# JAGIR SINGH v. RANBIR SINGH & ANR

- **Citation:** [1979] 2 S.C.R. 282
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1978-11-09
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 117 of 1978
- **Bench:** Jaswant Singh, 0. Chjnnappa Reddy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/jagir-singh-v-ranbir-singh-anr-7510
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Constitution of India, Art. 227(5), power of
judicial
superintendence,
scope.
J
Criminal Procedure Code, 1914 s. 397, introduction of changes for avoidance of delay-S. 484 (2) (b), ''Corresponding provision" scope, application
C
to jud1'cial orders made under Cr.P.C., 1898-S. 125, whether corresponds to
1. 488 "1'.P.C., 1898.
Ranbir Singh is Jagir Singh's son from his separated first wife. In 1971
he and his mother applied for maintenance under s. 488 of Cr.P.C.,
1898.
Although Ranbir Singh was a major, maintenance was awarded to him on the
ground that he was a student unable to maintain himself.
In April 1974, the
D
new Cr.P.C. came into force, and under s. 127 Jagir Singh applied for cancellation of the maintenance order, on the ground that the major son was not
prevented from maintaining himself through any infirmity or abnormality, and
was not entitled to maintenance under the new code. The respondent contended
that the maintenance order had been validly passed under the old Code, and
continued to remain in force notwithstanding the enactment of, the new Code
but the Magistrate cancelled the maintenance order, Ranbir Singh's Revision
E
Application was dismissed by the Sessions Court, on the ground that the order
made under s. 488 of the Cr.P.C., 1898 would not survive under s. 484(2)
of the Cr.P.C. 1974 due to the absence of a corresponding provision under lhe
new Code, enabling his maintenance. He then applied to the High Court for
a Revision. Tue High Court allowed the Revision holding that s. 125 of the
Cr.P.C., 1974 did correspond with s. 488 of the Cr.P.C. 1898.
F
The appellant contended that Ranbir Singh's Revision application to the
High Court was barred by s. 397(3), Cr.P.C., 1974, and was incompetent,
and that his right to invoke revisional jurisdiction of a superior court became
exhausted when be moved the Sessions Court in Revision.
He further con,
tended that the maintenance order was not saved either by s. 484(2), Cr.P.C.
1974 or sections 6 and 24 of the General Clauses Act.
G
The respondent submitted that his llevision application before the
High
H
Court could be treated and maintained, as, one directed against the Sessions
Judge's order rejecting his Revision application, or it could be treated as one
under Art. 227 of the Constitution.
Allowing the appeal, the Court,
HELD: (1) The power under Art. 227 is discretionary. The power of
judicial superintendenee under it could only be exercised sparingly to keep
1ubordinate courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority, and
not to correct mere errors. Where the statute banned the exercise of revisional
•
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JAGIR SINGH V. RANB!R SINGH
283
powers by the High Court, it would require very exceptional circumst8ol!ces to
A
warrant interference under Art. 227, since the power of superintendence was
not meant to circumvent statutory law. By the 42nd Amendment Act, clause
(5) was added in Art. 227, which is a verbatim reproduction oJ' s. 224(2) of
the Governn1cnt of India Act, 1935, conferring po\vers of aJministrative super·
intendcnce only, and not the power of judicial superi1n.endence. '[287F·I-I, 288A1
(2) In the Cr.P.C. of 1974 the District Magistrate is divested of his revisio~
jurisdiction over inferior criminal courts. In addition, there are two important
changes apparently designed to avoid delay and to secure prompt justice. The
first change is introduced by s. 397(2) which bars the exercise of revisional
power in relation to any iilterlocutory order passed in any appeal,
enquiry,
trial or other proceeding. The second change is introduced by s.
397(3)
under which any person aggrieved by an order of an inferior criminal court,
is given the option to approach either the Sessions Judge or the High Court,
and once he exercises the option, he is precluded frcm invoking the revisional
jurisdiction of the other authority. The object is, to prevent a multiple exercise of revisional powers and to secure early fintality to orders. [286C-F]
For v. Bishop of

## Text

282
A
JAGIR SINGH
v.
RANBIR SINGH & ANR.
November 9, 1978
B
[JASWANT SINGH AND 0. CHJNNAPPA REDDY, JJ]
Constitution of India, Art. 227(5), power of
judicial
superintendence,
scope.
