# JAGJIT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB

- **Citation:** [2018] 13 S.C.R. 405
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2018-09-26
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No.408 of 2017
- **Bench:** Ranjan Gogoi, Navin Sinha, K. M. Joseph
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/jagjit-singh-v-state-of-punjab-32486
- **Pages:** 23

## Headnote

Constitution of India - Art.136 - Contours of jurisdiction
under - Appellant's wife died along with her child by way of
drowning in a river within seven years of her marriage - Trial Court
convicted the appellant u/s.304-B of IPC - Conviction affirmed by
the High Court, however, it reduced the sentence from 8 years
rigorous imprisonment to a period of 7 years - Appellant contended
that there was neither cruelty nor any demand for dowry - On
appeal, held: In various Supreme Court judgments, it has been held
that in an appeal u/Art.136, the Court will not reassess the evidence
at large, particularly, when it has been concurrently accepted by
the High Court and the Courts below - For interference of Supreme
Court something more must be shown such as, violation of principles
of natural justice in the trial, error of law or procedure, by errors
of record or misreading of evidence, non-consideration of glaring
inconsistencies in the evidence which demolish the prosecution case
or where the conclusion of the High Court is manifestly perverse
and unsupportable and the like - In the instant case, there is material
in the form of testimony of PW-1 and PW-3 regarding dowry
harassment - On 16.02.2001, PW-1 stated that appellant's wife
contacted him from a PCO and informed him that all the accused,
including appellant were maltreating her - On the same date, PW-3
stated that appellant's wife had visited her and informed that
appellant had beaten her - Furthermore, PW-5 deposed that he
saw appellant's wife on 16.02.2001 at the PCO, though he could
not hear her but saw her weeping - Doctor who conducted post
mortem opined that death occurred on 16.02.2001/17.02.2001 -
Therefore, the law enjoins u/s.113-B of the Evidence Act drawing
of the presumption that the accused has committed dowry death -
The view taken by trial Court and affirmed by the High Court on
basis of the material available on record cannot be said to be
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405
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manifestly perverse - Thus, interference by the Supreme Court would
not be justified - Penal Code, 1860 - s.304-B - Evidence Act, 1872
- s.113-B.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Whether there is material within the meaning of
Section 113-B of the Evidence Act for the Court to have come to
the conclusion that soon before the death, the deceased was
treated with cruelty or harassed for or in connection with
demand for dowry. In this regard here is a material in the form of
testimony of PW1 and PW3. The marriage between the accusedappellant and the deceased took place on 24.1.1998 and it
survived only for a little over three (3) years. It is on 16.2.2001
that the deceased goes to the house of PW3, her elder sister,
spent 5 to 7 minutes, according to the said witness, complained
of cruelty or harassment by the accused and her own daughter
was with her. On the same day, she goes to the PCO, phones her
father PW1 and tells him about the harassment. PW4 the person
working at the PCO has also stated that she was weeping, when
she made a call. PW1 has spoken about the contents of the
telephonic conversation namely, all the accused were
maltreating and taunting her and that she was very much upset
and the accused had thrown her out from their house with the
daughter and that she will not be allowed to come back without a
Maruti car or Rupees two lakhs. If he is to be believed (In fact,
two courts have), this would amount to cruelty/harassment in
connection with demand for dowry. Therefore, the law enjoins
under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act drawing of the
presumption that the accused has committed the dowry death.
[Para 26] [424-E-H; 425-A-B]
2. Undoubtedly, the presumption is rebuttable at the hands
of the accused by adducing evidence and discharging the reverse
burden. Whether any such evidence in discharge with reverse
burden has been successfully adduced and whether it has been
considered, is the next question. The judgment of the t

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JAGJIT SINGH
v.
 STATE OF PUNJAB
(Criminal Appeal No.408 of 2017)
SEPTEMBER 26, 2018
[RANJAN GOGOI, NAVIN SINHA AND K. M. JOSEPH, JJ.]
