# JAi CHARAN LAL v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS

- **Citation:** [1967] 3 S.C.R. 981
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1967-05-05
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/jai-charan-lal-v-state-of-u-p-ors-4082
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

B
D
E
F
G
H
JAi CHARAN LAL
v.
STATE OF U.P. & ORS.
May 5, 1967
[M. HIDAYATULLAH AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAl\I Jn
U.P. Municipalities Act (2 of 1916), s. 81-A-(3)
and
(5)-"'Nor
earlier than 30 days", meaning of-"'Send by registered post not· less
than 7 clear aays" Scope. of-"Adjourn'", meaning of.
Under '· 87A(3) of the Uttar Pradesh
Municipalities
Act.
J9i6.
when a notice of intention to make a motion of non-confidence in the
President of a Municipality is <lelivereil by tho requisite
number
of
members of the Municipal Board, to the District Magistrate, the District
Magistrate shall convene a meeting on a date not earlier tlzan thirty, and
not later than thirty-five ·days from the date on which the notice was
delivered to him.
He shall send by registered post, not Jess than seven
clear days nefore the date of the meeting,
notice•
of the
date and
time of the meeting to all members.
Under s. 87A(4) he shall arrange
with the District Judge for a judicial officer to preside at the meeting.
If the presiding judicial officer doc!i not attend the meeting, it stands
automaticall} adjourned to a date and time to be appointed by
h:m
later. and, i.nder s. 87A(5), if the judicial officer is
unable to preside
at the meeting, he may, after ·recording his reasons, adjourn the meeting
to such other date and time as he may appoint.
In the present case, the notice by the members \\'US delivered to the
District Magistrate on October. 26, 1966.
He issued registered notices
on November 17, 1966, fixing November 25, 1966 as the date of the
me-zting.
The District Judge had nominated the Additional Civil Judge
to preside at the meeting, but the latter made an order on November
22, 1966 intimating that he would be unable to preside on the 25th and
adjourning the meeting to December 5, 1966.
The appellant, who wa'
the President of the Municipal Board and against whom the notice of
non-confidence was directed, filed a writ petition in the High Court for
stay of the meeting but before it was heard the resolution of non-confidence was passed unanimously by the members on December 5, 1966.
The appellant prayed that the High Court may quash the resolution,
but the High Court declined to exercise its discretionary powers as the
resolution had already been pa·;sed by the necessary majority.
Jn appeal to this Court it was contended that,
(!) there was a breach of s.
87-A(3), because, (a) :
excluding
November 18, 1966, the presumable date of receipt of the registered
notice issued by the District Magistrate, and November 25, 1966, the
date of the meeting, seven clear days did not intervene as required by
the section, and (b) : the expression "not earlier than thirty days" means
"not less than thirty days and on that basis, excluding both the terminal
days, namely October 26, 1966 and November 25, 1966 thirty clear
days, as required by the section, did not intervene; and (2) there was also
a breach of s. 87-A(S), becall<e, the presiding judicial officer was
not
empowered to adjourn the meeting in advance but could only do so on
the date of the meeting if he was unable to preside.
SUPRBM!i COURT REPORTS
[1%7] 3 S.C.R.
HELD: ( 11 There was no hreach or s. 87-A(3)
(a) Since the expression in the section is
"~hall send lhc
notice"
the critical <late is the date of dc:-.pittch of the notice nnd not the date
of its receipt.
As the notice \Va'i sent on the 17th and the n1ceting wa'
called on the :!5th. excluding the l\.i./o dates,
seven
clear
days
did
intervene.
!9X5A-BJ
(b) Tht: cxprcs'iions ,;not earlier than 30 Jays"'
~ind ··not Jc"ls than
30 days" c.111not he euuatc<l.
Just as '"not later than thirty-five
days''
would not exclude the 35th day. "not earlier than 30 days" would not
exclude the Jllth day.
"Not earlier than 30 days" means that it should
not he 29th day. hut there is nothing to show that the language excludes
the 30th <lay fron1 computation.
If the provision were "not earlier than
thiriy days and not later than thirty days" it is obvious that only
the
.10th

## Text

B
D
E
F
G
H
JAi CHARAN LAL
v.
STATE OF U.P. & ORS.
May 5, 1967
[M. HIDAYATULLAH AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAl\I Jn
U.P. Municipalities Act (2 of 1916), s. 81-A-(3)
and
(5)-"'Nor
earlier than 30 days", meaning of-"'Send by registered post not· less
than 7 clear aays" Scope. of-"Adjourn'", meaning of.