J
Criminal Procedure Code, 1914 s. 397, introduction of changes for avoidance of delay-S. 484 (2) (b), ''Corresponding provision" scope, application
C
to jud1'cial orders made under Cr.P.C., 1898-S. 125, whether corresponds to
1. 488 "1'.P.C., 1898.
Ranbir Singh is Jagir Singh's son from his separated first wife. In 1971
he and his mother applied for maintenance under s. 488 of Cr.P.C.,
1898.
Although Ranbir Singh was a major, maintenance was awarded to him on the
ground that he was a student unable to maintain himself.
In April 1974, the
D
new Cr.P.C. came into force, and under s. 127 Jagir Singh applied for cancellation of the maintenance order, on the ground that the major son was not
prevented from maintaining himself through any infirmity or abnormality, and
was not entitled to maintenance under the new code. The respondent contended
that the maintenance order had been validly passed under the old Code, and
continued to remain in force notwithstanding the enactment of, the new Code
but the Magistrate cancelled the maintenance order, Ranbir Singh's Revision
E
Application was dismissed by the Sessions Court, on the ground that the order
made under s. 488 of the Cr.P.C., 1898 would not survive under s. 484(2)
of the Cr.P.C. 1974 due to the absence of a corresponding provision under lhe
new Code, enabling his maintenance. He then applied to the High Court for
a Revision. Tue High Court allowed the Revision holding that s. 125 of the
Cr.P.C., 1974 did correspond with s. 488 of the Cr.P.C. 1898.
F
The appellant contended that Ranbir Singh's Revision application to the
High Court was barred by s. 397(3), Cr.P.C., 1974, and was incompetent,
and that his right to invoke revisional jurisdiction of a superior court became
exhausted when be moved the Sessions Court in Revision.
He further con,
tended that the maintenance order was not saved either by s. 484(2), Cr.P.C.
1974 or sections 6 and 24 of the General Clauses Act.
G
The respondent submitted that his llevision application before the
High
H
Court could be treated and maintained, as, one directed against the Sessions
Judge's order rejecting his Revision application, or it could be treated as one
under Art. 227 of the Constitution.
Allowing the appeal, the Court,
HELD: (1) The power under Art. 227 is discretionary. The power of
judicial superintendenee under it could only be exercised sparingly to keep
1ubordinate courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority, and
not to correct mere errors. Where the statute banned the exercise of revisional
•
•
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JAGIR SINGH V. RANB!R SINGH
283
powers by the High Court, it would require very exceptional circumst8ol!ces to
A
warrant interference under Art. 227, since the power of superintendence was
not meant to circumvent statutory law. By the 42nd Amendment Act, clause
(5) was added in Art. 227, which is a verbatim reproduction oJ' s. 224(2) of
the Governn1cnt of India Act, 1935, conferring po\vers of aJministrative super·
intendcnce only, and not the power of judicial superi1n.endence. '[287F·I-I, 288A1
(2) In the Cr.P.C. of 1974 the District Magistrate is divested of his revisio~
jurisdiction over inferior criminal courts. In addition, there are two important
changes apparently designed to avoid delay and to secure prompt justice. The
first change is introduced by s. 397(2) which bars the exercise of revisional
power in relation to any iilterlocutory order passed in any appeal,
enquiry,
trial or other proceeding. The second change is introduced by s.
397(3)
under which any person aggrieved by an order of an inferior criminal court,
is given the option to approach either the Sessions Judge or the High Court,
and once he exercises the option, he is precluded frcm invoking the revisional
jurisdiction of the other authority. The object is, to prevent a multiple exercise of revisional powers and to secure early fintality to orders. [286C-F]
For v. Bishop of Ches/or, [1824] 2 B&C 635; Maxwell (!Ith Edn. page 109);
applied.
(3) Whenever an Act is repealed and re-enacted, there are bound to be
changes and modifications. To say that a modified provision dealing with the
same subject matter in substantially the same manner a03 the original provision
is not a "corresponding provision'', \\.rould be to practically nullify the effect
of a "Repeal and Savings" provision like section 484 (2) (b) of the new Code.
"To correspond" does not usually, or properly, mean to be identical with;
but to harmonise wttn, or to be suitable to. There are no \Vords in s. 484 (2)
(b) limiting its appJication to orders made, and sentences passed, which are
not inconsistent with the provisions of the new Code.
All that s. 484(2)(b)
says is that such statutory instruments shall be deemed to be made under the
corresponding provisions of the new Code.