Constitution of India - Art.136 - Contours of jurisdiction
under - Appellant's wife died along with her child by way of
drowning in a river within seven years of her marriage - Trial Court
convicted the appellant u/s.304-B of IPC - Conviction affirmed by
the High Court, however, it reduced the sentence from 8 years
rigorous imprisonment to a period of 7 years - Appellant contended
that there was neither cruelty nor any demand for dowry - On
appeal, held: In various Supreme Court judgments, it has been held
that in an appeal u/Art.136, the Court will not reassess the evidence
at large, particularly, when it has been concurrently accepted by
the High Court and the Courts below - For interference of Supreme
Court something more must be shown such as, violation of principles
of natural justice in the trial, error of law or procedure, by errors
of record or misreading of evidence, non-consideration of glaring
inconsistencies in the evidence which demolish the prosecution case
or where the conclusion of the High Court is manifestly perverse
and unsupportable and the like - In the instant case, there is material
in the form of testimony of PW-1 and PW-3 regarding dowry
harassment - On 16.02.2001, PW-1 stated that appellant's wife
contacted him from a PCO and informed him that all the accused,
including appellant were maltreating her - On the same date, PW-3
stated that appellant's wife had visited her and informed that
appellant had beaten her - Furthermore, PW-5 deposed that he
saw appellant's wife on 16.02.2001 at the PCO, though he could
not hear her but saw her weeping - Doctor who conducted post
mortem opined that death occurred on 16.02.2001/17.02.2001 -
Therefore, the law enjoins u/s.113-B of the Evidence Act drawing
of the presumption that the accused has committed dowry death -
The view taken by trial Court and affirmed by the High Court on
basis of the material available on record cannot be said to be
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manifestly perverse - Thus, interference by the Supreme Court would
not be justified - Penal Code, 1860 - s.304-B - Evidence Act, 1872
- s.113-B.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Whether there is material within the meaning of
Section 113-B of the Evidence Act for the Court to have come to
the conclusion that soon before the death, the deceased was
treated with cruelty or harassed for or in connection with
demand for dowry. In this regard here is a material in the form of
testimony of PW1 and PW3. The marriage between the accusedappellant and the deceased took place on 24.1.1998 and it
survived only for a little over three (3) years. It is on 16.2.2001
that the deceased goes to the house of PW3, her elder sister,
spent 5 to 7 minutes, according to the said witness, complained
of cruelty or harassment by the accused and her own daughter
was with her. On the same day, she goes to the PCO, phones her
father PW1 and tells him about the harassment. PW4 the person
working at the PCO has also stated that she was weeping, when
she made a call. PW1 has spoken about the contents of the
telephonic conversation namely, all the accused were
maltreating and taunting her and that she was very much upset
and the accused had thrown her out from their house with the
daughter and that she will not be allowed to come back without a
Maruti car or Rupees two lakhs. If he is to be believed (In fact,
two courts have), this would amount to cruelty/harassment in
connection with demand for dowry. Therefore, the law enjoins
under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act drawing of the
presumption that the accused has committed the dowry death.
[Para 26] [424-E-H; 425-A-B]
2. Undoubtedly, the presumption is rebuttable at the hands
of the accused by adducing evidence and discharging the reverse
burden. Whether any such evidence in discharge with reverse
burden has been successfully adduced and whether it has been
considered, is the next question. The judgment of the trial Court
would show that there is indeed a reference to the contents of
the deposition of PW5, PW6 and PW8. [Para 27] [425-B-C]
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3. Power under Article 136 seemingly, transcends all
limitations in regard to matters save where it is expressly
excluded. However, by way of self imposed intrusions into such
power, as also by way of deference to the scheme of the
Constitution, the principles we have alluded to stand culled out.
Apposite to the facts of this appeal, the principles are:
1. Credibility of witnesses as commended to Courts below is not
ordinarily reappraised; 2. Is there misreading of evidence; 3. Is
there any non-consideration of glaring inconsistency in the
evidence which demolishes the prosecution's case; 4. Are the
findings inconsistent with the evidence; 5. Have the courts
overlooked striking features in the evidence or is their failure to
consider important piece of evidence; 6. Whether the evidence
adduced by the prosecution fall short of the test of reliability and
acceptability and it is therefore unsafe to act upon it. [Para 28]
[425-C-F]
4. PW3 stated that the deceased told her that on the night
previous to 16.2.2001, the appellant had hurled abuse on her
father and when she prevented the appellant from abusing her
father, she was beaten even more. If this be true, indeed, it is
cruelty near, in point of time and bearing a link proximate to the
time of her death immediately thereafter. (The doctor has
conducted post mortem on 28.2.2001. He has opined that the
probable time which elapsed between death and post-mortem
was about 12 days). This means that the tragic death took place
on the 16th or 17th of February, 2001. [Para 30] [426-B-D]
5. The trial Court has carefully discussed the possible
versions. The questions which this Court posed as troubling, most
of them, was present in its mind. The High Court has also
referred to the defence evidence including DW6 and DW8. The
trial Court, however, finds solace in rejecting the defence
version on the score that it cannot be squared with the deceased
visiting the home of PW3 on 16.02.2001, and it takes the view
that she would have been the last person for her to visit. It is
also found that the deceased did not go on being called by PW3.
