Gulshan, [1952] S.C.R. 867, Lilavati Bal v.
SMe of Bombay, [1957] S.C.R. 721, K. K. Kochuni v. State of Madras,
A.I.R. i 960 S.C. 1050, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2034 of
1969.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated May 7, 1969 of '..lie
Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ No. 850 of 1969.
K. L. Gosain, N. N. Goswamy, S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and
K. R; Nagaraja, for the appellant.
Harbans Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for respondeints Nos, 1 and
2.
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S. V. Gupte and S. K. Gambhir, for respondent No. 18.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
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Hegde, J.
This appeal by certificate arises from the decision
of a Division Beμch of the Punjab and Haryana High Court
in a writ petition wherein the appellants challenged the validity
of proceedings under ss. 4, 6, 9 and 17 (2) ( c) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by the Punjab Legislature.
For convenience sake we shall refer to that
amended Act as
'the Act'. The High Court dismissed the writ petition.
It appears that severnl ccntentions were sought to be advanF
ced before the High Court but in this Court only three contentions have been pressed for onr consideration i.e.
( 1) the
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acquisition in question being one for a company procewings
should have been taken under ss. 3fs to 44(B) of the Act,
the same..ilaving not been taken, the proceedings taken are void;
, (2) fi)t)(e was no urgency and hence recourse should not have
been had to s. 17 of the Act and (3) Section 17(2)(c) is inapplicable to fhe
1 facts of the case.
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Now we may state the facts _relevant for the purpose of deciding the ques'tions · in dispute.
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JAGE RAM v. HARYANA (Hegde, J.)
873
On 14/17 March, 1969, Government of Haryana issued a
notification under s. 4 of the Act notifying for acquisition the
land concerned in this case.
The notification further directed
that action under s. 17(2)(c) of the Act shall be taken on the
ground of urgency and the provisions of s. 5-A shall not app~y
in regard to the said acq1.1isition.
The preamable to the said
notification says that "whereas it appears to the Governor of
Haryana that land is likely to be required to be taken by Government, at public expenses, for a public purpose, namely for the
setting up a factory for the manufacture of Chine-ware and Procelain-ware including Wall Glazed Tiles etc. at village Kasser,
Tehsil Jhajjar, District Rohtak, it is hereby notified that the land
in the locality described in the specification below is likely to
iJe required for the above purpose''. On March 18, 1969 the
GovernmeD't isued a notification under s. 6 of the Act acquiring
the land for a public purpose.
On March 28, 1969 notices
under s. 9 of the Act were served on the appellants. On April
8, 1969, the appellants filed the writ petition giving rise to this
appeal.
The allegations in the writ petition include the assertion that
there was no urgency in the matter of acquiring the land in
question and therefore there was no justification for having recourse to s. 17 and thus deprive the appellants of the benefit of
s. 5-A of the Act. It was further alleged therein that the acquisition in, question was made for the benefit of a company and
hence proceedings should have been taken under ss. 38 to 44(B)
of the Act and that there was no public purpose involved in
the case. It was further pleaded that the land acquired was not
waste and arable land and that s. 2 ( c) of the Act did
not
~onfer power on the Government to dispense with the proceedm~s under s. 5-A. In the counter-affidavit filed by the Deputy
Director of Industries (Administration), Government of Haryana
on be~alf of the ,St~te. of Haryana, the above all~gations were
all demed.
Therem it 1s stated that at the instance of the State
of Haryana, Government of India had issued a letter of intent
to a com~any for .setti~g up a factory for the manufacture of
Glazed T.tles etc. m villag~ Kasser.
That project was
to be
st.ar~ed with . the collaboration of a foreign company known
as
Pilkington. Tiles Ltd. The scheme for setting up the project had
been finalised and approved by the concerned authorities.
On
November 26, 1968, the Government wrote to one of the pro·
rooters of .. the project, Shri H. L. Somany asking him to complete. ~h.e arrangem:nts for the import of capital equipment and
acqms1tion of land ID Haryana Srate for setting up of the pro-
~sed factory"·
It was further stated in that communication
e Go~emment was . pleased to extend the time for compleing
the pro1ect upto April 30, 1969. Under those circumstances it
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971] 3 S.C.R.
had become necessary for the State of Haryana to take immediate steps to acquire the required land.