Their validity will have to be
tested like any other statutory instrument made under the provisions of the
new Code, and they will have to a·nswer the test whether Lhey are inconsistent
with the provisions of the ne'\V Code. But in case of judicial orders made,
and sentences passed, such orders and sentences \Vhich have attained finality
and which have created rights in parties, do not have to answer the test of
being consistent with the provisions of the new Code.
[289F·ll~ 290B-E]
Butterworth's (Words and Phrases-legally defined)(2nd Edn. Vol.
[),
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd Edn. Vol. I); Sack>i/le-West
v.
Holmsdale (Viscount), [1870] LR. 4 H.L. 543; applied.
(4) Section 125 of the new Code corresponds to s. 488 of the Cr.P.C.,
1898 notwithstanding the faot that under the Cr.P.C. of 1974, a child who hii
attained majority, and who does not suffer from any infirmity, is not entitled
to be maintained by the father. Once an order under s. 488 Cr.P.C., 1898,
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is deemed to be an order under s. 125 of the Cr.P.C. 1974, it must be so
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deemed for all purpo1es, including the application of s. 127 of the Rew Code.
[290B, GJ
20-817 SCI/78
284
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979) 2 S.C.R.
A
Nanak Chand v. Chandra Kishore Aggarwal & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 446;
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referred to.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 117
of 1978.
(Appeal from the Judgment and Order dt. 5-12-77 of the Punjab
& Haryana High Court in Criminal Misc. Petition No. 3892-M of
1976).
R. S. Naru/a, M .. S. Marwah and D. S. Narula for the appellant.
S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagaraja and P. N. Puri for the respondents.
The Judgment ef the Court was delivered by
CHINN AP PA REDDY, J .-Jagir Singh, the appellant in this appeal
by special leave, was married to Kirpal Kaur in 1951. Husband and
wife became estranged in 1954, since when they have been living
separately. Ranbir Singh, the issue of the marriage, was born in 1954.
Jagir Singh married again and it is said that he has a son and a
daughter by the second wife.
On 25th May, 1971, Kirpal Kaur and
Ranbir Singh filed an application for maintenance under Section 488
of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.
One of the defences raised
by the appellant to that application was that Ranbir Singh was a major
and, therefore, not entitled to claim maintenance under Section 488.
The Magistrate held that Ranbir Singh was a student who was unable
to maintain himself and, therefore, the question whether he was a
major or a minor was immaterial.
On 19th May, 1973, he made an
order awarding maintenance at the rate of Rs. 200/-
per month to
Kirpal Kaur and Rs. 75/- per month to Ranbir Singh, Jagir Singh
filed a revision petition before the Sessions Judge. By consent of
the parties, the Sessions Judge made a reference to the High Court
recommending that the award of maintenance in favour of the wife
should be reduced to Rs. 150/- per month and that the award of
Rs. 75/- per month to the son should be confirmed.
The reference
was accepted by the High Court.
The Criminal Procedure Code 1898 was repealed and the Criminal
Procedure Code 197 4 was enacted in its place. The new Code came
into force on 1st April, 1974.
On 3rd May, 1974, the appellant made
an application before the Magistrate, purporting to be under Section
127 of the new Code, for cancellation of the order of maintenance in
favour of the son on the ground that the son had attained majority
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JAG!R SINGH v. RANBIR SINGH (Chinl1(J.ppa Reddy,!.)
285
and did not suffer from any infirmity or abnormality which prevented
him from maintaining himself. It was claimed on behalf of the appellant that under the new Code it was not permissible to award maintenance or enforce an order to maintenance in favour of a child who
had attained majority and who was not unable to maintain itself by
reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury. On 3rd June,
1974, the son filed a counter admitting that he had attained majority
but claiming that he was still a student, unable to maintain himself. The
son claimed that the order in his favour had been validly passed under
the old Code and continued to remain in force notwithstanding the
enactment of the new Code.
On 9th May, 1975, the learned Magistrate allowed the application of the father under Section 127 of the
Criminal Procedure Code 1974 and cancelled the order for maintenance made earlier in favour of the son.
Ranbir Singh, the son, filed
a Revision Application before the Sessions Judge. It was dismissed
on 12th March, 1976.
The learned Sessions Judge held that the order
made under Section 488 of the old Code could survive under Section
484 (2) of the new Code if there was a corresponding provision under
the new Code which enabled the award of maintenance to a major
child. Since there was no such corresponding provision the order
under Section 477 in favour of Ranbir Singh ceased to be in force.