The trial Court had the advantage of watching the demeanor of
the witnesses. This Court cannot hold that the view taken by the
trial Court as affirmed by the High Court is not warranted as
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such by the materials on record. This Court cannot possibly hold
that the view taken by the courts is manifestly perverse or that it
is based on no evidence. Even if persuaded to take a different
view as canvassed by the appellant, this Court would not be
justified in interfering. [Paras 31 and 32] [426-E-H; 427-A]
Saravanabhavan and Govindaswamy v. State of
Madras AIR 1966 SC 1273 ; Mst. Dalbir Kaur and
Others v. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 158 : [1977] 1
SCR 280 - relied on.
Sushil Ansal v. State Through Central Bureau of
Investigation (2014) 6 SCC 173 : [2014] 9 SCR 571 ;
Major Singh and Another v. State of Punjab (2015) 5
SCC 201 : [2015] 5 SCR 777 ; Rajinder Singh v. State
of Punjab (2015) 6 SCC 477 : [2015] 2 SCR 835 ;
G.V. Siddaramesh v. State of Karnataka (2010) 3 SCC
152 : [2010] 2 SCR 380 ;
Ashok Kumar v. State of
Haryana (2010) 12 SCC 350 : [ 2010] 7 SCR 1119 -
referred to.
Case Law Reference
AIR 1966 SC 1273
 relied on
Para 7
[1977] 1 SCR 280
 relied on
 Para 8
[2014] 9 SCR 571
 referred to Para 9
[2015] 5 SCR 777
 referred to Para 10
[2015] 2 SCR 835
 referred to Para 15
[2010] 2 SCR 380
 referred to Para 24
[2010] 7 SCR 1119
 referred to Para 25
 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 408 of 2017.
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.02.2015 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. S- 724 SB
of 2002.
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Dr. J.P. Dhanda, Ms. Raj Rani Dhanda, Vineet Dhanda,
N.A. Usmani, K.P. Singh, Gopi Chand, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ms. Jaspreet Gogia, Ms. Manadakini Singh, Advs. for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
 K. M. JOSEPH, J. 1. The appeal after granting special leave
to appeal is filed by the appellant against the judgment of the High court
of Punjab and Haryana affirming the judgment of the trial Court convicting
the appellant under Section 304-B IPC but reducing the sentence from
8 years rigorous imprisonment to a period of 7 years under the aforesaid
section. The appellant who was tried along with his parents and two
brothers was acquitted of the charge under Section 406 of the Indian
Penal Code by the trial Court. In view of his conviction under Section
304-B IPC, the trial Court did not find it necessary to record a separate
conviction under Section 498-A IPC.
2. We heard Dr. J.P. Dhanda, learned counsel for the appellant
and Ms. Jaspreet Gogia, learned counsel for the respondent-State.
3. There is no dispute that the marriage between the appellant
and his deceased wife took place on 24th January, 1998. It is also not in
the region of controversy that she died well within seven years of her
marriage. It is undisputed that the death of the appellant's wife was
unnatural and she died along with her child by way of drowning in a
river. In fact, PW8 - ASI in his deposition stated that both the dead
bodies were secured together with one chunni. The only question is
whether the death is to be attributed to cruelty/harassment on the part of
the appellant arising out of demand for dowry as contemplated under
Section 304-B of the IPC.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that the Court did
not consider the evidence given by the appellant and that neither cruelty
nor any demand for dowry is made out. It is contended that the appellant's
wife apparently took her life along with that of her daughter on account
of the fact that she was consistently taunted by PW3 - the sister of the
appellant's wife who was married to an industrialist. The appellant was
earning a sum of Rs.3000/- per month. However, notwithstanding the
same, the appellant had taken care of her by fulfilling the desire of the
deceased wife to pursue education and she was, in fact, doing her PostJAGJIT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
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Graduation at the time of her untimely death. The appellant's father (we
note that the appellant along with his two brothers and mother were
tried by the trial Court and the trial Court convicted the appellant and his
mother under Section 304-B but appellant's mother stood acquitted by
the High Court) had in fact financed the education of the deceased
wife.
5. Learned counsel for the State pointed out that no reliance is to
be placed on the evidence of the DW6 and DW8. They were neighbours.