It was under those
circumstances the Government was constrained to have recourse
to s. 17 of the Act. The Government denied the allegation that
the facts of this case did not come within the scope of s. 17 (2)
( c). It was also denied that the acquisition in question was not
made for a public purpose.
We have earlier seen that in the notification issued under s. 4,
it had been stated that the acquisition was made
"at public
expenses, for a public purpose" namely for the setting up a factory for the manufacture of
China-ware and
Porcelain-ware
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incl u<ling Wall Glazed Tiles etc.
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In the writ petition it was not denied that the acquisition
in question was made at "public expenses".
All that was challenged iii the writ petition was that the purpose for which the
acquisiti6n was made not a public purpose.
There is no denying the fact that starting of a new industry
is in public interest.
It is stated in the affidavit filed on behalf
of the State Government that the new State of Haryana was
lacking in industries and consequently it was become difficult
to tackle the problem of unemployment. There is also no denying the fact that the
industrialisation of an area is in public
interest.
That apart, the question whether the starting of an
indu.Stry is in public interest or not is essentially a question that has
to be decided by the Government.
That is a socio-economic
question.
This Court is not in a position to go into that question.
So long as it is not established that the acquisition is sought to be
made for some collateral purpose, the declaration of the Govern·
rnent it is made for a public purpose is not open to challenge.
Section 6 ( 3) says that the declaration of the Government that the
acquisition made is for public purpose shall be conclusive evidence
that the land is needed for a public purpose.
Unless it is shown
that there was a colourable exercise of power, it is not open to this
Court to go behind that declaration 'and find out whether in a
particular case the purpose for which the land was needed was a
public purpose or not-see Smt. Somavanti and ors. v. The State
of Pu11jab( 1) and Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. State of U.P.(').
On the facts of this case there can be hardly any doubt that the
purpose for which the land was acquired is a public purpose.
In view of the pleadings referred to earlier it is not open to
the appellant to contend that the State Government had not con:
tributed any amount towards the cost of acquisition.
We were
informed at the bar that the State Government had contributed
(l) [1963] 2 S.C.R. 774.
(2) [1967] I S.C.R. 373.
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JAGE RAM v. HARYANA (Hegde, J.)
875
a sum-of-Rs. 109;- towards the cost of th_e, ~and which fact is
also mentioned in the ,award of Land Acqu1S1t1on Officer. That
being so it was not necessary for the Government to _proceed wi!;h
the acquisition under Part VII of the Act-see Somavantz s
case(').
Now coming to the question of urgency, it is clear from the
facts set out earlier that there was urgency.
The Government
of India was pleased to extend time for the completion of the
of project upto April 30, 1969. Therefore urgent steps had to
be taken for pushing through the project.
Th.e fact
that the
State -Government or the party concerned was lethargic at an
earlier stage is not
very relevant for deciding
the
question
whethc:r on the date on which the notification was issued, there
was .urgency or not the conclusion of the Government in a given
case that there was urgency entitled to weight, if not conclusive.
This takes us to the question of applicability of s. 17 ( 2 )( c ).
lo the facts of the case.
The appellant had denied in the affidavit
that the entire land acquired is either waste or arable land. Thal
contention o[ his has not been examined by the High Court. Therefore we have to proceed on the basis that the case does not come
within the scope of s. 17 ( 1). The State has also not purported
to act under s. 17 ( 1 ) . It has purported to act under s. 1 7 ( 2) ( c).
Therefore we have to see whether the State could have proceeded
on the facts of this case under s. 17 (2 )( c). Section 17 as amended by the Punjab Act 2 of 1954, Punjab Act 17 of 1956 and
Punjab Act 47 of 1956 to the extent necessary for our present
purpose reads thus :
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"17 (1) In cases of urgency whenever, the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, tllough no
such award has been made, may, on tile expiration
of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1) take possession of
any waste or arable land needed for public purposes or
for a ~ompany. Such land shall thereupon. vest absolutely m the Government free from all encumbrances.