Ranbir Singh then filed a Revision Application before the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana which was allowed dn 5th December, 1977.
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The High Court held that notwithstanding the change in the law which . E
disentitled a major child from claiming maintenance, Section 125 of
the new Code did correspond to Section 488 of the old Code.
Therefore, the order for maintenance in favour of Ranbir Singh was saved
by Section 484(2) of the Code of 1974. Jagir Singh has preferred
this appeal after obtaining special leave from this Court under Article
136 of the Constitution.
Shri R. S. Narula, learned Counsel for the appellant contended that
the Revision Application to the High Court was incompetent as it was
barred by the provisions of Section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure 1974. He argued that the right of the respondent to invoke
the revisional jurisdiction of a superior Co'urt became exhausted when
G
he invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge. Shri
Narula further contended that under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1974, a major son who did not suffer from any physical or
mental abnormality or injury which prevented him from maintaining
himself was not entitled to get an order for maintenance in his favour
and that an order made in favour of such a son under Section 488
H
Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 was not saved either by Section
484(2) of the Code of Criminal Pocedure 1974 or Sections 6 and 24
286
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 2 S.C.R.
A
of the General Clauses Act. Shri S. K. Mehta, learned Counsel for
the respondent submitted that the revision application before the High
Court could be treated and maintained as one directed
against the
order of the Sessions Judge rejecting the Revision Application made
to him.
Iu any case he argued that the Revision Application could
be treated as one under Article 22 7 of the Constitution. He contended
B.
that the order of the Magistrate under Section 488 of the Criminal
Procedure Code 1898 continued to be in force and that it could not
be cancelled merely because Section 125 did not provide for the award
of maintenance to a major son who did not suffer from any abnormality
or injury.
c
The first question for consideration is whether the High Court was
precluded from interfering with the order of the Magistrate in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction by reason of the provisions of Section
397(3) of the Criminal Procdeure Code 1974. Section 397 which corresponds to Section 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1898 invests
D
the High Court and the Sessions Judge with concurrent revisional jurisdiction over inferior criminal Courts within their jurisdiction. The District Magistrate who also had revisional jurisdiction under Seeton 435 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is now divested of such jurisdiction.
In· addition, there are, in the 197 4 Code two important changes
both of which are apparently designed to avoid delay and to secure
E
:irompt rather than perfect justice. Tha first change is that introduced
by Section 397 (2) which bars the exercise of revisional power in
relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, enquiry, trial
or other proceeding. The second is that introduced by Section 397 (3)
which provides that if an application under the Section has been made
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by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no'
further application by the same person shall be entertained by the
other of them.
We are concerned with this provision in this -appeal.
The object of Section 397 (3) is clear. It is to prevent a multiple
exercise of revisional powers and to secure early finality to orders.
Any person aggrieved by an order of an inferior Criminal Court is
given the option to approach either the Session Judge or the High
Court and once he exercises the option he is precluded from invoking
the revisinnal jurisdiction of the other authority.
The language of
Section 397(3) is clear and peremptory and it does not admit of any
other interpretation.
We may also mention here that even under
Section 435 of the previous Code of Criminal Procedure, while the
Session·s Judge and the District Magistrate had concurrent jurisdiction, like present Section 397 (3) previous Section 435 ( 4) provides that
if an application under the Section had been made either to the Sessions
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JAG!R SINGH v. RANBIR SINGH (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)
287
Judge or District Magistrate no further application shall be entertained
A
by the other of them.
In order to cross the hurdle imposed by se.:tion 397 (3) it was suggested that the revision application before the High Court could be treated as an application directed agaiilSt the order of the Sessions Judge instead of an one directed against the order of the Magistrate. We do not
think that it is permissible to do so. What may not be done directly
cannot be allowed to be done indirectly, that would be an evasion of
the statute.
It is a "well-known principle of law that the' provisions
of an Act of Parliament shall not be evaded by shift or contrivance" (per
Abbott C.J. in Fox v. Bishop of Chester(') "To carry out effectually the
object of a Statute, it must be construed as to defeat all attempts to do,
or avoid doing, in an indirect or circuitous manner that which it has
prohibited or enjoined" (Maxwell, 11th edition, page 109).