Under '· 87A(3) of the Uttar Pradesh
Municipalities
Act.
J9i6.
when a notice of intention to make a motion of non-confidence in the
President of a Municipality is <lelivereil by tho requisite
number
of
members of the Municipal Board, to the District Magistrate, the District
Magistrate shall convene a meeting on a date not earlier tlzan thirty, and
not later than thirty-five ·days from the date on which the notice was
delivered to him.
He shall send by registered post, not Jess than seven
clear days nefore the date of the meeting,
notice•
of the
date and
time of the meeting to all members.
Under s. 87A(4) he shall arrange
with the District Judge for a judicial officer to preside at the meeting.
If the presiding judicial officer doc!i not attend the meeting, it stands
automaticall} adjourned to a date and time to be appointed by
h:m
later. and, i.nder s. 87A(5), if the judicial officer is
unable to preside
at the meeting, he may, after ·recording his reasons, adjourn the meeting
to such other date and time as he may appoint.
In the present case, the notice by the members \\'US delivered to the
District Magistrate on October. 26, 1966.
He issued registered notices
on November 17, 1966, fixing November 25, 1966 as the date of the
me-zting.
The District Judge had nominated the Additional Civil Judge
to preside at the meeting, but the latter made an order on November
22, 1966 intimating that he would be unable to preside on the 25th and
adjourning the meeting to December 5, 1966.
The appellant, who wa'
the President of the Municipal Board and against whom the notice of
non-confidence was directed, filed a writ petition in the High Court for
stay of the meeting but before it was heard the resolution of non-confidence was passed unanimously by the members on December 5, 1966.
The appellant prayed that the High Court may quash the resolution,
but the High Court declined to exercise its discretionary powers as the
resolution had already been pa·;sed by the necessary majority.
Jn appeal to this Court it was contended that,
(!) there was a breach of s.
87-A(3), because, (a) :
excluding
November 18, 1966, the presumable date of receipt of the registered
notice issued by the District Magistrate, and November 25, 1966, the
date of the meeting, seven clear days did not intervene as required by
the section, and (b) : the expression "not earlier than thirty days" means
"not less than thirty days and on that basis, excluding both the terminal
days, namely October 26, 1966 and November 25, 1966 thirty clear
days, as required by the section, did not intervene; and (2) there was also
a breach of s. 87-A(S), becall<e, the presiding judicial officer was
not
empowered to adjourn the meeting in advance but could only do so on
the date of the meeting if he was unable to preside.
SUPRBM!i COURT REPORTS
[1%7] 3 S.C.R.
HELD: ( 11 There was no hreach or s. 87-A(3)
(a) Since the expression in the section is
"~hall send lhc
notice"
the critical <late is the date of dc:-.pittch of the notice nnd not the date
of its receipt.
As the notice \Va'i sent on the 17th and the n1ceting wa'
called on the :!5th. excluding the l\.i./o dates,
seven
clear
days
did
intervene.
!9X5A-BJ
(b) Tht: cxprcs'iions ,;not earlier than 30 Jays"'
~ind ··not Jc"ls than
30 days" c.111not he euuatc<l.
Just as '"not later than thirty-five
days''
would not exclude the 35th day. "not earlier than 30 days" would not
exclude the Jllth day.
"Not earlier than 30 days" means that it should
not he 29th day. hut there is nothing to show that the language excludes
the 30th <lay fron1 computation.
If the provision were "not earlier than
thiriy days and not later than thirty days" it is obvious that only
the
.10th day could he meant.
Therefore, in the present
case,
although
October ~~ h"d lo he excluded. Novcniher 25. the date on which the
111l'cting Y•<ts to he called. ncc<l not he excluded and the date of the
meeting cannot r., described "' earlier than 30 day•. 1985F-H; 986A-C]
If. H. Raia !1ari11d,,,. St'11g/i v . .\'. Kamat'/ St'11glt & Or.1'., A.J:R, 1957
S.C. 271. followed.
S111t. Hanulcl'i v. StC1te of Andhra anti Anr. A.l.R. 1957 A.P.
229.
A
B
c
o\·crrulcd.
Dl
( 2) There wa' no hrc;1ch of s. 87-A ( 5).
'The judicial olliccr's power to adjourn the meeting to a later date
could be excrci'icJ hy hin1 not only ;:it the meeting hut aho hefore, if he
is in a position to ~ay that he would not he able I<> pre.·ddc.