Their evidence supporting the case of the appellant should be perceived
as born out of their need to maintain cordial relationship with their
neighbours. As to what happened within the four walls of the house, she
would question as to how could they depose before the Court. She
sought support from the evidence of PW1 and PW3. The evidence would
indicate that there is a proximity in a point of time between the acts, as
complained of, against the appellant and the untimely death of the
deceased.
6. Before we embark on the examination of the case it becomes
necessary to remind ourselves of the contours of the jurisdiction of this
Court in an appeal which is maintained after grant of special leave under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Does the Court have the duty
as a regular court to consider an appeal or is its jurisdiction
circumscribed by the consideration that this Court is dealing with the
appeal on the basis of grant of special leave.
7. We may profitably advert to the views of the majority expressed
in Saravanabhavan and Govindaswamy Vs. State of Madras AIR
1966 SC 1273, which is as under:-
"7. This is an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution and
we shall first state what this Court will ordinarily consider in such
an appeal. It is not to be forgotten that this Court's ordinary
appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases is to the extent laid down in
Article 134 of the Constitution. Some of the appeals in that article
are available as of right and others lie if a special certificate is
granted by the High Court. This appeal belongs to neither class. It
is not as of right and no special certificate has been granted by
the High Court. There is in our jurisdiction no "sacred right of
appeal" as the French Canadian law assumes(See Mayor etc. of
Montreal v. Brown, (1876) 2 AC 168 (184). Once a decision is
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given by the High Court, that is final unless an appeal is allowed
by special leave of this Court. No doubt this Court has granted
special leave to the appellants but the question is one of the
principles which this Court will ordinarily follow in such an
appeal. It has been ruled in many cases before that this Court will
not reassess the evidence at large, particularly, when it has been
concurrently accepted by the High Court and the court or courts
below. In other words this Court does not form a fresh opinion as
to the innocence or the guilt of the accused. It accepts the
appraisal of the evidence in the High Court and the court or courts
below. Therefore, before this Court interferes something more
must be shown, such as, that there has been in the trial a violation
of the principles of natural justice or a deprivation of the rights of
the accused or a misreading of vital evidence or an improper
reception or rejection of evidence which, if discarded or received,
would leave the conviction unsupportable, or that the court or
courts have committed an error of law or of the forms of legal
process or procedure by which justice itself has failed. We have,
in approaching this case, borne these principles in mind. They are
the principles for the exercise of jurisdiction in criminal cases,
which this Court brings before itself by a grant of special leave."
 (Emphasis supplied)
8. In Mst. Dalbir Kaur and Others Vs. State of Punjab 1976
(4) SCC 158, the Bench of two learned Judges laid down as follows:-
"3. As to the principles on which special leave is granted by this
Court, the same have been clearly and explicitly enunciated in a
large number of decisions of this Court. It has been pointed out
that the Supreme Court is not an ordinary court of criminal appeal
and does not interfere on pure question of fact. It is only in very
special cases where the court is satisfied that the High Court has
committed an error of law or procedure as a result of which there
has been a serious miscarriage of justice that the court would
interfere with the concurrent findings of the High Court and the
trial Court. It has also been pointed out by this Court more than
once that it is not in the province of this Court to reappraise the
evidence and to go into the question of credibility of the witnesses
examined by the parties, particularly when the courts below have
JAGJIT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
[K. M. JOSEPH, J.]
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after considering the evidence, given their findings thereon. In
other words, the assessment of the evidence by the High Court
would be taken by this Court as final, unless it is vitiated by any
error of law or procedure, by the principles of natural justice, by
errors of record or misreading of evidence, non-consideration of
glaring inconsistencies in the evidence which demolish the
prosecution case or where the conclusion of the High Court is
manifestly perverse and unsupportable and the like. As early as
1950 this Court in Pritam Singh v. State, 1950 SCR 453: AIR
1950 SC 169: 51 Cri LJ 1270, speaking through Fazl Ali, J. (as he
then was) observed as follows:
The obvious reply to all these arguments advanced by the learned
Counsel for the appellant, is that this Court is not an ordinary
court of criminal appeal and will not, generally speaking, allow
facts to be reopened, especially when two courts agree in their
conclusion in regard to them and when the conclusions of fact
which are challenged are dependent on the credibility of witnesses
who have been believed by the trial Court which had the
advantage of seeing them and hearing their evidence.