When the
Sessions Judge refused to interfere with the order of the Magistrate, the
High Court's jurisdiction was invoked to avoid the order of the Magistrate and not that of the Sessions Judge. The bar of Section 397(3)
was, therefore, effectively attracted and the bar could not be circumvented by the subterfuge of treating the revision application a·s
directed
against the Session Judge's order.
If the' revision application to the High Court could not be maintained under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, could the
order of the High Court be sustained under Article 227 of the Constitution,
as
now suggested
by the
respondent? In the first
place the High Court did not purport to exercise its power
of superintendence under Article 227.
The power under Articl~ 22 7 is a discretionary power and it is. difficult to attribute
to the order of the High Court such source of power when the High
Coun itself did not, in terms, purport to exercise any such discretionary power. In the second place the power of judicial superintendence
under Article 227 could only be exercised, sparingly, to keep subordinate Courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority and
not to correct mere errors. Where the statute banned the exercise
of revisional 1oowers by the High Court, it would indeed require very
exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of
·the Constitution, since the power of Superintendence was not meant to
circumvent statutory law.
In the third place it was doubtful if the
High Court could exercise any power of judicial superintendence on the
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date of its order as the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act had by then
been passed.
By the 42nd Amendment Act clause (5) was added in
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Article 227 of the Constitution and it says "Nothing in this article shall
(1) (1824) 2 B,& C 635.
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288
SUPREME COURT RllPORTS
(1979] 2 s.c.R.
be construed as giving to a High Court any jurisdiction to question any
judgment of any inferior Court which is not otherwise subject to appeal
or revision".
Clau'se (5) of Article 227 introduced by the
42nd
Amendment Act is a verbatim reproduction of Sub-Section (2) of Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935 which it was held conferred powers of administrative superintendence only and not the power
of Judicial Superintendence. In the present case the revision application
was, however, filed before the passing of the 42nd Amendment Act and
it was therefore, argued by the learned Counsel for the respondent that
the High Court could exercise the power of superintendence possessed
by it before the 42nd Amendment.
We have serious doubts.
Article
227, before the 42nd Amendment, gave no right to any party.
An
application invoking the High Court's power of Superintendence did not
create any vested right in the suitor.
There crntld, therefore, be no
question of any vested right being taken away or not being taken away
by the amendment.
It was just a question whether the High Court possessed the power of Superintendence on the date of the High Court's
order.
There is no dispute that it did not.
We do not wish to pursue
the matter further as in our view there was no case to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the revision application to the
High Court must be held to be incompetent.
In that view it is unneces•
sary to go into the question whether the original order under Section
488, Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 in favour of the respondent could
be cancelled under Section 127 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1974,
But the lower Courts went into the question at some length and detailed
submissions were made before us.
We will express our
opinion
briefly.
Section 484(1) of the 1974 Code repeals the Code of Criminal
Procedure 1898. Section 484(2) (a) provides for the continuance and
disposal of pending cases in accordance with the provisions of the old
Code.
Section 484(2)(b) provides that 'all notifications published,,
proclamations issued, powers conferred, forms prescribed, local jurisdictions defined, sentences passed and orders, rules and appointments made
under the old Code and 'which ru:e in force immediately before
the
commencement' of the new Code, shall be deemed, respectively, to have
been published, issued, conferred, prescribed, defined, passed or made
under the corresponding provisions of the new Code.
In the present
case the order of the Magistrate under Section 488 of the old Code awarding maintenance to the respondent was made on 19th May, 1973. The
new Code came into force on 1st April, 1974.
Therefore, the order
was in force immediately before the commencement of the new Code.
c •
JAGIR ~INGH v. RANBIR SINGH (Chimi(lppa Reddy, J.)
289
It must, therefore, be deemed to have been made under the corresponding provision of the new Code.
The question,, therefore, is whether
them is any provision of the new Code corresponding to the provision
of the old Code under which maintenance was awarded to the respondent.
As we said, the respondent was awarded. maintenance under
Section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1898. Under Section 488
Criminal Procedure Code 1898 a person having 'sufficient means and
neglecting or refusing to maintain his wife or his legitimate or illegitimate
child unable to maintain itself could be ordered to make a month! y allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child.
The word child
used in Section 488 led to some controversy whether a person could be
ordered to pay maintenance to a child who had attained majority but
who was unable to maintain itself.
In Nanak Chand v. Chandra Kishore
Agarwal & Ors.(')
the Supreme Court held that the word
'child' in Section 488 did not mean a minor son or daughter
and that the real limitation was contained in the expression 'unable to
maintain itsell".