The word
"adjourn" n1c;111r,; postpone, anJ the con!-.cqucncc of automatic .adjourn·
n1cnt under -.uh-'i. I 4) show'i th:it 1hc presiding officer could take action
in a<lvancc ~{t)ll no ... tponc the meeting IO a subscquen1 date.
r987A-D]
Krishna C'/1u11tlra Gupta v. l'rllyt1g .'Vllnlin & Ors., ( 1961) All. LJ.
22..6. overruled.
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRtsmcnoN:
Civil Appeal No. 199 of
11967.
E
Appeal by special leave from the jud~ment and order dated
f'
December 6. 1966 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.
Writ No. 4287 of 1966.
A. K. Se11, L. N. Math11r, 8. D11tta and 0. C. Math11r, for the
appeJlant.
C. B. A~an•'"'" and 0. P. Rana, for respondent Nos. 1-3.
(,.
S. P. Si11ha and M. I. Khawaja, for respondents Nos. 5-13.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hidayalullah, .I.
This is Hn apneal by special leave aaainst the
judgment and order of the High Court of AJlahabad. December
6. 1966, in Civil MisceJlaneous Writ Petition No. 4287 of 1966.
IL
The appellant, Jai Charan !.:al Anal was elected as a member
of the Municipal Board, 'Sikandrao in December, 1964.
He w.;s
·~
J
A
n
c
D
E
F
G
H
JAi CHARAN LAL v. U.P. (Hitlayatullah, J.)
9M~'
J;1ter elected as the President of the Board.
On October 26, 1966
a notice of intention to move a motion of non-confidence in thto
appellant was presented by certain members of the Board to the
District Magistrate, Aligarh.
The District Magistrate issued
notices to the members on November 17, 1966 fixing November
25, 1966 as the date for the meeting of the Board to consider
the non-confidence motion.
Thi> was done under s. 87-A of the
IJttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1916. On November 22, 1966.
the petitioner filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution
in the High Court of Allahabad asking that the meeting be stopped.
The case was listed before the High Court on Decemb<'r
I, I 966.
Before this date the meeting of the Board was aJiour11ed to December 5, 1966, under circumstances
to
which·
J~.tailed reference
will be made presently.
The High Court
directed that the petition should be listed fm• December 6, l 96<i.
By that date the ad.journed meeting was held on December 5.
I 966. and the non-confidence motion was passed unan.mously
I 0 out of 15 members who were present voted in its favour and
none against it.
The appellant thereupon asked the High Coun
to qua<;h the resolution of the Board.
The High Court by th~·
order unde1 appeal declined to do so on the ground that even
if there were some irregularities in calling the meeting, the reso·
Jution, having been passed by the necessary J)la.iority, the case
was not fit for the exercise of its discretionary powers.
In this appeal the question has been raised that the meetin)!
it-elf was contrary to the provisions of s. 87-A of the U.P. Municipalities Act and the resolution therefore being ultl'<I 1·ire.v and
illegal was void.
This argument is based upon the procedure
which is laid down in s. 87-A of the Act.
We may now refer
to those provisions.
Section 87-A deals with motion of non.
confidence against the President.
It begins by stating that subicct to the provisions of the section such a motion shall only be
mad~ in accordance with the procedure, laid down in the section.
Suh-section ( 2) requires that a written notice of intention to make
a motion of non-confidence on the Pre>ident must be signed bv
'uch number of members of the Board as constitute not less than
one-half of the total strength of the Board and must he accompimied bv a copy of the motion which it is proposed to make
and should be delivered in person by any two of the member.,
'igning the not'ce to the District Magistrate. Tli's was
done.
Sub-sections (3), (4), (5) and (6) then provide as follows:-
"(3) The District Magistrate shall then convene a
meeting for the consideration of the motion to be held
at the office of the Board. on the date and at the time
appointed by him which shall not be earlier than thirty
and not later than thirty-five days from the date on
which the notice under sub-section (2) was delh·ered
,
'984
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967j 3 S.C.R.
to him.
He shall send by registered post not less than
seven clear days before the date of the meeting a notice
of such meeting and of the date and time appointed
therefore, to every member of the board at his place
of residence and shall at the time cause such notice to
be published in such manner as he may deem fit. Thereupon every member shall be deemed to have received
the notice.