In arguing the appeal, Mr. Sethi proceeded on the assumption
that once an appeal had been admitted by special leave, the entire
case was at large and the appellant was free to contest all the
findings of fact and raise every point which could be raised in the
High Court or the trial Court. This assumption is, in our opinion,
entirely unwarranted.
The rule laid down by the Privy Council is based on sound
principle, and, in our opinion, only those points can be urged at the
final hearing of the appeal which are fit to be urged at the
preliminary stage when leave to appeal is asked for, and it would
be illogical to adopt different standards at two different stages of
the same case.
On a careful examination of Article 136 along with the
preceding article, it seems clear that the wide discretionary power
with which this Court is invested under it is to be exercised
sparingly and in exceptional cases only,....
Generally speaking, this Court will not grant special leave,
unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances
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exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done and that
the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to
warrant a review of the decision appealed against.
Analysing this decision, two principles appear to have been clearly
laid down by this Court:
"(1) that in appeals by special leave against the concurrent
findings of the courts below, this Court would not go into the
credibility of the evidence and would interfere only when
exceptional and special circumstances exist which result in
substantial and grave injustice having been done to the accused;
and
(2) that even after special leave has been granted the appellant is
not free to contest all the findings of fact, but his arguments would
be limited only to those points, even at the final hearing, which
could be urged at the stage when the special leave to appeal is
asked for."
8. Thus the principles governing interference by this Court in a
criminal appeal by special leave may be summarised as follows:
"(1) that this Court would not interfere with the concurrent
finding of fact based on pure appreciation of evidence even if it
were to take a different view on the evidence;
(2) that the Court will not normally enter into a reappraisement or
review of the evidence, unless the assessment of the High Court
is vitiated by an error of law or procedure or is based on error of
record, misreading of evidence or is inconsistent with the
evidence, for instance, where the ocular evidence is totally
inconsistent with the medical evidence and so on;
(3) that the Court would not enter into credibility of the evidence
with a view to substitute its own opinion for that of the High Court;
(4) that the Court would interfere where the High Court has
arrived at a finding of fact in disregard of a judicial process,
principles of natural justice or a fair hearing or has acted in
violation of a mandatory provision of law or procedure resulting in
serious prejudice or injustice to the accused;
JAGJIT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
[K. M. JOSEPH, J.]
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(5) this Court might also interfere where on the proved facts wrong
inferences of law have been drawn or where the conclusions of
the High Court are manifestly perverse and based on no evidence.
It is very difficult to lay down a rule of universal application, but
the principles mentioned above and those adumbrated in the
authorities of this Court cited supra provide sufficient guidelines
for this Court to decide criminal appeals by special leave. Thus in
a criminal appeal by special leave, this Court at the hearing
examines the evidence and the judgment of the High Court with
the limited purpose of determining whether or not the High Court
has followed the principles enunciated above. Where the Court
finds that the High Court has committed no violation of the
various principles laid down by this Court and has made a correct
approach and has not ignored or overlooked striking features in
the evidence which demolish the prosecution case, the findings of
fact arrived at by the High Court on an appreciation of the
evidence in the circumstances of the case would not be disturbed."
 (Emphasis supplied)
9. We may also notice the judgment rendered by this Court in
Sushil Ansal v. State Through Central Bureau of Investigation 2014
(6) SCC 173. Therein, in the judgment rendered by the T.S. Thakur, J.
as His Lordship then was, it is inter alia held in para 55 as follows:
"55. ....Perversity in the findings, illegality or irregularity in the
trial that results in injustice or failure to take into consideration an
important piece of evidence are some of the situations in which
this Court may reappraise the evidence adduced at the trial but
not otherwise...."
 (Emphasis supplied)
10. We lastly notice a recent judgment of this Court in the case of
Mohd. Ali alias Guddu v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2015 (7) SCC 272
wherein the Court inter alia held as follows:
 "17. In Ganga Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar, (2005) 6
SCC 211 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1424, the Court after referring to a
series of decisions on exercise of the power of this Court under
Article 136 of the Constitution, culled out the following principles:
(SCC p. 217, para 10)
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 "(i) The powers of this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution are very wide but in criminal appeals this Court does
not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact save in
exceptional circumstances.
 (ii) It is open to this Court to interfere with the findings of fact
given by the High Court, if the High Court has acted perversely
or otherwise improperly.
 (iii) It is open to this Court to invoke the power under Article 136
only in very exceptional circumstances as and when a question
of law of general public importance arises or a decision shocks
the conscience of the Court.