Explanation
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"(2) In the following cases, that is to say:-
(a) Whenever owing to any sudden change in the
cht· el of any navigable river or other unfores~ ·. emergen~y, it _becomes necessary for any
R. waY Adminstration to acquire the
inimed1ate posset<;sfon of any land for the mainte-
!lance of their tr:rtJic or for the purpose of makmg thereon a nver-side or ghat, station or of
(1) [1963] 2 S.C.R. n4. ,
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1971] 3 S.C.R.
providing convenient connection with or access
to any such station;
Whenever in the
opinion of the Collector it
becomes necessary to acquire the
immediate
possession of any land for the purpose of any
library or educational institution or for the
construction, extension or improvement of any
building; or other structure in any village for
the common use of the inhabitants of such
village, or any godown for any society registered under the. Co-operative Societies Act, 1912
(Act II of 1912), or any dwelling-house for
the poor, or the
construction of labour colonies or houses for any other class of people
under
a
Government-sponsored
Housing
Scheme or any irrigation tank, ir'rigation
or
drainage channel, or any well, or any public
road;
(c) Whenever land is required for a public purpose
which in the opinion of the appropr'iate Government is of urgent importance, the Collector
may, immediately after the publication of the
notice menti.oned in sub-section
( 1)
and
with the previous sanction of the appropriate
Government enter upon :md take possession
of suclil land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances.
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Provided that the Collector shall not take
possession of any building or part of a building under this sub-section mthout giving to the
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occupier thereof at
least
forty-eight
hour's
notice of his intention so to do . . .
( 3) In every case under either of the preceding subsections the Collector shall at the time of taking possession offer to the persons
interested compensation
for the standing; crop and three (if any) on such land
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and for any other damage sustained by them caused by
sudden dispossession . . . .
( 4) In the case of any land to which in the opinion
of the appropriate Government, the provisions of subsection (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisioR3
of section 5-A shall not apply .... "
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JAGE RAM v. HARYANA (Hegde, J.)
877
Herein we are only concerned with the scope of s. 17(2)(c)
as the vires of s. 17 ( 2) is not challenged.
Section 17 ( 2 )( c)
if read by itse1f is plain. It seems to permit the appropriate
Government to direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall
not apply whenever land is required for public purpose which
in the opinion of the appropriate Government is of urgent im·
portance. The conditions precedent for the application of s. 17
(2)(c) are (1) . that the land must be required for a public
purpose and (2) the appropriate Government must be of the
opinion that the purpose in question is of urgent importance.
But it was· urged on behalf of the appellants that we should apply
ejusdem generie rule in interpreting s. 17 (2 )( c). The contention on behalf of the appelants was that though s. 17(2) (c)
read by itself covers a very large field, that provision should be
given a narrower meaning because of the provisions in s. 17(2)
(a) and (b). It was urged that as the general words contained
ins. 17(2)(c) follow the specific words of the same nature, in
s. 17(2)(a) and (b), those ge-ueral words must be understood
as applying to cases similar to those mentioned in s. 17 (2 )(a)
and (b).
The ejusdem generis rule is not a rule of law but is merely
a rule of construction to aid the courts to. find out the true
intention of the legislature.
11£ a given pti'Yvision is plain and
unambiguous and the legislative intent is clear, there is no·
occasion to call into aid that rule ejusdem generis rule is explained in Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.) Vol. 36 p. 397
paragraph 599 thus : ·
"As a rule, where in a statute there are general
words following particular and specific
words,
the
general ~ords/must be confined to things of the
same kind as those specified, although this as a
rule of construction, must be applied with cauti~ and
subject to the primary rule that statutes are to be
construed in accordance with the intention of Parliament.
For the ejusdem rule to apply, the specific
words m?st constitute a category, class or genus; if they
do constitute such a category, class or genus then only
thing~ ~hich belongs to that category, clas; or genus
fall Wifhtn the general words .... "
It is observed in Craies on Statute Law (6th &In.) p. 1 gt
that:
. ''The ~jusdem generis rule is one to be applied
with cautiol! .and not. pushed too far, as in the case
of many dec1S1ons, which treat it as automatically appli-
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[1971] 3 S.C.R.
cable, and not 1fs being, whai it is, a mere presumption
in the absence of other indications of the intention of
the kgislature.
The modem tendency of the law, it
was said, is "to attenuate the application of the rule of
ejusdem generis". To invoke the application of the
ejusdem generis rule there must be a distinc.t genus or
category. The specific words must apply not to different objects of a widely differing
character but to
something which can be called a class or kind of
ob.iects."
According to Sutherland Statutory Construction (3rd Edn.)
Vol. II p. 395, for the application of the doctrine of ejusdem
generis, the following conditions must exist.