( 4) The District Magistrate shall arrange with the
Di\trict Judge for a stipendiary civil judicial officer to
preside at the meeting convened under this section, and
no other person shall preside, thereat. If within half
an hour from the time appointed for the meeting, the
judicial officer is not present to preside at the meeting,
the meeting sh:!ll stand adjourned to the date and the
time to be appointed and notified to the members by
that officer under sub-section ( 5).
( 5) If the judicial officer is unable to preside at
the meeting, he may, after recording his reasons adjourn the meeting to such other date and time as he
may appoint, but not later than fifteen days from the
date appointed for the meeting under sub-section ( 3)
He shalJ without delay communicate in writing to the
Dhtrict Magistrate the adjournment of the meeting. It
shall not be necessary to send notice of the date and
the time of the adjourned meeting to the members
individually, but the District Magistrate shall give notice
of the date and the time of the adjourned meeting by
publication in the manner provided in sub-section (3)
( 6) Save as provided in sub-section ( 4) and ( 5)
a meeting convened for the purpose of considering a
motion under this section shall not for any reason be
ad.iourned".
The contentions of the appellant are based upon the provisions
of sub-ss. ( 3) and ( 5.) and it is contend.ed that there has been
a breach of these provisions and therefore the resolution is void.
Three arguments in this connection have been raised before
us and we shall mention them now.
The first contention is that
the notice which was sent out by the District Magistrate by
registered post did not allow seven clear days before the date
-0f the meeting as required by the latter part of sub-section (3)
Jn advancing this argument the learned counsel for the appellant
contends that the critical date is not the date on which the notice
is despatched but the date on which the notice is received. Since
the notice was despatched on the 17th and presumably reached
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
JAI CHAP.AN LAL v. U.P. (Hidayatullah, !.)
985
the next day the learned counsel excludes the date of receipt ot
the notice and the date of the meeting and says that seven· days
did not intervene.
In our judginent this is an erroneous reading
of the sub-section.
The sub-section says that the District Magistrate shall send the notice not less than seven clear days before
the date of the meeting and the word "send" shows that the
critical date is the date of the despatch of the notice.
As the
notice was sent on the· 17th and the meeting was to be called
on the 25th, it is obvious that seven clear days did intervene and
there was no breach of this part of the section.
The next contention is that the District Magistrate had to
convene the meeting for the consideration of the motion on a
date which was not earlier than thirty days from the date on
which the notice under sub-section (2) was delivered to him.
As the notice was delivered to the District Magistrate on October
26, the learned counsel contends that the date fixed for the meeting, namely, November 25 was earlier than thirty days because
according to hiln the 30th day should be excluded in addition
to the date on which the notice was handed. In other words,
the learned coupsel wishes to exclude both the terminal days,
i.e.. October .26 and November 25 and wants to count thirty
clear days in lietween. . He contends that the expression
"not
earlier than thirty days" is equal to the expression "not less than
thirty days" and, therefore, thirty clear days must intervene between the two terminal days.
In support of his contention the
learned counsel relies ,upon a ruling reported in Sm. Haradevi v.
State of A1ulhra and Another(') in which the expression "not
earlier than three days" was equated to the expression "not less
than three days" that is to say, three clear days.
He also relies
upon certain other rulings which deal with the expression "not
less than so many days".
In our judginent the expression "not
earlier than thirty days" is not to be equated to the expression
"not less than thirty days". It is no doubt true that where the
expression is "not less than so many days" both the terminal days
have toi be excluded and the number of days mentioned must be
clear days but the force of the words "not earlier than thirty days"
is . not the same.
"Not earlier than thirty days" means that it
should not be the 29th day, but there is nothing to show that
the language excludes the 30th day from computation.
fn other
words, although October 26 had to be excluded the date on
which the meeting was to be called need not be excluded provided
by doing so one did not go in breach of the expression "not earlier than thirty days.". The 25th of November was the 30th day
counting from October 26 leaving out the initial day and therefore
!t cannot be des7ribed as e~rlier than thirty days.
In other words,
11 was not earlier than thirty days from the date on which the
rll A.LR. 1957 A.P. 229
986
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 3 S.C.R
notice under sub-section (2) was delivered to the District Magistrate. This reading is also borne out by the o.ther expression
·'not later than thirty-five days" which is <1sed in the section. In
this Court(') the expression "not later than 14 days" as used in
rule 119 under Representation of the 'People Act was held to
mean the same thing as "within a period of fourteen days".
In
that expression the number of days, it was held, should not exceed
the number fourteen.