 (iv) When the evidence adduced by the prosecution fell short of
the test of reliability and acceptability and as such it is highly
unsafe to act upon it.
(v) Where the appreciation of evidence and finding is vitiated by
any error of law of procedure or found contrary to the principles
of natural justice, errors of record and misreading of the evidence,
or where the conclusions of the High Court are manifestly
perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on record."
 (Emphasis supplied)
11. Learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention to the
recent judgment of this Court in the case of Major Singh and Another
v. State of Punjab reported in 2015 (5) SCC 201. It was a case of
unnatural death. Therein the prosecution witnesses, the complainantfather and brother of the deceased deposed that they saw the accused
dragging the deceased towards the room inside the house and that she
was trembling and on seeing the witnesses, all the four accused ran
away and the deceased breathed her last. The father had spoken about
the information he had given to the village panchayat. The Court
proceeded inter alia as follows:
"10. To sustain the conviction under Section 304-B IPC, the
following essential ingredients are to be established:
(i) the death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily
injury or otherwise than under a 'normal circumstance';
JAGJIT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB
[K. M. JOSEPH, J.]
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(ii) such a death should have occurred within seven years of her
marriage;
(iii) she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her
husband or any relative of her husband;
(iv) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection
with demand of dowry; and
(v) such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out
to the woman soon before her death."
The Court also proceeded to hold as follows:
"14. The prosecution has not examined any independent witness
or the panchayatdars to prove that there was demand of dowry
and that the deceased was subjected to ill-treatment. Ordinarily,
offences against married woman are being committed within the
four corners of a house and normally direct evidence regarding
cruelty or harassment on the woman by her husband or relatives
of the husband is not available. But when PW-3 has specifically
stated that the demand of dowry by the accused was informed to
the panchayatdars and that panchayat was taken to Village
Badiala, the alleged ill-treatment or cruelty of Karamjit Kaur by
her husband or relatives could have been proved by the
examination of the panchayatdars. The fact that the deceased
was subjected to harassment or cruelty in connection with
demand of dowry is not proved by the prosecution. It is also
pertinent to note that both the courts below have acquitted all the
accused for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC."
12. We noticed that it was a case where the courts had acquitted
all the accused for the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC. The
Court noted that the case of the prosecution is that there is a demand for
scooter and proceeded to hold inter alia as follows:
"18. Applying these principles to the instant case, we find that
there is no evidence as to the demand of dowry or cruelty and
that deceased Karamjit Kaur was subjected to dowry
harassment "soon before her death". Except the demand of
scooter, there is nothing on record to substantiate the allegation of
dowry demand. Assuming that there was demand of dowry, in
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our view, it can only be attributed to the husband Jagsir Singh who
in all probability could have demanded the same for his use. In the
absence of any evidence that the deceased was treated with
cruelty or harassment in connection with the demand of dowry
"soon before her death" by the appellants, the conviction of the
appellants under Section 304-B IPC cannot be sustained. The
trial court and the High Court have not analysed the evidence in
the light of the essential ingredients of Section 304-B IPC and the
conviction of the appellants under Section 304-B IPC is liable to
be set aside."
 (Emphasis supplied)
13. In this connection it is to be noticed that the appellants in the
said case was not the husband, but they were the parents-in-law of the
deceased.
14. We have already noticed that the essential ingredients of
Section 304-B IPC as noticed by this Court in Major Singh & Another
vs. State of Punjab (supra). Parliament has inserted Section 113-B in
the Evidence Act. In order that the presumption therein has to be applied
it must be established that soon before her death, such woman must
have been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in
connection with any demand of dowry. Upon this fact being established,
undoubtedly, the court is mandated to assume that the person has indeed
caused the dowry death as contemplated in Section 304-B IPC.
Therefore, the presumption cannot apply unless it is established that
soon before her death, a woman has been subjected to cruelty or
harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry. The words
"soon before" her death has also been considered in a large number of
cases.
15. We need only to advert to a recent judgment rendered by a
Bench consisting of three learned Judges in Rajinder Singh v. State of
Punjab reported in 2015(6) SCC 477 only for the purpose of
appreciating the words "soon before" occurring in Section 304-B IPC.
This is what the Court has to see
"24. We endorse what has been said by these two decisions.
Days or months are not what is to be seen. What must be borne
in mind is that the word "soon" does not mean "immediate". A
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fair and pragmatic construction keeping in mind the great social
evil that has led to the enactment of Section 304-B would make it
clear that the expression is a relative expression. Time-lags may
differ from case to case. All that is necessary is that the demand
for dowry should not be stale but should be the continuing cause
for the death of the married woman under Section 304-B."