(i) The statute contains an enumeration by specific words;
(ii) The members of the enumeration constitute a
class;
(iii) The class is not ,exhausted by the enumeration;
(iv )A general term follows the enumeration and
(v) There is not clearly manifested an intent that
the general term be given a broader meaning
than the doctrine requires.
The scope of the ejusdem generis rule has been considered
by this Court in several decisions.
In State
of Bon,?,ay
v.
Ali Gulshan('); it was observed:
"Apart from the fact that the rule must be confined· within nauow limits, and general or comprehensive words should recive their ful! and natural meaning unless they are clearly restrictive in their intendment, it is requisite that there must be a distinct genus,
which must comprise more than one species; before the
rule can be applied."
J.n Lilavati Bai v. The State of Bombay( 2 ) it was observed :
"The rule of ejusdem generis is intended to be applied where general words have been used following
. particular and specific words of the same nature on
the established rule of construction that the legislature
presumed to use the general words in a restricted sense;
that is to say, as belonging to the same genus as the
particular and specific words. Such a r~trided mean-
(I) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 867.
(2) [1957] S.C.R. 721.
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JAGE RAM v. HARYANA (Hegde, I.)
ing has to be given to words of general import only
where the context of the whole scheme pf legislation
requires it.
But where the content and the o~ject and
mischief of the enactment do not require such .restricted meaning to be attached to words of general ifttport,
it becomes the duty of the courts to give those wor.ds
their plain and ordinary meaning."
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the same view was reiterated by this Court in K. K. Kochilli
v. State of Madras and Kerala( 1).
Bearing in mirlll the principles set out earlier, we shall now
consider whether the general import of the words in s. 17 ( 2 )( c)
should be cut down in view of s. 17(2)(a) and (b).
Under
cl. (a) of s. 17(2), the acquisition is to be made by the Rail-
·way Administration when owing to any sudden change in the
chann~l of any navigable river or other tinforeseeen emergency ·
it becomes necessary for the administration to acquire the im· ·
mediate poasession of any ·land for the maintenance of the trntlic
or for the purpose of making thereon a river-side or ghat station
or for providing convenient connection with or access
to
any
such station. We would like to emphasize that under this provision, the acquisition can only be made by the Railway Administratiop and that when it considers that innnec):i'ate possession
c{ any land is necessary for the purposes nlent1oned therein.
Undi!r cl. (b) of sub-s. (2) of s. 17. before an acquisition can
be made, the Collector must form an opinion that it has become
necessary to acquire the immediate possession of the land concerned for the purposes mentioned theNin.
Under· cl. ( c) of
s. 17(2), the acquisition can be made only when the appropriate
Government forms the opinion that. because of urgent importance, the concerned land has to be acquired for the purpo;;cs
mentioned in that provision.
Under cl. (a) the decision to JC·
quire has to be made by the Railway Administration.
Under
cl. (b), the acquisitiol) can be made only on the formation of
the required opinion by the Collector. Under cl. ( c) the ac4uisition can be made only when the tequisi)e opinion is fonw~d by
the appropriate Government.
Further under cl. (a) the acquisition has to be. made to meet· certain unforeseeo~n emergency
as a result of which the immediate possession of the land is rieces-
. sary.
Under cl. (b )' the Collector must form an opinion that it
has become necessary to acquire the . immediate possession
of
land but undJr cl. ( c) the requir-~ment is that the appropriate
Governm~nt/must form the opinion that the acquisiion
is
of
urgent importance.
Under els. (a), (b) and (c} of sub-s. (2)
of s. 17, the decision to acquire land has not to be made by the
(I) A.LR. 1960 S.C. 1050.
1c-LI100 St1p Cl/71
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880
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971 ].3 S.C.R.
same authority but by different authorities. Further the conditions under which the acquisition has to be · made differ from
clause to clause.
Therefore there is no basis to say that the
geireral words in cl. ( c) follow the particular and specific words
A
in els. (b) and ( c). Nor can it be said that the specific words
contained in els. (a) and (b) constitute a category, class or
genus.
Hence we are unable to accept the contention that in
B
interpreting cl. (c) of s. 17(2), we should apply the rule of
ejusdem generis.
·
As none of the contentions taken by the appellants are acceptable, thise appeal fails and is dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.
K.B.N.
Appeal dismissed.
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