In the sub-section we are dealing with the
number of days that should not exceed thirty-five days.
On a
parity of reasoning not earlier than thirty days would include the
30th day but not the 29th day because 29th day must be regarded
as earlier than thirty days. If the provision were "not earlier
than thirty days and not later than thirty days" it is obvious that
.only the 30th day could be meant.
This proves that the fixing of
the date of the meeting was therefore in accordance with law.
We respectfully disapprove of the view taken in the Andhra
Pradesh case.
The third point arises
under
the following circumstances.
The District Magistrate had arranged with the District Judge for
.a stipendiary judicial officer to preside over the meeting to be
convened on November 25.
The District Judge had nominated
.one Mr. R. R. Agarwal, Additional Civil Judge, Aligarh for this
purpose.
Mr. R. R. Agarwal made an order on November 22,
1966 intimating that he was unable to pre~ide over the meeting
·on November 25 and that the meeting would be adjourned to
December 5.
The District Magistrate sent out notices on the
same day intimating the members of the change of date.
It is
-contended that this action of the Addi. Civil Judge, Aligarh violated the provisions of the fifth sub-section. The reason advanced
is that the judicial officer is not empowered to adjourn the meeting
in advance but he can only do so if he is unable to preside at the
meeting, that is to say, on the day on which the meeting is to
be held.
In support of this contention a ruling of the Allahabad
High Court reported in Krishna
Chandra
Guvta
v.
Pra)'a~
Narain and others(') is cited where at page 229 a Divisional
Bench said that the authority under sub-s. (5) to adjourn the
meeting is exercisable only on the date on which the meeting is
convened and if that occasion does not arise the ad.iournment is
improper.
Here again we find it difficult to accept the view expressed in the Allahabad High Court.
Sub-section ( 4) provides
that if the presiding judicial officer does not attend the meeting.
the meeting stands automatically adjourned after half an hour to
a date and time to be appointed later and notified to the mem
'be rs 'b~ that officer under sub-section ( 5). It seems
pointless
(I) H. H. R'4a Hiriwl'r Singh v. S. Karil.'lil Singh (I/Id other.~
A.l.R. 1957 S.C. 271.
(l\ 1%1 All. 1....1. 226.
A
B
c
D
' \
E
F
G
H
'A
II
.n
JAI CHARAN LAL v; U,P. (Hidayatul/ah, J.)
987
therefore to think that if the judicial officer knows in advance
that he would not be able to attend the meeting that he had not
the power to adjourn the meeting in advance.
No visible profit
results from such a construction. In fact, tile words of sub-s.
(5) are that if the judicial officer is unable to preside at the
meeting he may, after recording his reasons, ad.iourn the meeting
to such other date and time as he may appoint.
This can happen
not only at the meeting but also before the date of meeting if
the judicial officer is in a position to say that he would be unabl~
to preside at the meeting. If this were not so some unforeseen
event which requires the presiding officer to be absent would
frustrate the
entire non-confidence motion becau>e the judicial
otlicer would be unable to adjourn it in advance.
That the
consequences under sub-section ( 4) would automatically flow
also show that it should be possible for the presiding officer to
adjourn a meeting which under the law would in any event be
adjourned under sub-s. ( 4).
Jn our opinion it is not necessary
that the judicial officer should be present at the meeting
and
then adjourn it for purposes of sub-s. (5). He can take action
in advance.
This will be convenient all round because it will
save members from attendance on that day.
This was done in
this case and in our opinion the action was correct.
We do n0!
read the word "ad.iourn" as being in any way different from the
word "postpone" which
is
some
times
used.
The won!
"adjourn" means that the officer can postpone the meeting to a
subsequent date.
The High Court did not exercise its powers under Art. 226
of the Constitution and we must not be intended to have meant
that wher.~ the High Court has refused to exerc'se its discretion
this Court would always interfere.
This case was admitted
in
this Court merely to clear a dispute about the law which seems
to have evoked different interpretations in the High Courts.
On .a. consideratio~ of the whole matter we are of opinion that
the pet1t10n w~s dev01d of. merit and although it was dismiss~d
~ecause the High Court did not choose to exercise
its discrcuonary powers tl~e result would have been the same if the High
Court had gone mto the matter elaborately and correctly
The
appeal must therefore be dismissed.
We order accordingly.
fee. The appeal shall stand dismissed with costs.
One hearing.
V.P.S.
A ppea/ dismissed.