16. Having regard to the aforesaid statements of the law, we
embark on a consideration of the appeal. The prosecution case as
projected through PW1 complainant - Mohinder Singh, the father of the
deceased is as follows:- the deceased was married on 24th January,
1998 and he had given dowry beyond his capacity in the marriage. After
some time of the marriage, all the five accused started beating the
deceased. They started taunting her that she had brought meagre dowry
and that her parents had not given a Maruti car in the marriage due to
which they had felt belittled in their neighbourhood. The deceased
conveyed this fact to the complainant on telephone. The daughter was
aged about 11⁄2 years at the time of her death. In December 2000, the
deceased accompanied by her sister went to see her parents at Amao
Farm, PS Khatima. She informed the complainant that she was being
subjected to harassment by her in-laws. She also told him that the
accused had threatened her that she could return to her matrimonial
home only if she brought a sum of Rs.2 lacs from her parents for the
purchase of a Maruti car. The complainant then got prepared a fixed
deposit receipt for Rs.30,000/- and handed it over to the deceased. The
complainant has also informed at that time to accused Jagjit Singh on
phone that he would visit Ludhiana after the sale of the crops and would
pay the accused the sum of Rs.2 lacs demanded by them. He also
requested him not to harass the deceased. However, even then the
accused gave beatings to the deceased and turned her out of their house.
The deceased wife then went to the house of Avtar Singh (nephew of
the complainant), and he took her to the house of the accused and also
paid them Rs.2000/- and requested him to treat the deceased nicely. On
February 16, 2001 at about 11:30 a.m. the deceased made a telephone
call from the PCO to the complainant that all the five accused were
subjecting her to extensive harassment and that she was feeling
depressed also informed him that on that date also the accused had
given her beatings and turned her and her daughter out of the
matrimonial home. She also told him that she was making this telephone
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call from the PCO. The complainant consoled the deceased and told her
that he was coming to Ludhiana and advised her to return to her
matrimonial home. It is also stated that his nephew on being contacted
told them that the accused and his mother approached the house of
Avtar Singh in the evening and enquired about the deceased from him
and from his other relations. It is alleged that Avtar Singh told that they
had not visited him nor he had any information about them. It is the case
of the prosecution that complainant lodged the FIR on 17.02.2001.
17. PW1, father of the deceased inter alia states as follows:
The marriage between the appellant and his daughter (deceased)
took place on 24.1.1998. After a good period of marriage all the
accused persons in the home started beating the deceased for not
bringing sufficient dowry. He states that they also used to taunt his
daughter for bringing insufficient dowry. The appellant also demanded a
Maruti car. This fact was brought to the notice by his daughter on
telephone. A female child was born. Thereafter, he states that the
deceased went to her house, two months before the untimely death took
place namely in December 2000. He states that his daughter alongwith
PW3(another daughter) came to his farm. He states that his daughter
told him all the accused were harassing and demanding Maruti car or
Rupees two lacs for purchasing the car. The deceased daughter told
him that the accused misbehaved with her and she will not go to her
in-laws house as they used to beat her and further (it may be noted that
there is no allegation that the accused appellant used to beat her) he
deposed that she told him that they would kill her. He states that his
brother Ram Singh and daughter PW3 were present. He further states
that he send his daughter to her in-laws house after consoling her. Also
a FDR for Rs.30,000/- (Rupees Thirty Thousand only) was given to her.
He phoned up the accused not to maltreat his daughter and he promised
to give Rupees two lacs after selling the crop. He next says that all the
accused re-started giving the beatings and sent away his daughter to the
house of his nephew Avtar Singh. Avtar Singh, it is alleged brought this
to his notice and gave Rupees two lacs to the accused. PW1 states that
the maltreatment, however, continued. Thereafter, he relates about one
event that is on 16.2.2001 the deceased daughter phoned him up from a
PCO. She informed that all the accused were maltreating and she was
very much upset and the accused threw her out from the house and that
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the accused told her that the accused shall not allow her without Maruti
car. In cross examination, PW1 stated that the deceased daughter was
preparing for examination B.A. Part-I which she was doing as a private
candidate and that she did graduation after the marriage by studying in
her matrimonial home. He also states that at the time of her death, she
was preparing for the M.A examination. He claims to have made
payment of Rs.935/- as the admission fee, which according to the
accused-appellant, was paid by his father but he does admit that bank
draft of Rs.935/- was got prepared by the father of the appellant. He
says that he does not know whether the appellant was working as turner.