Irrespective of whether a son or daughter was a major
or minor, a father was bound to maintain the son or daughter if ouch son
or daughter was unable to maintain himself or herself.
Section 125
of the 1974 Code makes a slight departure.
Under this provision
a
child who has attained majority is not entitled to be awarded maintenance
unless such child is unable to maintain itself by reason of any physical
or mental abnormality or injury.
According to Shri R. Si. Narula in
view of the change it cannot be said that the new Code contains
any
provision corresponding to the provision in the old Code which Jnthorised the award of maintenance to a child who had attained majority and
who was unable to maintain itself even if snch child did not suffer from
any physical or mental abnormality or injury.
Therefore, according to
Sh1i Narula, Section 484(2) (b) does not save an order awarding maintenance. in favour of a child who has attained majority and who does
not suffer from any physical or mental abnormality or injury.
It is difficult to agree with the subnrission of Sbri Narula.
To
, accept the subnris'sion would be to give the expression "corresponding
provision" the meaning "identical provision". Whenever an Act is repealed and re-enacted there are bound to be changes and modifications.
To say that a modified provision dealing with the same• subject matter
in substantially the same manner as the original provision is not a corresponding provision would be to practically mullify the effect of a "Repeal
and Savings" provision like Section 484([2)(b) of the new Code.
In
the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary-Third Edition-Vol. I, the word
'correspond' is said to mean' (') to answer to something else in the way
(1) A.l.R. 1970 S.C. 446.
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2 90
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 2 S.C.R.
of fitness; to agree with; be conformable to; be congruous or in harmony
with.
(2) To answer to in character or function; to be similar to''.
In Butterworths. 'Words and Phrases-LegaUy defined' Second Edition
Vol. 1, it is said "'to correspond', does not usually, or properly, mean
'to be identical with', but 'to harmonise with', or 'to be suitable to' " and
B
reference is made to Sackville-West v. Holmesdale (Viscount)('). We
are, therefore, of the view that Section 125 of the new Code corresponds
to Section 488 of the old Code notwithstanding the fact that under the
new Code a child who has attained majority and who does not suffer from
any infirmity is not entitled to be maintained by the father. We also
note that there are no words in Section 484(2) (b) limiting its applicac
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tion to orders made and sentences passed which are not inconsistent with
the provisions of the new Code.
There are no such limiting words as
may be found as for example in Section 24 of the General Clauses Act
which limits its application to an order, rule•, etc. "so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted''.
This does not mean that
statutory instruments made under the old Code and which are inconsistent with the provisions of the new Code continue to be effective. All
that Section 484(2) (b) says is that ·such statutory instruments shall be
deemed to be made under the corresponding provisions of the new Code.
Their validity will have. to be tested like any other statutory instruments
made under the provisions of the new Code and they will have to answer
the test whether they are consistent with the provisions of the new Code·.
But, in the case of Judicial orders made and sentences passed,,
such
orders and sentences which have attained finality and which have created
rights in parties do not have to answer the test of being consistent with
the provisions of the new Code.
We, therefore, hold that the order
for maintenance made in favour of the respondent must be deemed to
be an order made under Section 125 of the new Code and tba+ it does
not automatically cease to be effective on the coming into force of the
new Code.
The High Court arrived at this conclusion and thought
that it was ·sufficient to hold in favour of the reS[)ondent and to
allow
the Revision Application.
We do not think that the High Court was
right in stopping there.
The High Court should have furi.1J.er considered
the question whether the order for maintenance which was deemed to
be an order under Section 125 of the new Code could not be cancelled
under the provisions of Section 127 of the new Code.
Once the order
under Section 488 is deemed to be an order under Section 125 of the
new Code, it must be so deemed for all purposes including the application of Section 127 of the new Code.
Section 127 provides for consequential orders upon proof of a change in the circum8tance of any person
(I) (1878) L.R. 4 L.H. 543.
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JAGIR SINGH v. RANBIR SINGH (Chinitippa Reddy, J.)
291
receiving, under Section 125, a monthly allowance, or ordered under the
A
same Section to pay a monthly allowance to his wife, child, father or
mother, as the case may be.
The admitted attainment of majority of
the respondent and the change of the law were surely circumstances
which entitled the appellant to have the order in favour of the respondent cancelled.
We accordingiy allow the appeal and set aside
the
judgment of the High Court.
B
M.R.
Appeal allowed.
"