He says he might be working but he does not know that he is earning
Rs.2000/- or Rs.2500/- per month. He admits the photograph of his
deceased daughter apparently in connection with the marriage of the
'Devar' of the daughter of Iqbal Singh (father of the appellant). He
admits that his other daughter (PW3) is married to a person having his
own industry which is being run by his son-in-law, his brother and father.
He admits that neither his brother who is lawyer nor the sister's son
who appears to be a Superintendent in the BPO Office, Ludhiana made
any report to the police station or elsewhere about the harassment. He
further states that he did not convene any panchayat in this regard. He
has denied the suggestion that he used to tell his deceased daughter to
separate from the parents-in-law. He denies the suggestion (apparently
that his daughter took her life) on the basis of the FIR lodged by him.
18. We may also advert to what PW3 has actually said.
Sometime after the marriage, the accused started taunting her deceased
sister by saying that she brought insufficient dowry and that there is a
demand for dowry. She says that this is disclosed about 5 or 6 months
after the marriage. Thereafter, she repeatedly told her about the
harassment at the hands of the accused on account of dowry. Thereafter, she refers to meeting her parents in December 2000 along with the
deceased. She speaks along the same lines as her father. On 16.2.2001,
it is alleged that the deceased came to her house and wept bitterly. She
told her that in the preceding day, her husband (appellant) has hurled
abuses at her father on phone and at that time she was accompanied by
her daughter. That all the five (5) accused used to beat her and she told
her that when she prevented her husband from abusing her father, the
appellant gave her more beating. She specifically says that when the
appellant went to take meal, her daughter also started sharing meal with
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her and then the appellant slapped her. The deceased also told her that
when she protested, Balwant Singh (brother of the appellant) also beat
her and abused her. It is thereafter she goes to a PCO and makes the
call which PW1 has spoken about. She does say that the appellant's
mother came to her house to make enquiry about the deceased and she
told her that the deceased was under depression and has gone to make
a call at the PCO and she should take her home. The appellant's mother
told her that she would herself return home.
19. In her cross examination she does state as follows:
Her husband and father-in-law are running their own industry.
More importantly, she says it is correct that the status of the accused
was lower than that of her in-laws. They had represented that they had
applied for industrial connection and would start their own industry. She
admits that the deceased continued with her studies and was preparing
for M.A. Examination at the time of her death so as to become
self-reliant. She denies the suggestion made to the effect that it is on
account of his financial status that the appellant used to shun the
company of her husband. She also states that her uncle, an Advocate
was informed about the harassment but he never lodged any complaint
or FIR with a view to ensure settlement of the deceased in her
matrimonial home. She states that on 16.2.2001, the deceased spent
about 5 - 7 minutes with her. She denies the allegation that she also
taunted the deceased that the birth of her daughter has further increased
the liability and therefore, the deceased committed suicide.
20. No doubt we notice that PW5 is examined to show that he
was at the PCO from where the deceased made a call on 16.2.2001 that
he just saw but did not hear her talk. She was weeping, the witness
deposed. Though there is a definite role for the nephew namely, Av tar
Singh, which is referred to in the deposition of both PW1 and PW3, the
prosecution has given up the said witness as being won over by the
accused.
21. Having adverted to the evidence which is the basis for
imputing the charge against the appellant, we may now examine what is
the defence evidence. DW5 is the father-in-law of the appellant's brother
(Sarabjit Singh). Be it noted that Sarabjit Singh was also an accused in
the trial. He says that after 6 years of marriage, his daughter and
son-in-law separated from the parents. He states that his daughter
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always remained happy in the house of her husband. He states that
PW3 is married into an affluent family. PW3 used to tell that she has
been married in a poor family. The deceased had told her that she
would get higher education and bring herself to the level of PW3. Upon
a daughter being born, again PW3 reminded her of the fact that she is
married in a poor family and asked her to get rid of the appellant. This
is how the deceased started remaining under depression. He says that
the accused never demanded dowry from the deceased-wife of the
appellant. In cross examination he would say that he used to visit the
house of the appellant after about a fortnight.
22. DW6 is a neighbour. His house is just opposite the house of
the Iqbal-appellant's father. He has stated that family of the accused is
a nice family. He never heard or saw the accused harassing the
deceased with the demand of dowry. He denies the allegation that
being neighbour he tried to depose in favour of the accused.